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EUROPEANS AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

The results of a survey study conducted
in February-March 1970 in the six countries
of the European Community

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EUROPEANS AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

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AMONG YOUNGER GENERATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

This report presents and analyses the overall findings of the most important public opinion survey ever conducted among the six countries of the European Economic Community on attitudes - and the formation of these attitudes - toward european unification considered in all its manifold aspects.

It has its origin in the suggestion of a group of specialists in the problems of youth, who met in Brussels in June 1967, at the initiative of the Commission on European Communities.

More precisely, its objective was to go far beyond what most opinion surveys will permit, i.e. neither to restrict it to taking country by country snapshots of the attitudes of young people toward european unification, nor simply to study briefly how these attitudes are distributed according to sex, age, socio-economic or socio-cultural settings, and so forth. For the first time, it involved questions of studying what is the precise meaning of the words "Europe" or "europeans" for the younger generations ; what content young people attribute to the notions of union, unification, integration, and so forth ; what motivations underlie the attitudes expressed ; what are the centers of interest of those persons who receive, directly or indirectly, informational or educational messages with "european" content ; and, what is the influence of various communication channels.

A first stage, namely the exploratory phase, was planned. It included a small number of in-depth interviews made up of three groups of youngsters, aged respectively 11 to 12, 15 to 16 and 19 to 20 years old. These interviews were conducted during the first half of 1968 by professional psychologists who used non-directive techniques in order to obtain the maximum in recollections and free associations of ideas, spontaneously expressed by the respondents about words such as "Europe", "European unification", "Common Market", etc... In all, 216 young people in the Community countries, excluding Luxembourg, were interviewed by use of similar methods, yet with the widest possible freedom given to the

institutes responsible for the field research.(x)

The second phase, conducted in March-April, 1969, aimed at the construction of questions or sets of questions which would make it possible to measure adequately, in qualitative or propositional ways, the attitudes uncovered during the exploratory phase. In all, 486 interviews with young people aged 15 to 16 and 19 to 20 years old, each age group representing half of the samples, were conducted in five countries of the Community. Since it was a pretest survey, the sample was not representative, but it was made as heterogeneous as possible; it also included, nevertheless, as many boys as girls (xx). The analysis of the collected data, carried out by the International Research Associates (Belgium) under the direction of Robert GIJS, allowed us to identify clusters of questions, each cluster measuring a basic dimension of manifest opinions or of underlying attitudes related

(x) These polling institutes were selected among the two main international groups :

- the International Research Associates (INRA) group
 - COFREMCA (France)
 - Institute for Demoscopy (Germany)
 - INRA - Brussels (Belgium)
- the International Gallup group
 - DOXA (Italy)
 - IFOP (France)
 - NIPO (Netherlands)

Each institute conducted 36 interviews, for which the tape recordings and the written transcriptions are available. In addition, under the supervision of Lucien Mironer and Jacqueline Bissery, the French Public Opinion Institute (IFOP) carried out an interesting experiment with graphic displays of Europe. For this research, see "Les jeunes et l'Europe" (IFOP, mai 1968), as well as two articles by J. Bissery : "Comment l'idée de l'Europe vient aux plus jeunes" and "Comment les jeunes français voient l'Europe politique", in "Communauté européenne" n° 131, June 1969 and n° 134, September 1969.

(xx) The following institutes took part in this stage of the survey :

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----|------------|
| Institute for Demoscopy (Germany) | 102 | interviews |
| INRA (Belgium) | 75 | " |
| IFOP (France) | 100 | " |
| NIPO (Netherlands) | 70 | " |
| DOXA (Italy) | 139 | " |

to european unification (x).

Finally, the third phase, conducted in February-March 1970, involved a survey based on representative samples of the entire populations of each of the six countries of the European Community (xx). The decision to extend this third

- (x) It consisted of a multivariate analysis of relationships between the responses to each pair of items, i.e. to each element of information included in each question. The analysis, carried out by a mathematical method described in a technical report on INRA, makes it possible to construct hierarchically ordered scales, each one representing a cluster of items which not only showed meaningful correlations among them, but also where the most "difficult" item, i.e. the one obtaining the smallest percentage of positive responses, allows one to predict the responses to "easier" items included in the rest of the scale. For example, we were able to construct a scale which measures the attitudes of respondents who, simultaneously are willing to accept temporary personal inconveniences to have Europe come to pass, who would tolerate the entry of foreigners into their country, who favor replacing their national currency with a european currency, who consider themselves as politically involved or keep informed about politics, who feel in agreement with student demonstrations, and who do not agree with those who claim that everything is all right with the world and nothing ought to be changed nor with those who believe european unification is impossible because of language differences.

The specialists may refer to the INRA technical report : "L'unification européenne", second quantitative stage. Ref. C.01.132.

A working document on the preliminary findings of this stage of the survey was published in February, 1970, by the Press and Information general office of the Commission of the European Communities under the title : "La jeunesse et l'unification de l'Europe" (Doc. 17.261/X/69-F. Rev).

- (xx) The samples were distributed among the countries as follows :

| | |
|--|-------------|
| - Germany (Institut für Demoskopie) | 2021 people |
| - Belgium (International Research Associates) | 1298 " |
| - France (Institut français d'opinion publique) | 2046 " |
| - Italy (Istituto per la Ricerche Statistiche e l'Analisi dell'Opinione Pubblica) | 1822 " |
| - Luxembourg (International Research Associates) | 335 " |
| - Netherlands (Nederland Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie) | 1230 " |

Total : 8752 people

The technical methods of the field research and data analysis are presented in the report of the International Research Associates which gives the overall findings : "Les déterminants d'une attitude favorable à l'unification politique de l'Europe", as well as in the annex "L'unification européenne", Ref. C.01.197.

To date, only the country findings have been published, before any secondary analysis, in a note issued by the general office of the Press and the Information of the Commission of the European Communities (doc. 12.241/X/70-F, dated July 20, 1970) and in an article published by the British Journal Government and Opposition. Vol. 6, Nr 4, Fall 1971, under the title " European and the unification of Europe".

phase to the entire population, instead of limiting it to youngsters as initially planned, was taken in view of the findings of the first two phases, starting with the following considerations :

- 1° The first two phases provided sufficiently rich and detailed information that certain conclusions could be drawn about the youth population, especially in that the differences between young people and adults regarding the same object, are not as important and sharp as expected.
- 2° In any event, verification of this absence of substantial differences required that the same questions be asked of youngsters and of adults.
- 3° The choice of samples representing the total population from the age of 16 and males it possible to treat "age" as a continuous variable and to observe variations in opinion and attitudes as a function of this variable.

. . .

Each of the three phases yielded a harvest of information. Some hypotheses formulated in the first and second stages were verified in the third, and some were not. Others still remain to be examined in future research.

In this present report, we have tried to present the essential findings of this long research without delving too much into technical details or insisting too much on the hypotheses which were rejected in the process. Our objective was, and still is, to improve our knowledge of attitudes and attitude formation of the European public toward European unification in order to upgrade public information policy.

The entire data set as well as all the reports of the institutes contracted are available to research scholars who wish to consult them.

Jacques-René RABIER

First Part

DIRECTION AND FORMATION OF PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES AMONG YOUNGER GENERATIONS

I

THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

"Far from forming first or even early data, the feeling and even the concept of one's own nation appears relatively late in a normal child without its seeming to bring about, necessarily, a sense of patriotic ethnocentrism. On the contrary, to acquire an intellectual and affective awareness of his own country, a child has to undertake an entire process of "de-centrising" (with respect to his city, his canton, etc...) and of coordination (with perspectives other than his own) - a process which makes him come to understand other countries and points of view different from his own".

Jean PIAGET and A.M. WEIL "Le développement chez l'enfant de l'idée de Patrie et des relations avec l'étranger". International Bulletin of Social Sciences, UNESCO - Autumn 1951, Vol III, n° 3.

It's especially with these comments of Jean Piaget in mind that the first phase of the survey included in-depth interviews with young people - boys and girls - aged 11 to 12 years, along side interviews with youngsters 15 to 16 years old and with young adults, aged 19 to 20.

This was at once a study of general predispositions, which ought to uncover the fundamental dimensions of attitudes toward Europe for the purpose of quantification in the later phases, as well as of genetic psychology, which should allow one to predict to what extent the young generations might respond to or in the uniting of Europe, while keeping in mind their life cycle, on the one hand, and the historical conditioning of their own generation, on the other.

The main conclusions, drawn from the mass of information collected in the course of the 216 in-depth interviews of young people in the three categories samples (11-12, 15 to 16 and 19 to 20 years old), can be summarized as follows :

1. No great resistance, but little motivation toward a Europe perceived as a Community of manifest destiny.

a) Among young people between 11 and 12 years of age and even 15 and 16 years old, the concept of Europe is vague. It is characterized by differences between people and nations rather than by common characteristics. These differences are principally defined by geographical properties, but the distances are expressed in psychological terms rather than in geometrical terms, especially in the youngest age group : one country is seen more distant from another, even if it is more proximate on the map.

Although Europe is viewed as a group of countries very different one from the other, these countries are perceived as having peace, tranquility and material welfare in common. The fear of war remains alive in the youngest age group.

Evident signs of an awareness of a common european destiny or even of a feeling of european solidarity are not to be found among these youngsters. On the other hand, feelings of solidarity at a planetary level, at the level of all mankind, seem to exist in a latent, more or less embryonic form.

b) A sort of european feeling along with a still vague awareness of the common destiny of the peoples of Europe does show up among youngsters of 19 to 20 years of age. This awareness is expressed by a sensitivity to the common history of european countries. In this age group, Europe is spoken of as one entity, even at the outset of the interview when the respondent did not yet know that the interview concerned european unification.

Among the young people with higher intellectual skills, Europe is viewed as being at the origin of all advanced civilizations for which she has some kind of responsibility. There is also a sort of regret about the lessening of Europe's importance in the world.

In short, there is no great resistance among young people to the idea of european unification ; on the contrary, one notices a latent pro-european motivation in search of a goal. Thus the question is : to what extent can present european achievements and efforts undertaken for its unification become the goal of this latent motivation ?

2. Pro-european feelings in search of a goal.

The differences observed in the concepts and views of Europe among the three age groups studied are partly explained by the difficulty of the formation of pro-european feelings in the minds of young people.

This difficulty has its origins in the real differences between children of 11 to 12 years of age and the preceding generations. The children who were 11-12 years old at the time of the first stage of the study in 1968 differ from the preceding generations by traits which will probably remain as characteristics of their generation. For us, one of these characteristics seems to be the influence of new means of social communication, especially television, which is contributing to the birth of a new culture and of a new kind of civilization.

Much has been said and much remains to be said about the influence of television on our societies. But, in limiting ourselves to the purpose of this study and to the collected materials, how can one not be struck by the difference between the generation of young people who were born between the end of World War II and 1955, on the one hand, and young people born after 1955, on the other ? The first most assuredly belongs to a generation of inventors and users of new and powerful means of communication, but their frame of reference still goes back to pre-war generations. In contradistinction, the generation born after 1955 became aware of the world in an era which was experiencing the massive penetration of television.

This study allowed us to ascertain that for children who were 11 to 12 years old, time and space were experienced in a much more immediate, compressed and direct way than during the preceding generations. In addition, the mass of information absorbed has increased tremendously.

These new characteristics of perception give rise to a stronger emotional, almost physical participation in the subject matter. In the immediacy of their effects, the child sees and almost touches violence, conflicts and major world problems. Nevertheless, the volume of messages transmitted forces the subject to filter this information.

The information which penetrates this filter and affects youngsters directly is that which makes an immediate or pressing appeal to their sensitivities. However, information about Europe transmitted by television has difficulty getting through this filter. On the one hand, because of its technical character, it is not within the reach of the child. On the other hand, it lacks the emotional content which characterizes information about other subjects of national and, particularly, international politics.

In comparing the development of attitudes and opinions to computer processing of data, one could state that data are stored at the age of 11 to

12, whereas around 15 to 16 years old, the search for a data processing program is underway. Television does not offer this (data processing) program, and messages sent by other agents (family, school, press, books, etc...), which ought to help the child to interpret, sort out and understand the information perceived via television, are insufficient or inadequate, or, moreover, cannot become attached to emotional quickstones without which this information is more or less removed from the life and interests of the child.

Another finding is the evidence of a feeling of uneasiness that 15 to 16 years old youngsters have in the face of the growing demands of technological culture on the individual. They feel that their personal freedom is oppressed or threatened by the specialization of activities, the subdivision of groups, and alienation of the masses. In this age group, the concept of Europe has little attractiveness because of its technical character, its lack of emotional appeal, its absence of ideals or even its lack of simple and clearly stated goals.

The 19 to 20 years old youth are more sensitive to reality and even to details. They have entered a phase of fulfillment and feel a deep urge for action. To take the image of the computer once again, one could say that youngsters of this age have acquired a data processing program. The concept of a united Europe seems more attractive to them. It's a choice within reach of concrete fulfillment. In addition, the notion of a united Europe is capable of appealing to feelings in the way of an overarching program, of an exiting adventure, but provided that these youngsters already have the necessary intellectual training. Yet there is no doubt that many of the young people aged 19 to 20 and even adults are still below this level of maturity ; their mentality comes closer to that of 11 to 12 year old children.

This second series of findings show that it is high time the minds of youngsters born after 1955 were mobilized in favor of the uniting of Europe. In fact, the differences observed in the conditions of the formation of fundamental attitudes and opinions between this generation and previous generations might result in a weakening of pro-european feelings to the benefit of other, yet unknown, choices.

In order that policy for european unification arouse an interest among young people and bring about their conscious participation, the motives, efforts and achievements of the authors of this policy should be communicated to these young people (and to the adults who have not gone beyond this mental level) in its simplest form and in ways that appeal more to their affective predispositions. Indeed, there is no doubt that the visible signs of developing european unification presently are much too technical, and the associated concepts, too intellectual. To be understood, these ideas call for an intellectual level and a sensitivity very rarely found among the public in general, including young people. They do not appeal to primary emotions and motivations such as the drive for power, the need for security, the feeling of being able to participate in great historical achievements, and so forth.

3. The general views of a united Europe held by youngsters do not differ from those of the greater mass of adults.

The general views of Europe we have been able to observe were generally latent ; the views expressed by the subject in the course of the interview did not place his emotivity at stake.

This variety of views is also found among adults of the countries within the European Community. A united Europe is considered by some as a step toward the union of people all over the world, or also as the development of a new economic and military power, or still yet as a kind of promised land where prosperity and peace will prevail. Among the youngest children the principal attraction of european unification is based on peace and tranquility ; these motivations obviously correspond to a fundamental need for security.

There is also a certain resistance to european unification among these youngsters. This resistance stems from a fear of dilution or disappearance of their cultures and also from the fear that unification would allow the largest european countries to pursue policies of domination over the others. This last fear is expressed mainly by young Dutch and Belgians, but also by young French, Germans and Italians.

a) In the youngest age group, Europe is geographically defined : all european countries, including Turkey, are seen as part of Europe. This broad view - "the more, the better" - reveals the absence of deep feelings of unity.

b) For 15 to 16 year old youngsters, the principal attraction of european unification lies with the solution of world wide problems it would make possible, problems they have just become aware of : the meeting of minds between people, the disappearance of barriers which separate men and nations, union on a world wide scale. The view of Europe as a step toward world unification is rather frequent in this age group.

c) Among young people aged 19 to 20, we find most of the views already observed in the youngest age groups. Nevertheless, the accent shifts toward a more concrete and more practical outlook. Europe thus appears as an accomplishment in which one ought to collaborate. It is an action-oriented outlook. It is in this age group we find most often the idea of Europe conceived as a new, great world power, the development of which would allow this part of the world to catch up with the other great powers, especially with the United States. It is possible to detect a latent hope that one day Europe would be capable of influencing the world with as much authority as in the past, but this time in order to contribute to the solution of the

great world problems of our time.

We also notice among these 19 to 20 years old young people that a united Europe is most frequently limited to the six countries of the Common Market and, at the most, to countries of Western Europe.

The material gathered during the first phase of research allowed the formulation of a certain number of hypotheses which might be shown as necessary, and perhaps sufficient, conditions for the explanation of the development and organization of attitudes toward european unification :

a) The strength of attitudes toward european unification.

We have found among young people that the view of a united Europe about which an attitude is formed can take on different aspects, of which the main ones are as follows :

- A Europe of sovereign nations, built upon agreement between independent states ;
- A federal Europe, consisting of a division of powers between federal authority and national authorities in political, economic, etc. spheres ;
- A unitary Europe, conceived in terms of the model of a national unitary state, a view that is to be found sometimes (especially among the youngest) as a rather utopic form of integration, and at other times as the extreme degree of the above mentioned federal idea.

The analysis of these three views led to the formulation of the hypothesis that it was more a matter of differences in the degree, hence the strength, of attitudes than in distinctly different outlooks. This hypothesis, which was verified throughout the following phases of the study, permitted the use of a single index to measure pro-european attitudes, an index which was inferred from a cluster of questions and served as a measure of the dependent variable (1).

b) The independent variables.

Besides the dependent variable, which measured pro-european attitudes in and of themselves, a certain number of independent variables was hypothetically stated at the end of the first phase : each of these variables is expected to influence, directly or indirectly, pro-european attitudes.

(1) See pp. 25 to 30.

page 7 & 8 missing

The vast majority of young respondents think that the principal task of a government is to maintain order in the country. Among young people who express this opinion, close to three quarters believe it is important for their country to play an important role in world politics. At the bottom of the scale, the most discriminating question obtains the agreement of those who think that everything goes well anyway in the present state of affairs, and that there is no reason for a change.

| Items | N = 486 | % |
|---|---------|----|
| - Think that "the Government must, aboveall, maintain order in the country" | 450 | 93 |
| - Believes it to be important that his country "plays an important role in world politics" . . . | 330 | 68 |
| - Believes it important for his country to "have a strong army" | 256 | 53 |
| - Takes sides against "students who demonstrate" during the last year in this country and in numerous other countries | 195 | 39 |
| - Thinks : "everything is well with us and the way things are, so why change ?" | 165 | 34 |

High scores on the scale measuring conservative nationalism are found in the following subgroups :

- Young people aged 15 to 16 years,
- Young people with brothers and sisters,
- Farmers' or workingmen's children.

This cluster of attitudes is more related to intellectual background than to material wealth. In fact, the responses hardly vary as a function to the income of the household as reported by the respondent. To the contrary, we find a much less nationalist attitude among students than among youngsters of the same age.

Young people who show little or no interest in politics are more nationalist than those who express a stronger interest : this finding confirms the importance of the hypothetical variables related to level of information (5) and to the degree of involvement in politics and public affairs (16). In fact, persons who claim that they never or rarely watch newsbroadcasts on television as well as those who rarely or never read the news reports about politics in the

newspapers more frequently respond, and in a meaningful way, in the direction of conservative nationalism.

Young people who did not pursue their studies beyond the primary school level also obtain high scores (on this scale) as do those who plan to take a job as working men in the next 10 years.

Since level of education, exposure to mass media and level of knowledge are strongly related, it is not surprising that youngsters who have not yet heard of plans for european political unification, or who cannot name the member countries of the common Market, respond more frequently in the direction of conservative nationalism.

Trust in traditional authorities (parents, teachers, union leaders, religious authorities, cabinet members, legislators, business leaders) usually go along with nationalist feelings. At the same time, an inverse relationship with trust in leaders of students movements as well as in student demonstrators is observable.

Finally, subjects who believe that a good citizen loves his own country, is proud of it and defends it against foreigners, show a higher degree of nationalism than those who believe a good citizen is, above all, he who stands up against the government when something displeases him.

In summary, we have qualified as "conservative nationalism" those attitudes or clusters of attitudes which appear typical of the majority of young europeans. This is a majority who is slightly informed, disinterested in political life, suspicious of new ideas and probably, as well, of "intellectual elites", and who stick cautiously to traditional values and authorities. Perhaps it is what nowadays is called the "silent majority".

2. Satisfied Conservatism (Scale II)

This cluster is made up of 6 questions. It expresses the attitudes of those who are afraid of losing their material welfare and who, as a result, are opposed to running the risks of the venture in european unification. It is the opposite of favorable attitudes toward progress and protest.

At the bottom of this scale we find the notion that unification is impossible because of the diversity of languages, a notion found further on in cultural and ethnocentric resistance to european unification (Scale VIII). This finding is not surprising if one thinks of the importance of the mother-tongue in the development of a sense of national identity and, symbolically, in

the image one has of understanding among men.

| Items | N = 486 | % |
|--|---------|----|
| - Is not unhappy | 431 | 89 |
| - Has nothing, in principle, against "foreign workers", but thinks that "there are really too many of them in our country" | 264 | 54 |
| - Believes that "in a united Europe we will be forced to accept decisions taken abroad anyway" | 256 | 53 |
| - Finds it important to be able to afford a car (or a new car). | 246 | 51 |
| - Thinks that "everything is well with us and the way things are, so why change ?" | 163 | 34 |
| - Thinks that "european unification is impossible because of different languages" | 82 | 17 |

We find high scores on this scale among the same groups as in the previous scale. However, several differences show that it is, indeed, a distinct dimension.

For example, the difference between sexes is less pronounced. In addition, satisfied conservatism seems to vary according to stated religion, which is not the case for the previous scale : the persons who indicated membership in the protestant religion or who say they have no religion are more frequently satisfied conservatives, but this relationship has to be interpreted cautiously. It is interesting to notice, on the other hand, that contrary to the satisfied conservatives, those who might be considered as progressivists or protesters come most frequently from rich families.

Another difference with respect to conservative nationalism is that, although satisfied conservatism crops up as frequently among youngsters who intend to become workers, it also appears among young people who plan, later on, to take jobs as heads of businesses, upper level managers, engineers, shopkeepers or tradesmen. On the other hand, he who plans to become a high ranking civil servant or to pursue a professional occupation is more often inclined to protest.

Although satisfied conservatism seem to generate less resistance to european unification than does conservative nationalism, it certainly does not produce a favorable attitude. In fact, it goes along with a weak interest in european questions.

Also in contradistinction to satisfied conservatism it is not related to the degree of interest in politics : among youngsters involved or interested in politics, we find the same proportion of satisfied conservatives as in the entire sample.

The two variables we just analyzed represent two important aspects of the "conservative-progressive" dimension. The first component tends to cover the "authoritarian" aspect and the second, its "liberal" aspect in the european sense of the word.

We may thus conclude that the conservative attitude toward politics presently alive among young people of the European Community is more a kind of "petit-bourgeois" outlook than a kind of idealism. Traditional nationalist ideology is disappearing in circles of young intellectuals who will probably provide a high proportion of tomorrow's leaders. On the other hand, nationalism is still a lively feeling among those young people who will probably make up the mass publics.

3. Commitment in favor of the political unification of Europe (Scale III)

This scale, composed of seven questions, seems to be the least "simple" of the eight hierarchical scales detected. This is probably the result of several basic variables, one of which is related to a strong pro-european attitude (predisposition to put up with passing personal discomfort to have Europe come to pass) and a progressive attitude (favorable feelings toward protesting students and an openness toward foreign workers). Thus the hypothesis that nationalist or satisfied conservatism is opposed to the formation of pro-european attitudes is verified anew.

| Items | N = 486 | % |
|--|---------|----|
| - Does not agree that "european unification is impossible since we speak different languages" | 404 | 83 |
| - Does not agree with the statement that : "Everything is well with us and the way things are, so why change ?" | 330 | 68 |
| - Is for "students who have demonstrated" during the last year in his own and numerous other countries | 291 | 60 |
| - Considers himself as politically involved in or keeps informed of political life without participating personally | 265 | 55 |
| - Favors the idea that "his national currency should be replaced by a european currency" | 260 | 54 |
| - Does not agree with the idea "as a rule, I have nothing against foreign workers, but there are really too many of them in our country". | 222 | 46 |
| - Is "so favorable to european unification" that he is ready "to accept, temporarily, discomforts, (as for example, having a little less money) so long as it comes to pass" | 156 | 32 |

Attitudes on this dimension occur more frequently and are more pronounced among male youngsters whose fathers are not laborers.

They also show up among catholic young people or among those who state that they have no religion, but this is difficult to interpret.

Young people who come from wealthy families, who are pursuing their studies in universities or in centers of higher learning or who keep informed of political events have relatively high scores. They are all well-informed about european affairs ; they express the hope that other european countries will join the six of the EEC, including, in numerous instances, the communist countries ;

they prefer types of unification which imply a high degree of integration to the intergovernmental kind ; and, they have less confidence in established authorities than in leaders of student movements and in young protestors.

This third scale thus appears to express a general outlook or a set of attitudes in contrast to those covered by scales II and III. This verifies once again the hypothesis that nationalism and conservatism run counter to the birth and to the development of pro-european attitudes.

4. Utilitarian Pro-European Attitude (Scale IV)

Scale IV shows that a relatively materialistic conception of the goals pursued in european unification can also lead to a positive attitude toward this object. It turns on a kind of traditional outlook, not in the least protest-oriented, and, undoubtedly, very similar to the kind which gave breath to the process of economic unification in Europe.

This scale includes five items of which the "easiest" scale point is the statement that the relative size of our states is no longer adapted to conditions of the modern world, and the most difficult point, the statement that the national flag ought to be replaced by a european flag in important ceremonies.

| Items | N = 486 | % |
|---|---------|----|
| - Believes that "the relative size of our states is no longer adapted to conditions of the modern world, in our days, we ought to think bigger" . . . | 381 | 78 |
| - Thinks that "in a united Europe, we'll be able to buy things cheaper" | 334 | 69 |
| - Considers himself as politically involved or keeps informed about political life without participating personally | 265 | 55 |
| - Would change residence if he were sure "to find in another region of his country" "a more interesting life" than the one he can expect to lead by staying at home | 245 | 50 |
| - Favors the idea that "the national flag be replaced by a european flag in important ceremonies" . . | 159 | 33 |

We find this attitude again more frequently among young men than among young girls, but there is no significant relationship with family characteristics. On the other hand, there is a strong relationship between a utilitarian pro-european attitude and the fact of keeping informed about political news.

The relationship with level of education is less strong than for the former scale, but the attitude generally goes along with an excellent knowledge of the number and names of the countries in the common Market. It is likely that existing european achievements and institutions are accepted at a higher rate among these adolescents than among those whose pro-european attitude draws its inspiration from a progressive and protest-oriented internationalism.

The utilitarian aspect of the attitude measured is the fact that the scores on this scale are the only ones which show a positive and linear correlation with the number of languages spoken by the respondent : the acceptance of the Europe of the common Market is accompanied by practical steps to participate in it.

Organized youth, i.e. those who state they have paid membership dues to an organization, more often manifest this utilitarian pro-european attitude than an idealistic one. This is the youth who, in its political activities, accepts the rules of the game of our society ; these are youth one could call non-demonstrating progressivists or reformers. For example, these young "utilitarian" europeans show a mixed kind of trust in established authority, a great trust in their generational cohorts and in leaders of students movements, but none in student protestors.

5. Resistance to European Unification (Scale V)

For one to act favorably on a goal or to decide in favor of its attainment, the goal must not only be attractive but there must also be no resistance acting in the opposite direction. But several previous studies have shown that most pro-european attitudes held by the public at large can be defined as the absence of resistance rather than as a positive attraction for the plans and initial accomplishments of european unification.

The first phase of the present study has also brought to light the importance of certain typical kinds of resistance, for example the fear of cultural levelling. The scale, whose items are indicated below, includes nearly a complete list of all possible kinds of resistance of the ilk included in the questionnaire, with the sole exception of those expressing a fear of cultural levelling. The last item in this scale - the predisposition to accept temporary personal discomforts to have Europe come to pass - is the only one which does not express any resistance, but which, on the contrary, measures best the degree of favorable commitment to a united Europe.

In short, this scale appears to us to measure a certain kind of acceptance of european unification characterized by the absence of resistance, i.e., by a certain optimism, an open mindedness or, in other words, an absence of prejudice regarding, in particular, the possible negative aspects of european unification.

| Items | N = 486 | % |
|---|---------|----|
| - Does not agree with the idea that "to attempt to draw closer together countries so different from one another within a United Europe, runs the risk of provoking new conflicts and new wars". | 361 | 74 |
| - Does not agree with the notion that "a United Europe might appear as a threat to other countries and generate new conflicts". | 357 | 73 |
| - Does not agree that "the peoples of Europe are too self-centered to clasp hands in brotherhood". | 257 | 53 |
| - Does not agree that "in a United Europe, we would have to accept decisions taken abroad". | 230 | 47 |
| - Is "so favorable to european unification" that he is prepared "to put up, temporarily, with personal discomforts for it to come to pass". | 156 | 32 |

The optimism measured by this scale seems rather widespread among youngsters whose fathers hold positions as professional man or as high civil servants. It is weak among youngsters coming from families who are independent farmers, storekeepers or tradesmen. Catholics also seem a little more optimistic than the others.

Resistance to united Europe decreases as function of the level of education. On the other hand, the degree of resistance (or non-resistance) is only slightly related to the degree of information about the common Market, which indicates that it is really a matter of an intervening variable : slight resistance to european unification is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the development of a strong attitude. It results in a permissive attitude. (It is noteworthy that for those who are very favorably predisposed toward United Europe, the image of a good citizen is one who knows to place the common interest above his own and respects the liberty and the convictions of others.)

6. Degree of Accepted or Desired Integration (Scale VI)

The fact that different degrees of integration expressed by different questions are located in one unidimensional cluster confirms the hypothesis stated above that different views of United Europe - ranging from a simple intergovernmental agreement to complete integration of a unitary kind - are not qualitatively different, but rather degrees of the same continuous variable. (1)

| Items | N = 486 | % |
|--|---------|----|
| - Believes important "that european countries should join in a United Europe" | 442 | 91 |
| - Thinks that "a United Europe is a first step toward world peace" | 375 | 77 |
| - Is favorable to the idea that "national currency be replaced by a european money" | 260 | 54 |
| - Is favorable to the notion that "the National team sent to the next Olympic Games become part and parcel of a single european team". | 161 | 33 |
| - Is favorable to the idea that "the national flag be replaced by a european flag in important ceremonies" | 159 | 33 |

This is, indeed, a scale that measures the accepted or desired degree of integration. Only the second item deals with the goals of a United Europe (contribute to maintaining world peace) whereas the four other items deal with its content, its manifestations and its symbols. However, the second item is the weakest of the whole cluster, i.e. the one which shows the least significant level of statistical relationship to the cluster. To us, its presence recalls that the strongest of all pro-european attitudes suggests the image of a very integrated Europe, one like a european nation in which the pre-existing nations would be amalgamated.

This evidence confirms the hypothesis whereby the images of a Europe that would unite only the nations and states composing it in the most ardent form of cooperation are held mainly by persons who do not really have a favorable attitude toward european unification.

(1) See page 6

Correlations between this variable and the various characteristics of the respondents are about the same as those found in analyzing the other pro-european scales (III, IV and V). Nonetheless, all these correlations are weaker.

As an example, a favorable attitude toward integration in its penultimate form of development implies great trust in the leaders of student movements and even in protesting students, but does not predict at all to the amount of trust in established authorities.

The relative weakness of correlations between scores on this scale (VI) and other characteristics of the respondents is probably due to the fact that the degree of integration is not a clear or willing choice, but rather a vague desire or wish about the organization of Europe in the future.

7. Intensity of pro-European Feelings (Scale VII)

The items in this scale express a certain impatience with the making of Europe. As in the preceding scale, there are items related to the political organization of a United Europe, but accompanied this time by the question which we found measures best the degree of commitment to Europe, namely : the predisposition to put up with temporary personal discomforts to have Europe come to pass (Scale III and V). This scale is quite distinct from the former one because of the presence of items expressing a desire for concrete policies and definite action : a european army, a european currency, a european government.

| Items | N = 486 | % |
|--|---------|----|
| - Believes it important "that european countries join together in a United Europe " | 442 | 91 |
| - Thinks that "the government should, above all, contribute to the building of a United Europe" . | 421 | 87 |
| - Is favorable to "the principle of a european army which would unite the armies of different countries of "Western Europe" including the interviewee's own country | 318 | 65 |
| - Is favorable to the idea "that the national currency be replaced by a european money" | 260 | 54 |
| - Is favorable to the notion that " the government of Europe have the right to take decisions about certain important issues, decisions which would take precedence over those of the national government" | 245 | 50 |
| - Is "so favorable to the unification of Europe " that he is ready "to put up, temporarily, with personal discomforts to have it come to pass". . | 156 | 32 |

The highest scores on this scale are found among the best informed youth, with all the subsidiary characteristics it involves (family size, head of household's occupation, level of education).

Notice, however, that responses to the items making up this scale show a strong relationship with responses to the question measuring the degree of information about the existence of plans for the political unification of Europe. This demonstrates that this scale is measuring an active pro-european attitude accompanied by ideas about the political contours of a United Europe. The respondents who obtained a high score on this scale also more often give right answers to the question about the countries which are members of the common Market.

8. Cultural Resistance of the ethnocentric Type (Scale VIII)

The variable measured by this scale could have been defined as a kind of nationalism. It represents, however, a particularism of a different kind, for the most meaningful items included in the measure of nationalism (scale I) are missing here. Scale VIII begins and ends with items clearly focused on the particular culture of a people : to let all peoples keep their distinctive birthmarks and to believe that european unification is impossible because of the diversity in languages. One also finds an item typical of satisfied conservatism : satisfaction with the present state of things.

Two of our latent variables are clustered on this scale : the ethnocentrism (or inability to identify with a larger community) and attachment to one's cultural identity (expressed as the fear to lose this identity). This may be due to the fact that those two variables are strongly related - and also to the impossibility of distinguishing one from the other with the questionnaire used.

This scale expresses a deeply felt, basic kind of resistance. The interdependence of the items in the scale does not spring from logical reasoning but from deep feelings in the respondent. It is a deeply rooted resistance that any european information and training program for youth must take into account.

| Items | N = 486 | % |
|---|---------|----|
| - Agrees that "all peoples ought to keep their distinctive heritages" | 430 | 88 |
| - Is not "opposed, in principle, to foreign workers, " but thinks that "there are really too many of them in our country" | 264 | 54 |
| - Believes it important to be able to afford a car (or a new car) | 240 | 49 |
| - Agrees that "the peoples of Europe are too self centered to join hands in brotherhood". | 229 | 47 |
| - Agrees that the statement : "all is well with us and the way things are, so why change ? " . . | 165 | 34 |
| - Agrees that "european unification is impossible since we all speak different languages" | 82 | 17 |

According to a hypothesis stated at the end of the first phase of the study, this resistance ought to be found more among the youngest age group. It is, however, not confirmed. It is nonetheless possible that this resistance, which is observable in all age groups, is expressed more easily and more spontaneously by the youngest cohorts.

Like all resistance of the conservative-nationalist type, the cultural and ethnocentric resistance increases in function of the number of brothers and sisters of the respondent. High scores also show up among respondents from farm-owning families, which suggests that the attachment to native soil is directly or indirectly related to fears of the effects of a more advanced european integration. On the other hand, little resistance of this kind is found among respondents from wealthy families.

As a general rule, the scores on scale VIII, covary with the other characteristics of the respondents just like the other variable which implied an opposition to european unification.

The second phase of the study was a transitional phase in the design of the final questionnaire. Most of the questions which proved to form hierarchically ordered clusters for a heterogeneous sample of youth were adopted in the questionnaire used in the third phase.

Nonetheless, the last phase also dealt specifically with young people's attitudes. For this reason, it is pertinent to verify to what extent the hypotheses formulated at the end of the first phase were confirmed or not.

a) Confirmed is the notion that the different definitions of unification ranging from "l'Europe des patries" based on agreements between sovereign states to a Europe of a unitary type are projected on to a single continuous variable within the attitude system of youth.

b) The importance of the first independent variable which we defined in hypothetical terms and called idealistic internationalism, has been confirmed. This variable influences the development of pro-european feelings.

c) The second hypothetical variable, political nationalism, interferes with the development of truly european feelings. This political nationalism, of an authoritarian bent is effectively different from the desire to keep one's cultural and linguistic identity and from ethnocentrism proper, i.e. from the tendency to accept and to favor values, views and ways of life of one's own in-group.

d) On the other hand, the existence and the importance of the third variable, i.e. the resistance to technological civilization and the negative reaction to the technical and esoteric character of present european realizations and institutions, have not been demonstrated.

The non-verification of a hypothesis, which seemed to be backed up by common sense, must be interpreted cautiously. It may well be, in fact, that the questions asked had not been well suited to the desired measure, or else that the variables related to pro-european attitudes, such as they were measured by the questionnaire, are far removed from those which would have permitted the measurement of attitudes toward present day accomplishments and institutions.

e) The fourth variable, i.e. the desire for peace, and anxiety in the face of conflicts, has been confirmed in so far as its existence and its importance in the development of pro-european feelings are concerned.

f) The importance of information level (hypothetical variable 5) has also been confirmed. The low level of awareness of european problems and the rather negative attitudes toward european unification among young people with little intellectual training, support without necessarily confirming the hypothesis that visible

signs of the present european Community on television are too rare and draw far too little on the public emotions to be capable of creating favorable currents of feeling among non-intellectuals.

g) The sixth variable, the degree of "presence" of european institutions in the public's field of perception, has not been verified.

h) In order to confirm the importance of the seventh variable (living under centralized or decentralized socio-political systems), it is necessary to draw a comparison between several countries, something the sample did not allow at this stage of the study.

i) The importance of the identification with national sub-groups (hypothetical variable) has not been confirmed (1).

j) The existence and the importance of the ninth variable (ethnocentrism) has been partially confirmed. It has also been confirmed that this variable is different from nationalist ones and that it runs counter to pro-european feelings.

k) The tenth hypothetical variable was age : pro-european feelings should occur more frequently among young people (aged 15-16) than among older ones (19-20 years old). At this point of the study, this hypothesis has not been confirmed. On the contrary, the average scores on the scales measuring nationalism, conservatism and ethnocentrism are slightly higher in the first of the two age brackets. Inversely, the average scores on the scales measuring pro-european attitudes are very slightly higher in the second age bracket, except for scale VI which expresses a favorable orientation toward symbols of a United Europe (2).

l) The importance of the eleventh variable, i.e. the desire for emancipation, has been confirmed. Most of the sets of questions related to pro-european attitudes contain items which express a desire to free oneself from the very marked coercion of traditional authorities.

(1) This scale will reappear in the third phase of the study but one will notice that its influence on the formation of pro-european attitudes is the opposite of what had been hypothesized. Pro-european attitudes decrease in function of the degree of identification with minority national sub-groups.

(2) This problem has been studied in greater detail during the third phase. (See pages 60 to 71). We came to the conclusion that, if nationalist and ethnocentric feelings are less powerful among 16 to 20 years old youngsters than among adults, it does not appear that this decrease in national values is accompanied by a reinforcement of marked internationalist and pro-european feelings. A more refined analysis should be made by comparing more closely bracketed age groups (15-16 years, 17-18 years) and by questioning young people and adults of the same family, in order to control as much as possible all other variables except age.

m) It was not possible to distinguish the attachment to language and cultural identity (the twelfth hypothetical variable) from ethnocentrism.

n) The function of knowledge of present european institutions (thirteenth variable) has not been isolated in its pure state. One observes, of course, a very strong correlation between pro-european attitudes and the amount of knowledge of present european institutions, but, for the moment, it is impossible to clearly distinguish cause from effect.

o) The fourteenth variable, i.e. the urge to move within a familiar environment, has been partially confirmed. One observes that resistance to european unification increases in the degree to which one is less informed about other peoples and other cultures. Ignorance of one's neighbor seems to go along with a greater fear of the possible effects of unification.

p) Regarding the fifteenth variable (desire to overcome an inferiority complex toward the great powers), we had thought that the desire to have a politically united Europe represent a third great power - equal to the United States and to the URSS-, would be a symptom. This is not the case. Positive responses to this item are only weakly correlated with the most sensitive indicators of pro-european attitudes. It seems that this inferiority feeling leads instead to a sublimation of nationalist feelings into an image of a Europe which would have as its sole function the satisfaction of power needs. Persons who are motivated in this way do not seem opposed to european unification, but appear little inclined to accept or to participate actively in advanced degrees of integration.

q) The degree of involvement in politics and public affairs (the sixteenth variable) has been confirmed as a factor underpinning pro-european attitude. One observes, however, that the relationship is stronger with attitudes of the idealistic type (scale III) rather than with utilitarian and realistic attitudes (scale IV).

r) It has also been shown that civic spirit (the seventeenth variable) bears a relationship to pro-european attitudes. However, this positive relationship is found only when civic spirit is defined as a feeling of responsibility toward society. Defined in a traditional way and as more or less indicative of patriotism, civic spirit bears a negative relationship to pro-european feelings.

In short, two major conclusions can be drawn from the research, specifically dealing with youth, which was conducted during the first two phases.

1. - The different positive views about a United Europe, as well as commitment in favor of unification, exist mainly among those youth with the most developed intellect.

This probably explains, in part, why the scales having to do with these views and attitudes generally form less coherent clusters than do the scales concerning national, conservative and ethnocentric attitudes. In fact, the principle underlying the coherence of the first group tends to be intellectual and rational, whereas that of the second group is more affective and emotional.

2. - The qualitative changes in the views and attitudes among the youngest people of the new generation do not seem to be very large. In the groups with the highest intellectual background, one observes a keener, more critical turn of mind and a more or less marked rejection of traditional authority, but this is a minority of youth. On the whole, symptoms of conservatism are more striking than symptoms of progressivism and protest.

This last comment, based on data collected in 1968 and 1969, should not let one lose from sight that, on the one hand, studies like this one ought to be repeated periodically in order to draw sounder conclusions and that, on the other hand, the phenomena of "social resonance", whereby innovating or disruptive minorities can have a lasting or passing influence out of proportion to their numerical size, are still badly understood.

Second Part

THE DETERMINANTS OF POSITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

In order to interpret the findings of the third phase of this study, which sought to identify the determinants of positive attitudes toward the political unification of Europe, it was indispensable to have in hand an index of pro-european attitudes. Such an index had to fulfill two conditions : 1) contain a relatively high number of questions, since the accuracy of placement of a respondent on a given index increases as a function of the number of question it contains; 2) be made up of questions which are statistically related.

It made sense to search for this index among hierarchical clusters or scales detected by a multivariate analysis during the second phase of the data-processing. But two problems arose : the first was that these scales had been derived from findings based on a sample of young people exclusively, whereas we were now dealing with a population aged 16 and over ; the second problem was that the questions used in the third phase were not exactly the same as those used in the second phase. Therefore, the findings of the third phase were submitted to the same type of multivariate analysis as was done in the previous phase ; this had the additional advantage of allowing comparisons between the variables determining the pro-european attitudes of young people as well as those determining the attitudes of the entire population.

The findings of this multivariate analysis will be studied later (1). It suffices to indicate here that no contradiction was found between the scales detected during the second phase and those which were drawn from the findings of the third phase.

The problem remains in the choice of a single scale of sufficient generality as to constitute an index of pro-european attitudes valid for all interviewees. The final choice settled on a set of questions which not only composed a hierarchically ordered scale, but also included items that frequently appeared in most of the scales measuring pro-european attitudes, no matter what the type.

The index of pro-european attitudes takes on the following form (see table I) :

(1) See chapter II, pages 122 to 148 and document INRA C. 01.197, appendices to the report on "L'Unification européenne" (third quantitative phase).

Table 1COMPOSITION OF THE INDEX OF PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very of fairly favorable to european unification | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is favorable to the evolution of the common Market toward a political grouping in the form of a U.S. of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - Agrees that above the government (of his own country) there be a european government responsible for common policies in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economy | 4869 | 56 |
| - Is favorable to the proposal that the currency (of his country) be replaced by a european currency | 4453 | 51 |
| - Is wholly or fairly predisposed to accept certain personal sacrifices, financially for example, to see Europe come to pass | 3000 | 34 |
| - Would be terribly sorry to hear to-morrow that the common Market is being disbanded . . . | 2510 | 29 |

Scores on this scale were attributed to each respondent in the following way :

- a) Subjects who systematically responded by "don't know" to each question or who gave no answer were sorted out from the others, since it was not possible to assign any measure of attitude intensity to them (1).
- b) The score of each subject was simply fixed by adding up the number of questions the subject answered positively according to the scale ; we, thus, obtained scores varying between 0 (no positive response) to +6 (responses to each of the six questions in the scale).
- c) Given the large number of persons who obtained the score of "0", we tried to distinguish in this group the "indifferents", "undecideds", and the "hostiles" : persons who were "indifferent" to the easiest question in the scale ("are you favorable to european unification") were assigned to this group ; those who answered "don't know" or who did not answer this question were classified as "undecideds" ; finally, those who answered "rather unfavorable" or "very unfavorable" were attributed a score of -1, which made it possible to extend the scale by one point.

The index thus constructed, we still had to verify its hierarchical and metrical properties and to use it in the analysis of the entire data set (2).

The distribution of scores on this pro-european index is given for each country and for the whole of the Community in table 2 :

-
- (1) In fact, this group is rather small and is barely perceptible with the exception of the Italian sample.
 - (2) To verify the unidimensional character of the index, see the technical report of INRA, doc. C. 01-J97.

Table 2

DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRO-EUROPEANINDEX BY COUNTRY (x)

(Interviewees aged 16 and older)

| Scores | EEC Total (xx) | Germany | Belgium | France | Italy | Luxembourg | Netherlands |
|---------------|----------------------|---------|---------|--------|-------|------------|-------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 18 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 12 |
| + 5 | 15 | 17 | 12 | 12 | 17 | 18 | 19 |
| A | 27 | 35 | 22 | 20 | 28 | 26 | 31 |
| + 4 | 19 | 17 | 19 | 18 | 23 | 19 | 17 |
| + 3 | 17 | 13 | 15 | 19 | 19 | 22 | 19 |
| B | 36 | 30 | 34 | 37 | 42 | 41 | 36 |
| + 2 | 13 | 12 | 14 | 16 | 11 | 16 | 13 |
| + 1 | 11 | 9 | 13 | 14 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| C | 24 | 21 | 27 | 30 | 19 | 25 | 23 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 6 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Undecided | 5 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| No response | 1 | - | - | 1 | 2 | - | - |
| D | 13 | 14 | 17 | 13 | 11 | 8 | 10 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Average score | 3,11 | 3,30 | 2,80 | 2,79 | 3,27 | 3,19 | 3,24 |
| N | 8749 | 2019 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1229 |

-
- (x) The results are presented with 4 sub-totals which reflect the strength of the attitude (as measured by the index) at these scale points : very favorable (A), favorable (B), fairly favorable (C), indifferent, hesitant or negative (D).
- (xx) The results in the column "European Community" correspond to the total results for each country weighted by the percentage of the population aged 16 years and older in each of the countries, namely :

| | | | |
|--------------|-------------|----|----------|
| Germany : | 46.232.000 | ou | 33,238 % |
| Belgium : | 7.132.000 | ou | 5,128 % |
| France : | 37.139.000 | ou | 26,701 % |
| Italie : | 39.294.000 | ou | 28,250 % |
| Luxembourg : | 254.000 | ou | 0,183 % |
| Pays-Bas : | 9.041.000 | ou | 6,500 % |
| <hr/> | | | |
| Total | 139.092.000 | ou | 99,990 % |
| <hr/> | | | |

This means that these percentages are the best possible estimations of the percentage one should obtain in interviewing a representative sample of the total population of the Community.

In the whole community, more than one person out of four (27 %) can be considered as very favorable to european unification. The truly indifferent, undecided and hostile persons barely represent more than one out of ten (13 %). Midway between these two polar extremes, 60 % of the population seems to drift from a point of unawareness or disinterest (rather than hostility) to one of commitment. (See graphic 1)

As one can see, when the countries are ranked by their mean scores, Germans come in first place with a score of 3,30, the Italians with 3,27, and the Dutch with 3,24, followed closely by the Luxembourgers with 3,19, yet far ahead of the Belgians with 2,80 and the French with 2,79.


Now, if the highest scores (+ 6 and + 5) on the index instead of the mean scores are taken into account, nearly the same rank-order is found but the differences between the countries are more accentuated : Germany and Holland first (35 and 31 % respectively), Italy (28 %), Luxembourg (26 %), Belgium (22 %) and France (20 %).

More detailed results will be presented in these two chapters :


- I - Summary results by country.
- II - Characteristics of favorable commitment to european unification.

Graph 1

INDEX OF PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES



ATTITUDES



I

SUMMARY FINDINGS BY COUNTRY

Most of the findings of international survey research are presented by country, and the analyses are often limited to comparisons between countries. The journalist and his reader, indeed the specialist, easily come to believe that people in one country think and behave in a particular way and that people in another country think and act in other ways. This is merely an indication of what we might call comparative national ethnocentrism, i.e. an outlook on the world whereby membership in a national group is for each and every one, the single best discriminatory criterion in the formation and the expression of his attitudes and behavior. In other words, we presume that, from a social-psychological point of view, a person is German, Belgian, French, ... before being a man or woman, young or old, rich or poor, or educated or not.

In the next chapter, we shall see how unscientific this method is. National membership has to be treated as a variable among others. It will even be shown that this variable is a relatively weak predictor of attitudes toward european unification in contrast with others like socio-occupational status, education level and even sex.

Nonetheless, in this chapter, we have adhered to the traditional country by country presentation, not for the sake of opportunism nor from a desire to avoid running counter to conventional practice, but in order to take into account the fact that, on the one hand, the data were collected on the basis of national representative samples and that, on the other hand, the socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural systems constituting our nation-states are still -or seem to be - very different from one another, even within the european Community.

We will examine, successively the following variables :

- 1.- Demographic and cultural differences among countries.
- 2.- Political, union and religious participation.
- 3.- Exposure to mass media, level of knowledge and contacts with foreign countries.
- 4.- Attitudes toward european unification.
- 5.- General attitude toward life (satisfaction or dissatisfaction, optimism or pessimism).
- 6.- Aims and objectives attributed to the socio-political system.
- 7.- Degree of trust in certain foreign peoples.

1 - DEMOGRAPHIC AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AMONG COUNTRIES

a) Sex : In each of the six countries of the European Community, women are more numerous than men, although the difference is slight.

b) Age : Persons of 55 years of age and older represent, on the average, almost one third of the population studied in all six countries. The percentage of persons who were 65 and older, at an age one can regard as marking the end of active employment in life, is relatively high in the Belgian and French samples (18 %), whereas it is not so high in the Italian (10 %) and Dutch (9 %) samples.

c) Occupation : Among inhabitants of the countries of the European Community aged 16 and older, only 8 % are employed in agriculture. Three-fourths of them are farmers, and one-fourth are hired farm helpers, the majority of which reside in Italy. In Belgium and in Italy, only a small proportion of the active population is employed in agriculture : 2 to 3 % . On the other hand, in the samples of these two countries, there is a relatively high proportion of shopkeepers and artisans : i.e., 10 to 11 %, compared to an average of 7 %, in the European Community.

d) Education level : In Germany, and to a lesser extent in France, a high proportion of respondents did not go past the primary level. In the countries where this proportion is lower, the percentage of persons having gone to university is not very high either, except in Belgium ; particularly in these countries, there is a larger proportion of persons who have attended courses in technical or vocational schools. The proportion of persons who completed higher education is 10 to 12 % in Belgium, in France and in Italy, in contrast to only 4 % in Germany. (See table 3)

Table 3EDUCATION LEVEL IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EEC

(respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | Germany | Belgium | France | Italy | Luxembourg | Netherlands |
|--------------------------------|------|---------|---------|--------|-------|------------|-------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Primary School | 53 | 67 | 46 | 58 | 52 | 44 | 35 |
| Secondary School | 24 | 23 | 21 | 16 | 29 | 22 | 35 |
| Technical or Vocational School | 13 | 6 | 21 | 16 | 7 | 21 | 19 |
| Higher Education | 8 | 4 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 4 | 7 |
| Other | 1 | 0 | 1 | - | - | 8 | 3 |
| Don't know or not ascertain | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

2 - POLITICAL, UNION AND RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION

A. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Three questions or groups of questions made it possible to study attitudes toward politics and the party identification of the interviewees, the relation which may exist between party identification and attitudes toward european unification, and finally the transmission of party identification from one generation to the other.

a) Attitudes toward politics and party identification

- "Do you, yourself, participate in political activities or do you follow politics with some interest without participating actively, or don't politics interest you especially or not at all ?"
- "Is there a political party you feel closer to (than others)?"
- "Do you feel strongly attached to this party or only a little?"

Very few respondents indicated that they were participating in political activities : 4 % as an average for the entire Community, without large differences from one country to another.

The great majority of respondents divide into three groups of about equal size :

- 36 % indicate that they follow with interest politics without participating actively (47 % in Holland and 17 % only in Belgium) ;
- 31 % indicate that politics does not interest them more than anything else ;
- 27 % say they are not interested at all in politics (54 % in Belgium).

In Holland and in France, followed by Luxembourg, Germany and Italy, the citizens more frequently feel involved in politics. Belgium comes in last, way behind the others (1). (See table 4)

Table 4

PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL LIFE

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Participate in political activities | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
| Are interested in politics without participating actively | 36 | 36 | 17 | 42 | 33 | 41 | 47 |
| Are not especially interested in politics | 31 | 43 | 23 | 26 | 22 | 34 | 25 |
| Are not interested at all in politics | 27 | 16 | 54 | 27 | 34 | 20 | 23 |
| Don't know or don't answer | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

In order to make these differences between countries stand out better, it is possible to calculate an "index of participation in political life", by attributing a coefficient of 3 to the response "personally participates", 2 to "is interested without participating personally", and 1 to "is not especially interested", and then dividing the total by 100. Hence, the following classification is obtained :

Index of participation in political life

(maximum : 3,00)

| | |
|-------------|------|
| Netherlands | 1,28 |
| Germany | 1,24 |
| Luxembourg | 1,22 |
| France | 1,22 |
| Italy | 1,03 |
| Belgium | 0,66 |

(1) As we will see further on p. 53, the Netherlands also is the most exposed to mass media, whereas Belgium is the least exposed.

In regard to party identification, in Germany and, to a lesser degree, in Italy and the Netherlands, there is a high proportion of interviewees who say they feel identified with a political party, whereas in France and especially in Belgium, these proportions are much less.

However in Germany, where almost two thirds of the population (64 %) identify with a political party, the strength of attachment to this party is less widespread than in the other countries and is only present among less than one quarter of the citizens who are party-identifiers. In Belgium, on the contrary, where only 19 % of the respondents identify with a political party, almost half of them say they are strongly attached to this party. Thus, even the distribution of political involvement appears to differ from one country to another (1). (See tables 5 and 6)

b) The relation between party identification and attitudes toward european unification

- "Do you know whether the representatives of the party (named by the respondents) are favorable or not to european unification ?"
- "If this party took a position contrary to your opinions about european unification, do you think you would most certainly, probably, probably not vote for another party ?"

Among the respondents who expressed a preference for a political party designated by name, almost one out of three are unaware of the attitude of the party's representatives toward european unification. The vast majority of the others think the party has a favorable position.

The percentage of party-identifiers who are unaware of the position of their party's representatives toward Europe is considerably lower in Germany and Luxembourg. In Belgium, on the contrary, it reaches 46 %.

These findings confirm the hypothesis already stated at the end of the previous phases of the study, namely that the attitude of most political parties toward european unification is not very salient to the public. Moreover, everything seems to indicate that party preference has hardly been influenced by the positions on Europe attributed to the parties ; since the public is, in large measure, favorable to european unification, it attributes similar positions to party leaders.

(1) It would be interesting to search for the causes of these differences. It may be due to the number of active political parties in a given country. In Germany, nearly all voters are split between only two parties ; in Belgium, 2 parties are hardly enough to account for half of the electorate ; in France, three parties are necessary, and almost four in the Netherlands to account for 50 % of the voters.

Table 5

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND STRENGTH
OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

(respondents aged 16 years and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Feel identified with a political party, of whom : | 56 | 64 | 39 | 44 | 60 | 49 | 57 |
| - are strongly attached to this party | 17 | 15 | 18 | 15 | 22 | 22 | 22 |
| - are weakly attached to this party | 38 | 49 | 20 | 29 | 36 | 26 | 34 |
| - do not respond | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Do not feel especially close to a political party | 34 | 21 | 52 | 50 | 30 | 35 | 37 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 10 | 15 | 9 | 6 | 10 | 16 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 6

STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

(based on those who indicate a party preference)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|------|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| - Are strongly identified with this party | 31 | 23 | 45 | 33 | 37 | 44 | 38 |
| - Are only weakly identifies with this party | 67 | 76 | 52 | 65 | 60 | 54 | 60 |
| - Do not know or do not respond | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 4661 | 1284 | 512 | 909 | 1096 | 163 | 697 |

This weak relationship between party preference and attitudes toward Europe is also confirmed by the fact that only one person out of five (19 %) state that they would definitely change political party if their preferred party adopted a position toward european unification contrary to their own. In Italy, one finds the highest percentage of persons who would definitely vote for another party (27 %) and in Germany, the lowest (14 %).

No matter how weak the influence of the party's political program appears to be on the european attitudes of their partisans, it probably is not negligible. In Germany, for example, there is, at once, a very high proportion of persons who are very favorable to the idea of european unification, two large political parties whose pro-european orientation is known, a high percentage of people who think the policy of these parties is favorable to Europe, and, at the same time, a strong reluctance among citizens who say what they would do if their party adopted a position contrary to their personal opinions on Europe. This reluctance may mean that the hypothesis of a deep disagreement between the pro-european attitudes of the interviewees is not very likely as well as underline the fact that a party's program on Europe is not a decisive factor in party choice. (See tables 7 and 8)

Table 7

AWARENESS OF THE POSITION OF PREFERRED POLITICAL
PARTY TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

(based on persons who expressed a party preference)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|------|------|-----|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Think that the leaders of their preferred party are : | | | | | | | |
| - very favorable | 27 | 34 | 19 | 21 | 9 | 34 | 15 |
| - rather favorable | 38 | 43 | 30 | 42 | 27 | 36 | 47 |
| - rather unfavorable | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| - very unfavorable | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | 1 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 31 | 21 | 46 | 31 | 38 | 29 | 33 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 6523 | 1589 | 898 | 1497 | 1240 | 242 | 1057 |

Table 8

ATTACHMENT TO PREFERRED POLITICAL PARTY AS A FUNCTION OF ITS
POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

REGARDING EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

(based on persons who expressed a party preference)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|------|------|-----|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Would vote for another party in case of disagreement concerning Europe : | | | | | | | |
| - definitely | 19 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 27 | 23 | 22 |
| - probably | 25 | 37 | 16 | 18 | 21 | 20 | 24 |
| - probably not | 22 | 28 | 18 | 20 | 16 | 15 | 20 |
| - certainly not | 16 | 10 | 24 | 26 | 12 | 29 | 18 |
| Do not respond or do not know | 18 | 11 | 26 | 19 | 24 | 13 | 16 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 6523 | 1589 | 898 | 1497 | 1240 | 242 | 1057 |

c) Transmission of party identification from one generation to another

- "Do you know whether your parents had a preference for any political party ?"
- "Was it a political party of the same tendency as the one for which you would vote now, or was it of another tendency?"
- "What was the political tendency of your parents ?"

It seemed interesting to ask these questions to attempt to bring light to this rather poorly known problem of the transmission of party identification. In fact, the results are not very meaningful because of the number of confounding variables and of the low proportion of persons in the total sample who express, at one and the same time, a party preference, know whether their parents had one and can compare their parents' preference with their own. (The tendency is even less meaningful, since, in addition, the respondent's preference has to differ from the preference he attributes to his parents.)

Taking these reservations into account, we observe that the majority of the respondents in Germany (60 %) state that the party preference of their parents is unknown ; this is probably due to the fact that the present political regime is relatively recent and that many still hesitate to indicate their parents' preference under the previous regime, even if they know it. In Italy, on the other hand, there is a high percentage of people who are aware of their parents' party preference although this country has experienced the same political discontinuities as Germany. Two factors probably influence the answer to this question : on the one hand, the historical continuity of the political regime and, on the other, the predisposition to discuss politics and to let one's preference be known. The high percentage of people in Belgium and the Netherlands who claim to know their parents' party preference is probably attributable to the first factor, whereas the high percentage observed in Italy may be due to the second.

With all of the countries of the EEC taken as a whole, the ratio of persons who express a political preference to those who know their parents had another preference is about one to three. This proportion is higher in France and, most of all, in Holland (See table 9)

Table 9

PARTY IDENTIFICATION:COMPARISON OF SELF WITH PARENTS

(based on persons who expressed a party preference)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|------|------|-----|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Know their parents had a preference for a political party | 51 | 40 | 61 | 54 | 58 | 53 | 65 |
| whose: - tendency was the same as theirs | 34 | 26 | 42 | 35 | 40 | 39 | 40 |
| - tendency was different | 16 | 12 | 18 | 18 | 16 | 12 | 25 |
| - don't know or don't respond | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | - |
| Do not know | 49 | 60 | 39 | 46 | 42 | 47 | 35 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 6531 | 1588 | 898 | 1503 | 1241 | 244 | 1057 |

B. UNION MEMBERSHIP

As with political participation, it seemed interesting to collect data on the affiliation of employees with unions (and on their feelings toward these union organizations of which they are not members), on the strength of their identification with these organizations and on their awareness of union positions toward european unification.

a) Union membership and the strength of attachment to unions

- "Do you belong to a union?"
- "Even though you aren't a member, do you nonetheless feel fairly close to a union?"
- "Do you feel strongly very close to this union, only fairly close or not at all close?"

As we already know, the rate of unionization varies a lot from country to country. On the basis of the data, there may be on the average within the European Community, about one out of three employees who are union members, 58 % in Belgium and only 31 % in Germany.

In each country, there are, to a greater or lesser degree, segments of the salaried working population who, without necessarily being union members, identify with a union. This segment is proportionately smaller in a country like Belgium where the rate of union membership is very high, yet is scarcely greater in Germany where this rate is less. In France, where the rate is equal to the mean rate within the European Community, there is a proportionately greater number of union identifiers than in the other countries.

The concentration of union strength, i.e. the ratio of the number of organizations to that of union members or identifiers, also differs considerably from country to country. The six countries could be ranked on an index of concentration of union strength calculated on the basis of the number of organizations required to attain a rate of 50 % of union members or identifiers in each country, as follows : (1)

- (1) The formula used is $\frac{\sum p}{n \times 50}$ where $\sum p$ is the sum of scores obtained by union organizations beginning with the largest required to attain 50 % of the total number of union members or identifiers. For example, in Germany, where the DGB obtained 70 % of all scores, the index is equal to $\frac{70}{1 \times 50} = 1,40$; in France, it is equal to $\frac{38 + 16}{2 \times 50} = 0,54$.

| | |
|------------|------|
| Germany | 1,40 |
| Belgium | 0,85 |
| Italy | 0,77 |
| Luxembourg | 0,68 |
| Holland | 0,62 |
| France | 0,54 |

Table 10

UNION MEMBERSHIP OR IDENTIFICATION BY COUNTRY

(based on salaried workers who are union members or identifiers)

GERMANY

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| D G B (socialist leaning). | 70 |
| D A G (white collar workers). | 21 |
| others | 5 |
| do not respond | 4 |
| | <hr/> |
| | <u>Total</u> <u>100</u> |
| | (N) (419) |

BELGIUM

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| CSC/ACV (catholic unions) | 47 |
| FGTB/ABVV (socialist unions) | 38 |
| CGSLB/ACLVB (liberal unions). | 6 |
| others | 4 |
| do not respond | 5 |
| | <hr/> |
| | <u>Total</u> <u>100</u> |
| | (N) (324) |

FRANCE

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| CGT (communist leaning). | 38 |
| CFDT (former catholic union) | 16 |
| CFTC (catholic union leaning). | 5 |
| CGT-Force ouvrière (socialist leaning) | 11 |
| others | 19 |
| do not respond | 8 |
| | <hr/> |
| | <u>Total</u> <u>100</u> |
| | (N) (406) |

ITALY

| | | |
|--|--------------|------------|
| CGIL (communist and socialist leaning) | 42 | |
| CISL (christian democratic leaning) | 35 | |
| U I L (socialist leaning) | 5 | |
| CISMAL (neo-facist leaning) | 1 | |
| Others | 9 | |
| Do not respond | 8 | |
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>100</u> |
| | (N) | (317) |

LUXEMBOURG

| | | |
|--|--------------|------------|
| L A V (socialist leaning) | 37 | |
| L C C B (christian unions) | 31 | |
| F E P (white collar workers) | 15 | |
| FNCTTFEL (public services) | 5 | |
| SYPROLUX (christian railways union) | 2 | |
| Others | 10 | |
| Do not respond | - | |
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>100</u> |
| | (N) | (63) |

NETHERLANDS

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|------------|
| N V V (socialist leaning) | 45 | |
| C N V (protestants) | 17 | |
| N K V (catholics) | 18 | |
| Others | 9 | |
| Do not respond | 11 | |
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>100</u> |
| | (N) | (225) |

Generally speaking, the strength of identification with a union is rather weak in all the countries : less than one employee out of three who are union members or identifiers claim to feel strongly identified with their union (1). (See tables 11 and 12)

(1) Undoubtedly, the explanation to this phenomenon has to be sought in the history of the unions and of the workers' movement rather than in the present structure of the union movement.

Table 11

ATTITUDES TOWARD UNIONS :
MEMBERSHIP, LIKING AND IDENTIFICATION
 (based on salaried workers)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Are union members | 34 | 31 | 58 | 34 | 35 | 43 | 40 |
| Identify with a union | 16 | 11 | 12 | 23 | 16 | 10 | 19 |
| Total | 50 | 42 | 70 | 57 | 51 | 53 | 59 |
| who are : | | | | | | | |
| - strong union identifiers | 15 | 10 | 24 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 17 |
| - weak union identifiers | 27 | 25 | 33 | 33 | 26 | 22 | 31 |
| - non-identifiers | 6 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 9 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 10 | 2 |
| Are neither members nor identifiers of a union | 50 | 58 | 30 | 43 | 49 | 47 | 41 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 3292 | 1000 | 459 | 708 | 615 | 122 | 388 |

Table 12

STRENGTH OF UNION IDENTIFICATION

(based on workers who are members of identifiers)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Strong identifiers | 29 | 25 | 34 | 30 | 31 | 33 | 28 |
| Weak identifiers | 55 | 59 | 47 | 58 | 51 | 42 | 53 |
| Non-identifiers | 12 | 11 | 13 | 9 | 15 | 7 | 15 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 4 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 18 | 4 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 1754 | 419 | 324 | 406 | 317 | 63 | 225 |

b) The awareness of the union's positions toward european unification

In all of the countries of the European Community, almost one union member employee out of two does not know whether his union is favorable or unfavorable toward european unification. This proportion is even higher than the one we observed for political parties (1). This difference between the position attributed to a party or a union, respectively, is observable in all countries. Moreover, in France and in Italy, an unfavorable orientation toward Europe is more frequently attributed to a union rather than to a party.

From these data, one may conclude that the union influence on employees attitudes toward european unification is, to present, practically inexistant, except perhaps in France and in Italy where four union members or identifiers out of ten claim to be affiliated to extreme left-wing organizations and where, respectively, 9 and 12 % of these employees attribute an unfavorable position toward Europe to their union leaders (See table 13).

(1) See table 7

Table 13

AWARENESS OF ONE'S OWN UNION TOWARDEUROPEAN UNIFICATION

(based on workers who are identifiers)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|------------------------------------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Think that the union leaders are : | | | | | | | |
| - very favorable | 14 | 16 | 21 | 9 | 16 | 24 | 12 |
| - rather favorable | 34 | 45 | 25 | 32 | 20 | 33 | 41 |
| - rather unfavorable | 4 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 8 | - | 1 |
| - very unfavorable | 2 | - | - | 3 | 4 | - | - |
| Do not know or do not respond | 46 | 38 | 53 | 50 | 52 | 43 | 46 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 1754 | 419 | 324 | 406 | 317 | 63 | 225 |

C. CHURCH MEMBERSHIP AND ATTENDANCE

Questions concerning church membership and attendance were asked, as in any socio-political survey, in order to try to evaluate the effect of this variable on attitudes at the heart of this study, namely attitudes toward european unification. We will return to this point later. For the moment, we would simply like to point out that only 9 % of the respondents in all six countries indicate no religion as a response, but that this percentage rises as high as 15 % in Belgium and 32 % in the Netherlands.

As one could have expected, the largest majority of the people living in Belgium, France, Italy or Luxembourg who indicate a religious preference belong to the catholic religion. In Germany and in the Netherlands, more than half the population of church members are protestants, but the catholics are barely in a minority.

Among persons who are church members, the proportion of those who practice regularly, i.e. those who attend services at least once a week, is twice as high in Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands (more than 6 out of 10) as in Germany and in France. (See tables 14 and 15).

Table 14

CHURCH MEMBERSHIP AND ATTENDANCE

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Church membership : | 91 | 96 | 85 | 89 | 91 | 99 | 68 |
| - catholic | 69 | 43 | 83 | 84 | 90 | 98 | 31 |
| - protestant | 20 | 52 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 35 |
| - other | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | - | 2 |
| Church attendance : | | | | | | | |
| - go to church at least once a week | 37 | 29 | 51 | 23 | 56 | 52 | 42 |
| - occasionally during the year | 37 | 46 | 20 | 40 | 30 | 30 | 18 |
| - never | 17 | 21 | 14 | 26 | 5 | 17 | 8 |
| Belong to no church | 9 | 4 | 15 | 11 | 9 | 1 | 32 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 15

CHURCH MEMBERSHIP AND ATTENDANCE

(based on persons who indicate a church preference)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Church membership : | | | | | | | |
| - catholic religion | 76 | 45 | 98 | 95 | 99 | 98 | 46 |
| - protestant religion | 23 | 54 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 51 |
| - other religion | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Church attendance : | | | | | | | |
| - at least once a week | 41 | 30 | 60 | 26 | 61 | 53 | 62 |
| - occasionally during the year | 40 | 48 | 23 | 45 | 33 | 30 | 26 |
| - never | 19 | 22 | 17 | 29 | 6 | 17 | 12 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 7681 | 1941 | 1095 | 1813 | 1667 | 332 | 833 |

3 - EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA, DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONTACTS WITH
FOREIGN COUNTRIES

A. EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA

In the whole of the countries of the European Community almost seven persons out of ten claim to watch newsbroadcasts on television every day (48 %) or several times a week (20 %). Only 13 % never watch these programs.

Radio comes in second as a source of information : six persons out of ten say they listen to the news every day (45 %) or several times a week (16 %) ; 17 % never listen to radio news broadcasts.

The press takes third place : four persons out of ten read news about current events in the newspapers every day (27 %) or several times a week (14 %) ; 29 % never read them. (See table 16).

Table 16

EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Watch news broadcasts on television : | | | | | | | |
| - every day | 48 | 60 | 41 | 46 | 36 | 37 | 57 |
| - several times a week | 20 | 19 | 20 | 16 | 24 | 21 | 24 |
| - at least once a week | 11 | 8 | 13 | 11 | 16 | 11 | 7 |
| - less often | 8 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 4 |
| - never | 13 | 6 | 15 | 19 | 15 | 23 | 8 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Listen to the radio : | | | | | | | |
| - every day | 45 | 50 | 30 | 48 | 36 | 46 | 52 |
| - several times a week | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 20 | 16 | 13 |
| - at least once a week | 11 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 15 | 7 | 6 |
| - more rarely | 11 | 12 | 18 | 9 | 11 | 16 | 12 |
| - never | 17 | 14 | 27 | 18 | 18 | 15 | 17 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Read news about current events : | | | | | | | |
| - every day | 27 | 34 | 19 | 25 | 19 | 42 | 38 |
| - several times a week | 14 | 16 | 11 | 13 | 15 | 12 | 17 |
| - at least once a week | 13 | 12 | 9 | 15 | 13 | 9 | 12 |
| - less often | 17 | 21 | 19 | 14 | 14 | 18 | 18 |
| - never | 29 | 17 | 42 | 33 | 39 | 19 | 15 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

The degree of exposure to mass media can be calculated by attributing a coefficient of 4 to persons who say they keep informed "every day", 3 to those who answer "several times a week", the coefficient 2 for the response "once a week", 1 to the response "less often", and 0 to the "never" and then dividing this total by 100 .

(See table 17)

Table 17

DEGREE OF EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA

(maximum : $4,00 \times 3 = 12,00$)

| | Germany | Belgium | France | Italy | Luxembourg | Netherlands |
|------------|---------|---------|--------|-------|------------|-------------|
| Television | 3,20 | 2,61 | 2,72 | 2,57 | 2,41 | 3,18 |
| Radio | 2,75 | 2,05 | 2,66 | 2,45 | 2,62 | 2,71 |
| Newspapers | 2,29 | 1,46 | 1,83 | 1,61 | 2,40 | 2,45 |
| Total | 8,24 | 6,12 | 7,21 | 6,63 | 7,43 | 8,34 |
| Order | 2 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 1 |

This table shows that the Dutch public keeps highly informed, followed by the Germans. The Netherlands not only has the highest total score, but also the highest score for newspapers ; television and radio take second place in contrast with other countries.

In Germany, television and radio come in first in comparison with other countries, although the German public ranks only third insofar as newspaper reading is concerned.

The Italians and especially the Belgians have the lowest scores.

B. AMOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE

The amount of knowledge was measured by two questions, one asking about the name of government leaders of their country at the time of the survey (Prime Minister or Foreign Minister) and a second asking the number and the exact name of the member countries of the common Market.

Throughout the entire Community, nine persons out of ten correctly gave

Table 19

KNOWLEDGE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMON MARKET
(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Correctly named | 36 | 39 | 34 | 31 | 35 | 63 | 49 |
| Incorrectly named | 64 | 61 | 66 | 69 | 65 | 37 | 51 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

It is interesting to observe that the rank order of countries by the percentage of people who know the name of both political leaders corresponds rather well to that obtained by the degree of exposure to mass media. In the Netherlands, however, the name of the Prime Minister of the time was less well known than that of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Luns.

The relationship between the knowledge of the number and the names of the member states of the common Market is equally striking, although there are some exceptions. In Luxembourg, the membership of the common Market is best known, although this country ranks only third in its degree of exposure to mass media; this may be explained by the fact that in the five other countries, Luxembourg is least often recognized as a member of the common Market, a fact that its own inhabitants are likely to ignore. In France, we find the smallest percentage of persons who know the membership of the common Market, whereas this country ranks fourth in its exposure to mass media; it is possible that in some countries (mainly the "big ones") the degree of exposure to mass media is greater than the quantity of information about the European Community contained in messages transmitted by these media, or else that these messages are addressed more to national problems and presented to the public in a national setting (1).

-
- (1) It is noteworthy that information about the common Market, published in the newspapers, the radio or television are more often related to meetings of the European Community and are presented to the public, the journalists and news agencies of a given country by representatives to the EEC in a national context to the extent of giving the highest esteem and most prestigious role to the government in question.

Finally, if the degree of knowledge of the countries in the common Market is compared separately with the scores for each information source, one observes that the relationship is best for the press and worst for television ; indeed it is better for the press than for the total score for all three media taken together.

This evidence does not necessarily mean that the press provides better information than the radio or television, since it is likely that persons who are already well informed, perhaps because they already acquired an interest in politics, tend to read political commentary in the newspapers more frequently than those who are less interested. It is well known that radio and television act much more often to sensitize persons to issues than to inform them.

In comparing this rank ordering of countries with that obtained for participation in political life (table 4), one observes that it is exactly the same as that obtained for degree of exposure to the three information sources : the Netherlands lead, followed by Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and Belgium. Once again, the relationship is best for the ordering by newspaper reading, and worst for television (1). (See table 20).

Table 20

RANK-ORDER OF THE SIX BY DEGREE OF EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA,
DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE AND PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL LIFE

| N. | Degree of exposure | | | | Degree of knowledge | | | Participation in political life |
|-------|--------------------|-------|-------|-----|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--|
| | Total | Press | Radio | T V | Prime Minister | Foreign Minister | EEC membership | |
| | ① | ① | ② | ② | ③ | ① | ② | 1 |
| Germ. | ② | ③ | ① | ① | ① | ② | ③ | 2 |
| Lux. | ③ | ② | 4 | 6 | ② | ③ | ① | 3 |
| Fr. | 4 | 4 | ③ | ③ | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 |
| It. | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | - | - | 4 | 5 |
| Bel. | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

- (1) Of course, this comparison between countries probably does nothing more than translate differences in social structure (age, education, occupation, residence etc.). A socio-psychological analysis would require an examination of the correlations among the different variables for each respondent. This examination remains to be done.

C. CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sojourns abroad, too, may be considered as an important source of information as well as a significant variable in pro-european attitude formation. Nonetheless, the probability of going on sojourns abroad - be it for only a day's duration, as the question asked - depends on numerous factors such as the size of the country and the average purchasing power of its population. It is not surprising that proportionately more Luxembourgers go on sojourns abroad than do residents in the other countries. They are followed by the Dutch, and even though the Belgians live in a "small" country, geographically speaking, they obtain a lower score than the Germans. The French and the Italians travel far less often than the others. (See table 21).

An "index of familiarity with foreign countries", calculated as the average number of countries visited by each respondent, makes it possible to rank the countries as follows :

Index of Familiarity with Foreign Countries

| | |
|-------------|------|
| Luxembourg | 4,03 |
| Netherlands | 3,27 |
| Germany | 2,90 |
| Belgium | 2,76 |
| France | 2,08 |
| Italy | 1,15 |

Table 21

CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Have spent at least one day in : | | | | | | | |
| - no foreign country | 32 | 20 | 18 | 32 | 54 | 1 | 14 |
| - 1 foreign country | 18 | 15 | 17 | 23 | 18 | 13 | 14 |
| - 2 foreign countries | 14 | 16 | 16 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 16 |
| - 3 " " | 11 | 15 | 14 | 10 | 6 | 17 | 15 |
| - 4 " " | 8 | 11 | 14 | 7 | 3 | 15 | 11 |
| - 5 " " | 5 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 12 | 8 |
| - 6 " " | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 10 | 8 |
| - 7 " " | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 5 |
| - 8 " " | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 3 |
| - 9 " " and more | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 5 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 0 | - | - | - | - | 3 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

4 - ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

The notable characteristic of this survey is that it is not limited to collecting more or less vague opinions about general and superficial aspects of european unification in which the respondents feel more or less involved. The survey tried to aim higher by collecting more data, such as :

- attitudes toward the political unification of Europe,
- identification with national symbols,
- desired geographical definition of the common Market,
- desired degree of integration for a United Europe,
- image of the United States of Europe : expectations and fears
- evaluation of the effects of the common Market,
- degree of support for european unification.

A. POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

Four questions make it possible to identify, at first glance, general attitudes toward political unification : the evolution of the common Market into a political grouping in the form of the United States of Europe, the election of a european parliament by direct popular suffrage, the formation of a european government, and the election of a President of the United States of Europe belonging to a country other than one's own. A fifth question allows us to measure general commitment to european unification.

1° "Are you for or against the evolution of the common Market in a political form like the United States of Europe?"

In all the countries of the Community, seven persons out of ten and almost nine out of ten who expressed a (positive or negative) opinion are "for" this statement.

The highest percentage of positive responses were observed in Luxembourg and Italy. In regard to Luxembourg, the results are rather surprising and will be discussed further (1) ; in fact, we already know that this country is positioned after Germany, Netherlands and Italy in terms of high values obtained on the index

(1) See pages 90 and 91

of pro-european attitudes (1).

The lower percentages in Belgium and in France are not surprising : these two countries had the lowest scores in the two highest categories of the index. Both have the largest number of non-responses ("don't know or do not respond").

On the other hand, the percentage obtained in the Netherlands seems rather small, at first, compared to Luxembourg and Italy (See table 22).

If the non-responses are eliminated, thereby taking into account only positive and negative responses, one observes that, ranked immediately after Luxembourg and Italy, Germany and Belgium are practically equal, barely ahead of the Netherlands and France.

One may thus conclude that the majority of the europeans with an opinion - and 80 % of the respondents have one - are favorably predisposed toward the evolution of the common market toward a political grouping in the form of the United States of Europe (See table 23).

An examination of the results for young people of 16 to 20 years of age, on the one hand, and persons aged 21 and older, on the other, shows that youth more frequently have an opinion as well as a more favorable one than do older cohorts, but the difference is significant only in Luxembourg and Belgium (See table 24).

(1) This difference stresses the value of working with a well-constructed index and not with separate questions to which identical responses might have different meanings and levels of intensity. The question analyzed here is included in our index, though it is one of the "easiest" questions.

Table 22

EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON MARKET TOWARD A POLITICAL GROUPING
IN THE FORM OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE
 (Respondents aged 16 years and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 70 | 69 | 62 | 63 | 77 | 77 | 75 |
| Against | 10 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 6 | 5 | 14 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 20 | 21 | 28 | 24 | 17 | 18 | 11 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 23

EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON MARKET TOWARD A POLITICAL GROUPING
IN THE FORM OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE
 (all respondents who express an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 88 | 87 | 86 | 83 | 93 | 94 | 84 |
| Against | 12 | 13 | 14 | 17 | 7 | 6 | 16 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Table 24

EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON MARKET TOWARD A POLITICAL GROUPING
IN THE FORM OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

Differences in percentages between responses of young people aged
16 to 20 and those of the adult respondents

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|
| For | + 4 | - 2 | + 16 | + 4 | + 1 | + 19 | + 4 |
| Against | + 2 | + 1 | - 1 | + 4 | + 2 | - 5 | - 1 |
| Do not know or do not respond | - 6 | + 1 | - 15 | - 8 | - 3 | - 14 | - 3 |

If only those persons who expressed an opinion (positive or negative) are taken into account, the differences disappear almost completely, except for Luxembourg.

2° "Are you for or against election of a european Parliament
by direct popular suffrage, i.e. a parliament elected by
all citizens of the member countries?"

This question is important. In fact, it is included in most of the scales measuring the various aspects of pro-european attitudes ; it also forms part of the general index.

Almost two thirds of the interviewees respond positively (64 %) with the Italians and the Luxembourgers coming in first, followed by the Germans, the Dutch and the French, and finally by the Belgians in last place.

Between 20 to 30 % of the respondents expressed no opinion (See table 25).

Correlation analyses show that persons who desire maximum integration of to-day's nations in the Europe of tomorrow are all favorable to the election of a European Parliament by direct popular suffrage.

A positive response to this question tends to go along with the following attitudes :

- would regret the eventual disbandment of the common Market,
- expects that in a United States of Europe, the underprivileged would have more opportunity to get ahead,
- expects a higher standard of living in the United States of Europe,
- does not consider, however, the fight against inflation to be an important objective,
- but considers an improvement in the citizens' participation in government decisions as an important objective,
- is strongly identified with a political party,
- would certainly or probably vote for another political party, were the leaders of his party to take a different position on european unification,
- considers aid to underdeveloped countries as a top priority objective,
- humanization of our society is also considered as an objective with top priority,
- as well as the protection of the freedom of speech,
- tends to be favorably predisposed toward student demonstrations,
- lacks nationalist feelings.

Finally, we notice that a favorable attitude toward a european parliament is found more frequently among people who visited several (at least four) foreign countries.

Therefore, a response favorable to a european parliament elected by direct popular suffrage seems to be tied to two deep feelings, which are, on the one hand, the desire to see Europe integrated as far as possible and, on the other hand, the desire for as direct a democracy as possible. Furthermore, these factors are not independent. Thus, the hypothesis, stated at the end of the second phase of the research, is confirmed, namely that the desire for democratization is generally accompanied by truly pro-european feelings, whereas more authoritarian attitudes generally go together with more or less hidden anti-european feelings.

We observe in table 25 that it is, once again, in Belgium where one finds the highest percentage of persons who refuse to commit themselves, whereas this percentage is lower in Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

Taking into consideration only those persons who have expressed an opinion, the percentage of positive responses is higher in Italy (90 %), in Luxembourg (86 %) and Germany (85 %). In France (79 %) and especially the Netherlands (74 %),

the percentages are lower. (See table 26).

At first glance, the Dutch findings are surprising ; in fact, the score of this country on the pro-european index ranked it first after Germany. This seems to indicate that the Dutch public, no matter how pro-european it may be, is nonetheless very attached to its national institutions and is somewhat apprehensive about the effects of highly developed integration. The differences between youth (16 - 20 years of age) and the rest of the population also holds some surprises :

- whereas in Belgium and Germany the young people are more favorable to the election of a european parliament than the other respondents, the differences run in the opposite direction in the Netherlands ;
- in all countries, except in Germany, the percentage of the opponents to the european Parliament is slightly higher for young people, especially in Luxembourg ;
- even when non-responses are eliminated, one observes that this opposition is relatively stronger among youth, notably in Luxembourg. (See table 27).

It appears that we may suggest the hypothesis that the main reason for these differences, which shows young people in several countries to be less favorable to a European Parliament than their elders, does not stem from a desire for "complete integration", but rather from the desire for "democratization". Despite appearances, we must ask ourselves the question whether the new generation is as keen about democracy and its development through elections and too, perhaps, about the characteristic freedoms of this democracy as the preceding generations (1).

(1) Here we are only skimming over this problem of fundamental importance which merits further detailed comparative analysis of the phenomena of dissatisfaction and protest among youth in post-industrial societies.

Table 25

ELECTION OF A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
(Interviewees aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 64 | 63 | 56 | 59 | 71 | 70 | 60 |
| Against | 12 | 11 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 11 | 21 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 24 | 26 | 32 | 25 | 21 | 19 | 19 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 26

ELECTION OF A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
(based on persons expressing an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 84 | 85 | 82 | 79 | 90 | 86 | 74 |
| Against | 16 | 15 | 18 | 21 | 10 | 14 | 26 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Table 27

ELECTION OF A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
(Percentages differences in the responses of the young people aged 16 and 20 and the adult population)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|
| For | + 2 | + 9 | + 11 | + 1 | + 0 | + 3 | - 4 |
| Against | + 4 | 0 | + 5 | + 3 | + 5 | + 8 | + 1 |
| Do not know or do not respond | - 6 | - 9 | - 16 | - 4 | - 5 | - 11 | + 3 |

- 3° "Would you agree that above the government (of your country) there be a european government responsible for a common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economics ?"

This is the same type of question as the former one, but the element of "integration" ought to appear much more markedly than that of "democratization" which is not implied in the text. In fact, this question is different from the previous one in that persons who are responsive to the "power" aspects of a United Europe will easily respond in the affirmative.

At the level of the european Community considered as a whole, the percentage of positive responses (58 %) is lower than for the preceding responses (64 %). It is due to the fact that the previous question explicitly included two ideas, whereas this one was more precise.

Italians and Germans give a positive response more frequently than respondents in other countries. A clear, yet non-negligible minority of the Dutch and Luxembourgers more frequently express opposition : more than one third of persons interviewed over 40 % of those who express an opinion (1).

We also notice that in France, the percentage of favorable responses is relatively high, once we take into account the fact that this country came in last on the overall index of pro-european attitudes (2). (See tables 28 and 29)

As for the young people, they are slightly more favorable than the rest of the population in each country. One also notices a slightly greater proportion of unfavorable opinions among their elders in Luxembourg, Belgium and Italy. If non-responses are eliminated, the largest part of differences between youth and adults which we had stressed in the previous question vanishes ; this appears to confirm the hypothesis we stipulated regarding a certain reticence or a certain indifference of young people toward democracy as it is practiced in our countries. (See table 30).

-
- (1) In order to explain this relative disagreement among the Dutch, one might refer to the hypothesis expressed previously : apprehension about the effects of a highly integrated Europe (See page 64)
- (2) See table 2

Table 28

FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 58 | 56 | 52 | 53 | 67 | 47 | 49 |
| Against | 23 | 23 | 19 | 28 | 16 | 36 | 37 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 19 | 21 | 29 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 14 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 29

FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT

(based on persons who expressed an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 72 | 71 | 73 | 65 | 81 | 57 | 57 |
| Against | 28 | 29 | 27 | 35 | 19 | 43 | 43 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Table 30

FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT

Percentage differences in responses of the young people
aged 16 - 20 years and adults

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| For | + 4 | + 8 | + 4 | + 6 | + 1 | + 3 | + 3 |
| Against | + 2 | - 6 | + 6 | + 1 | + 6 | + 9 | - 3 |
| Do not know or do not respond | - 6 | - 2 | -10 | - 7 | - 7 | -12 | 0 |

- 4° "In the case of the election of a President of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, would you vote or not for a candidate of another nationality, provided that his personality and his program agreed better with your ideas rather those of candidates of your own nationality ?"

This question obviously belongs to the same group as the two previous ones. At first glance, this question measures rather accurately a favorable attitude to european integration. In fact, the respondent is not asked to give his opinion on the principle of a presidential election by popular vote, but to give somewhat of an idea of the extent to which he would be willing to do away with his national and even perhaps his nationalist feelings. The ranking of countries by the percentage of persons who agree with this statement corresponds more or less, in fact, with the average scores on the pro-european scale as given above in Table 2, though France ranks higher (1).
(See tables 31 and 32).

In all the countries, young people respond more favorably than adults, i.e. for the election for a foreign president. Of the four questions related to european political unification presently under examination, this question reveals the sharpest difference between youngsters and adults. It reinforces the hypothesis which proposed that the youngsters' turn of mind is better characterized by the weakening of nationalist feelings than by the strengthening of definitely pro-european feelings.
(See table 33)

-
- (1) It is worthwhile to stress that this question, as all the others too, is not as good a measure of pro-european attitudes as the scores in the overall index. In fact, each question contains elements which bear no direct relation to pro-european attitudes. In this instance, for example, a feeling of national pride is set in opposition to the personality and political program of the president of the United States of Europe, without giving any details about this program or his personality. It is then possible to believe that some respondents who are ideologically involved but not necessarily favorable to the unification of Europe would prefer to vote for a foreign leader of the same party rather than for a compatriot who might be a political opponent. The presence of this question in most pro-european scales only shows that a goodly amount of the variance in responses to this question may be attributed to pro-european attitudes.

Table 31

VOTE FOR A PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE OF ANOTHER
NATIONALITY

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 66 | 70 | 54 | 63 | 64 | 68 | 71 |
| Against | 19 | 14 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 19 | 19 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 15 | 16 | 23 | 14 | 14 | 13 | 10 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 32

VOTE FOR A PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE OF ANOTHER
NATIONALITY

(Based on respondents who expressed an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 78 | 83 | 70 | 73 | 74 | 78 | 79 |
| Against | 22 | 17 | 30 | 27 | 26 | 22 | 21 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Table 33

VOTE FOR A PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE OF ANOTHER
NATIONALITY

Percentage differences in responses of young people aged 16 to
20 and adults

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| For | + 12 | + 10 | + 14 | +10 | +18 | +18 | + 1 |
| Against | - 7 | - 6 | - 6 | - 7 | -14 | -11 | - 2 |
| Do not know or do not respond | - 5 | - 4 | - 8 | - 3 | - 4 | - 7 | + 1 |

Table 35

PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN YOUNGSTERS (16-20 years old)
AND ADULTS (aged 21 and more) RESPONSES TO THE FOUR QUESTIONS
ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNIFICATION

(taking into account only those persons who expressed an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| - Creation of the United States of Europe | - 1 | - 2 | + 3 | - 3 | - 2 | + 6 | + 2 |
| - Election of a european Parliament | - 4 | + 2 | - 3 | - 3 | - 5 | - 9 | - 2 |
| - Acceptance of a european government | 0 | + 8 | - 4 | + 2 | - 5 | - 4 | + 3 |
| -Vote in favor of a foreign candidate | + 9 | + 8 | +11 | + 9 | +17 | +13 | + 2 |

5° "Would you say you are very favorable, rather favorable, indifferent, rather unfavorable or very unfavorable to european unification ?"

Responses to this question are largely very favorable, but the true value of these responses is rather poor, because of the very general character of the question which gives no information about the kind of united Europe involved. It is an "easy" question which naturally appears in all scales measuring pro-european attitudes.

More than one third of the respondents (34 %) say they are very favorable to european unification and 40 % are rather favorable, which means that throughout all of the six countries of the Community, three persons out of four are inclined to accept - if not support - unification.

As predicted, in Luxembourg, Italy and Germany, the percentage of very favorable responses is the highest. However, what is not explained at first glance is why in the Netherlands this percentage is relatively low and of the same magnitude as that in Belgium. In the Netherlands, one also observes a relatively high percentage of unfavorable responses : 10 % compared to 8 % in France.

Would it be that in Holland there is an active minority group which is opposed to european unification ? In the absence of exact answers to this question, we have to propose the hypothesis that some unadmitted, nationalist (or ethnocentric) feelings exist in this country, or else that there is disagreement about the way european unification has been undertaken so far. This second hypothesis, however, appears to us as the least likely since, as we shall see later, it is in Holland where one observes the highest percentage of persons who would feel "very sorry" if the common Market were disbanded. (See table 36)

Table 36

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Very favorable | 34 | 39 | 31 | 24 | 40 | 52 | 30 |
| Rather favorable | 40 | 37 | 35 | 46 | 38 | 24 | 44 |
| Indifferent | 11 | 13 | 16 | 11 | 7 | 14 | 11 |
| Rather unfavorable | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 7 |
| Very unfavorable | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 9 | 6 | 13 | 11 | 10 | 6 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

B. ATTACHMENT TO NATIONAL SYMBOLS

One question makes it possible to measure approximately an attitude which one may think runs in the opposite direction of pro-european attitudes : the strength of attachment to certain symbols involving a sense of national identification : currency, olympic team, flag.

"Would you be favorable, opposed or indifferent that the currency (of your country) be replaced, that the team (of your country) sent to the next Olympics be part and parcel of a european team, that the flag (of your country) be replaced by a european flag in important ceremonies ?"

More than half the respondents throughout all of the countries of the european Community come out in favor of a european currency, whereas only 23 % are opposed to it. Apart from Luxembourg, where a very high percentage of people is favorable to a european currency (63 %) is found, the results are fairly similar in the various countries. The special case of Luxembourg probably can be explained by the fact that her currency is closely linked to Belgium's.

On the other hand, rather strong differences in the matter of forming european olympic teams among countries are observable. A little more than one fourth (27 %) of the european public is favorable to it, whereas 43 % are opposed. The ratio of partisans to opponents is the highest in Luxembourg for reasons which are easy to understand, but surprisingly enough, this country is followed by France. Another surprise is that this ratio is the lowest in Germany and especially in the Netherlands, the country which, as we know, ranks first in the scores of the pro-european attitude index.

The percentage of favorable attitudes toward a european flag is, for all respondents, the same for the Olympic team, namely 27 %. On the other hand, the percentage of opponents reaches 52 %. They are found, first of all, in France (61 %), but also in Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (57 %). In this last country, only 19 % support it. One can state that the kind of nationalism symbolized by the flag is weaker in Germany and Belgium, and stronger in France and the Netherlands. This evidence supports the hypothesis, stated at the outset of this study, that nationalism and pro-european attitudes do not lie on the same dimension, but represent two distinct dimensions.

In psychological terms, the motivations tending to create a desire for european unification are not the same as the motivations related to national pride. Nationalist motivations, when potent, clearly are opposed to pro-european motivations,

but both can co-exist and create tension or friction. In the case of the Netherlands, it seems that the hypothesis formulated above can be refined : in this country, there are strong motivations supporting european unification held by the majority of the population, yet there are also very strong, latent and less easily detected, national feelings which might become visible as european unification takes form.

This is a phenomenon often observed in studies of motivations. In these studies which almost always have a utilitarian, generally commercial objective, one can distinguish the attraction generated by an object from the resistance impeding acquisition of the motivation. Thus a motivation which makes an object attractive is considered as different from one which deflects a possible buyer away from this object.

From this point of view, a favorable attitude toward european unification may be considered similar to its acquisition. There are four conceivable attitude profiles :

- strong attraction, weak resistance,
- strong attraction, strong resistance
- weak attraction, weak resistance
- weak attraction, strong resistance.

The Dutch public, which is well-informed and politically mobilized, tends to reflect the second profile, whereas the Belgian public tends toward the third. (See table 37).

Table 37

ATTACHMENT TO THREE NATIONAL SYMBOLS :
CURRENCY , THE OLYMPIC TEAM AND THE FLAG
 (Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| <u>European Currency</u> | | | | | | | |
| Favorable | 51 | 52 | 49 | 51 | 51 | 63 | 47 |
| Opposed | 23 | 26 | 23 | 23 | 21 | 13 | 23 |
| Indifferent | 18 | 14 | 21 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 27 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 5 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Ratio Fav. / Opp. | 2,22 | 2,00 | 2,13 | 2,22 | 2,43 | 4,85 | 2,04 |
| <u>European Olympic Team</u> | | | | | | | |
| Favorable | 27 | 25 | 26 | 34 | 24 | 53 | 20 |
| Opposed | 43 | 51 | 36 | 36 | 41 | 20 | 54 |
| Indifferent | 22 | 18 | 27 | 22 | 25 | 21 | 23 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 8 | 6 | 11 | 8 | 10 | 6 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Ratio Fav. / Opp. | 0,63 | 0,49 | 0,72 | 0,94 | 0,59 | 2,65 | 0,37 |
| <u>European Flag</u> | | | | | | | |
| Favorable | 27 | 35 | 26 | 22 | 24 | 26 | 19 |
| Opposed | 52 | 41 | 48 | 61 | 57 | 57 | 57 |
| Indifferent | 15 | 18 | 20 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 21 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Ratio Fav. / Opp. | 0,52 | 0,85 | 0,54 | 0,36 | 0,42 | 0,46 | 0,33 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

C. DESIRED GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COMMON MARKET

Two questions were asked on this subject : one concerning Great Britain's joining the common Market and the other about different countries which the public would like or not to see join the common Market.

1° "Are you for or against Great Britain's entry into the common Market ?"

In February and March 1970, almost seven respondents out of ten throughout the countries of the european Community and nine out of ten among those who expressed an opinion were favorable to Great Britain's entry into the common Market. The highest percentage is in the Netherlands and the lowest in France, though the gap is much smaller if only those respondents who express an opinion are taken into account. (See tables 38 and 39).

If we take into account again only the people expressing an opinion and compare the data in table 39 with those in table 23, we notice that the percentage of persons favorable to Great Britain's entry into the common Market in Belgium and in Holland exceeds that of those who support the political development of the common Market toward the United States of Europe. This tendency also exists in Germany. In France and in Italy, on the other hand, an opposite tendency is observable.

Although the differences are very small, they seem significant. One might propose the hypothesis that differences in attitudes toward Great Britain and the British plays a more important role than european views themselves. A positive response to the question about Great Britain's entry appears related to a relatively high degree of interest in politics.(1)

(1) See chapter II, pages 143 to 145.

Table 38ATTITUDE TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO THECOMMON MARKET

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 67 | 70 | 65 | 60 | 65 | 72 | 82 |
| Against | 11 | 9 | 7 | 15 | 12 | 6 | 7 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 22 | 21 | 28 | 25 | 23 | 22 | 11 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 39ATTITUDE TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET

(Respondents who express an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| For | 86 | 89 | 90 | 80 | 84 | 92 | 92 |
| Against | 14 | 11 | 10 | 20 | 16 | 8 | 8 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

2° "Among the following countries, which do not belong to the common Market, are there any you would like to see join it ? Which one ?" (Choice indicated on a list)

For all of the interviewees, Switzerland and Denmark are most frequently chosen on the list of six countries proposed (63 and 59 % respectively). These are two countries in Western Europe, small in size and considered as democracies. The percentage of votes favorable to Spain is considerably lower (39 %), although higher than the percentages obtained by the three countries in eastern Europe indicated on the list : Eastern Germany (25 %), Poland (23 %) and the Soviet Union (18 %).

There are some rather marked differences between the attitudes of the respondents in the countries of the Community. On the average, Belgians and Luxembourgers indicate less than two countries, which seems to show that the public at large does not feel very favorable to enlarging the common Market, at least insofar as the present notion is concerned. At the other extreme, we find the Germans and the French, followed by the Dutch, who appear more open-minded. The rank-order of the countries is very different from the one we found concerning the entry of Great Britain into the common Market : both kinds of expansion, in fact, scarcely have anything in common. In one case, it is a matter of expressing one's opinion on a definite, forthcoming issue, and in the other case, to express oneself on the eventual, but rather improbable membership of countries as different as Spain, Switzerland and the Soviet Union.
(See table 40).

The degree of familiarity or proximity of one country to another seems to influence considerably the choice of the other possible, future partners in the common Market. Thus, we observe that almost eight out of ten Dutchmen and almost as many Germans express the wish to see Denmark enter the common Market. On the other hand, only four Italians out of ten, express themselves in the same direction.

The differences between what one may call the popularity ratings are far less marked for Switzerland, which is probably due to its rather central location in Europe, to its great notoriety and to its particularly favorable image. (1)

(1) We shall see further that, of the six countries cited, the Swiss obtain the highest percentage of trust accorded in each of the six countries of the EEC.
See pp. 118 -121.

The percentage of respondents recommending the entry of Spain into the common Market is lower in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium than in Italy, Germany and, most of all, France. Indeed, in France we also find the highest proportion of people who desire the entry of so-called european popular democracies into the common Market : approwimately one Frenchman out of four and even 28 % when it comes to Poland. In Western Germany, almost 30 % of the respondents would like to see the German Democratic Republic join it, but only 16 % wish to see the Soviet Union join.

Observe that in Luxembourg and Holland , the countries leaning toward communism obtain percentages as small as in Belgium, though other countries have been chosen much more often.

The choice of countries in eastern Europe as desirable partners in the common Market probably depends upon several factors, one of which is, without a doubt, the degree of familiarity with it(Eastern Germany in West Germany and Poland in France) and another, which is the size of the party and of the communist electorate in the country where the respondents are interviewed (France and Italy). In each country of the european Community, it is interesting to compare the total votes received by the three western countries, on the one hand, and bu the three eastern countries, on the other. The more hospitable the public of each country is toward western rather than toward eastern countries, the higher the ratio. The three Benelux countries have a higher value on the index of relative western orientation than the three large countries ; after the Benelux, Western Germany is the least oriented toward the East ; its orientation still is largely influenced by its relations with Eastern Germany.

Index of relative western orientation

| | |
|-------------|------|
| Luxembourg | 3,58 |
| Netherlands | 3,54 |
| Belgium | 3,09 |
| Germany | 2,68 |
| Italy | 2,29 |
| France | 2,07 |

Table 40COUNTRIES ONE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ENTER THE COMMON MARKET

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Denmark | 59 | 76 | 46 | 52 | 43 | 54 | 78 |
| Spain | 39 | 42 | 30 | 45 | 33 | 25 | 29 |
| Eastern Germany | 25 | 29 | 16 | 26 | 22 | 13 | 16 |
| Poland | 23 | 24 | 15 | 28 | 19 | 15 | 18 |
| U. S. S. R. | 18 | 16 | 12 | 23 | 18 | 12 | 16 |
| Switzerland | 63 | 67 | 57 | 62 | 59 | 64 | 70 |
| None of these countries | 5 | 3 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 3 |
| Do not know or do not answer | 15 | 12 | 22 | 14 | 19 | 20 | 12 |
| Total of Western countries | 161 | 185 | 133 | 159 | 135 | 143 | 177 |
| Total of Eastern countries | 66 | 69 | 43 | 77 | 59 | 40 | 50 |
| Total of above-mentioned countries | 227 | 254 | 176 | 236 | 194 | 183 | 227 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

D. DEGREE OF INTEGRATION DESIRED FOR UNITED EUROPE

Theoretically, one can distinguish three ways of organizing relations between states and peoples within a Europe which is politically united or in the process of uniting : intergovernmental cooperation ; the setting up of a "supranational" government of a confederal or federal kind ; the establishment of a unitary european state.

The question asked makes it possible to judge the public's views of these three formulas.

Contrary to what one might have feared, the percentage of non-responses is not very high for a relatively complicated question like this one : depending on the country, one to two persons out of ten have no opinion, with a minimum for Holland (8 %) and a maximum for Belgium (20 %).

More than one third of the people expressing an opinion chose the solution advocating a european government in charge of the most important matters, with each country keeping its national government to handle particular problems.

The proportion of respondents who prefer that each national government retain its sovereignty, by reducing cooperation to intergovernmental meetings for decisions on common policy, is about the same in the different countries : less than two persons out of ten.

Finally, the advocates of full integration implying the substitution of national governments by a european government are even more of a minority : in France and Luxembourg, they are the least numerous, and the most numerous in the Netherlands and Germany.

Responses to this question are of the greatest importance : they show that citizens in the countries of the Community are much more involved than is sometimes expected and that public support for european unification reflects a "more supranational" way of organizing relations among the states, governments and peoples than is presently practised within the european Community.
(See tables 41 and 42).

Table 41

DEGREE OF INTEGRATION DESIRED FOR UNITED EUROPE

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| A. There is no government at the european level, but the governments of each country meet regularly to decide upon common policy. | 16 | 16 | 14 | 18 | 13 | 19 | 18 |
| B. There is a european government responsible for the most important matters, but each country retains its own government responsible for its own problems. | 56 | 52 | 51 | 62 | 57 | 63 | 58 |
| C. There is a european government responsible for all matters and the member countries no longer have a national government. | 11 | 15 | 9 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 13 |
| D. None of these formula | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| E. Do not know or do not respond | 13 | 13 | 20 | 10 | 16 | 12 | 8 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 42DEGREE OF INTEGRATION DESIRED FOR UNITED EUROPE

(Respondents who express a preference)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| A. The governments of each country meet regularly | 19 | 19 | 19 | 21 | 16 | 22 | 20 |
| B. One european government handles the most important matters | 68 | 63 | 69 | 71 | 71 | 72 | 65 |
| C. One european government handles all matters | 13 | 18 | 12 | 8 | 13 | 6 | 15 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

E. IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE : HOPES AND FEARS

What we just observed supports all previous surveys in that the vast majority of "Europeans" are in favor of the uniting of Europe and even support some kind of supranational organization of a united Europe. One criticism, however, is often made of surveys like this one : do the respondents know what it is all about ? Do they feel concerned or involded ? What image do thy have of a united Europe, and exactly what do they expect ?

At first, one possible response is that the percentage of "don't know" or "don't answer" is not very high : this is already one indication of an awareness of concern and involvement. In the instance of the four questions, for example, concerning the evolution of the common Market toward a form of the United States of Europe, the election of the European Parliament by direct universal election, the setting up of a european government above the national governments and voting for a "foreign" candidate to the office of president of the United States of Europe, the mean percentage of persons not expressing an opinion was nearly 20 % for all of the Community countries (28 % in Belgium and 14 % in the Netherlands). For the question concerning one's general attitude toward european unification, the non-response rate was about 9 % (13 % in Belgium and 5 % in the Netherlands).

Yet it is still possible to object that even the respondents expressing themselves (be it positively or negatively) have a vague, unreal notion of european unification, a notion reflecting, perhaps, an ideal detached from reality.

To respond to these objections, we asked the following question which consists of presenting to the respondents a certain number of opinions, twelve exactly, to which they should respond by indicating the extent of their agreement or disagreement : "strongly agrees", "agrees", "disagrees", and "strongly disagrees" as well as non-response. (1)

One first finding is that the majority of the respondents (more than eight out of ten) reaffirms his national pride : the percentage is 82 % throughout all the countries in the Community (92 % in Luxembourg and 71 % in Germany).

Conservatives - namely those who are reluctant to see any change in the present situation, those who fear certain negative effects of european integration (loss of national culture and identity, increase in the cost of living, and unemployment), and also those who believe european unification is impossible because of the diversity of its languages - represent two to three persons out of ten.

(1) See complete results in annex (table 1).

Luxembourgers appear to be the most conservative, followed by the Belgians and the Dutch. The Italians are the most open to change.

About one person out of two express resigned or ethnocentric kinds of opinions which are very close to conservatism : 55 % agree that "one can't change anything about the fact that the strong always rule over the weak" and 46 % agree that there are too many foreigners in their country.

When it comes to pro-european attitudes, which represent a clear majority, these seem to be organized around five major images or motivations :

- Europe, as a third power between America and the U.S.S.R. : 67 % of the respondents agree (69 to 64 % in Germany, Belgium, Italy and France, 57 % in the Netherlands, and 48 % in Luxembourg) ;
- Europe as a means for european scientists to catch up with the Americans : 62 % of the respondents agree ;
- Europe as a means to improve the level of the most underprivileged groups : 61 % of the respondents agree ;
- Europe as a first step toward world government which would eliminate war (66 to 54 % in Germany, Belgium, Italy and France, 47 % in the Netherlands, and 40 % in Luxembourg) ;
- Europe as a means of improving the standard of living for all : 59 % of the respondents agree (71 % in Italy).

In order to facilitate the reading of the results and to underline the differences among items and countries, the distribution of the percentage obtained is summarized in the following table. The responses "strongly agrees" or "strongly disagrees" were given a coefficient of 2 ; the responses "agrees" or "disagrees", a coefficient of 1 ; the difference between the total of positive and negative responses were then divided by the percentage of the respondents who expressed an opinion (1).

(See table 43).

(1) Example, for the entire european Community and for the first item ("I am proud to be German, or Belgian etc.") :

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|------|------------------------|-----|
| - strongly agrees | 55 % | multiplied by 2 equals | 110 |
| - agrees | 27 % | " | 27 |
| - disagree | 8 % | " | 8 |
| - strongly disagrees | 5 % | multiplied by 2 equals | 10 |
| - Do not know or do not respond | 5 % | | |

The index is obtained as follows :
$$\frac{(110 + 27) - (8 + 10)}{(100 - 5)} = 1,25$$

Table 43
IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE
FEARS AND EXPECTATIONS (1)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| I am proud to be (from this or that country) | 1,25 | 0,82 | 1,55 | 1,49 | 1,42 | 1,71 | 1,48 |
| The United States of Europe should become a third power, equal to the USA and the USSR | 0,98 | 0,97 | 1,24 | 0,94 | 1,00 | 0,51 | 0,55 |
| Within the United States of Europe, european scientists would be able to catch up with the Americans | 0,81 | 0,81 | 0,63 | 0,83 | 0,84 | 0,63 | 0,53 |
| Within the United States of Europe the most underprivileged groups of the population would have better chances to improve their status | 0,81 | 0,68 | 0,91 | 0,69 | 1,00 | 0,62 | 0,73 |
| In the United States of Europe, the standard of living would probably be higher | 0,78 | 0,44 | 0,99 | 0,73 | 1,15 | 0,68 | 0,58 |
| The United States of Europe would represent a first step toward world government which would eliminate war | 0,64 | 0,89 | 0,88 | 0,44 | 0,62 | 0,05 | 0,20 |
| One cannot change the fact that the strong will always rule over the weak | 0,32 | 0,52 | 0,72 | 0,54 | 0,13 | 0,97 | 0,32 |
| In principle, I have nothing against foreign workers, but there are really too many in our country | 0,05 | 0,29 | 0,85 | 0,52 | -1,14 | 0,29 | 0,24 |
| In the present state of affairs, all is well with us, so why change? | -0,55 | -0,12 | 0,03 | -0,64 | -1,07 | 0,34 | -0,33 |
| Within the United States of Europe the various peoples would run the risk of losing their culture and their identity | -0,55 | -0,51 | -0,39 | -0,52 | -0,86 | -0,51 | 0,06 |
| In the United States of Europe, the cost of living would be higher, along with a greater risk of unemployment | -0,81 | -0,77 | -0,57 | -0,71 | -1,06 | -0,54 | -0,53 |
| European unification is impossible since we speak different languages | -0,89 | -0,99 | -0,70 | -0,75 | -0,94 | -1,00 | -0,72 |

(1) For the method of calculating the summary coefficient corresponding to each item and country, see the note on the preceding page.

The items are ranked here in descending order of the mean values obtained by the countries of the European Community.

In all the countries except Germany, the item which obtains the highest score is a nationalist item, reflecting a feeling opposed to a favorable attitude toward european unification. This item belongs to the same group as the one which expresses pessimism about european unification because of the language differences and the one expressing the feeling that there are too many foreigners in the country. In Germany, two more items expressing a favorable attitude toward european unification obtain a larger number of votes : they involve the wish to see Europe become a third power equal to the United States and the Soviet Union, and the perception of United Europe as a first step toward world government which would eliminate war.

The perception of United Europe as a third world power ranks second in popularity among the public throughout the countries in the European Community. However, this image is far less popular in Luxembourg and the Netherlands than in the other countries. A perception which is more or less tied to the idea of a third power would mean that, in the United States of Europe, europeans scientists would be able to catch up with the Americans. This opinion also obtains a large number of positive votes in all the countries. In Belgium, however, we observe at the same time the largest percentage of advocates of the third power and a relatively small percentage of persons who believe that european scientists could catch up with the Americans ; this difference is due to the high percentage of "non-responses" to this last question.

The notion that european unification could mean a first step toward a greater world unity and toward universal peace also obtains strong support, mostly in Germany, and surprisingly enough, in Belgium. The French public is a little more sceptical about it ; the Dutch and Luxembourg public, even more so (1).

The feeling that the domination of the weak by the strong is a sort of unchangeable law is related to a fairly negative attitude toward european unification. In all the small countries, nonetheless, the proportion of positive responses is higher than that of the negative ones, especially in Luxembourg and Belgium ; the

(1) The results obtained by means of this item have to be interpreted cautiously. The objective of the question was to measure the presence and the intensity of a certain notion of a united Europe viewed as a world power qualitatively different from the other powers and as a power whose strength would, at first, not be economic, military or political, but rather moral. It is uncertain whether this item accurately measures this notion. In fact, in this instance we find that it shows no negative correlation with the item referring to Europe as a third world power. Moreover, this item is only very indirectly related to those items which measure, more surely, favorable attitudes toward european unification.

Italian public responds more positively to this statement.

The last item where the proportion of positive responses is higher than the negative responses is the one which expresses reservations about foreign workers. This item definitely measures a conservative attitude. It is normal that Italy is an exception, since Italy has a negligible number of foreign workers and is a country of emigrants. We observe that Belgium has the highest score on this item, with France taking second place.

The statement which most clearly measures this conservative attitude is the item stating that there is no reason to change the present state of affairs. The highest positive scores on this item are observed in Luxembourg and Belgium. On the other hand, quite clearly in France and Italy, the nays have it ; these instances undoubtedly ought to be seen as stemming from a correlation with the existence of a powerful communist movement in these two countries rather than as a direct expression, at least in Italy, of dissatisfaction with the present or of pessimism about the future (1).

The fear that european unification might result in the loss of cultural identity does not represent a wide spread objection among the countries of the European Community. Everywhere the score on this item is negative, with the exception of Holland where, once again, we find a kind of nationalism and latent ethnocentrism mentioned above (2).

The belief that the unification of Europe runs the risk of increasing the cost of living and unemployment is not widespread. The proportion of those who agree is a little higher in the Benelux countries than in the "large" countries. In Italy, this proportion is particularly low ; this is confirmation of the Italians' optimism regarding the positive effects of european unification on their standard of living.

Agreement with the belief that european unification is impossible because of the diversity of languages spoken by the european peoples is not only a recognition of a difficult problem, but also a symptom of unfavorable attitudes toward unification. However, of all the items in this series, this one is the least approved. That agreement with this item is slightly higher in France and Belgium is understandable, yet the rather high figure in Holland confirms once again the hypothesis, presented above, regarding ethnocentric tendencies in this country.

(1) See pages 99 and 100

(2) See pages 64 and 66.

The data in table 43 make it possible to see somewhat more clearly the structure of the public's attitudes in each of the six countries, at least in the form of hypotheses.

- The German public differs from the other countries in the lower averages on items expressing reservations about european unification. On the other hand, this positive motivation seems to be characterized less by economic aspects (better opportunity for the underprivileged, improvement of the standard of living) than by political aspects.

- The Belgian public seems to be as attracted by the positive effects of unification as the German public, but with greater reservation. A large segment of the public responds conservatively. Belgians appear to be particularly sensitive to the effects of unification on the standard of living. Nevertheless, note that these tendencies were based on those respondents who expressed an opinion. Indeed, the proportion of persons who express no opinion is highest in Belgium. This is, along with France, the lowest of all the countries of the European Community (1). The findings examined here allow us to conclude that this low average must be attributable to the indifference of the greater part of the Belgian public and to the existence of conservative reflexes in the other part rather than to the lack of attraction to the idea of european unification itself.

- The French public is less conservative than the Belgian. Resistance to unification also is less, but here we also find a smaller proportion of persons who are sensitive to the factors which may make european unification attractive. One exception concerns the possibility that, thanks to unification, Europe can close the technological gap with the United States.

- The Italian public also is not characterized by strong resistance to notions concerning unification. In regard to its attractiveness, this public seems particularly sensitive to promises of improvement in prosperity and the standard of living within the context of the european Community's development .

- The Luxembourg public is an exception. It is relatively conservative and, moreover, it seems slightly less sensitive to the motives for unification presented in the list.

(1) See table 2.

This is a poor explanation of its rather high score on the overall index (1), but the particular position of Luxembourg within the Community has to be taken into consideration. The latent nationalism and particularisms of the Luxembourgers cannot be of the same nature as those in the other countries. Even at the level of the mass public, the Luxembourg people must be more aware of their dependent position than other European peoples. They are accustomed, for example, to the frequent use of several currencies ; indeed, currency can be considered as one of the principal symbols of national sovereignty. Thus an acceptable hypothesis is that for the Luxembourg people, the changes European unification will bring about do not seem particularly important. If this hypothesis were verified, it would mean that attitudes which run against the formation of pro-European attitudes in other countries (nationalism, social or political conservatism) do not generate any real resistance in Luxembourg.

- Lastly, in a first look at the Dutch public, we notice that the percentage of persons who respond is considerably higher than in the other countries. This means that the segment of the Dutch population corresponding to those groups who abstain from responding in other countries has a stronger influence on the distribution of responses than other countries. This segment of the Dutch population is probably responsible for the fact that we notice a more important particularistic reflex in the Dutch public than among most of the other countries. In the Netherlands, a non-negligible part of the population shows awareness of national identity which is probably more socio-cultural in character than of the nationalist type, yet which runs the risk of engendering strong reactions, if the cultural and perhaps moral identity of the Dutch people seemed threatened. As indicated above, it is a latent feeling, since to present, no real nor eventual threat has been felt by that segment of the population which would be responsive to it. (2)

(1) See table 2

(2) The analysis of nationalism, or more precisely, of feelings of national identity among the small countries of the EEC has not yet been carried out.

F. ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE COMMON MARKET AND DEGREE OF ATTACHMENT
TO THE COMMON MARKET

Two questions made it possible to measure the attitudes toward the common Market : one had to do with estimating the effects of the common Market on the respondents' standard of living, the other with evaluating the degree of attachment to the common Market.

- 1° "Do you think that, up to now, the common Market has had a very favorable, rather favorable, rather unfavorable or very unfavorable effect upon your standard of living ?"

Responses to this question do not often appear in the scales measuring favorable attitudes toward european unification. One reason is, undoubtedly, the fact that 40 % of the european public is unable to respond to this question. In Belgium and France, almost half the respondents do not express an opinion. We can thus think that persons who give the cautious response of "rather favorable effects" are not very sure of their response.

Therefore, although the vast majority of the respondents is favorable to european unification and even, has, as we have seen, a rather precise image of the forms unification ought to take and of the objectives it might attain, the effects of the common Market on the standard of living are scarcely perceived.

These findings might mean that the effects of the common Market are really weak at the level of the "man in the street" or else, even though non negligible in effect, they are hardly perceived. The first interpretation is scarcely plausible, if what is known about increased exchanges between the countries in the common Market is taken into account, yet from our point of view, what is important is less the objective situation than the image that is perceived. In fact, by eliminating non-responses, one observes that the favorable effects are predominant. The non-responses are undoubtedly given by respondents who are not sufficiently informed or else badly integrated into a society whose constraints and injustices are perceived in a undifferentiated way. One also observes that in the three countries where the index of exposure to mass media is the highest (Holland, Germany and Luxembourg), non-response is the least frequent. (See tables 44 and 45).

Table 44

ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE COMMON MARKET ON THE
STANDARD OF LIVING

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Very favorable effects | 5 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
| Rather favorable effects | 37 | 43 | 36 | 30 | 36 | 42 | 45 |
| Rather unfavorable effects | 14 | 11 | 8 | 18 | 12 | 13 | 22 |
| Very unfavorable effects | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 5 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 40 | 36 | 48 | 46 | 44 | 37 | 23 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 45

ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF THE COMMON MARKET ON THE
STANDARD OF LIVING

(based on respondents expressing an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Very favorable effects | 8 | 10 | 12 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 6 |
| Rather favorable effects | 62 | 67 | 69 | 56 | 64 | 67 | 58 |
| Rather unfavorable effects | 23 | 17 | 15 | 33 | 22 | 21 | 30 |
| Very unfavorable effects | 7 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 3 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

- 2° "If you were told to-morrow that the common Market is being abandoned, would you feel very sorry, a little sorry, indifferent or relieved ?"

Although favorable effects of the common Market are perceived by only four persons out of ten in the countries of the common Market, the public feels attached to it. Six persons out of ten would feel sorry if the common Market were to disappear. Thus, even among those persons who did not respond to the question on the effects of the common Market or who attribute unfavorable effects to it, some are favorably predisposed toward it.

One must not hide from view, however, that this attachment is very strong, and that the proportion of those who would feel very sorry represents only four people out of ten in the Netherlands and in Germany, and only two out of ten in Luxembourg, France and Italy.

The percentage of persons who would feel relieved does not differ very much from country to country and remains very small : an average of 5 %.

The people who are indifferent represent one fourth of the respondents ; they are relatively numerous in Belgium (32 %) and few in Germany (16 %). (See tables 46 and 47).

The multivariate analysis demonstrates that responses to this question are part of the main scales measuring attitudes toward european unification. Indifference or relief compose the three scales measuring negative attitudes. However, there are some indications that those persons who would feel very sorry have a more parsimonious and somewhat Western view of to-morrow's Europe than those who respond differently.

Table 46

DEGREE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH THE COMMON MARKET
(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Were the common Market abandoned, would you feel : | | | | | | | |
| - very sorry | 28 | 38 | 27 | 21 | 22 | 20 | 40 |
| - somewhat sorry | 34 | 30 | 26 | 37 | 38 | 37 | 28 |
| - indifferent | 24 | 16 | 32 | 30 | 28 | 28 | 20 |
| - relieved | 5 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| - Do not know or do not respond | 9 | 10 | 12 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 7 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 47

DEGREE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH THE COMMON MARKET
(based on respondents expressing an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Would feel : | | | | | | | |
| - very sorry | 31 | 42 | 31 | 23 | 24 | 22 | 43 |
| - somewhat sorry | 37 | 33 | 30 | 40 | 42 | 42 | 30 |
| - indifferent | 26 | 18 | 36 | 32 | 31 | 31 | 22 |
| - relieved | 6 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

G. DEGREE OF ATTACHMENT TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

The question was worded as follows :

"Would you be willing to accept personal sacrifices, financially for example, to have the unification of Europe come to pass ?"

As for the previous question, the highest percentages of positive responses are found in Germany and Holland and the highest percentages of negative responses, in Belgium and France.

Of the total respondents in all six countries of the Community, over one third (34 %) are not at all willing to accept some sacrifices to see european unification come about. If the persons who claim to be "little willing" (22 %) are added to this group, one observes that more than half of the respondents (56 %) have only weak, if not negative, attitudes toward unification.

The hypothesis according to which the most positive feelings toward the european unification are expressed by those groups who agree the most with what has been achieved to date and who have a rather "western" view of to-morrow's Europe is confirmed by the fact that responses to the question about personal sacrifices one would be willing to accept to see Europe come about, appear in no scale, except one, and are not associated with responses to the question measuring one's attachment to the common Market.

The exception concerns the scale which measures the hope that Europe be a third power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, there must exist a small minority of the population whose pro-european feelings are inspired by a kind of nationalist nostalgia and another truly european minority that does not agree with the manner european unification has taken place so far (1).

(1) For the total sample of all six countries, we find the following distribution :

| | |
|---|-------|
| - strongly attached to the common Market <u>and</u> to the political unification of Europe | 18 % |
| - strongly attached to the common Market, but weakly attached to political unification of Europe | 10 % |
| - weakly attached to the common Market, but strongly attached to the political unification of Europe | 16 % |
| - weakly or not at all attached to the common Market, <u>nor</u> to the political unification of Europe | 56 % |
| Total | 100 % |

Moreover, one notices that those persons whose immediate well-being is an important aim, namely those who give more priority to an increase in salary than to better human relations in our society, express little or no attachment to the political unification of Europe. Therefore, a favorable attitude seems founded more on hope than on satisfaction with the tangible results of economic unification achieved to date.

Table 48

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SOME PERSONAL SACRIFICES TOHAVE EUROPE COME TO PASS

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Entirely willing | 8 | 13 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 9 |
| Fairly willing | 27 | 29 | 18 | 22 | 29 | 31 | 34 |
| Not so willing | 22 | 24 | 19 | 22 | 20 | 21 | 19 |
| Not at all willing | 34 | 27 | 47 | 41 | 34 | 29 | 32 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 9 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Table 49

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SOME PERSONAL SACRIFICES TOHAVE EUROPE COME TO PASS

(based on respondents expressing an opinion)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Entirely willing | 9 | 14 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 10 |
| Fairly willing | 30 | 31 | 20 | 24 | 32 | 36 | 36 |
| Not so willing | 24 | 26 | 21 | 24 | 22 | 24 | 20 |
| Not at all willing | 37 | 29 | 53 | 46 | 38 | 33 | 34 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

5 - OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD LIFE

The overall attitude toward life was identified and measured on two dimensions : namely, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with present living conditions, on the one hand, and optimism or pessimism about an improvement in living conditions in the near future, on the other.

A. SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION

"Are you satisfied with your present living conditions ?"

Almost two thirds of the respondents throughout the entire Community are satisfied with their present conditions of life. In Italy and especially France, a high percentage of dissatisfied people is observable ; in the latter country, it even represents a slight majority. (See table 50).

Table 50

SATISFACTION WITH PRESENT LIVING CONDITIONS (Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Satisfied | 9 | 14 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 10 |
| Rather satisfied | 30 | 31 | 20 | 24 | 32 | 36 | 36 |
| Dissatisfied | 24 | 26 | 21 | 24 | 22 | 24 | 20 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 37 | 29 | 53 | 46 | 38 | 33 | 34 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

B. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM

"Do you think that your conditions of life will improve considerably during the next five years?"

On the whole, the optimists and the pessimists almost cancel each other out, though the first are, percentage wise, definitely more numerous than the latter in Italy and Belgium and far less numerous in Germany and the Netherlands.

The case of Italy is typical of a country where a large minority of dissatisfied people is still in evidence, yet where there is a large majority of optimists among respondents expressing an opinion. On the contrary, in France the percentage of optimists is smaller than that of the dissatisfied (1). (See table 51).

Table 51

OPTIMISM ABOUT FUTURE LIVING CONDITIONS

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Think that their living conditions : | | | | | | | |
| - will improve considerably during the coming five years | 40 | 30 | 46 | 43 | 48 | 44 | 34 |
| - will not improve considerably | 41 | 56 | 33 | 37 | 27 | 36 | 48 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 19 | 14 | 21 | 20 | 25 | 20 | 18 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

- (1) A joint analysis of responses to the two questions would make it possible to establish a typology of "satisfied/optimists", "satisfied/pessimists", "dissatisfied/optimists" and "dissatisfied/pessimists" for each country. No doubt, this last category gives a particularly important hue to socio-political life.

6 - GOALS AND OBJECTIVES SET FOR THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM

It appeared interesting to cast light upon attitudes toward european unification by obtaining responses to a serie of questions dealing with a certain number of general policy aims such as peace, freedom, material comfort, and national prestige. Moreover, since this survey was conducted in 1970, one question was asked about attitudes toward student demonstrations. Another question made it possible to identify conservative, reformist or revolutionary attitudes vis-à-vis present society. Finally, two other questions were directed, respectively, at the two concrete aims considered to be most desirable and the degree of importance attributed to various socio-political aims.

A. GENERAL POLICY AIMS

"Now I am going to name a certain number of things one may wish to see accomplished. For each one, please tell me whether you really want it accomplished, whether you are indifferent, or whether you tend to oppose it."

Nearly all of the respondents came out, of course, in favor of "no more world wars" or in favor of "living in a free country where everyone can freely say what he thinks". Close to nine persons out of ten strongly hope to "encounter no financial difficulties in the purchase of a car or a house, for example"; the same proportion hopes to be able to "move about freely in all countries without red tape".

Responses to three other items makes it possible to sketch an analysis of nationalism or, rather, of the sense of national identity.

1° Almost eight persons out of ten (78 %) keenly desire that their country make important scientific discoveries. The percentage of positive responses is highest (86 %) in France and lowest (65 %) in Belgium. Very few persons are opposed to this aim, yet more than one fourth of the respondents in Germany, Luxembourg and Holland and more than one third in Belgium are indifferent or have no opinion. Excluding Germany, one observes a rather striking difference between two of the "large" and the three "small" countries of the European Community.

2° As usual, it is in France and in Italy where we observe a high proportion of respondents who keenly desire that their country play an important role in world politics. Opposition to this aim is not negligible in Germany nor in the

Netherlands. The percentage of indifferent respondents and of those who did not respond is particularly high in the Netherlands and in Belgium.

3° The difference between the forms of national identification in the large and the small countries shows up even more clearly when the percentages of persons who want their country to have a strong army are compared. The rank order of countries by this proportion is the same as the rank order according to economic size as measured, for example, by gross national product : Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, lagging far behind.

In Germany and France, the percentage ratio of those who "keenly desire" that the country have a strong army to those who are "rather against it " is, respectively, 1,72 and 1,62. In Italy, the ratio is equal to 1,00, i.e. there are as many positive opinions as negative ones. In Holland and Belgium, the ratio is respectively 0,64 and 0,47, whereas it is only 0,04 in Luxembourg.
(See table 52).

Table 52

GENERAL POLICY AIMS :PEACE, FREEDOM, COMFORT AND NATIONAL PRESTIGE (1)

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| That there will be no more wars : | | | | | | | |
| - desire it strongly | 97 | 97 | 95 | 98 | 97 | 96 | 97 |
| - indifferent | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| - rather opposed | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| To live in a free country where everyone freely say what he thinks: | | | | | | | |
| - desire it strongly | 95 | 97 | 94 | 95 | 94 | 98 | 95 |
| - indifferent | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| - rather opposed | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Not to encounter financial difficulties in the purchase of a car or a house, for example : | | | | | | | |
| - desire it strongly | 88 | 88 | 87 | 86 | 92 | 92 | 83 |
| - indifferent | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 13 |
| - rather opposed | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

(1) The items here are ranked in decreasing order of percentages based on the weighted average for all of the countries in the European Community.

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| To be able to travel freely in all the countries without any red tape : | | | | | | | |
| - desire it strongly | 86 | 89 | 88 | 81 | 87 | 93 | 83 |
| - indifferent | 10 | 10 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 2 | 9 |
| - rather opposed | 2 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 6 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| That their country make great scientific discoveries : | | | | | | | |
| - desire it strongly | 78 | 73 | 64 | 86 | 79 | 69 | 68 |
| - indifferent | 18 | 24 | 27 | 10 | 16 | 23 | 27 |
| - rather opposed | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 3 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| That their country play an important role in world politics : | | | | | | | |
| - desire it strongly | 56 | 54 | 50 | 59 | 59 | 54 | 43 |
| - indifferent | 31 | 28 | 35 | 31 | 31 | 34 | 41 |
| - rather opposed | 7 | 12 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 10 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 6 | 6 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| That their country have a strong army : | | | | | | | |
| - desire it strongly | 38 | 43 | 21 | 42 | 33 | 3 | 29 |
| - indifferent | 26 | 27 | 28 | 25 | 28 | 10 | 22 |
| - rather opposed | 30 | 25 | 45 | 26 | 33 | 84 | 45 |
| - do not know or do not respond | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 4 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

B - ATTITUDES TOWARD STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

"Recently large student demonstrations have taken place in many countries. Generally speaking, do you feel very favorable, rather favorable, rather unfavorable or very unfavorable toward students who have demonstrated?"

Persons who say they feel very favorable toward student demonstrations are very few (7 % in all of the EEC) compared to 30 % who feel very unfavorable. The highest proportion of unfavorable responses is found in France and, to a lesser extent in Germany. In Luxembourg, a country with no university on its soil, the smallest proportion of unfavorable responses is found. (See table 53).

Table 53

ATTITUDES TOWARD STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS
(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Very favorable | 7 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 11 | 8 | 7 |
| Rather favorable | 22 | 22 | 22 | 18 | 23 | 36 | 33 |
| Rather unfavorable | 30 | 30 | 26 | 32 | 28 | 25 | 29 |
| Very unfavorable | 30 | 29 | 32 | 35 | 29 | 18 | 26 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 11 | 14 | 12 | 9 | 9 | 13 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

C - FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIETY : CONSERVATISM, REFORMISM
AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

"On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes toward the
society in which we live. Please choose the attitude which
best describes your own opinions."

Advocates of a radical change in society through revolutionary action are very few in number in the countries of the EEC : 1 to 3 % in Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium, and 5 to 7 % in France, Holland and Italy. In all the countries, the vast majority of the public tends to prefer gradual improvement in society by intelligent reform. Also in all the countries, the ultra-conservatives, namely those who prefer the statement that our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces, are considerably more numerous than the revolutionaries ; only Italy is an exception. In this country, the conservatives are only one and a half times more numerous than the revolutionaries, while the ratio in France and the Netherlands is 2,5, almost 5 in Belgium , 10 in Germany and 27 in Luxembourg.
(See table 54).

Table 54

FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIETY

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Our entire society must be radically changed by revolutionary action | 5 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 6 |
| Our society must be improved little by little by intelligent reform | 73 | 70 | 69 | 78 | 73 | 65 | 75 |
| Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces | 15 | 20 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 27 | 15 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 7 | 8 | 14 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 4 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

D - THE MOST STRONGLY DESIRED, CONCRETE POLICY AIMS

"Now I'd like to indicate some policy aims to you.
Among the following aims, which two do you prefer
the most ?"

This question included eight items of which four were related to social concerns (job security, better human relations in our society, wage increases and worker participation in business management) and four other items related to political concerns (the maintenance of law and order, the fight against rising prices, the protection of the freedom of speech for everyone, and improvement in the participation of citizens in political decisions of the government).

These findings can be presented in two different ways : first of all, by analyzing separately the responses to the two groups of items ; or, secondly, by analyzing the correlations between all the responses. As we will see, the second analysis turned out to be much more interesting than the first.

1° SOCIAL AIMS AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

a) In all the countries, the most frequently chosen social objective is the assurance of greater job security, although this percentage is significantly lower in Germany and Belgium than in the other countries.

At the european level, almost half the respondents choose the objective of making our society more humane (49 %). This objective is definitely more frequent in Holland and definitely less frequent in Germany and Luxembourg. On the other hand, in these two countries, which were seen to be the least revolutionary of the six, we find the highest percentage of persons who choose the participation of workers in business management as one of the two most preferred social objectives ; these are also the only two countries where this last, more precise, choice is more frequent than the more vague objective related to the humanization of our society. In all the countries, except in Luxembourg, an increase in salaries is the least frequently chosen objective.

These results seem to indicate that the population of the countries of the European Community, considered as a whole, sets more store by job security and the quality of life than by an increase in income.

b) Nevertheless, among the four objectives of a political nature, the fight against rising prices is the most frequently chosen (68 %), with a relatively high percentage in Germany and relatively low percentage in Luxembourg. An improvement in the participation of citizens in the political decisions of the government is the least frequently selected (27 %) ; in Luxembourg this objective obtains only 12 % of the votes compared to 38 % in the Netherlands.

It ought to be noted that in the three large countries of the EEC, the percentage of persons who choose the maintenance of law and order as one of the most preferred objectives is higher than the percentage of those who choose the protection of the freedom of speech ; the percentage ratio is 1,59 in Germany, 1,25 in France and 1,20 in Italy. In the Benelux countries, on the contrary, the protection of freedom of speech is chosen at a rate equal or greater than is the maintenance of law and order.
(See table 55).

Whether it is social or political objectives that are at stake, the differences observed between countries do not seem to be explicable at the macro level, i.e. in terms of data such as the history of the country in question, its present political regime, its total national income or its income per capita. If these variables have an intervening effect, it is only to the extent that they determine the socio-economic, socio-cultural and socio-political structure of each country. In other terms, as we suspected in undertaking this research, any attempt to identify and to measure the determinants of attitudes, especially favorable attitudes toward the unification of Europe, has to employ more refined instruments than the sheer country by country comparison of responses aggregated at the national level.

A more thorough analysis of the data just examined will allow us to prove this assertion.

2° SETTING OF PERSONAL GOALS : SECURITY AND COMFORT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Taking the work of Abraham H. Maslow as a starting point, it is Professor Ronald Inglehart (University of Michigan and University of Geneva) who is responsible for having formulated and verified the hypothesis that it is in our most developed societies, often considered as post-industrial, where now that the basic needs for physical and economic security of a large and ever increasing segment of the population have been largely satisfied, this segment of the public has turned to the

Table 55

THE TWO MOST PREFERRED, CONCRETE OBJECTIVES (1)

(Respondents aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Social aims : | | | | | | | |
| - Provide greater job security | 69 | 59 | 62 | 72 | 79 | 73 | 71 |
| - Make our society more humane | 49 | 41 | 49 | 52 | 51 | 37 | 62 |
| - Insure the participation of workers in business management | 35 | 42 | 38 | 32 | 27 | 50 | 41 |
| - Increase salaries | 34 | 33 | 44 | 37 | 32 | 28 | 24 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 13 | 25 | 7 | 7 | 11 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| Political objectives : | | | | | | | |
| - fight rising prices | 68 | 75 | 63 | 66 | 64 | 40 | 56 |
| - maintain law and order | 55 | 54 | 52 | 60 | 53 | 30 | 50 |
| - guarantee freedom of speech so that everyone can freely say what he thinks | 43 | 34 | 53 | 48 | 44 | 41 | 54 |
| - improve citizen's participation in the political decisions of the government | 27 | 27 | 26 | 22 | 29 | 12 | 38 |
| Do not know or do not respond | 7 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 10 | 77(2) | 2 |
| Total | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

(1) The items here are ranked in decreasing order of percentages based on the weighted average for all of the countries of the EEC.

(2) In many cases the Luxembourg interviewers understood the question wording in such a way that the choice of only one objective is sufficient.

pursuit of other goals ; its affective, intellectual, esthetical needs have become more and more important, and thus its value system and behaviour are modified in political spheres as well as in other fields of activity. In this respect, Inglehart distinguishes between values he qualifies as "post-acquisitive" as opposed to those called "acquisitive". In fact, among the four political items we just examined, two of them can be considered as reflecting "acquisitive" values (maintaining law and order and fighting rising prices) and two as "post-acquisitive" values (guaranteeing the freedom of speech and improving the participation of citizens in the political decisions of the government) (1).

The respondents were allowed only two choices ; apart from non-responses, each respondent was able to choose any of the six possible pairs of items. The choice of a "post-acquisitive" item should be expected to show a strong positive correlation with the choice of another item of the same kind in each national sample ; the same relation ought to hold for the choice of acquisitive items. This hypothesis was verified. Approximately half the respondents in each country select one of the two "pure" pairs of objectives ; the percentage ratio of "acquisitive" to "post-acquisitive" orientations is at least three to one. (See table 56).

Table 56

PAIRWISE CHOICE OF "ACQUISITIVE" OR "POST-ACQUISITIVE"

OBJECTIVES (2)

| | Germany | Belgium | France | Italy | Netherlands | Great Britain |
|--------------------|---------|---------|--------|-------|-------------|---------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Pairs selected : | | | | | | |
| - acquisitive | 43 | 32 | 38 | 35 | 30 | 36 |
| - post-acquisitive | 10 | 14 | 11 | 13 | 17 | 8 |

- (1) See Ronald INGLEHART : "Changing Values Priorities and European Integration", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. X, n° 1, September 1971, pp 1-36.
See also : "The Silent Revolution in Europe : Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies". The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, n° 4, December 1971, pp 991-1017.
- (2) Cf. INGLEHART, Journal of Common Market Studies, Sept. 1971, p. 5. The pertinent data for Luxembourg have not been used because of the small sample size. On the other hand, the study was extended by INGLEHART to include Great Britain.

In addition, INGLEHART confirmed the hypothesis that value systems thus expressed are correlated with the other political preferences, for example with attitudes toward student demonstrations (see table 57) and with support for european unification (see table 58).

Table 57

ATTITUDES TOWARD STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS BY

PAIRS OF OBJECTIVES CHOSEN (1)

(Percentage favorable to demonstrations)

| | Germany | Belgium | France | Italy | Netherlands | Great Britain |
|--|---------|---------|--------|-------|-------------|---------------|
| Maintaining law and order and fighting rising prices (x) | 14 | 18 | 12 | 19 | 21 | 12 |
| Maintaining law and order and freedom of speech | 35 | 29 | 18 | 29 | 33 | 22 |
| Maintaining law and order and participation | 29 | 36 | 23 | 36 | 42 | 9 |
| Fighting rising prices and freedom of speech | 35 | 32 | 38 | 42 | 37 | 22 |
| Fighting rising prices and participation | 46 | 60 | 41 | 54 | 47 | 60 |
| Freedom of speech and participation | 83 | 65 | 66 | 77 | 70 | 65 |
| Percentage of respondents expressing an opinion | 32 | 35 | 27 | 36 | 39 | 17 |

(x) Pure pairs of items corresponding respectively to acquisitive and post-acquisitive objectives.

(1) Cf. INGLEHART, op. cit. p.6.

Table 58

SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION
AMONG "ACQUISITIVE" AND "POST-ACQUISITIVE" GROUPS (1)

| | Germany | | Belgium | | France | |
|-------------------|---------|----------|---------|----------|---------------|----------|
| | Against | For (N) | Against | For (N) | Against | For (N) |
| | | | | | | |
| Acquisitives | 11 | 45 (850) | 8 | 31 (406) | 9 | 36 (694) |
| Post-acquisitives | 2 | 76 (200) | 2 | 64 (174) | 4 | 69 (216) |
| | Italy | | Holland | | Great Britain | |
| | Against | For (N) | Against | For (N) | Against | For (N) |
| | | | | | | |
| Acquisitives | 5 | 48 (604) | 16 | 38 (561) | 40 | 13 (704) |
| Post-acquisitives | 5 | 69 (224) | 2 | 62 (313) | 25 | 32 (148) |

(1) Cf. INGLEHART, op. cit., p.21. Note that "for" and "against" are calculated by the author according to an index, the composition of which he explains in the cited article, pages 15 to 19.

E - DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS SOCIO-POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

Responses to this question complement those to the previous one. It was no longer a matter of selecting the two most desired objectives from two separate series of aims, but instead one of indicating the degree of importance attached to each and every objective on this scale : top priority, important objective, secondary objective, objective of no importance. (1)

In attributing a numerical value to each possible response, we are able to rank the objectives by the mean score obtained in each country. Scores were attributed in the following manner :

- top priority : 3 points
- important objective : 2 points
- secondary objective : 1 point
- objective of no importance : 0 point.

The rank order of the means obtained for the whole of the six countries confirms the conclusions drawn from analysis of the responses to the previous question.

The five first objectives identified as most desirable are all directly related to the idea of security and stability :

- 1° Guarantee decent retirement benefits to all old persons. . . 2,68
- 2° Provide employment for young people 2,50
- 3° Stop the manufacturing of atomic bombs 2,48
- 4° Provide greater job security 2,44
- 5° Maintain law and order 2,36

More ideological preferences appear only in sixth place in the rank order, the first of which is freedom of speech. Among these objectives, a more humane society and school reform have higher mean scores than wage increases. Aid to underdeveloped countries takes only tenth place, followed by the participation of workers in business management and the fostering of private enterprise in the sphere of economic activity.

Issue-positions on communism or capitalism come in only last, at the end of the list, which means that these overarching ideological issues interest only a

(1) See complete results in annex (table 2).

small segment of the population.

Nevertheless, rather large differences by country are observable in the rank-order of objectives in terms of the degree of concern as well as the views themselves. (See tables 59 and 60).

a) The degree of concern is measured by the percentage of non-response : the higher this percentage, the less the public feels concerned by the question.

It is interesting to note that :

- 18 % of the respondents in all of the countries of the common Market do not take a position on abolishing capitalism (23 % in Germany and 7 % in the Netherlands).
- 16 % of the respondents express no opinion about the fostering of private enterprise (21 % in Germany and 9 % in the Netherlands).
- 13 % of the interviewees do not respond to the question about the fight against communism (17 % in Luxembourg, 16 and 15 % respectively in France and Germany, and 6 % in the Netherlands).
- 12 % of the interviewees seem to have no opinion about school reform and 11 % about the participation of workers in business management.

Generally speaking, the public which seems to feel most concerned by the various objectives proposed is the Dutch public ; the German public seems to be the least concerned.

b) In respect to the views expressed, we shall stress only the main differences observed in the rank order of importance attributed to these objectives : (1)

- Guaranteeing decent retirement pensions for all old people is accorded the highest priority in all countries. On the other hand, providing jobs for young people takes only fifth place in Holland and sixth in Germany ; this difference is probably due to different conditions in the job market within the countries at the time of the survey.

(1) To compare countries, the differences in rank order of the objectives appear more meaningful to us than the differences in the scores on the index.

- The objective of stopping manufacturing atomic bombs takes second place in Italy and the Netherlands, but only fourth place in Germany and France.
- The differences between countries in the relative importance accorded to maintaining law and order are substantial. In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, this objective takes sixth place ; in Belgium, Italy and France, it ranks fifth ; but in Germany it is second (in a tie with job security).
- Freedom of speech ranks higher in Luxembourg and the Netherlands than in the other countries.
- A more humane society is a relatively more important objective in Italy than in the other countries.

It is possible that some differences are the result of current events or conditions peculiar to each country, so it is necessary to avoid drawing conclusions too hastily.

. . .

In summary, compared to the european public at large, the attitudes of the publics in the various countries regarding the degree of importance attributed to the objectives enumerated in the question show the following characteristics :

- The Dutch differ the most from the european average. First of all, they feel more concerned about the proposed objectives. For them , providing jobs for young people and increasing wages are objectives of less importance than in the other countries ; on the other hand, guaranteeing the freedom of speech and providing aid to under-developed countries rank higher than anywhere else.
- Germans take positions less frequently, but they give greater importance to the maintenance of law and order and lesser importance to the problem of job opportunities for young persons than do other countries.
- Belgians hardly stand out except for the relatively slight importance given to school reform, and the Luxembourgers stand out only by the relatively greater importance they attribute to the freedom of speech.
- The French and Italian publics come very close to the european average.

In this as in the previous analysis, we have the impression that the differences in attitudes between the publics of the member states of the Community can be explained, in large measure, by the differences in present socio-political and socio-economic conditions and organization of these countries and not by differences in "mentality" or in historical predetermination. Were this hypothesis confirmed, we would be able to draw the conclusions that the differences are relatively superficial, are strongly related to current events and merely represent one motif as so many others in a single, common european backdrop.

Moreover, responses to the following question support this hypothesis.

Table 59

DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS SOCIO-POLITICAL OBJECTIVES (1)

| | EC | | D | | B | | F | | I | | L | | N | |
|---|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. |
| | % | | % | | % | | % | | % | | % | | % | |
| 1. Guarantee a reasonable retirement pension to all old persons | 3 | 2,68 | 4 | 2,54 | 1 | 2,83 | 1 | 2,80 | 1 | 2,66 | 1 | 2,83 | 1 | 2,62 |
| 2. Provide jobs for the young | 4 | 2,50 | 10 | 2,25 | 2 | 2,70 | 1 | 2,74 | 1 | 2,52 | 1 | 2,78 | 1 | 2,28 |
| 3. Stop the manufacturing of atomic bombs | 5 | 2,48 | 8 | 2,39 | 3 | 2,59 | 5 | 2,48 | 2 | 2,61 | 3 | 2,62 | 3 | 2,55 |
| 4. Provide greater job security | 4 | 2,44 | 8 | 2,41 | 3 | 2,54 | 2 | 2,52 | 3 | 2,44 | 2 | 2,71 | 1 | 2,42 |
| 5. Maintain law and order | 4 | 2,36 | 8 | 2,41 | 2 | 2,45 | 2 | 2,39 | 2 | 2,30 | 2 | 2,59 | 2 | 2,26 |
| 6. Guarantee the freedom of speech | 6 | 2,31 | 10 | 2,30 | 7 | 2,44 | 5 | 2,36 | 4 | 2,28 | 3 | 2,72 | 2 | 2,30 |
| 7. Make our society more humane | 8 | 2,20 | 16 | 1,88 | 4 | 2,42 | 2 | 2,34 | 5 | 2,28 | 3 | 2,48 | 1 | 2,22 |
| 8. Reform the school system | 12 | 2,06 | 14 | 2,11 | 14 | 1,83 | 14 | 1,88 | 11 | 2,16 | 13 | 2,52 | 4 | 2,03 |
| 9. Increase wages | 7 | 1,88 | 12 | 1,71 | 3 | 2,15 | 4 | 2,02 | 5 | 1,91 | 6 | 2,29 | 2 | 1,69 |
| 10. Aid underdeveloped countries | 7 | 1,81 | 11 | 1,32 | 5 | 1,79 | 5 | 1,47 | 6 | 1,68 | 4 | 2,26 | 1 | 1,94 |
| 11. Ensure the participation of workers in business management | 11 | 1,79 | 11 | 1,83 | 8 | 2,04 | 9 | 1,78 | 13 | 1,71 | 6 | 2,30 | 4 | 1,80 |

(1) The items here are ranked in decreasing order of the mean score obtained for all of the countries of the EEC.

.../...

Table 59 (Continuation)

| | EC | | D | | B | | F | | I | | L | | N | |
|--|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. | no reply | Coeff. |
| | % | | % | | % | | % | | % | | % | | % | |
| 12. Foster private initiative in the sphere of economic activity | 16 | 1,76 | 21 | 1,41 | 13 | 2,15 | 13 | 1,90 | 15 | 1,87 | 19 | 2,30 | 9 | 1,84 |
| 13. Fight communism | 13 | 1,53 | 15 | 1,62 | 13 | 1,72 | 16 | 1,21 | 9 | 1,58 | 17 | 2,00 | 6 | 1,74 |
| 14. Abolish capitalism | 18 | 1,29 | 23 | 1,07 | 14 | 1,55 | 16 | 1,45 | 16 | 1,35 | 21 | 1,35 | 7 | 1,39 |
| mean | 8 | 2,08 | 12 | 1,95 | 7 | 2,23 | 7 | 2,10 | 7 | 2,10 | 7 | 2,41 | 3 | 2,08 |

Table 60

**RANK-ORDER OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS SOCIO-POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES**

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Guarantee decent retirement pensions to old people | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Provide jobs for young people | 2 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Stop the manufacturing of atomic bombs | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 2 |
| Provide greater job security | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Maintain law and order | 5 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| Guarantee the freedom of speech | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4 |
| Make our society more humane | 7 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
| Reform the school system | 8 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 8 |
| Increase wages | 9 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 11 | 13 |
| Aid the underdeveloped countries | 10 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 9 |
| Ensure the participation of workers in business management | 11 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 11 |
| Foster private initiative in the sphere of economic activity | 12 | 12 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 |
| Fight communism | 13 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 12 |
| Abolish capitalism | 14 | 14 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 14 |

7 - DEGREE OF TRUST IN FOREIGN PEOPLES

"Now, I would like to ask you some questions about the how much trust you have in various peoples of the world. I am going to read the names of different peoples and would you please tell me whether you trust them a great deal, somewhat, not too much, or not at all..."

The degree of trust the inhabitants of a given country have in those of another country does not seem to be determined, in especially large measure, by the nature of historical relations between the countries concerned. Nonetheless, it is a little surprising, at first, to notice that the three countries obtaining the highest score of trust on the part of citizens of the countries of the EEC are the nationals of countries which do not belong to the Community. These are the Swiss, the Americans and the British. (1)

The numerical values, which make it easier to compare countries, were obtained in the following way :

| | |
|-------------------------|-----|
| - a great deal of trust | + 2 |
| - some trust | + 1 |
| - not too much trust | - 1 |
| - no trust at all | - 2 |
| - other responses | 0 |

The mean scores obtained by the various peoples proposed are graduated as follows :

| | |
|-----------------|--------|
| - the Swiss | + 1,10 |
| - the Americans | + 0,68 |
| - the British | + 0,37 |
| - the French | + 0,13 |
| - the Germans | - 0,13 |
| - the Italians | - 0,52 |
| - the Russians | - 0,85 |
| - the Chinese | - 1,41 |

(See table 61)

The comment previously made about data analyses, namely that the tendency to attribute high scores varies from country to country, also holds here. It is still necessary to distinguish between the general predisposition to place trust (in others) and the exact direction of this predisposition.

(1) For the complete results, see the annex (table 3).

1° GENERAL PREDISPOSITION TO TRUST OTHERS

At the european level, the mean score is negative (-0,08). The Luxembourg and Italian publics are the least disposed to place their trust in other peoples (respectively -0,17 and -0,16). The French public also has a negative average rate (-0,12) whereas the German and the Dutch publics have average rates very close to 0. The Belgium public seems to be the least xenophobic (0,09).

2° DIRECTION OF TRUST

One first finding is that there are differences between countries in the ratio of mean trust placed in Western peoples (Germans, British, French, Italians, and Swiss) to the mean trust placed in the peoples in countries under communist rule (the Chinese and Russians).

The difference between the trust placed in Western peoples and in the people under communist rule is greatest in Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg. Holland is located at an intermediate position. Italy and especially France, a country with a powerful communist party, are those where the difference in favor of Western peoples is the lowest.
(See table 62).

Among all the countries, the Swiss enjoy the greatest trust, followed by the Americans who come in second everywhere. The British rank third among all the countries, except in Belgium where the French precede them.

In Germany, Italy and Luxembourg, the index of trust puts the French in first place. But they are only fifth in the Netherlands behind the Germans.

In Belgium, France and, of course, the Netherlands, the index of trust puts the Germans in front of the Italians ; Luxembourg is the only country to show more trust in Italians than in Germans.

The Russians take seventh place, and the Chinese eighth, in every instance.

The rank order of the countries by this trust index allows us to advance the hypothesis that the criteria used by the great majority of the public interviewed must be of the same kind as those which prompted them to indicate priorities for various political objectives. In all likelihood, these are criteria anchored in feelings of security and stability. We can nonetheless conclude that the mutual trust

the citizens of the three large countries of the European Community have in one another is certainly no greater than the trust they have in other Western countries which are not members of the Community : Switzerland, an isle of peace and prosperity; the United States, rich and powerful ; Great-Britain, already so close to the European Community in 1970. This might mean not only that the membership in the same economic grouping has not yet created a true feeling of Community, but also that historical antagonisms, such as those between France and Germany for example, play only a minor role in the expression of present attitudes.

In all conjecture, as in this hypothesis, one must consider these above results as data requiring especially careful interpretation.

The image that people fashion of one another is a complex phenomenon where a great many factors intermingle : historical, geographical, political, cultural, and so forth. More detailed studies would make it possible to capture these images in which trust is reflection of only one facet. To state that two groups understand each other is to assert that each one regards the behavior of the other as predictable ; to state that they trust each other is to assert, moreover, that each expects the other to behave favorably in his behalf. Favorable behavior of this kind can be expected in very varied spheres of activity : cultural, economic, military cooperation and even integration within the same political system. Even the favorable images one people have of another might vary considerably in content ; moreover, each and every one of these images has its roots in the images fashioned by each social group making up an entire people.

Table 61DEGREE OF TRUST IN FOREIGN PEOPLES

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| The Swiss | 1,10 | 1,38 | 1,17 | 1,06 | 0,81 | 1,14 | 1,29 |
| The Americans | 0,68 | 0,90 | 0,73 | 0,35 | 0,62 | 0,85 | 0,80 |
| The British | 0,37 | 0,48 | 0,69 | 0,19 | 0,07 | 0,55 | 0,28 |
| The French | 0,13 | 0,27 | 0,81 | | -0,13 | 0,44 | 0,09 |
| The Germans | -0,13 | | 0,05 | -0,03 | -0,30 | -0,74 | 0,27 |
| The Italians | -0,52 | -0,66 | -0,23 | -0,44 | | -0,67 | -0,39 |
| The Russians | -0,85 | -1,08 | -1,00 | -0,57 | -0,77 | -1,29 | -0,83 |
| The Chinese | -1,41 | -1,48 | -1,52 | -1,39 | -1,41 | -1,65 | -1,47 |
| Mean | -0,08 | -0,03 | 0,09 | -0,12 | -0,16 | -0,17 | 0,005 |

Table 62
INDEX OF TRUST IN WESTERN COUNTRIES AND
IN THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| In Western countries | 0,27 | 0,47 | 0,54 | 0,23 | 0,21 | 0,26 | 0,39 |
| In communist countries | -1,13 | -1,28 | -1,26 | -0,98 | -1,09 | -1,47 | -1,15 |
| Difference | 1,40 | 1,75 | 1,80 | 1,21 | 1,30 | 1,73 | 1,54 |

I I

CHARACTERISTICS OF FAVORABLE COMMITMENT
TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

In this second chapter, we shall no longer attempt to compare the percentage distributions of the responses of the interviewees in each country to the questions asked, but will try to show instead, on the one hand, what attitude scales are detected by a multivariate analysis of all the interviewees in the six countries of the European Community and, on the other hand, what are the variables which covary the most with the attitudes we defined as pro-european. (1)

The first analysis represents a sort of reading of the hidden meaning of the entire set of findings ; based on a rigorous statistical method, this analysis makes it possible to interrelate responses to items which, at first glance, are wholly disconnected and, thus, to identify attitude clusters of some clarity which existed in the minds of the european public at the time of the survey. This method, now applied to the entire sample of respondents, is exactly the same as the one previously used to study the results of the second phase of the research, which involved a restricted sample of young people aged 15 to 16 and 19 to 20 years old. (2)

The second analysis involves us more particularly in the study of variables which characterize, more or less well, an attitude of favorable commitment to european unification.

We wish to stress that in each of these analyses, the total N is made up of all the respondents, i.e. the sum of representative samples of each country. This total is not weighted by the population size of each country ; as a result, the small countries are relatively over-represented in the total sample, but this is not a handicap since, in this instance, our objective is no longer to state that "europeans think like this or like that", but instead to try to discover the nature of europeans' attitudes toward Europe and to explain how relatively committed, favorable attitudes toward unification are formed.

1) See page 25

(2) See part I, chapter II : "Analysis of responses to the pretest questionnaire".

1 - ATTITUDE SCALES AND THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC

The first scale has already been presented : it is the scale which represents what we have called the index of pro-european attitudes (1). We consider it here once again in order to present it along with two other scales and to expose it fully, although only the responses to six of the items making it up have been kept for the calculation of the different values of the index ranging from + 6 to - 1.

Scale I

INDEX OF PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

| Items | N - 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification. . . | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is favorable to the evolution of the common Market toward a political grouping in the form of the United States of Europe . . . | 6094 | 70 |
| - In the case of an election of a President of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, the respondents would vote for a candidate who would not be of his own nationality - provided that his personality and his program were better suited to his ideas than those of the candidates of his own country. . . . | 5673 | 65 |
| - Is in favor of the election of a European Parliament by direct universal suffrage | 5483 | 63 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country), there be a european government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Is favorable that the currency (of his country) be replaced by a european currency. | 4453 | 51 |
| - Takes a personal part in political activities or follows politics with interest without participating actively. | 3450 | 39 |
| - Is entirely willing or rather willing to make certain personal sacrifices, financially for instance, to have Europe come to pass. | 3000 | 34 |
| - Would feel very sorry if he were told to-morrow that the common Market is being disbanded. | 2510 | 25 |

(1) See pages 25 to 30.

Fifteen more scales reflecting attitude dimensions of interest to our research have been identified in addition to three more scales with no direct reference to european unification which we deemed useful to present here for further study.

A. SCALES REFLECTING DIMENSIONS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD
EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

In the scales detected during the analysis, it is possible to distinguish two types defined by the manner in which favorable attitudes toward european unification play a role.

On the one hand, we have scales which directly express a favorable attitude and which are made up of items such as the position for or against the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe, the election of a European Parliament, the setting up of a european government, the vote for a President from another country other than one's own and a generally favorable attitude toward the unification of Europe. We will call these "A scales".

On the other hand, we have scales made up of items expressing a commitment to unification achievements or plans : great sorrow in case of the eventual disappearance of the common Market and predispositions to accept personal sacrifices to see that european unification takes place. We shall call these "B scales".

Nevertheless, it is possible that these two groups of items do not always appear in one scale or another. It is also very interesting to note what aspects of unification cannot be brought into harmony with the dimension in question : for example, in the event that all the questions of type A are accepted except the question about a "supranational" government.

It may also very well be that responses of this type are found in inverted form in a given scale : the discovery, for example, of negative responses in a scale reflecting a favorable attitude.

Finally, it may turn out that one response of several of type A or B is present in a scale ; one example is that for a given scale, the correlation may only exist in the case of a strong attitude (great sorrow in case of the disappearance of the common Market) or, on the contrary, with a less strongly held attitude (great sorrow and little concern).

Generally speaking, it can be said that the scales containing items of type A express a pro-european attitude which is less strongly held than those with items of type B. It is more "difficult" to express a commitment (to accomplishments or to plans) than to express an opinion which is known to be widely shared by the group to which one belongs (1).

1° Moderate pro-european attitudes (scales Ia, Ib and Ic).

Three scales, rather similar one to the other, measure these attitudes.

The scale Ia, type B, seems to reflect a certain relationship between favorable attitudes toward european unification and concern with the standard of living. Note that no reference to the election of a european parliament appears in this scale. In reversing the direction of this scale, one may better grasp what kind of relationship is involved : those who expected that european unification will have negative effects on the standard of living also tend to hold a negative attitude toward unification.

Scale Ib, type A, which reflects a less strongly held attitude, differs from the previous one in the presence of the item about daily reading of political news in the newspapers. The use of radio and television cannot be included in the scale and, moreover, show hardly any significative relationship with any of the responses in the questionnaire.

Scale Ic is once again of type B, with one slight difference compared to scale Ia : it also includes persons who would feel only a little sorry if the common Market were disbanded. In addition, it introduces a new aspect : the positive relationship between familiarity with a great number of foreign countries and a favorable attitude toward european unification.

(1) Remember that an item placed at the bottom of the scale with the lowest percentage of responses is said to be "the most difficult". In principle, this item determines the content of the scale ; the same applies for all the other items which follow, each compared to the others, as one reads up the scale to the "easiest" item.

Scale I a

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification. . . | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - Agrees that the most underprivileged segments of the population in the United States of Europe will have more opportunity to improve their status. | 5272 | 60 |
| - Agrees that the United States of Europe will undoubtedly have a higher standard of living | 5133 | 59 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) there be a european government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Is favorable to the idea that the currency (of his country) be replaced by a european currency | 4453 | 51 |
| - Agrees that so far the common Market has had a favorable effect on his standard of living | 3698 | 42 |
| - Is entirely willing or rather willing to make certain personal sacrifices, financially for instance, to see that european unification takes place | 3000 | 34 |
| - Would feel very sorry if he were told to-morrow that the common Market is being disbanded | 2510 | 29 |

Scale I b

| Items | N - 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification . . | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is favorable to the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - Agrees that the most underprivileged segments of the population in the United States of Europe will have more opportunity to improve their status | 5272 | 60 |
| - Agrees that the standard of living will undoubtedly be higher in the United States of Europe | 5133 | 59 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) a european government be responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Is favorable to the idea that the currency (of his country) be replaced by a european currency | 4453 | 51 |
| - Reads political news in the newspapers daily | 2384 | 27 |

Scale I c

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification . . | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - Is favorable to the election of a European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. | 5483 | 63 |
| - Would feel very or little sorry if to-morrow he were to hear that the common Market is being disbanded | 5364 | 61 |
| - Agrees that the most underprivileged segments of the population in the United States of Europe will have more opportunity to improve their status | 5272 | 60 |
| - Agrees that the standard of living will undoubtedly be higher in the United States of Europe | 5133 | 59 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) a european government be responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Is favorable to the idea that the currency (of his country) be replaced by a european currency | 4453 | 51 |
| - Has visited at least four foreign countries for sojourn of at least one day | 2489 | 28 |

2° Pro-european attitudes of the "post-acquisitive" and "acquisitive" type (scales II and III)

Remember that borrowing from the work and terminology of Professor Ronald INGLEHART, we distinguished between "post-acquisitive" values (freedom of speech and increased participation in socio-political decisions) and "acquisitive" values (security and comfort).

Scale II, type A, expresses a positive relationship between a moderately favorable attitude toward european unification and the various concrete measures it implies (European Parliament and government), on the one hand, and items which we identified as characteristic of new aspirations and values (a preference for citizen participation over the fight against rising prices) on the other hand.

Scale III, type B, confirms our hypothesis by showing a negative relationship between a strongly held pro-european attitude and aspirations or values of the traditional, acquisitive type.

However, it seems that the post-acquisitive tendency has less of an influence in the direction of pro-european attitudes than the acquisitive tendency does in the opposite direction. These indications obviously would have to be verified when other studies dealing, in particular, with the younger generations in "bourgeois" or at least wealthy circles, are undertaken.

Scale II

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification . . | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - In case of the election for a president of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, the respondent would vote for a candidate who would not be of his own nationality provided that his personality and his program would better suit his own opinions than those of the candidates of his own country. | 5673 | 65 |
| - Is in favor of the election of a european parliament by universal suffrage | 5483 | 63 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) a european government be responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Does not consider the fight against rising prices as an important objective | 3102 | 35 |
| - Considers an improvement of citizens' participation in the decisions of the government to be an important objective | 2384 | 27 |

Scale III

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Would not feel sorry if to-morrow he were told that the common Market is being disbanded | 6240 | 71 |
| - Is not willing to make some personal sacrifices, financially for instance, to see that european unification takes place | 5750 | 66 |
| - Consider that making our society more humane is not an important objective | 4407 | 50 |
| - Believes that increasing wages is an important objective | 3004 | 34 |
| - Considers that increasing wages is an objective which must be given top priority | 2566 | 29 |

3° Politicoized pro-european attitudes (scales IV and V)

Scale IV and Scale V, both of type A, reflect a relationship between a certain type of political commitment and a favorable attitude toward concrete measures for european unification. In both cases, the relationship seems to touch upon attitudes toward political parties.

One ought to notice, nonetheless, that it is impossible to introduce into the same scale :

- both proximity to a party and a strong commitment to this party at the same time (scale IV),
- or, both the two previous items and the willingness to change one's preference if one's preferred party were to modify its attitude toward Europe (scale V).

Thus it seems that the attitude toward a political party does not determine attitudes toward european unification except for those who strongly identify with their party. Moreover, the dimension expressed by party identification is different from that implied by the readiness to change one's party preference for reasons based on his own attitude toward Europe.

When dealing with scales of type A, we know that the pro-european attitude they express is not very strongly held. The second scale (V), however, seems stronger than the first (IV).

Scale IV

| Items | N - 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification. . | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe. | 6094 | 70 |
| - In case of the election for a president of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, the respondent would vote for a candidate who would not be of his own nationality provided that his personality and his program better suited his opinions than those of candidate of his own country | 5673 | 65 |
| - Is in favor of the election of a european parliament by a direct universal suffrage | 5483 | 63 |
| - Takes part personally in political activities or follows politics with interest without participating actively | 3450 | 39 |
| - Is strongly committed to the political party he feels closest to | 1557 | 18 |

Scale V

| Items | N - 8750 | % |
|--|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification . . | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - In the case of the election for a president of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, the respondent would vote for a candidate who would not be of his own nationality provided that his personality and his program better suited his opinions than those of candidates of his own country | 5673 | 65 |
| - Is in favor of an election of a european parliament by direct universal suffrage | 5483 | 63 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) there be a european government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Would definitely or probably vote for another political party were the leaders of his preferred party to take an attitude toward european unification different from his own | 2886 | 33 |
| - Would definitely vote for another political party, were the leaders of his preferred party to take an attitude toward european unification different from his own | 1280 | 15 |

4° A politically disinterested or rather unfavorable conservative attitude toward european unification (scale VI)

This scale of type B reflects very clearly the relationship between a rather authoritarian attitude of conservatism and an unfavorable attitude toward european unification.

This relationship is accompanied by a lack of interest and perhaps a certain contempt for political life.

Scale VI

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|--|----------|----|
| - Would not feel sorry if to-morrow he were told that the common Market is being disbanded | 6240 | 71 |
| - Is not very favorable to european unification | 5817 | 66 |
| - Is not ready to make personal sacrifices, financially for instance, for the european unification | 5750 | 66 |
| - Is not interested in politics | 5300 | 61 |
| - Is not favorable to the idea that the currency (of his country) be replaced by a european currency | 4297 | 41 |
| - Does not agree that it is necessary to improve our society little by little through intelligent reforms nor to change it radically by revolutionary action | 1980 | 23 |
| - Believes that our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.. . . . | 1303 | 15 |

5° Idealistic and progressive pro-european attitudes (scales VII and VIII)

Scale VII is related to scale II which expresses a post-acquisitive kind of pro-european attitude, yet it also reflects an attitude of idealism and generosity. Among the most difficult items in this scale we find aid to underdeveloped countries, humanization of our society, and freedom of speech, all considered as top priorities. This is a scale of type A, but it includes nonetheless, in an attenuated way, one type B item (a great deal or a little sorrow in the event that the common Market is disbanded).

Scale VIII is similar to scale VII, though it appears to express an attitude more directly related to the mentality of protest (i.e., a favorable opinion of student demonstrations).

We do not find any item expressing directly attitudes toward revolutionary action, reformism and the defense of established order in either of these two scales. The relationship between a favorable attitude toward european unification and these more or less idealistic or even protest kinds of progressive attitudes does exist, but it seems that it is neither very clear nor very strong.

Scale VII

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - In the case of the election for a president of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, the respondent would vote for a candidate who would not be of his own nationality provided that his personality and his program better suited his opinions than those of the candidate of his own country | 5673 | 65 |
| - Is favorable to the election of a European Parliament by direct universal suffrage | 5483 | 63 |
| - Would feel very or a little sorry if to-morrow he were told that the common Market is being disbanded | 5364 | 61 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) there be a european government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Considers aid to underdeveloped countries as top priority . . . | 3745 | 43 |
| - Considers that making our society more humane is an objective of top priority | 3243 | 37 |
| - Considers that guaranteeing the freedom of speech is an objective of top priority | 1414 | 16 |

Scale VIII

| Items | N - 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - In the case of the election of a president of the United States of Europe through universal suffrages, the respondent would vote for a candidate who would not be of his own country provided that his personality and his program better suited his opinions than those of the candidates of his own country | 5673 | 65 |
| - Is in favor of the election for a european parliament by universal suffrage | 5483 | 63 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) there be a european government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Considers that guaranteeing the freedom of speech is an important objective | 3978 | 45 |
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to students who have demonstrated | 2701 | 31 |

6° Three views of united Europe : Europe as a power (scale IX),
Europe as surpassing the nation (scale X) and Europe as a means
to improve our society (scale XI)

What these three scales have in common is that all three express different views of a United Europe (1). But, in general, the items making them up play here a less important role than the one we had observed during the intermediary survey which dealt only with youth. In the present study, which concerns the entire population, pro-european attitudes seem to show a closer relation with concerns about the so-called new society, with an interest in politics and political parties and also with traditional social concerns rather than with one or another image of the hopes or fears that the process of european unification evokes.

Scale IX includes the item that the United States of Europe should become a third power equal in strength to the United States of America or the URSS, but this relationship is not very strong.

Scale X introduces an item of dissatisfaction with or distance from national values : "I am not proud to be a citizen (of this country)".

Finally, scale XI, has its roots in an item which seems to express the opposite of an attitude of resignation about the status quo ; to refuse to agree that the powerful will always dominate the weak is an opinion, a hope or a moral imperative which is related to a certain kind of pro-european attitude.

Scale IX belongs to type B ; the two other are of type A.

(1) See pages 81 to 91.

Scale IX

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - Agrees with the idea that the United States of Europe ought to become a third power equal to that of the United States of America or the URSS | 5655 | 65 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) there be a european government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Is very favorable to european unification | 2933 | 34 |
| - Would feel very sorry if to-morrow he were told that the common Market is being disbanded | 2510 | 29 |

Scale X

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|--|----------|----|
| - Is very or rather favorable to european unification | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - In the case of the election for a president of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, the respondent would vote for a candidate of another nationality other than his own provided that his personality and his program better suited his opinions than those of the candidates of his own country | 5673 | 65 |
| - Is favorable to the election of a european parliament by direct universal suffrage | 5483 | 63 |
| - Accepts that above the government (of his country) there be a european government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Is not proud to be a citizen (of this country) | 1500 | 17 |

Scale XI

| Items | N - 8750 | % |
|--|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is favorable to the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - In the case of the election for a president of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, the respondent would vote for a candidate who would not be of his own nationality, provided that his personality and his program better suited his opinions than those of the candidate of his own country | 5673 | 65 |
| - Accepts that above the government of his country there be a european government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and economic questions | 4869 | 56 |
| - Does not agree with the statement that nothing can be done about the fact that the strong will always rule over the weak | 4827 | 55 |

7° Three scales of conservatism unfavorable to european unification
(scales XII , XIII and XIV)

These scales have in common the fact that each one expresses a certain type of conservatism composed of a certain amount of nationalism (scale XII), of dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs (scale XIII) and of ethnocentrism combined with disinterest in politics (scale XIV). This last scale is of type B.

Note that scale XIII includes the item, "is not very favorable to european unification". Thus it seems that these aspects of conservatism and ethnocentrism only prevent the formation of very strongly held attitudes favorable to Europe.

Scale XIV shows certain similarities with scale VI, but the latter seems to express a more authoritaitian tendency (defense of the established order) whereas scale XIV expresses more the acceptance, as fact, that european unification is a utopy of little interest.

Scale XII

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - I am proud to be a citizen (of this country) | 7250 | 83 |
| - Agrees that european unification is impossible since we speak different languages | 6873 | 79 |
| - In principle, has nothing against foreign workers, but agrees that there are really too many of them (in his country) . . . | 4439 | 51 |

Scale XIII

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|--|----------|----|
| - Is not very favorable to european unification | 5817 | 66 |
| - In principle, has nothing against foreign workers, but agrees that there are really too many of them (in his country). . . . | 4439 | 51 |
| - Agrees that all is well with us and the way things are, so why change ? | 2775 | 32 |

Scale XIV

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Would not feel sorry if to-morrow he were told that the common Market is being disbanded | 6240 | 71 |
| - Is not willing to make personal sacrifices, financially for example, in order to see that european unification occurs . . | 5750 | 66 |
| - Is not really interested in politics | 5300 | 61 |
| - Agrees that european unification is impossible since we speak different languages | 1877 | 21 |

8° The entry of Great Britain into the common Market (scales XVa, XVb, XVc and Xvd)

The relationships between attitudes toward european unification, on the one hand, and Great Britain's joining the common Market, on the other hand, are not simple. As we have already noticed, the question about membership appears related to some degree of interest in politics (1). We are now able to be more precise and to distinguish several kinds of attitudes.

If we reverse the direction of scale XVa, which is of type B, we observe that a favorable attitude toward Great Britain's membership and the lack of trust in the British go along with the absence of a strong commitment to Europe and with a lack of interest in politics in general.

Scale XVb, if we reverse it too, shows that refusal of Great Britain's entry goes so far that it includes refusal of european unification, in general, and political unification, in particular : here appears a sort of nationalist conservatism which is expressed by a reluctance to do away with the national currency or the national flag.

Scales XVc and Xvd cannot fail to surprise : one, by introducing an item which we would qualify as acquisitive (namely, top priority to wage increases) and the other, by bringing up trust in Americans. Subject to qualification by future studies, this favorable attitude toward British membership also seems to be related to a sort of european conformism, "bourgeois" and "atlantic" in character.

Scale XVa

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is favorable to Great Britain's entry into the common Market | 5904 | 67 |
| - Trusts the British | 5532 | 63 |
| - Participates personally in political activities or follows politics with interest without participating actively . . . | 3450 | 39 |
| - Is entirely or rather willing to make certain personal sacrifices, financially for instance, to see that european unification takes place | 3000 | 34 |
| - Would feel sorry if to-morrow he would be told that the common Market is being disbanded | 2510 | 29 |

Scale XVb

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - Is favorable to Great Britain's entry into the common Market . | 5904 | 67 |
| - Would feel very or a little sorry if to-morrow he were told that the common Market is being disbanded | 5364 | 61 |
| - Is favorable to the idea that the currency (of his country) be replaced by a european currency | 4453 | 51 |
| - Is favorable to the idea that the flag (of his country) be replaced by a european flag during important ceremonies | 2255 | 26 |

Scale XVc

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Is very favorable or rather favorable to european unification | 6377 | 73 |
| - Is in favor of the evolution of the common Market toward the political establishment of the United States of Europe | 6094 | 70 |
| - Is favorable to Great Britain's entry into the common Market . | 5904 | 67 |
| - Considers that wage increases are an objective of top priority | 2566 | 29 |

Scale XVd

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|--|----------|----|
| - Trusts Americans (the United States) | 6032 | 69 |
| - Trusts the British | 5532 | 63 |
| - Is ready to make certain personal sacrifices, financially, for example, to see that european unification takes place . . | 3000 | 34 |
| - Is very sorry if to-morrow he were told that the common Market is being disbanded | 2510 | 29 |
| - Is very favorable to european unification | 2933 | 34 |

B. SCALES WITHOUT ANY DIRECT REFERENCE TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION
(SCALES A, B AND C)

Three scales which did not refer directly to european unification were identified. Although these scales bear no direct relation to attitudes toward the integration of Europe, they are interesting from the socio-political point of view : they correspond respectively to dimensions which one might qualify as expressing political tendencies of liberal conservatism, of humanitarian progressism and of strict nationalism.

The two first scales have several items in common, but scale A emphasizes the participation of workers in business management as well as the encouragement of private initiative, whereas scale B includes no item related to the maintenance of order, but refers instead to the humanization of our society and aid to underdeveloped countries.

Scale C clearly expresses a dimension of traditional nationalism.

Scale ALIBERAL CONSERVATISM

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|--|----------|----|
| - Considers that guaranteeing decent pensions to all old people is an objective with top priority | 6144 | 70 |
| - Considers that providing jobs for young people is an objective with top priority | 4888 | 56 |
| - Considers that insuring greater job security is an objective with top priority | 4356 | 50 |
| - Considers that maintaining law and order is an objective with top priority | 4123 | 47 |
| - Considers that guaranteeing the freedom of speech is an objective with top priority | 3745 | 43 |
| - Considers that insuring workers' participation in business management is an objective with top priority | 1991 | 23 |
| - Considers that fostering private initiative in the sphere of economic activity is an objective with top priority | 1691 | 19 |

Scale BHUMANIST PROGRESSIVISM

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|---|----------|----|
| - Considers that guaranteeing decent pensions to all old people is an objective with top priority | 6144 | 70 |
| - Considers that providing jobs to young people is an objective with top priority | 4888 | 56 |
| - Considers that insuring greater job security is an objective with top priority | 4356 | 50 |
| - Considers that guaranteeing the freedom of speech is an objective with top priority | 3745 | 43 |
| - Considers that making our society more humane is an objective with top priority | 3243 | 37 |
| - Considers that aid to underdeveloped countries is an objective with top priority | 1414 | 16 |

Scale CTRADITIONAL NATIONALISM

| Items | N = 8750 | % |
|--|----------|----|
| - Desires keenly that his country make important scientific discoveries | 6586 | 75 |
| - Desires keenly that his country play an important role in the world politics | 4727 | 54 |
| - Desires keenly that his country possess a strong army . . . | 2886 | 33 |

2 - THE DETERMINANTS OF PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

Apart from the analysis presented later which will examine how responses to various questions of demographic variables vary as a function of scores on the scale measuring pro-european attitudes (1), it is useful to determine where the highest and lowest mean scores are found.

A. OVERALL TABLE OF PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

The table below gives the rank order of all the subgroups the questionnaire was able to identify by their mean scores on the index of pro-european attitudes. It is obvious that the various subgroups are not mutually exclusive ; it simply amounts to a serial partition of the entire sample, each time according to a different criterion (2). The first thirteen and the last fourteen subgroups represent, respectively, one-sixth of the total subdivisions.

(1) See pages 154 to 200.

(2) The maximal value is 6,00 and the minimal value is 1,00.

Table 63

RANK-ORDER OF SUBGROUPS BY THEIR MEAN SCORE
ON THE INDEX OF PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

| <u>Subgroups</u> | <u>Mean Score</u> |
|---|-------------------|
| 1. Heads of firms and upper management | 4,53 |
| 2. Professionals and high-ranking civil servants | 4,26 |
| 3. Persons with high education level | 4,23 |
| 4. Persons within a household whose head is a business head or upper management | 4,06 |
| 5. Persons within a household whose head is a student | 4,06 |
| 6. Persons who say they are members of a wealthy family | 3,92 |
| 7. Persons who would vote for a liberal party | 3,85 |
| 8. Persons within a household whose head is a high-ranking civil servant or a professional | 3,83 |
| 9. Students | 3,78 |
| 10. Mid-management and white collar workers | 3,73 |
| 11. Persons having a political preference different from their pa- rents' | 3,72 |
| 12. Inhabitants of the North-Eastern part of Italy | 3,71 |
| 13. Persons who attended a non-technical secondary school | 3,67 |
| 14. Heads of a family who are not union-members, yet identify with a union | 3,64 |
| 15. Non-practising protestants | 3,58 |
| 16. Heads of a family who are union members and who feel identified with it | 3,57 |
| 17. Males | 3,55 |
| 18. Persons who show a weak party identification | 3,53 |
| 19. Heads of household who are union members, but do not identify with it | 3,52 |
| 20. Persons who say they are members of a fairly wealth-y family | 3,52 |
| 21. Persons who would vote for an extreme left-wing, non-communist party | 3,49 |
| 22. Members of households whose head is a mid-management or white- collar worker | 3,49 |
| 23. Persons who would vote for social-democratic parties | 3,46 |
| 24. Inhabitants of the Western part of Holland | 3,45 |

| | |
|--|------|
| 25. Inhabitants of the central part of the Federal Republic of Germany | 3,41 |
| 26. Persons who show a strong party identification | 3,40 |
| 27. Persons with the same political preference as their parents | 3,37 |
| 28. Persons born between 1950 and 1955 (aged 16 to 20 years old) | 3,35 |
| 29-30 Persons born between 1940 and 1950 (aged 21 to 29 years old) | 3,34 |
| 31. Persons who show a very weak party identification | 3,34 |
| 32. Inhabitants of the North-Western part of Italy | 3,32 |
| 33. Germans | 3,30 |
| 34. Shopkeepers and artisans | 3,30 |
| 35-36 Inhabitants of localities with more than 20.000 inhabitants | 3,29 |
| 37. Persons born between 1920 and 1925 | 3,27 |
| 38. Persons who attended a technical or vocational school | 3,27 |
| 39. Italians | 3,27 |
| 40. Union-members, who identify with the union and who are not heads of a household | 3,25 |
| 41. French who vote for the UDR (Gaullists) | 3,24 |
| 42. The Dutch | 3,24 |
| 43. Union-members, who do not identify with their union and are not heads of a household | 3,23 |
| 44. Inhabitants of the Southern part of the Netherlands | 3,22 |
| 45. Inhabitants of the Southern part of the Federal Republic in Germany | 3,21 |
| 46. Non-practising catholics | 3,20 |
| 47. Luxembourgers | 3,19 |
| 48-49 Persons born between 1925 - 1935 (aged 35 to 45 years old). | 3,18 |
| 50. Persons born between 1915 and 1920 (aged 50 to 54 years old). | 3,18 |
| 51. Persons without a religion | 3,18 |
| 52. Persons who vote for a christian-democratic party or a centre party | 3,17 |
| 53. Inhabitants of the Paris area | 3,16 |
| 54. Inhabitants of the central part of Italy. | 3,15 |
| 55. Persons in a household whose head is a shopkeeper or an artisan | 3,14 |
| 56. Heads of households who are neither union-members nor union-identifiers | 3,12 |
| 57. Inhabitants of the Southern part of Italy | 3,12 |
| 58. Practising catholics | 3,12 |
| 59. Persons who are not union-members, nor heads of a household, but who identify with a union | 3,12 |
| 60. Persons who say they are members of a family with average means | 3,11 |
| 61. Persons born between 1935 and 1940 (aged 30 to 34 years old) | 3,10 |

| | | |
|-------|---|------|
| 62. | Inhabitants of the Northern part of the German Federal Republic | 3,09 |
| 63. | Inhabitants of the Northern part of the Netherlands | 3,05 |
| 64. | Persons voting for a very right-wing party | 3,04 |
| 65. | Persons belonging to a non-christian religion | 3,04 |
| 66. | Laborers. | 3,03 |
| 67. | Practising protestants | 2,98 |
| 68. | Persons born between 1905 and 1915 (aged 55 to 64 years old) | 2,93 |
| 69. | Inhabitants of localities of less than 20.000 inhabitants | 2,88 |
| 70. | Inhabitants of the Brabant province in Belgium | 2,88 |
| 71. | Persons whose head of household is a worker | 2,87 |
| 72. | Inhabitants of the Italian islands | 2,85 |
| 73. | Persons in households whose head is the housewife | 2,84 |
| 74. | The Wallons Belgians | 2,82 |
| 75-76 | Inhabitants of the North-Eastern and South-Western part of France . . . | 2,82 |
| 77. | Belgians | 2,80 |
| 78. | French | 2,79 |
| 79-80 | Retired persons, with or without a retirement pension and members of their household | 2,79 |
| 81. | Persons who are neither heads of a household, union-members nor identi- fied with a union | 2,78 |
| 82. | Persons who do not identify with any party | 2,78 |
| 83. | Inhabitants of the Eastern part of the Netherlands | 2,77 |
| 84. | Inhabitants of the South-Eastern part of France | 2,73 |
| 85. | Women | 2,71 |
| 86. | Farmers | 2,66 |
| 87. | The Flemish Belgians | 2,64 |
| 88. | Members of a household whose head is a farmer | 2,63 |
| 89. | Housewives | 2,62 |
| 90. | Persons born before 1905 (aged 65 and older) | 2,60 |
| 91. | Persons with no education past the primary school level | 2,56 |
| 92. | Inhabitants of the North-Eastern part of France | 2,54 |
| 93. | Persons who say they are members of a family with few means | 2,54 |
| 94. | Persons who refuse to say for what party they would vote or who answer : "for no political party". | 2,53 |
| 95. | Persons who would vote for a communist party | 2,40 |
| 96. | Persons whose head of household is a salaried farm helper | 2,32 |
| 97. | Persons who say they are members of a poor family | 2,23 |
| 98. | People who do not respond to the question about their party identifica- tion | 2,21 |
| 99. | Salaried farm workers | 2,17 |

What strikes us immediately in reading this table is the fact that the average scores on the index are higher among the privileged categories.

The mean is 3,11 with a standard deviation of approximately 1,8 (1). The five subgroups obtaining an average score clearly higher than the overall mean belong to privileged segments of the population. These are persons who are employed in positions of high prestige, responsibility and salary or who are members of a household whose head holds such a position, as well as persons who attended centres of higher education. One must go down to the subgroup ranked in twelfth place in order to find a geographical area which apparently is not a privileged group in society: these are the inhabitants of the North-Eastern part of Italy. But in all of Italy, this region can be considered and considers itself to be relatively privileged: it does not enjoy the highest income per capita in Italy, but its internal gross product per capita has increased the most per annum, on the average, during the last twelve years (2).

On the other hand, at the bottom of the table we find a larger number of underprivileged subgroups who have good reason to consider themselves as such: farmers, housewives, old people, persons whose education level does not go beyond primary school, people not interested in politics, and persons who belong to a family of few means or to a poor family. In this same part of the table, one finds segments of the population who are opposed to the existing socio-political organization and structure and who probably consider themselves as oppressed: for example, communist voters and the Flemish in Belgium. The inhabitants of underprivileged regions like the North-Western part of France are also found in this part of the table.

The conclusion is obvious: the ideals and the aspirations, which presently engender a strongly held attitude favorable to European unification, are not out of the same cloth as the tensions which may exist among the underprivileged segments of the present day European population. As a stimulus for taking a favorable position, the image of united Europe attracts only groups which are privileged from the socio-economic and socio-cultural points of view or which considered themselves as such.

Recall, however, that the findings discussed in this report are drawn from a sample which represents the European population as a whole. The values, views, images and attitudes which may exist only among very small, minority groups cannot be

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- (1) The standard deviation measures the dispersion. It indicates from how much the different scores are far from the mean.
 - (2) See "L'évolution régionale dans la Communauté", Commission of European Communities, 1971, pp 291 and 292.

statistically detected in a study as overarching as this one.

B. VARIOUS VARIABLES

We shall examine, successively, five variables or sets of variables :

- nationality and region of residence,
- personal characteristics : sex and age,
- socio-demographic characteristics : occupation, education level, size of the locality, (subjective) income level, and religious, political, union and other membership,
- level of knowledge,
- attitudes toward other countries.

1° NATIONALITY AND REGION

Region is a better predictor of a pro-european attitude than nationality. While the mean scores between countries are narrowly spread, ranging from 3,30 for Germany to 2,79 for France, the mean scores between regions are very dispersed, ranging from 3,71 for the North-Eastern part of Italy to 2,54 for the North-Western part of France. Nonetheless, neither nation nor region are as good predictors as is occupation (heads of firms and upper management : 4,53 ; salaried farm helpers : 2,17) or the level of education (higher education : 4,23 ; primary school level : 2,56).

Graph 2 shows the dispersion of mean scores by region and by country. Table 64 gives the percentage distributions by region and country for each value on the pro-european attitude index.

Graph 2

RANK - ORDER OF REGIONS AND COUNTRIES
BY THEIR AVERAGE SCORE TO THE PRO-
EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX




Table 64

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY REGION

| Index scores | Germany | | | | Belgium | | | | France | | | | | |
|--------------|---------|-------|--------|-------|---------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | Total | North | Centre | South | Total | Flander | Brab. | Wall. | Total | Paris | North West | North East | South West | South East |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 18 | 21 | 20 | 14 | 10 | 9 | 12 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 6 | 9 | 11 | 6 |
| + 5 | 17 | 13 | 16 | 19 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 10 | 12 | 17 | 8 | 13 | 11 | 12 |
| + 4 | 17 | 14 | 18 | 17 | 19 | 15 | 19 | 23 | 18 | 22 | 19 | 17 | 14 | 19 |
| + 3 | 13 | 10 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 20 | 20 |
| + 2 | 12 | 13 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 12 | 14 | 16 | 13 | 14 | 17 | 19 | 17 |
| + 1 | 9 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 10 | 18 | 14 | 11 | 11 |
| Indifferent | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Undecided | 5 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 7 |
| - 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| No reply | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | 2 | 0 | - | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean Score | 3,30 | 3,09 | 3,41 | 3,21 | 2,80 | 2,64 | 2,88 | 2,82 | 2,79 | 3,16 | 2,54 | 2,82 | 2,82 | 2,73 |
| N | 2019 | 402 | 959 | 658 | 1298 | 611 | 281 | 406 | 2046 | 452 | 403 | 487 | 261 | 443 |

Table 64 (continued)

| Index scores | Italy | | | | | | Luxembourg | Nether lands | | | | |
|--------------|-------|------------|------------|--------|-------|-------|------------|--------------|-------|------|------|-------|
| | Total | North West | North East | Centre | South | Isles | Total | Total | North | East | West | South |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 11 | 11 | 15 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 9 | 16 | 9 |
| + 5 | 17 | 19 | 18 | 16 | 17 | 15 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 14 | 20 | 19 |
| + 4 | 23 | 22 | 29 | 20 | 22 | 17 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 14 | 18 | 16 |
| + 3 | 19 | 20 | 18 | 22 | 17 | 17 | 22 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 24 |
| + 2 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 13 | 12 | 17 | 10 | 15 |
| + 1 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 11 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 9 |
| Indifferent | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Undecided | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 2 |
| No reply | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean Score | 3,27 | 3,32 | 3,71 | 3,15 | 3,12 | 2,85 | 3,19 | 3,24 | 3,05 | 2,77 | 3,45 | 3,22 |
| N | 1822 | 521 | 358 | 360 | 406 | 177 | 335 | 1229 | 157 | 215 | 598 | 259 |

Within six regions we find that between 30 % and 40 % of the respondents obtain a score of + 5 or + 6 which can be considered as a very favorable attitude. These are the following areas :

| | |
|-----------------------|------|
| - Centre of Germany | 36 % |
| - Western Holland | 36 % |
| - Northern Germany | 34 % |
| - Southern Germany | 33 % |
| - North-Eastern Italy | 33 % |
| - North-Western Italy | 30 % |

It is, nonetheless, the inhabitants of North-Eastern Italy who obtain the highest mean score (3,71), since there are very few persons with a zero or negative score : indifferent, undecided and hostile persons represent only 6 % of these respondents, whereas in the three German regions these responses vary between 13 % in central and 18 % in northern Germany. In Western Holland, they account for 9 %.

The population of Northern Germany seems to show the most mixed attitude, in spite of its rank order on the previous scale. In fact, more than one third of the respondents in this region obtain scores of 5 or 6, yet 18 % have a score below 1. Only in the Flemish regions of Belgium do we find an even greater proportion of zero or negative attitudes (20 %).

Thus the assertion that the most favorable attitudes are found among privileged groups in the population is supported by these data. Throughout all the countries, the highest mean score and the highest percentage of very favorable scores is observed among the inhabitants of the most developed area of the country, which is, except for Italy, the region where the capital is located.

2° PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

a) SEX - The male population is definitely more favorable to european unification than the distaff half. The average score for men is 3,55 and 2,71 for women; the percentage of "very favorable" men (score 5 and 6) is 36 %, and 19 % of women. (See table 65).

The importance of this difference leads us to think that at least two factors intervene. One of the factors probably is the lesser interest in politics shown

by women (and by old people, among whom women are much more numerous than men : namely, after 65 years of age, more numerous throughout the entire European Community). But a second factor probably adds to the first : it is the image of Europe - much more technical and economic than political in character, more intellectual than affective - in short, a sort of "masculine" image, which, undoubtedly, is not of a kind to mobilize the interest of women.

Table 65

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY SEX

| Index Score | Total | Men | Women |
|-------------|-------|------|-------|
| | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 17 | 7 |
| + 5 | 15 | 19 | 12 |
| + 4 | 19 | 20 | 18 |
| + 3 | 17 | 16 | 18 |
| + 2 | 13 | 11 | 15 |
| + 1 | 11 | 8 | 13 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 3 | 6 |
| Undecided | 5 | 2 | 7 |
| - 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 |
| No response | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,11 | 3,55 | 2,71 |
| N | 8749 | 4230 | 4519 |

b) AGE - The highest mean scores and percentages for low values on the index are observed among the youngest age groups, i.e. among people less than 30 years old, i.e. born after 1940. For the age groups from 35 to 54 years old, the mean score is still slightly higher than that of the entire population. From the age of 55 on, the attitudes become markedly less positive. Note the relatively low scores and percentages of the 30 to 34 years old age group, i.e. of persons born between 1935 and 1940 ; in this instance, one might be observing the consequences of the conditions under which the "political socialization" of this generation (1) took place.

We find, nonetheless, that the differences in mean scores among the age groups of persons less than 55 years old are not due to high scores, but instead to zero or negative scores. It is for this reason that the percentage of high scores in the 21 to 55 age group is greater than that we find among the less than 20 year old group, yet the percentage of zero or negative values increases rather steadily as a function of age. This is a reconfirmation of the hypothesis that the favorable attitudes toward european unification we find among the youngest age groups are not so much the effects of truly very positive views on their part, i.e. a very strong attraction of the ideas or plans for unification, as they are the effect of the lesser pull of traditional resistance (based on nationalism, ethnocentrism, etc.) (2). (See table 66 and graph 3).

(1) On this point see Ronald INGLEHART's research, especially "The Socialization of Europeans", University of Chicago, 1967, and "An End to European Integration ?", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI, n° 1, March 1967, pp. 91-105.


(2) Already stated in the preceding chapter, this hypothesis merits closer examination. Are we confronted with a general phenomenon ? Are the old value systems weakening or disappearing among the younger generations at a faster tempo than new ones are adopted ?

Table 66

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY AGE GROUP

| Index Scores | Total | 16 - 20 years old | 21 - 24 y.o. | 25 - 29 y.o. | 30 - 34 y.o. | 35 - 39 y.o. | 40 - 44 y.o. | 45 - 49 y.o. | 50 - 54 y.o. | 55 - 64 y.o. | 65 y.o. and over |
|--------------|-------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 10 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 10 | 9 |
| + 5 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 15 | 15 | 11 |
| + 4 | 19 | 22 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 21 | 17 | 18 | 16 |
| + 3 | 17 | 20 | 19 | 16 | 20 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 16 |
| + 2 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 15 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 13 |
| + 1 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 14 |
| Indiff. | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| Undecided | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 10 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| No reply | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 2,11 | 3,35 | 3,34 | 3,34 | 3,10 | 3,18 | 3,18 | 3,27 | 3,18 | 2,23 | 2,60 |
| N | 8749 | 865 | 729 | 836 | 735 | 901 | 782 | 747 | 629 | 1310 | 1315 |

Graph 3

**MEAN SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY AGE GROUP**

3° SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

a) OCCUPATION - Of all socio-demographic characteristics, employment in such or such an occupation is the most discriminatory. Among the first five subgroups of the population to obtain the highest mean scores, we find four occupations. Among heads of firms and upper management, nearly two thirds of the respondents have one of the two highest scores ; the proportion is still 50 % among high civil servants and professionals. At the opposite extreme, the highest percentages of zero or negative scores are found among farmers, housewives, retirees or pensionees, and, most of all, among salaried farm workers. Shopkeepers, artisans, and workers are also close to the average. (See table 67).

Attitudes of persons holding a job are more or less the same as those of the members of their household.

Table 67

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY OCCUPATION

| Scores | Total | Farmers | Salaried farm workers | Heads of firms and upper management | High civil servants + professionals | Shopkeepers Artisans | Mid-Management + white collar | Workers | Students | Housewives | Retirees Pensionees |
|------------|---------|---------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|---------|----------|------------|---------------------|
| + 6 | 12 | 9 | 4 | 34 | 25 | 15 | 18 | 11 | 18 | 6 | 10 |
| + 5 | 15 | 11 | 7 | 27 | 25 | 16 | 22 | 15 | 19 | 11 | 12 |
| + 4 | 19 | 17 | 13 | 17 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 25 | 18 | 17 |
| + 3 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 9 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 21 | 19 | 17 |
| + 2 | 13 | 10 | 17 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 15 | 7 | 10 | 10 |
| + 1 | 11 | 15 | 16 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 12 | 6 | 13 | 10 |
| Indiff. | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | - | 4 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| Undecided | 5 | 5 | 12 | - | 0 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 0 |
| - 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
| No reply | 1 | 1 | 4 | - | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 1,11 | 2,66 | 2,17 | 4,53 | 4,26 | 3,30 | 3,73 | 3,03 | 3,78 | 2,62 | 3,70 |
| N | 3745(x) | 489 | 100 | 286 | 199 | 642 | 1254 | 1646 | 503 | 2298 | 1197 |

(x) Included are 32 people who were not classified.

b) LEVEL OF EDUCATION - This variable shows a close relationship with pro-european attitudes. Persons who attended centres of high education have a mean score two thirds higher than those who did not go beyond primary school : the percentage of both maximum scores is almost three times greater among the former than among the latter. Inversely, the proportion of zero and negative scores is five times greater among persons who do pursue studies beyond the primary level than among those who went on to higher education.

Note the significant difference between the scores for a secondary level of education, on the one hand, and for technical or vocational training, on the other. (See table 68 and Graph 4).


Table 68DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

| Index scores | Total | Primary school | Secondary education | Technical or Vocational education | Higher Education | Others |
|--------------|----------|----------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|--------|
| + 6 | 12 | 7 | 16 | 13 | 28 | 15 |
| + 5 | 15 | 11 | 21 | 17 | 23 | 10 |
| + 4 | 19 | 18 | 20 | 22 | 21 | 16 |
| + 3 | 17 | 16 | 19 | 20 | 15 | 22 |
| + 2 | 13 | 15 | 11 | 12 | 5 | 17 |
| + 1 | 11 | 14 | 6 | 10 | 4 | 11 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Undecided | 5 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| - 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| No reply | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 2,11 | 2,56 | 3,67 | 3,27 | 4,23 | 3,12 |
| N | 8749 (x) | 4685 | 2106 | 1152 | 707 | 81 |

(x) Included are 18 people who were not classified

Graph 4

**MEAN SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND STANDARD OF LIVING**



c) SIZE OF THE COMMUNE - The number of inhabitants in the commune of residence apparently is related to pro-european attitudes. The mean score is significantly lower in communes of less than 20.000 inhabitants (2,88) than in larger communes (3,29). The difference can probably be attributed to socio-occupational, economic, and cultural differences that exist between residents of a rural commune and those of larger urban areas.

d) RELIGIOUS MEMBERSHIP AND PRACTICE - The preceding observation, also, probably applies to variables of a religious type. For example, that protestants who do not practice their religion (which, by the way, represents only 4 % of the sample) have a significantly higher mean score than the other respondents must be interpreted by taking into account the fact that the majority of this subgroup is made up of Dutch and Germans living in large urban areas of their country. The difference with the practicing protestants, who obtain a much lower mean score, can probably be explained by the fact that the latter are more numerous in rural communes.

The difference between practicing and non-practicing people also shows up among the catholics, but it is less marked.

e) STANDARD OF LIVING - Table 69 brings out a strong correlation between pro-european attitudes and the respondents' opinion about the financial means at their disposal. The mean score increases almost linearly, from 2,23 for persons who consider their family poor to 3,92 for wealthy families.

That this is not simply a question of information level is shown by the fact that the percentage of persons with negative scores also decreases linearly as a function of the standard of living. Indeed, as we shall see later, the minority of persons with negative scores is not less informed than those who have high scores on the pro-european attitude index : this is a minority often made up of persons of the extreme left or right. Similarly, we saw above that negative scores are scarcely influenced by education level. (See table 69 and graph 4).

-
- (1) In order to verify whether and to what extent religious membership and practice directly affect pro-european attitudes, an analysis of the following variables would suffice : religious membership and practice, respondents' opinions about the financial means at their disposal, and the index itself.

Table 69

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY STANDARD OF LIVING
(according to respondents' subjective estimate)

| Index scores | Total | Poor family | Family of few means | Family with average means | Family fairly well-off | Wealthy family |
|--------------|----------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|----------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 5 | 6 | 10 | 17 | 22 |
| + 5 | 15 | 9 | 11 | 16 | 18 | 22 |
| + 4 | 19 | 11 | 17 | 21 | 20 | 20 |
| + 3 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 16 |
| + 2 | 13 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 9 |
| + 1 | 11 | 13 | 15 | 10 | 8 | 6 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Undecided | 5 | 13 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| - 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| No reply | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 2,11 | 2,23 | 2,54 | 2,14 | 3,52 | 3,92 |
| N | 3749 (x) | 541 | 1974 | 2950 | 2731 | 459 |

(x) Included are 94 people who were not classified.

f) POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION - Persons who indicate a preference for a liberal party obtain the highest mean score (3,85). After these come those who identify with far left-wing, non-communist parties (3,49) and with the social democratic parties (3,46), followed by identifiers with centre or rightist parties. (See table 70).

To understand fully this table, one also has to take other factors into consideration, such as nationality. For example, the difference in the attitudes between persons who identify with far left-wing non-communist parties and communists is striking; the first have a score much higher than the european average, whereas the latter have among the lowest scores. Only salaried farm helpers as well as persons who say they are members of a poor family and those without any party identification whatsoever obtain even lower mean scores.

This leads us to think that the way politics intervenes as a factor in the formation of pro-european attitudes and its importance as a factor depend upon one's party preference.

Where scores very clearly deviate from the european average, i.e. among respondents of liberal tendency, on the one hand, and among communists, on the other, one can assume that the political factor -which is, itself, correlated with other factors, has a direct influence on pro-european attitudes.

With regard to other parties including the extreme right, it can be assumed that pro-european attitudes, on the one hand, and the party preference, on the other, depend a single set of economic and social factors, but that there is no direct relationship between the two variables themselves.

Without a doubt, one of the factors which has as much influence on party preference as on pro-european attitudes is the degree of interest in politics and strength of party identification. It is well-known that some parties, particularly those in the centre, attract - be it permanently or occasionally - a proportionately larger number of people who show little interest in politics (1). Indeed, these persons also obtain lower scores on the pro-european attitude scale. Table 71 shows

(1) See Emeric DEUTSCH, Denis LINDON and Pierre WEILL : "Les familles politiques aujourd'hui en France", Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1966.

These authors classify under the name "Marias", on the one hand, "false centrists", i.e. voters who located themselves in the centre, but who are not interested in politics and, on the other hand, those who are unable to locate themselves anywhere (on a left-right scale).

that the mean score of respondents who strongly identify with a political party is much higher than the european average (3,40), yet not as high as those respondents who show a weak party identification (3,53). The difference between these two scores can be attributed to the fact that extremists, whom we know have less favorable european attitudes, are found in the first group. From this point forth, however, mean scores rapidly devrease as the strength of party identification decreases. Respondents who claim no party identification whatsoever obtain one of the lowest scores among all the subgroups we have studied.

If interest in politics and the strength of party identification lead to a favorable attitude toward european unification, it is to be expected that the voters of majority parties obtain lower mean scores. In fact, these parties draw proportionately smaller numbers of strong identifiers.

Political heredity also plays a certain role. Respondents who state that their party preference differs from that of their parents obtain a mean score of 3,72. Observe, however, that political interest and commitment probably are the reason for it. In fact, respondents who claim to have the same party preference as their parents also obtain a mean score above the european average (3,37). Only those interviewees who do not know their parents' political preference or who do not have one themselves or who, for that matter, do not respond to the question obtain scores lower than the average. (See table 72).

So far, we have examined the relationship between party preference and pro-european attitudes as if the latter were a result of the former. Yet it is possible that european attitudes influence party preference rather than vice-versa. This hypothesis, however, does not seem defensible. It is true, as the data in table 73 show, that people who are very favorable to european unification also have a tendency to attribute these attitudes to the representatives of their preferred party, and that the respondents who are unfavorable to european unification attribute the same feelings to their political leaders, but these data do not inform us about the extent to which the european feelings of political leaders are known to the voters. Indeed, it would be rather difficult to come out, on the one hand, as an avid partisan of european unification, and to admit, on the other, that one votes for a party whose leadres hold a contrary position.

In this respect, table 74 is more revealing. The correlation between a european attitude and the tendency to vote for another party if the presently pre-

ferred party were to take a position on european unification contrary to the interviewee's opinions is practically nul.

Thus, we must conclude that opinions, feelings and attitudes toward european unification generally have hardly any influence on political behaviour and preference. This means either that unification is not considered to be an important problem compared to those at stake in elections, or else that unification is immutable and runs its own course. In both cases, the hypothesis we already advanced is confirmed once again, namely that plans for Europe have not yet touched the affective core of human response.

Table 70

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY PARTY PREFERENCE

| Index scores | Total | Communists | Non-Communist extreme left | Social Liberals Democrats | Liberals | Christian Democrats + Centrists | U D R France | Extreme right | No party or no reply |
|--------------|----------|------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|--------------|---------------|----------------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 5 | 16 | 16 | 19 | 12 | 8 | 14 | 7 |
| + 5 | 15 | 11 | 19 | 17 | 22 | 17 | 16 | 11 | 11 |
| + 4 | 19 | 18 | 18 | 21 | 22 | 18 | 22 | 20 | 17 |
| + 3 | 17 | 14 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 21 | 16 |
| + 2 | 13 | 16 | 16 | 12 | 9 | 13 | 16 | 11 | 14 |
| + 1 | 11 | 18 | 2 | 9 | 6 | 11 | 12 | 8 | 13 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 7 |
| Undecided | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 10 |
| - 1 | 3 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 8 | 4 |
| No reply | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,11 | 2,40 | 3,49 | 3,46 | 3,85 | 3,17 | 3,24 | 3,04 | 2,53 |
| N | 8749 (x) | 352 | 178 | 1990 | 575 | 2584 | 408 | 363 | 2235 |

(x) Included are 64 respondents who were not classified.

Table 71

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

| Index Score | Total | Strong Party Identifiers | Weak Party Identifiers | Very weak Party Identifiers | No party Identification | Don't know |
|-------------|-------|--------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 16 | 16 | 10 | 8 | 4 |
| + 5 | 15 | 18 | 18 | 23 | 13 | 9 |
| + 4 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 18 | 14 |
| + 3 | 17 | 15 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 18 |
| + 2 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 15 | 15 |
| + 1 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 12 | 14 |
| Indiff. | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 9 |
| Undecided | 5 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 12 |
| - 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| No reply | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,11 | 3,40 | 3,53 | 3,34 | 2,78 | 2,21 |
| N | 8749 | 1556 | 3000 | 96 | 3235 | 862 |

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY PARTY
PREFERENCE COMPARED WITH PARENTS' PREFERENCE

| Index Score | Total | Same as parents | Different from parents | Don't know |
|-------------|-------|-----------------|------------------------|------------|
| | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 16 | 14 | 19 | 10 |
| + 5 | 18 | 18 | 20 | 27 |
| + 4 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 21 |
| + 3 | 18 | 17 | 19 | 20 |
| + 2 | 12 | 13 | 10 | 10 |
| + 1 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 9 |
| Indifferent | 2 | 3 | 2 | - |
| Undecided | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| No response | 0 | 0 | - | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean Score | 3,50 | 3,37 | 3,72 | 3,71 |
| N (x) | 3506 | 2330 | 1105 | 71 |

(x) Included are only respondents who express a party preference and who also know their parents' party preference.

Table 73

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY SUPPOSED DEGREE OF COMMITMENT OF PREFERRED PARTY'S
REPRESENTATIVE TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

| Index Score | Supposed Attitude of Preferred Party's Representatives toward European Unification. | | | | | |
|----------------|---|----------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------|
| | Total | Very favorable | Rather favorable | Rather unfavorable | Very unfavorable | Don't know |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 14 | 28 | 14 | 7 | 4 | 3 |
| + 5 | 17 | 25 | 18 | 11 | 1 | 9 |
| + 4 | 19 | 19 | 24 | 15 | 6 | 15 |
| + 3 | 18 | 14 | 19 | 17 | 10 | 19 |
| + 2 | 13 | 7 | 13 | 11 | 8 | 17 |
| + 1 | 10 | 4 | 7 | 15 | 31 | 16 |
| Indifferent | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 7 |
| Undecided | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | 8 |
| - 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 15 | 37 | 5 |
| No reply | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean Score | 3,32 | 4,28 | 3,58 | 2,30 | 0,93 | 2,27 |
| N | 6499 (x) | 1626 | 2498 | 212 | 72 | 2091 |

(x) Included are only people expressing a preference for a political party.

Table 74

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY TENDENCY TO CHANGE PARTY PREFERENCE IN FUNCTION OF THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ONE'S PREFERRED PARTY

| Index score | Would change political preference | | | | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|------------|----------|--------------|----------------|------------|
| | Total | Definitely | Probably | Probably not | Definitely not | Don't know |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 14 | 16 | 15 | 17 | 15 | 5 |
| + 5 | 17 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 16 | 10 |
| + 4 | 19 | 19 | 24 | 19 | 18 | 15 |
| + 3 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 17 |
| + 2 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 16 |
| + 1 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 15 |
| Indiff. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 6 |
| Undecided | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| No reply | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,32 | 3,48 | 3,61 | 3,57 | 3,33 | 2,36 |
| N | 6499 (x) | 1238 | 1557 | 1352 | 1169 | 1183 |

(x) Included are only respondents who express a preference for a political party.

g) UNION MEMBERSHIP OR IDENTIFICATION WITH A UNION - Table 75 shows that the scores on the pro-european attitude index covary with the three variables examined, i.e. whether or not one is the head of household, a union member or (strongly or weakly) identified with a union.

The fact that, generally speaking, the heads of household are more favorable than the non-heads stands to reason, since the housewives and women who, on balance, have low scores represent the large majority of non-heads of household. Even among strongly committed union members, heads of households have significantly higher scores than non-heads : 3,57 to 3,25. Similarly among respondents who are neither union-members nor union-identifiers, heads of household are more european : 3,12 to 2,78.

In general, union members obtain a higher average score than non-members. But, as already seen, it seems improbable that this more positive attitude is attributable to the influence of union leaders (1). A more probable hypothesis is that most union members identify themselves in some way with the socio-economical structures which exist in the countries of the common Market, even if they criticize them. This hypothesis, which remains to be verified, squares with the general observation we made according to which "privileged persons", however relative the advantage, hold the most positive attitudes toward european unification.

The highest score is obtained by the subgroup of non-union heads of household who identify with a union (3,64). It is likely that in this subgroup, we find heads of firms and upper management, high civil servants and professionals which are categories we know to be by far the most favorable to the unification of Europe. The relative importance of this category (more than 7 % of the sample) shows that the union phenomenon is accepted in the milieux presently holding key positions in society and favorable to the european unification.

The third variable, i.e. strength of union identification, also shows a positive correlation with scores on the pro-european attitude index. Whether heads of household or not, those respondents who belong to unions and who identify with them obtain higher scores than union members who do not identify with their union. Similarly, respondents who, without being union members, feel attached to one obtain higher scores than non-identifiers. Lest we forget, this does not mean that those milieux which identify most strongly with a union or are most favorable to unions feel more "European" because of their union ties or sympathies, but because

(1) See page 47.

it is in these groups we would consider as reformist or progressive where pro-euro-pean attitudes are more widely held and more firmly rooted than in other social groups.

As in the case of party preference, those persons who, either as union members or identifiers, are relatively more favorable, as we just observed, than others to european unification attribute similar views to union leaders. But in neither instance does this finding inform us about the knowledge these people have about the views union members truly hold (See table 76).

Table 75

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY UNION MEMBERSHIP AND IDENTIFICATION

| Index score | Total | Heads of household | | | | Non-heads of household | | | |
|-------------|---------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | | Union Members or Identifiers | -Union Members but non Identifiers | Non-Union members but sympathizer | Neither Union member nor Identifier | Union Members or Identifiers | Union members but non Identifiers | Non-Union members but sympathizer | Neither Union Members nor Identifier |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 8 |
| + 5 | 15 | 21 | 18 | 19 | 16 | 17 | 14 | 15 | 12 |
| + 4 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 22 | 18 | 22 | 25 | 20 | 18 |
| + 3 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 14 | 18 | 15 | 19 | 19 |
| + 2 | 13 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 13 | 9 | 15 | 14 | 14 |
| + 1 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 10 | 13 |
| Indiff. | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 5 |
| Undecided | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| No reply | 1 | - | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | - | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3, 11 | 3,57 | 3,52 | 3,64 | 3,12 | 3,25 | 3,23 | 3,12 | 2,78 |
| N | 8749(x) | 552 | 773 | 636 | 2167 | 170 | 366 | 689 | 3302 |

(x) Included are 94 respondents who were not classified.

Table 76

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY SUPPOSED ATTITUDE TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION OF LEADERSHIP IN UNIONS
TO WHICH ONE BELONGS OR IDENTIFIES

| Index score | Union leaders' attitude toward European unification | | | | |
|-------------|---|----------------|------------------|---|------------|
| | Total | Very favorable | Rather favorable | Rather unfavorable and very unfavorable | Don't know |
| | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 15 | 29 | 19 | 5 | 9 |
| + 5 | 17 | 22 | 22 | 11 | 14 |
| + 4 | 21 | 20 | 23 | 14 | 20 |
| + 3 | 17 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
| + 2 | 12 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 14 |
| + 1 | 9 | 4 | 7 | 19 | 12 |
| Indifferent | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Undecided | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| - 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 16 | 4 |
| No reply | 0 | - | - | - | 0 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,40 | 4,29 | 3,90 | 2,19 | 2,94 |
| N | 3222 (x) | 455 | 996 | 148 | 1623 |

(x) Respondents who are either union members or identifiers.

4° LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA

From the preceding analysis, it can certainly be expected that the level of knowledge is strongly correlated with scores on the pro-european attitude index. Indeed, it is natural for you to be better informed about subjects dear to you than about those indifferent to you. On the other hand, we have observed that the most favorable attitudes toward european unification are found among persons and groups which, judged by their level of education, represent an "intellectual elite". Thus table 77 shows that respondents who are able to cite exactly the names of all the six member states of the common Market obtain a significantly higher mean score than the others : 3,89 compared to 2,58.

It is also natural for persons with a clearly positive attitude toward the unification of Europe to know better the internal political life of their country. To know the name of the Prime Minister of the government in office was taken as a measure of the level of knowledge we expected to, indeed, exist. If a person holding a positive attitude toward european unification was, everything considered, more interested in foreign policy than in domestic policy, the knowledge of the Foreign Minister's name ought to be more strongly related to the scores on the pre-european attitude index than the knowledge of the Prime Minister's name. This is also verified. The mean score for respondents who know the name of the Foreign Minister of their country is 3,49, whereas the mean score of those who know the Prime Minister's name is 3,19. Note that both scores are considerably higher than the average for the total sample. (1)

-
- (1) The difference in the mean scores between persons who know the name of the Prime Minister of their country, on the one hand, and those who know the Foreign Minister's name, on the other, might be the effect of a greater interest shown for international affairs by respondents with a very positive attitude toward european political unification, but this is not proof of the hypothesis. In fact, with few exceptions (the Netherlands, for instance), more people know the names of the Prime Minister than those of the Foreign Minister. This means that it is more "difficult" to know the Foreign Minister's name than the name of the Prime Minister. Given the higher level of general knowledge among people who demonstrate very positive attitudes toward european unification, it is possible, indeed probable, that the mean score of persons who give the right answer increases as a function of the difficulty of the question.

Taking as a point of departure newspaper reading of current political news and exposure to news broadcasts on radio and television - phenomena already analyzed in the previous chapter (1) - one can predict that newspaper reading is a better predictor of european attitudes than exposure to news broadcasts by other media. The figures in table 79 confirm this prediction. They also show that exposure to news broadcasts or political articles, no matter what the medium, covary positively with european attitudes. This is illustrated by the graph below, on which the frequency of exposure to mass media is recorded on the abscissa and the mean scores on the pro-european attitude index, on the ordinate. (See graph 5).

As we already commented in the previous chapter, information programs may be both the cause and effect of a strengthening of political commitment and, hence, of attitudes toward european unification. Undoubtedly this explains why newspaper reading of current political news shows a stronger covariation with european attitudes than the exposure to news broadcasts by other media.

If only it were possible to measure the sole effect of information on the attitudes of people by eliminating the confounding effect that actively informing them has on their attitudes, then it is likely that the slope of the relationship with exposure to television news broadcasts would show a better fit.

(1) See pages 51 to 56.

Table 77

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THE COMMON MARKET

| Index Score | Total | Know the exact composition of the common Market | Don't know the exact composition of the common M. |
|-------------|-------|---|---|
| | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 21 | 6 |
| + 5 | 15 | 22 | 11 |
| + 4 | 19 | 21 | 17 |
| + 3 | 17 | 16 | 18 |
| + 2 | 13 | 9 | 16 |
| + 1 | 11 | 6 | 14 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| Undecided | 5 | 1 | 7 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| No response | 1 | - | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,11 | 3,89 | 2,58 |
| N | 8749 | 3327 | 5422 |

Table 78

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NAMES OF LEADING NATIONAL FIGURES

| Index scores | Total | Know the Prime Minister's name | Don't know the Prime Minister's name | Don't know | Know the Foreign Minister's name | Don't know the Foreign Minister's name | Don't know |
|--------------|---------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------------|--|------------|
| + 6 | 12 | 13 | 5 | 4 | 17 | 9 | 4 |
| + 5 | 15 | 16 | 15 | 8 | 18 | 13 | 10 |
| + 4 | 19 | 19 | 18 | 14 | 20 | 20 | 16 |
| + 3 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 23 | 18 |
| + 2 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 15 | 12 | 14 | 16 |
| + 1 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 17 | 8 | 10 | 16 |
| Indiff. | 4 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| Undecided | 5 | 4 | 10 | 12 | 3 | 4 | 9 |
| - 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| No reply | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | - | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 2,11 | 2,19 | 2,66 | 2,22 | 3,49 | 3,03 | 2,79 |
| N | 9740(x) | 6351 | 2657 | 1237 | 1098 | 611 | 2813 |

(x) Included are 394 (Prime Minister) and 194 (Foreign Minister) useless, Italian responses.

Table 79

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY DEGREE OF EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA

| Index Score | Read political current news in newspapers | | | | | | |
|-------------|---|-------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------|-------------------------------|
| | Total | Daily | Several times a week | Once or twice a week | Less than once a week | Never | Do not know or do not respond |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 23 | 15 | 11 | 7 | 4 | 16 |
| + 5 | 15 | 21 | 22 | 17 | 12 | 8 | 11 |
| + 4 | 19 | 18 | 21 | 23 | 19 | 16 | 16 |
| + 3 | 17 | 15 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 16 |
| + 2 | 13 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 17 | 8 |
| + 1 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 14 | 15 | 8 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 11 |
| Undecided | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 10 | 11 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| No response | 1 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 2 | - |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,11 | 3,84 | 3,65 | 3,32 | 2,76 | 2,27 | 2,84 |
| N | 8749 | 2384 | 1233 | 1097 | 1490 | 2508 | 37 |

Table 79 (continued)


| Index Score | Watch news broadcasts on television | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|--|
| | Total | Daily | Several times a week | Once or twice a week | Less than once a week | Never | Do not know or do not respond |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 15 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 8 |
| + 5 | 15 | 17 | 16 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 8 |
| + 4 | 19 | 20 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 15 | 23 |
| + 3 | 17 | 17 | 19 | 18 | 16 | 15 | 15 |
| + 2 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 14 | 16 | 12 |
| + 1 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 13 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 3 |
| Undecided | 5 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 17 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 |
| No response | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | - |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,11 | 3,38 | 3,10 | 2,91 | 2,66 | 2,49 | 2,61 |
| N | 8749 | 4173 | 1780 | 957 | 679 | 1094 | 66 |

Table 79 (continued)

| Index Score | Listen to radio news broadcasts | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|--|
| | Total | Daily | Several times a week | Once or twice a week | Less than once a week | Never | Do not know or do not respond |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 15 | 12 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 13 |
| + 5 | 15 | 18 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 12 | 6 |
| + 4 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 19 | 18 | 19 | 22 |
| + 3 | 17 | 17 | 19 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 9 |
| + 2 | 13 | 12 | 15 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 13 |
| + 1 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 11 | 12 | 9 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 3 |
| Undecided | 5 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 19 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 |
| No response | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean Score | 3,11 | 3,42 | 3,09 | 2,89 | 2,77 | 2,78 | 2,52 |
| N | 8749 | 843 | 1376 | 875 | 1070 | 1553 | 32 |

Graph 5

MEAN SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY FREQUENCY OF EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA



5° ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES

In this study, three questions brought up the relations - real or imagined - that the respondents might have had with countries other than their own. One question dealt with countries which are not members of the common Market, but which one might wish to see join : this is an attitude question. Another question on attitudes tended to measure the degree of trust in one or another foreign people : namely, in this case, in the three large countries of the european Community, the British, the Swiss, the Americans, the Soviets and the Chinese. A third question, more characteristic of socio-cultural level, revealed to us the degree of openness to the outside world measured by the number of countries visited for sojourns of at least one day.

a) ADMISSION OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES INTO THE COMMON MARKET

Table 80 shows that the predisposition to allow other countries to enter the common Market increases as the attitude toward the unification of Europe becomes more positive. From this table, however, we run the risk of drawing erroneous conclusions by presenting, in each instance, scores on the pro-european index for the total number of persons who would accept a given country : this is why the mean score of those persons who accept Eastern Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union is higher than the mean score of a much greater number of persons who speak up in favor of Denmark and Switzerland.

Table 81 and Graph 6 present the same data, in a more meaningful way, by giving the percentages obtained by each of the countries for all respondents whose scores for pro-european attitudes are ranked in descending order.

This table shows that the average number of accepted countries systematically decreases as the score on the pro-european attitude index tends toward zero. We also observe a rather striking difference between the indifferent and undecided responses, on the one hand, and the respondents obtaining a negative score, on the other. Not only does the latter group respond more easily to the question (21 % "no response" compared to 56 % in the former group), but also the percentage of respondents who would admit no new country into the present common Market is much higher among those people with negative scores (28 %).

Significant differences also exist between the percentages of respondents who would admit Western countries and those who are favorable to the admission of countries under communist rule. Thus, among the group of persons obtaining the maximum score, Denmark was chosen 4,4 times more frequently than by those in the group of indifferents or undecideds. This ratio is 4,6 for Spain, 4,0 for Switzerland.

For the three Eastern countries (the Democratic Republic of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union) the ratios are respectively 7,8 and 7,5. The difference between the views of the respondents with maximum scores and those with scores equal to zero thus is much greater for Eastern European countries than for Western countries.

When the group of respondents with maximum scores is compared with those respondents with negative scores, the differences are not the same. We find a ratio of 2,3 for Denmark and 2,0 for Switzerland ; this means that respondents with negative scores more readily accept these two countries. The same applies for Poland and the Soviet Union (2,7). On the other hand, Spain and, oddly enough, the Democratic Republic of Germany have many more advocates in the group with negative scores ; the ratios are respectively 4,6 and 4,9.

These results prove once again that a large number of protesters in our present society are found in the group most hostile to european unification. This group includes communists and right-wingers though the former are greater in number.

Table 80

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY THE COUNTRIES ONE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ENTER THE COMMON MARKET

| Index score | Total | Denmark | Spain | Democratic Rep. of Germ. | Poland | Soviet Union | Switzerland | None of these countries | D.K. no reply |
|-------------|---------|---------|-------|--------------------------|--------|--------------|-------------|-------------------------|---------------|
| + 6 | 12 | 18 | 18 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 16 | 2 | 2 |
| + 5 | 15 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 21 | 19 | 19 | 7 | 4 |
| + 4 | 19 | 22 | 22 | 23 | 22 | 21 | 22 | 11 | 8 |
| + 3 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 14 | 13 |
| + 2 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 17 | 15 |
| + 1 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 18 | 19 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 11 |
| Undecided | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 21 |
| - 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 4 |
| No reply | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean Score | 2,11 | 2,74 | 3,78 | 3,93 | 3,90 | 3,82 | 3,63 | 2,73 | 2,53 |
| N | 9749(x) | 5114 | 3191 | 1957 | 1873 | 1511 | 5513 | 519 | 1273 |

(x) A choice of several countries was possible.


Table 81

CHOICE OF COUNTRIES ONE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ENTER THE COMMON
MARKET BY THE RESPONDENTS' SCORES FOR PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

| Country chosen | Score | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | + 6 | + 5 | + 4 | + 3 | + 2 | + 1 | 0 | - 1 |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Switzerland | 84 | 80 | 73 | 67 | 58 | 46 | 21 | 42 |
| Denmark | 88 | 78 | 68 | 58 | 50 | 37 | 20 | 39 |
| Spain | 55 | 49 | 42 | 39 | 31 | 23 | 12 | 12 |
| Democratic Republic of Germany | 39 | 31 | 27 | 20 | 16 | 16 | 5 | 8 |
| Poland | 38 | 30 | 25 | 20 | 15 | 14 | 5 | 14 |
| Soviet Union | 30 | 22 | 19 | 17 | 13 | 13 | 4 | 11 |
| None of these countries | 1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 28 |
| Does not know or does not respond | 3 | 4 | 7 | 12 | 18 | 27 | 56 | 21 |
| Total | 338 | 297 | 264 | 238 | 209 | 186 | 134 | 175 |
| Mean number of countries chosen | 3,34 | 2,90 | 2,54 | 2,21 | 1,89 | 1,49 | 0,67 | 1,26 |

Graph 6

PERCENTAGES OBTAINED BY COUNTRIES ONE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ENTER
THE COMMON MARKET BY PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE SCORES



b) DEGREE OF TRUST IN FOREIGN PEOPLES

Trust in foreign countries generally increases as a function of the score on the pro-european attitude index (1). But the reading of the results is more interesting when an index of the degree of trust in each of the eight suggested countries is used to rank the pro-european attitude scores in descending order for all the respondents.

Table 82 and Graph 7 show that the rate of decrease in trust by scores on the pro-european attitude index varies according to the country in question.

The relationship between european scores and trust in Germans is stronger than the others ; this means that the degree of trust the respondents place in Germans is a better indicator of a favorable attitude toward european unification than the degree of trust in other peoples. (Recall that the respondents were not asked to express an opinion on their countrymen). The correlation between european scores and trust also is rather strong in regard to opinions about Italians, British, French, Swiss and even Russians.

With respect to trust in Americans, we observe that it too decreases as function of decreasing scores on the pro-european attitude index ; this decrease is especially pronounced in the drop from zero to negative scores. On the other hand, an inverse tendency is observable with respect to trust in Chinese. The greatest mistrust of Chinese is found among respondents who score from 3 to 5 on the pro-european index. From score 3 on down the scale, mistrust of Chinese tends to diminish. Among the people who obtains a negative score, the degree of trust in Chinese is of the same magnitude as those who score near 6 and even slightly higher. These results justify our speculation that the respondents of the extreme left, who obtained a negative score on the pro-european index, also have a tendency to feel closer to the Chinese than to the Russians. All groups distrust Chinese more than Russians.

Table 83 brings to light the distance in the degree of trust separating the Russians and the Chinese, respectively, as a function of decreasing scores on the pro-european attitude index. One observes that the relative trust in Russians compared to trust placed in Chinese, increases slightly the further one goes down the scale of european scores until it reaches its maximum at a score of 4. From this point on, the relative trust in Russians decreases and becomes negative at a score of

(1) See the complete results in annex (Table 4).

- 1.

In conclusion, one ought to remember that a favorable attitude toward european unification is accompanied by a greater open mindedness toward other countries, other peoples and other cultures. Among respondents with high scores, this openness depends less on the ideological or political setting of the peoples in question than it does for respondents with negative scores. Nonetheless, we observe that, among the interviewees who obtained the maximum score on the pro-european index, trust in the peoples of Europe is no greater than trust in North Americans. The sole exception concerns attitudes toward the Swiss.

The fact that trust in Americans decreases very rapidly as a function of decreasing pro-european scores, is equivalent to saying that trust in Americans is a better predictor of pro-european attitudes than the trust placed in the Swiss. Thus, we have confirmation of the hypothesis that a large number of persons very favorable to european unification view their belonging to Europe as what we might consider as "atlantic" or else that they view the building of a united Europe in the hopes of good relations with the United States.

Table 82

DEGREE OF TRUST IN FOREIGN PEOPLES BY THE RESPONDENTS' PRO-EUROPEAN
ATTITUDE SCORES (1)

| Mean trust in foreign peoples | Scores | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | + 6 | + 5 | + 4 | + 3 | + 2 | + 1 | 0 | - 1 |
| Swiss | 1,20 | 1,16 | 1,07 | 1,02 | 0,98 | 0,86 | 0,64 | 0,86 |
| Americans | 0,85 | 0,80 | 0,73 | 0,65 | 0,54 | 0,34 | 0,40 | 0,21 |
| British | 0,64 | 0,63 | 0,44 | 0,45 | 0,35 | 0,24 | 0,14 | -0,05 |
| French | 0,40 | 0,30 | 0,32 | 0,20 | 0,23 | 0,05 | 0,08 | -0,32 |
| Germans | 0,57 | 0,26 | 0,02 | -0,10 | -0,27 | -0,45 | -0,45 | -0,67 |
| Italians | -0,18 | -0,28 | -0,37 | -0,43 | -0,56 | -0,60 | -0,47 | -1,02 |
| Russians | -0,54 | -0,68 | -0,69 | -0,87 | -0,93 | -0,91 | -0,96 | -1,26 |
| Chinese | -1,07 | -1,22 | -1,27 | -1,24 | -1,18 | -1,17 | -1,15 | -1,04 |


(1) The index of trust has been calculated in the following manner : a great deal of trust = 2, some trust = 1, not too much trust = -1, no trust at all = -2, other responses = 0.

Table 83RELATIVE TRUST IN RUSSIANS AND CHINESE BY THE RESPONDENTS'PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE SCORES

| Scores | Difference in degree of trust in Russians and Chinese |
|--------|--|
| + 6 | + 0,53 |
| + 5 | + 0,54 |
| + 4 | + 0,58 |
| + 3 | + 0,37 |
| + 2 | + 0,25 |
| + 1 | + 0,26 |
| 0 | + 0,19 |
| - 1 | - 0,22 |

Graph 7

**MEAN VALUES OF THE INDEX OF TRUST IN FOREIGN PEOPLES BY
PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE SCORES**



c) DEGREE OF FAMILIARITY WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

As one might have expected, the greatest open-mindedness toward other countries by persons who hold a positive attitude toward european unification depends upon their personal experience. The highest scores on the pro-european index are found among those groups in the population who have the means, and probably (professional and other opportunities) to travel abroad.

Table 84 shows that there is a positive correlation between the number of countries visited and the pro-european attitude index.

Table 84

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX BY NUMBER
OF COUNTRIES VISITED (1)

| Index Score | Total | No country | 1 to 2 countries | 3 to 5 countries | 6 countries or more |
|----------------|---------|------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 6 | 10 | 16 | 25 |
| + 5 | 15 | 10 | 16 | 19 | 21 |
| + 4 | 19 | 17 | 20 | 19 | 20 |
| + 3 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 13 |
| + 2 | 13 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 9 |
| + 1 | 11 | 14 | 12 | 8 | 6 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Undecided | 5 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| - 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| No response | 1 | 2 | 0 | - | - |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean Score | 3,11 | 2,50 | 3,09 | 3,50 | 3,96 |
| N | 8749(x) | 2631 | 2816 | 2202 | 1068 |

(x) Included are 32 responses which were not classified.

(1) For sojourns of at least one day.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR ACTION

Now at the end of this analysis, we are able to summarize, without prejudice to other analyses of these data which might be conducted, the present findings as follows :

- 1 - One "European" out of three is very favorable to the unification of Europe and he is very little opposed to it.

To say, as is often heard, that three-fourths of the respondents among the six countries in the European Community are "very favorable" or "rather favorable" to european unification is not very meaningful.

On the one hand, the question is too general - What kind of Europe and what kind of unification do the respondents favor ? - and, on the other hand, the opinions expressed are tallied up as if they were of the same nature and of the same intensity.

Nevertheless, building an index from several questions which form a single, hierarchical scale allowed us to classify the attitudes by a small number of categories in decreasing magnitudes of intensity :

| | |
|---|------|
| - very favorable (+6 and +5) | 27 % |
| - favorable (+4 and +3) | 36 % |
| - slightly favorable (+2 and +3) | 24 % |
| - indifferent, undecided or unfavorable | 13 % |

Thus constructed, the scale locates responses on a continuum on which the extremes clearly reflect immutable attitudes, but on which the intermediate positions are less stable depending on the questions asked and on the circumstances prevailing at the time they were asked (1).

What is certain is that approximately two thirds of the population, between the ages of 16 and older, in the six countries of the European Community, would not be opposed to an extension of efforts to unite Europe from the sphere of

(1) This is the reason why survey research of this kind should be periodically repeated by asking, among others, the same questions used to construct the index. Another index might be better, but it seems that the concern for continuity prevails over perfectionism.

economics to politics. But a large segment of the public (60 %) abstain from expressing an opinion about the possible effects of european unification, even though these effects are more or less vaguely believed to be positive.

"Committed" europeans are in a minority. More than half of the public is only slightly or not at all ready to accept personal sacrifices to see that the unification of Europe occurs.

On the other hand, with the exception of small organized groups with extreme political views, there is no real opposition. Because of their small numerical size, these groups are hard to study, but they seem to be located more at the extreme left than the extreme right.

2 - There are more differences between regions and social groups than between countries.

The country by country differences observed in attitudes toward european unification are less strong than one would have generally thought and appear to be related more to differences in present socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions than to differences in historically determined "mentality". This is the reason why we generally observe stronger mean differences between regions within a country than between countries ; the differences among social groups are even stronger. A markedly favorable attitude to the unification of Europe is found much more frequently among segments of the population who, for whatever reason, are or feel advantaged. Inversely, slightly or very unfavorable attitudes show up much more frequently among groups who, for various reasons, are or believe themselves underprivileged.

3 - Attitudes toward the common Market and, most of all, toward the effects expected are a good test of attitudes toward european unification.

The construction of a serie of attitude scales allowed us to identify various ways of being pro-european which may be combined, to varying degrees, in the same person and even more so in one and the same social group or country(1).

(1) More than any other part of the analysis, this part deserves closer examination. In fact, the scales are, by definition, built from responses to the questions asked ; undoubtedly, other questions would make it possible to refine the analysis and perhaps to reduce the number of meaningful scales.

Generally speaking, the majority of the public is rather satisfied with economic unification as it has developed to date ; this is especially true for Germany and the Netherlands. But a favorable attitude toward the common Market depends less upon the perceived effects than upon the effects expected : the majority of the public is incapable of responding to the question about the effects of the common Market on their standard of living. It is noteworthy that in countries with already high standards of living like Germany and the Netherlands, the proportion of those who expect favorable effects on their standard of living is smaller than in the other countries.

An obviously favorable attitude toward the political unification of Europe, which implies a readiness to accept sacrifices to achieve this goal, also implies satisfaction with the common Market.

- 4 - Two "Europeans" out of three speak out in favor of a federal kind of european government.

Of the three types of unification proposed to the respondents, more than two thirds of the european public chose the one proposing a european government which would handle the most important matters, yet leave to each national government the responsibility to deal with the particular problems particular to its own country.

- 5 - Two "Europeans" out of three favor Great Britain's membership.

More than two thirds of the european public and 86 % of those persons expressing an opinion are favorable to Great Britain's joining the common Market, yet this attitude is independent of attitudes toward european unification.

In regard to the admittance of other european countries, the public of a given country is willing to accept another country to the extent that :

- a) the population of this country is better known than others,
- b) the country is closer than others,
- c) its political system is more similar to the one the persons, lives in or prefers,
- d) one does not attribute motives of domination to the candidate country.

Thus in France and in Italy, one observes the lowest percentages of respondents opposed to the admittance of Eastern european countries. In the Federal Republic of Germany, a relatively high percentage (29 %) would admit the Democratic Republic of Germany.

6 - A majority is in favor of Europe as a "Third Power".

The majority of the european public is attracted by the image of Europe perceived as a "third power" - between the United States and the Soviet Union - but this majority is less pronounced in the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

The French public appears more sensitive to notions of prestige. Thus, for a larger part of this public, attraction to european unification means an opportunity to catch up technologically with the Americans.

The motivation of the German public draws its inspiration from political rather than economic considerations. The Italian public, on the contrary, is particularly sensitive to promises of greater prosperity.

The Luxembourg public is favorable to european unification, most of all, because of the absence of any strong resistance. It expects little change in its present situation.

The positive motivation of the Dutch public is comparable to that of the German public. However, the existing sort of latent "nationalism" in the Netherlands merits further study.

As for the Belgian public, it is rather sensitive to the effects of unification on its standard of living, but the respondents expressing an opinion are relatively less numerous than in the other countries.

7 - Obstacles : nationalism, ethnocentrism, conservatism and the techno-bureaucratic image of present day accomplishments.

The main obstacles to the formation of favorable attitudes toward european

unification are nationalism, ethnocentrism and conservatism as well as the very technical, indeed techno-bureaucratic, character of present day european accomplishments.

The nationalist motivation seems to fall more on an attitude dimension than does the pro-european motivation. In other words, the same individual can hold at once nationalist views and ideas or feelings favorable to european unification. Nevertheless, his nationalist outlook will run counter to his adopting views reflecting a very integrated form of united Europe. Moreover, there are probably feelings of national identity that are related more strongly to the individual's cultural identity than to what we generally consider in Europe as nationalism or as an exaltation of national feeling. Measures favorable to economic and monetary unification (replacement of national currency by a european currency) and even to political unification (symbolized by the adoption of a european flag) would be accepted rather more easily than measures in favor of cultural unification, like the creation of a european Olympic team. This sort of ethnocentrism or at least this fear of a standardized culture imposed on all nations in an "integrated" Europe runs less counter to a favorable attitude toward european unification than to a commitment to too narrow a view (or too rapid a development) of integration; this is a sort of latent opposition, especially found in the Netherlands, which might show up as hostile responses whenever important decisions taken on matters of political unification and cultural diversity appear in danger.

Pure conservatism, i.e. the tendency to want to maintain the status quo at all costs, is a barrier to the creation and the development of pro-european attitudes. This is the main reason why the Belgian public, as a whole, appears as less favorable.

But the biggest obstacle to the development of pro-european attitudes seems to be the very image the great mass of the public has of present day achievements, i.e. of the Europe of the common Market. This image is truly technical and even techno-bureaucratic, attractive from a rational point of view, yet it does not appeal to one's feelings for it conveys more the image of administering things than governing men.

This barrier prevents pro-european attitudes from developing both in breadth and in intensity. Undoubtedly this explains why the trust the public of one Community country places in another does not depend at all on whether or not the country in question belongs to the European Economic Community: generally speaking, one places more trust in the Swiss, the Americans or the British than

in the French, the Germans or the Italians. With a view to trust as a concept expressing an expectation of both predictable and favorable behavior on the part of another party, a "Western" or "Atlantic" feeling presently seems more alive and kicking than the feeling of belonging to the common Market.

- 8 - There are very weak relationships between pro-european attitudes and participation both in political and union life, but a strong relationship with exposure to mass media.

Finally, recall the kinds of relationship we found between pro-european attitudes and participation in political and union life and exposure to mass media.

a) On the whole, there is scarcely any apparent relationship between party identification or even political tendency and attitudes toward european unification, except perhaps in Germany. A substantial percentage of respondents expressing a party preference (31 % in all the european countries, 38 % in Italy and 46 % in Belgium) does not know whether the representatives of this party are favorable or not to the creation of Europe. If the political parties were to adopt a more explicit position on european problems and made it known to the public, this might influence, on the average, the vote of only one elector out of five among those voters who express a party preference.

b) The influence of unions on the european attitudes of their members or their identifiers is even weaker. Only the members of far left wing unions in France and in Italy attribute hostile feelings about european unification to the leaders of their organization.

c) There is a very strong relationship between pro-european attitudes and exposure to mass media.

The Dutch, German and Luxembourg publics are among the most exposed to mass media : in Germany, television and radio are used relatively more frequently

than in other countries, whereas it is the newspapers in the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

The publics of countries where the mass media are most intensively used are also better informed about political problems and about the European Community.

The relationship between exposure to media and levels of knowledge is strongest for newspapers and the weakest for television : this does not necessarily imply that television is a poorer source of information than newspapers, but rather that persons interested in politics are more easily inclined to read political news in the newspapers than are other people.

The index of exposure to the media covaries with the pro-european attitude index : the relationship is even stronger for the daily press considered separately.

9 - Pro-european attitudes are permissive attitudes.

In the last analysis, although pro-european attitudes are widely spread and undoubtedly are solidly implanted in a large minority of about 30 % of the european public who are found among more educated, better informed and more politicized circles, these attitudes are more permissive than binding in character. So far, the economic unification of Europe has taken place in a relative calm and even amidst a certain indifference. For the majority of the public, this is a good thing ; it is more the concern of specialists than of citizens. However generally accepted it may seem, political unification will not necessarily proceed in an atmosphere as peaceful as economic integration. To the extent that specific decisions will have to be taken, some opposition may become visible ; even though the resultant of these component forces is not easily predictable, it seems likely that favorable views will prevail for the very reason that the views of the most strongly committed minority will strengthen in an atmosphere where the energy of these affective vectors will be transposed into rational motivations.

Prospects for an effective information policy.

Since the aim of a study like the research just presented is to inform the actions of decision-makers, this question must be asked : "What is to be done?"

Three important characteristics of the general attitude of the european public will allow us to try to answer this question :

- a) its hopes for a change in society through progressive reforms without revolutionary turmoil : in each country the partisans for revolutionary action does not exceed 7 % of the total public (in Italy), namely two times less than the ultra-conservatives (15 % on the average);
- b) its hopes for a markedly more democratic society and for more direct participation in the running of the country : this attitude goes along with a real commitment to european unification, whereas, inversely, an authoritarian attitude is usually accompanied by opposite tendencies ;
- c) its greater hopes, on the whole, for security and happiness than for prosperity, for the quality of life and for a more humane society than for the acquisition of new riches.

As we have seen, presently the political unification of Europe is not a problem of overriding importance in the minds of the european public. This is probably one of the reasons why political parties in most of the countries abstain from taking clear cut positions on this issue or from giving detailed planks on this problem in their programs. But, on the other hand, the reticence shown by political parties with respect to integration involving the progressive creation of a european political system going beyond simple economic and monetary union is one of the major causes for the public's relative lack of interest. Thus we find ourselves in a vicious circle that must be broken (1).

(1) From this point of view, candidate countries for membership - Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway - hold a privileged position. In these countries, the European cause has often given way to passionate political debates in the parliaments, inside parties and in the press ; this has hardly ever happened in the case of the first six member states. Soon after these countries' entry into the Community, it will be interesting to study what was the effect of this phenomenon on the nature and the intensity of attitudes toward european unification.

This study has shown that european unification has reached a point in its development where if leaders want more progress, they will have to take the risk of politicizing public debate. It seems likely that a regression in attitudes favorable to unification, observed in certain cases of the sudden appearance of serious problems which cannot be solved to the satisfaction of all the governments at the same time (for example, in the case of a monetary crisis), would be far less serious if the views of these problems and their solutions were politicized to a greater degree, namely if the most varied kinds of men and groups involved in the developing process of the entire multinational system were to become conscious of the aims, the plans and the means they have in common as members concerned about the cohesion and longevity of this gloval society.

This politization should find both its expression and its stimulus in the existence of a european assembly elected via direct universal suffrage, i.e. by all citizens of voting age.

From the solely social-psychological point of view we adopted here, and taking as given that the creation of a european political system is a desirable end, there is no doubt that as long as the communal, regional or national vote of an elector cannot be influenced, however slightly, by european tensions or conflicts, the decisions taken at this level, no matter the nature or the aim, will be of little concern to the public because of their very diplomatic nature.

In a diplomatic debate, solutions are negotiated between government spokesmen. In a political debate, they are discussed between spokesmen for the citizens, political parties and interest groups.

The first kind of negotiation gives too much weight to a single variable, namely the interests of the national communities each taken separately - a gross simplification ! - as an integral whole. In an elected european assembly, this variable will undoubtedly remain important, but there would be more opportunity for other variables to become manifest, for interests would overlap either in opposition or in harmony, one to the other across national borders, whatever the decision-making procedures. When confronted with european problems, a German elected official will probably react as a German, a French representative as a Frenchman, yet in the face of other problems, he will respond as a progressivist or a conservative, as a centraliser or a decentraliser, as a socialist, a liberal, a christian-democrat, or also as a communist or a nationalist.

In other words, the politization of european unification would allow numerous transnational ties to find one another, to be created and to manifest themselves, which is a necessary condition for the formation of strongly held attitudes (indeed, favorable attitudes, in our opinion) toward unification.

Practically, this means that, first of all, one would have to stimulate the demand for the creation of an elected european assembly endowed with real powers. This demand can be expressed only by existing groups or political parties who are the first that one has to persuade. They could be more easily persuaded if they knew that planks in a program for the political unification of Europe carried weight, at least potentially, as an electoral argument (1).

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- (1) These lines were written well before the publication of the so-called the "Rapport Vedel" (Brussels, March 25, 1972). There is a striking convergence of conclusions. This report notes that "the Parliament of the european Community shows a considerable amount of democratic representation. The great political tendencies of the member-states find a place there. Moreover, their regrouping at the european level is not negligible, although there are still some lacunae (...). Yet this representation finds its expression in a closed circle. The debates and work of the Parliament, the manifest tensions themselves which are proof of a political institution, hardly find an echo in the press, in public opinion or in the life of the political parties. Therefore, the Parliament carries out only very imperfectly the functions of expressing and shaping political opinion normally incumbent upon a parliament." (page 35)

The "Vedel Report" underlines two very important deficiencies in the european Parliament : the "narrowness of its powers, on the one hand, and the method of appointing its members, on the other. It is underscored that "direct election would strongly contribute to the democratization of the common order and, henceforth, its legitimacy".

"An electoral process offered to the peoples of Europe would, undoubtedly, represent a force for unification because it would, at one and the same time, encourage the mobilization of the existing parties around political issues on a european scale and stimulate the formation of larger groupings drawn together from the diverse political tendencies represented in the member states." (Page 68, our italics).

The results of this study show us not only that it is now necessary to take the risk of politizing the process and democratizing the proceedings in the unification of Europe by giving powers to an elected, representative assembly. It also shows that it would be possible to let eventual tensions and conflicts increase to the point that the political passions of the elected candidates and the mass public become actively involved in the process. In other words, the moment seems appropriate (still taking as given that political integration is a desirable goal) to let issues of "high politics" (foreign affairs, defence, etc...) enter the public arena, without forgetting those concerning the very type of socio-political organization (union or federation, centralization, etc...) or the future of our societies and of mankind (growth, environment, etc.).

Should this run the risk of increasing the number of outspoken opponents, of bringing latent opposition to light and arousing polemical debates, it is a risk we have to take. Indeed, this is the only way to finally get the majority of citizens who are at least occasionally or somewhat interested in politics to take seriously the uniting of Europe so that it is supported by a truly popular movement; otherwise, it appears to the "man-in-the-street" or even the "rank-and-file militant" as the technico-bureaucratic execution of decisions taken in high quarters - or be it, as is said, "at the summit" - for issues which do not appear to be of concern to them in their everyday lives.

Generally, as we have seen, the partisans of the unification of Europe are more sensitive to the issues of democratic values, to the quality of life and the humanization of society than are the opponents. This means that the present institutions of the Community and the economic goals set by already existing treaties have only been accepted temporarily, for lack of anything better, as one might say. Yet, among the most ardent partisans of unification, there is a latent, perhaps increasing, impatience with the goals proposed and the institutional setting, an impatience which reflects three aspirations: more democracy, more concern for the quality of life and more transnational integration at the european level.

Practically, it would be timely to make public, at short notice, concrete projects concerning relatively straight forward goals for the mid-run which are easy to understand and to popularize. In so doing, priority should be given to goals which respond to the three aspirations above and, moreover, which reflect areas of action where the impotence of the "independent and sovereign" national

State is easily perceptible, if not already clearly perceived (1).

If the problems of european unification were politized in this way, it would obviously ne necessary to foresee the probable reactions of the forces present. The conclusions drawn from this study deal only with the six "founding" countries of the European Community, but we have no reason to think that the distribution of attitudes differs very much in the four countries presently in the process of joining the Community. In any case, a similar survey ought to be undertaken as soon as possible after their membership becomes effective.

We clearly find the most ardent partisans of european unification among the relatively privileged groups of the population. Nevertheless, this does not imply that these groups are conservative. On the contrary, we discovered progressive, indeed protest, views among what ought to be called the bourgeois classes, especially among youth. More conservative about acquired status even when it hopes for more change in the production and distribution of wealth, the working class seems to us as opposed, on the whole, to taking any kind of risk. The farmers, who represent about 10 % of the entire electorate in the six member states and certainly less in a community which included Great Britain, share two kinds of attitudes determined by many variables which, in the last analysis, probably have more of a conservative than a progressive effect.

For unwavering as well as moderate supporters of Europe, it would be wise to explain the aims, the plans and the means of unification to them in a language they will understand (2).

With respect to the opponents of european unification, we know they are presently found at both extremes of the traditional "left-right" continuum and are more to the left than to the right. Does this mean that there exist some segments of the population which are opposed to the way Europe has been unified so far, i.e. to the common Market, but which, on the other hand, would be favorably predisposed to take an active part in plans for political unification ?

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- (1) Of course, other projects might be presented even if they were less easily accepted by the majority of the population representing "the european people" ; for example, this is the case of common policy for development aid, which we know finds real support only among minorities.
 - (2) One never insists enough on the language problems in political communication. Public officials, newspapers, radio and television often prove incapable of expressing themselves in a language and in a style which are adapted to modern menas of communications and understandable to the recipients.

The findings of this study give no clues to this question. At first sight, one might expect find such an attitude among a progressive, internationalist, anti-capitalist intellectual elite, in short - among protesters. However, no clear alternative positions on european integration are found in these groups. At the present time, the problems of concern to these groups probably do not offer anchoring points for fixed attitudes toward european unification.

A certainty is that the readiness to make a commitment in favor of european unification is systematically accompanied by a hostile position toward an eventual abandonment of the common Market as it exists today. Therefore, it is around favorable attitudes toward the present European Community that we have the best possibility of seeing favorable attitudes toward the political unification of Europe crystallize.

One final word about youth. It would be mistaken to count too much on the active support of youth in the efforts to bring about political unification and, especially, the creation of an elected assembly. The pro-european attitude of youth must be attributed much more to the absence of traditional kinds of resistance (nationalism, ethnocentrism and, to a certain extent, conservatism) than to the attraction of european and democratic ideas.

Among the youngest cohorts (11 to 12 years old), we observed the existence of a state of mind which is not the most favorable to the development of pro-european feelings, nor to a political commitment in favor of european unification. In order to modify this situation in the relatively short run, educators and leaders of social movements in education, on one side, and producers of radio and television programs, on the other, must be associated with an intensive and concerted action program. The vain division separating the two is harmful to the achievement of works which should be shared in common. Moreover, the sharing of this work in a joint program should contribute to carrying out a policy of continuous education which would allow each and every one to develop his personality to his own liking throughout life in his work or in his leisure time activities by combining them with the digestion of information, the resumption of studies and the enhancement of personal experience.

The program of action to be conceived and carried out might deal with the problems, the obstacles and the consequences of the uniting of Europe, the role of nations, regions and countries in a united Europe, and the strength and the responsibilities of this united Europe in the world. Without fanfare, yet without timourness.

No matter from what angle we approach the problems at the center of this study on the determinants of favorable attitudes toward the unification of Europe, we come to the conclusion that the worst possible position of rulers and other decision makers would be to tack back and forth in the obscure waters of these tacitly opposing currents of opinion. Realism in democracies seems to come down on the side of audacity rather than timourness, yet the choices proposed must be explicitly defined. The peoples of Europe, as known today, have almost come of an age and a consciousness that we should beware of underestimating.

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A P P E N D I C E S

Appended Table 1

THE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE : HOPES AND FEARS (1)

(complete results for persons aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 1. I am proud to be (... name the respondent's nationality) | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 55 | 38 | 70 | 66 | 62 | 81 | 54 |
| - agree | 27 | 33 | 18 | 22 | 24 | 10 | 28 |
| - disagree | 8 | 14 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 13 |
| - strongly disagree | 5 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| - don't know or no response | 5 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 2. The United States of Europe should become a third power equal in strength to the United States of America and to the U.S.S.R. | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 36 | 36 | 45 | 37 | 35 | 31 | 30 |
| - agree | 31 | 33 | 22 | 27 | 31 | 17 | 27 |
| - disagree | 10 | 12 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 23 | 26 |
| - strongly disagree | 6 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 6 |
| - don't know or no response | 17 | 14 | 22 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 11 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 3. In the setting of the United States of Europe, european scientists could catch up with Americans | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 27 | 27 | 25 | 28 | 26 | 33 | 20 |
| - agree | 35 | 36 | 25 | 36 | 33 | 22 | 40 |
| - disagree | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 15 | 23 |
| - strongly disagree | 6 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 11 | 3 |
| - don't know or no response | 20 | 19 | 29 | 18 | 25 | 19 | 14 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

(1) See pp. 84 - 91.

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 4. In the United States of Europe, the most underprivileged segments of the population would have better chances to improve their status. | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 22 | 23 | 25 | 17 | 26 | 25 | 20 |
| - agree | 39 | 36 | 30 | 38 | 43 | 28 | 46 |
| - disagree | 11 | 14 | 8 | 12 | 7 | 15 | 17 |
| - strongly disagree | 5 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 3 |
| - don't know or no response | 23 | 20 | 32 | 28 | 20 | 24 | 14 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 5. In the United States of Europe, the standard of living would probably be better. | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 22 | 18 | 25 | 16 | 31 | 26 | 16 |
| - agree | 37 | 33 | 32 | 39 | 40 | 33 | 44 |
| - disagree | 12 | 19 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 17 | 21 |
| - strongly disagree | 5 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 3 |
| - don't know or no response | 24 | 22 | 32 | 30 | 21 | 18 | 16 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 6. The United States of Europe would be a first step toward world government which would abolish war. | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 32 | 40 | 39 | 28 | 28 | 25 | 23 |
| - agree | 27 | 26 | 21 | 26 | 30 | 15 | 24 |
| - disagree | 15 | 13 | 11 | 17 | 10 | 21 | 36 |
| - strongly disagree | 11 | 8 | 9 | 14 | 13 | 21 | 8 |
| - don't know or no response | 15 | 13 | 20 | 15 | 19 | 18 | 9 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 7. Nothing can be done to change the fact that the strong always rule over the weak. | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 28 | 31 | 42 | 32 | 19 | 52 | 24 |
| - agree | 27 | 30 | 21 | 29 | 23 | 18 | 29 |
| - disagree | 16 | 15 | 14 | 16 | 19 | 11 | 35 |
| - strongly disagree | 18 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 27 | 11 | 6 |
| - don't know or no response | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 12 | 8 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 8. I have nothing, in principle, against foreign workers, but there are really too many in our country. | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 24 | 27 | 44 | 35 | 6 | 38 | 29 |
| - agree | 22 | 27 | 18 | 25 | 10 | 15 | 30 |
| - disagree | 18 | 22 | 12 | 17 | 14 | 18 | 27 |
| - strongly disagree | 24 | 16 | 11 | 15 | 49 | 23 | 6 |
| - don't know or no response | 12 | 8 | 15 | 8 | 21 | 6 | 8 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 9. All is well with us and the way things are, so why change? | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 10 | 15 | 22 | 8 | 3 | 35 | 10 |
| - agree | 20 | 29 | 22 | 19 | 10 | 16 | 21 |
| - disagree | 32 | 28 | 27 | 36 | 29 | 18 | 49 |
| - strongly disagree | 29 | 21 | 18 | 29 | 45 | 19 | 11 |
| - don't know or no response | 9 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 13 | 12 | 9 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 10. In the United States of Europe, the different peoples would run the risk of losing what's distinctive about their ways of life. | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 8 | 9 | 12 | 9 | 5 | 15 | 13 |
| - agree | 19 | 20 | 17 | 20 | 14 | 14 | 32 |
| - disagree | 26 | 29 | 20 | 25 | 22 | 23 | 37 |
| - strongly disagree | 27 | 26 | 25 | 28 | 33 | 32 | 8 |
| - don't know or no response | 20 | 16 | 26 | 18 | 26 | 16 | 10 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 11. In the United States of Europe, the cost of living would go up | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 5 | 6 | 9 | 4 | 5 | 11 | 6 |
| - agree | 13 | 14 | 13 | 15 | 8 | 14 | 15 |
| - disagree | 29 | 31 | 21 | 27 | 25 | 24 | 50 |
| - strongly disagree | 27 | 28 | 24 | 22 | 35 | 27 | 10 |
| - don't know or no response | 26 | 21 | 33 | 32 | 27 | 24 | 19 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 12. The unification of Europe is impossible because we speak different languages. | | | | | | | |
| - strongly agree | 6 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 7 |
| - agree | 15 | 15 | 16 | 19 | 14 | 9 | 13 |
| - disagree | 29 | 26 | 22 | 33 | 25 | 25 | 56 |
| - strongly disagree | 38 | 44 | 37 | 33 | 41 | 48 | 20 |
| - don't know or no response | 12 | 10 | 16 | 9 | 14 | 8 | 4 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Appended Table 2

THE DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO VARIOUS SOCIO-POLITICAL GOALS

(2) (complete results for persons aged 16 years and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 1. Guarantee decent retirement pension to all old people : | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 68 | 59 | 83 | 80 | 66 | 82 | 63 |
| - important objective | 27 | 31 | 15 | 18 | 32 | 17 | 34 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 |
| - not at all important | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 |
| - don't know or no response | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 2. Provide jobs for young people : | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 54 | 38 | 70 | 73 | 53 | 77 | 41 |
| - important objective | 37 | 40 | 27 | 26 | 44 | 22 | 49 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 4 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 2 | - | 7 |
| - not at all important | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 2 |
| - don't know or no response | 4 | 10 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 3. Stop manufacturing atomic bombs : | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 63 | 56 | 73 | 64 | 68 | 75 | 69 |
| - important objective | 20 | 22 | 13 | 18 | 24 | 12 | 17 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 7 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| - not at all important | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 5 |
| - don't know or no response | 5 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

(2) See pp. 113 to 117.

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 4. Provide greater job security | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 48 | 46 | 55 | 54 | 45 | 70 | 46 |
| - important objective | 43 | 39 | 39 | 41 | 50 | 28 | 49 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 4 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| - not at all important | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - don't know or no response | 4 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 5. Maintain law and order | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 47 | 51 | 52 | 50 | 40 | 63 | 38 |
| - important objective | 39 | 30 | 39 | 38 | 50 | 32 | 49 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 8 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 1 | 9 |
| - not at all important | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| - don't know or no response | 4 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 6. Guarantee the freedom of speech | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 41 | 41 | 49 | 44 | 37 | 70 | 38 |
| - important objective | 43 | 37 | 37 | 42 | 51 | 27 | 52 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 8 | 10 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 7 |
| - not at all important | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | 1 |
| - don't know or no response | 6 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 7. Make our society more humane | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 34 | 22 | 47 | 45 | 34 | 51 | 40 |
| - important objective | 44 | 36 | 42 | 42 | 55 | 43 | 52 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 12 | 20 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 6 |
| - not at all important | 8 | 16 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 8. Reform the educational system | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 28 | 32 | 22 | 21 | 30 | 40 | 28 |
| - important objective | 41 | 35 | 36 | 40 | 46 | 34 | 48 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 15 | 16 | 19 | 19 | 10 | 8 | 15 |
| - not at all important | 4 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| - don't know or no response | 12 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 11 | 13 | 4 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 9. Increase salaries | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 28 | 23 | 40 | 32 | 28 | 46 | 21 |
| - important objective | 35 | 28 | 36 | 40 | 40 | 34 | 36 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 21 | 26 | 17 | 18 | 17 | 9 | 31 |
| - not at all important | 9 | 11 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 5 | 10 |
| - don't know or no response | 7 | 12 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 10. Ensure the participation of workers in business management | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 20 | 23 | 32 | 20 | 16 | 44 | 22 |
| - important objective | 38 | 35 | 37 | 38 | 40 | 38 | 41 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 23 | 24 | 18 | 26 | 21 | 8 | 25 |
| - not at all important | 8 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 10 | 4 | 8 |
| - don't know or no response | 11 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 13 | 6 | 4 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 11. Foster private enterprise in economic activities | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 17 | 10 | 31 | 21 | 17 | 33 | 19 |
| - important objective | 39 | 28 | 40 | 42 | 47 | 41 | 45 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 19 | 26 | 14 | 18 | 14 | 5 | 20 |
| - not at all important | 9 | 15 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 7 |
| - don't know or no response | 16 | 21 | 13 | 13 | 15 | 19 | 9 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 12. Fight communism | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 22 | 25 | 26 | 13 | 23 | 36 | 27 |
| - important objective | 23 | 22 | 25 | 18 | 28 | 20 | 31 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 21 | 19 | 22 | 27 | 19 | 18 | 21 |
| - not at all important | 21 | 19 | 14 | 26 | 21 | 9 | 15 |
| - don't know or no response | 13 | 15 | 13 | 16 | 9 | 17 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 13. Help underdeveloped countries | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 12 | 7 | 25 | 11 | 14 | 40 | 27 |
| - important objective | 35 | 23 | 36 | 36 | 47 | 43 | 45 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 31 | 38 | 23 | 35 | 22 | 11 | 21 |
| - not at all important | 15 | 21 | 11 | 13 | 11 | 2 | 6 |
| - don't know or no response | 7 | 11 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 1 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 14. Abolish capitalism | | | | | | | |
| - absolutely essential objective | 15 | 10 | 25 | 19 | 15 | 18 | 20 |
| - important objective | 19 | 16 | 18 | 20 | 23 | 17 | 21 |
| - objective of secondary importance | 23 | 21 | 22 | 25 | 22 | 19 | 27 |
| - not at all important | 25 | 30 | 21 | 20 | 24 | 25 | 25 |
| - don't know or no response | 18 | 23 | 14 | 16 | 16 | 21 | 7 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Appended Table 3

DEGREE OF TRUST IN FOREIGN PEOPLES (3)

(complete results for persons aged 16 and older)

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 1. Swiss | | | | | | | |
| - a lot of trust | 35 | 48 | 34 | 28 | 27 | 35 | 40 |
| - some trust | 43 | 38 | 43 | 49 | 43 | 43 | 44 |
| - little trust | 7 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 4 |
| - no trust at all | 4 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 2 |
| - don't know or no response | 11 | 8 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 10 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 2. Americans | | | | | | | |
| - a lot of trust | 23 | 29 | 25 | 12 | 24 | 27 | 22 |
| - some trust | 46 | 48 | 44 | 47 | 43 | 44 | 53 |
| - little trust | 17 | 13 | 14 | 25 | 16 | 14 | 16 |
| - no trust at all | 6 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 4 | 3 |
| - don't know or no response | 8 | 6 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 3. British | | | | | | | |
| - a lot of trust | 12 | 17 | 19 | 6 | 9 | 13 | 11 |
| - some trust | 49 | 55 | 51 | 49 | 40 | 52 | 50 |
| - little trust | 21 | 17 | 13 | 26 | 24 | 16 | 23 |
| - no trust at all | 9 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 14 | 7 | 11 |
| - don't know or no response | 9 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 12 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 4. French | | | | | | | |
| - a lot of trust | 8 | 10 | 23 | | 4 | 13 | 6 |
| - some trust | 44 | 48 | 51 | | 39 | 50 | 45 |
| - little trust | 28 | 27 | 11 | | 32 | 20 | 29 |
| - no trust at all | 10 | 8 | 6 | | 13 | 8 | 10 |
| - don't know or no response | 10 | 7 | 9 | | 12 | 9 | 10 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 100 | 100 |

(3) See pp. 118 - 121.

| | EEC | G | B | F | I | L | N |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| 5. Germans | | | | | | | |
| - a lot of trust | 10 | | 14 | 9 | 11 | 1 | 10 |
| - some trust | 35 | | 38 | 39 | 28 | 26 | 50 |
| - little trust | 25 | | 17 | 26 | 25 | 28 | 21 |
| - no trust at all | 21 | | 22 | 17 | 26 | 33 | 12 |
| - don't know or no response | 9 | | 9 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 7 |
| Total | 100 | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 6. Italians | | | | | | | |
| - a lot of trust | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | | 2 | 3 |
| - some trust | 28 | 23 | 37 | 31 | | 24 | 29 |
| - little trust | 37 | 41 | 27 | 33 | | 36 | 41 |
| - no trust at all | 22 | 24 | 19 | 21 | | 25 | 14 |
| - don't know or no response | 10 | 9 | 13 | 12 | | 13 | 13 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 100 |
| 7. Russians | | | | | | | |
| - a lot of trust | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 3 |
| - some trust | 19 | 15 | 17 | 25 | 19 | 10 | 21 |
| - little trust | 32 | 33 | 26 | 36 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
| - no trust at all | 36 | 43 | 43 | 24 | 36 | 49 | 36 |
| - don't know or no response | 9 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 9 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 8. Chinese | | | | | | | |
| - a lot of trust | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| - some trust | 7 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 7 |
| - little trust | 19 | 21 | 14 | 21 | 15 | 13 | 19 |
| - no trust at all | 54 | 55 | 59 | 50 | 57 | 65 | 56 |
| - don't know or no response | 18 | 17 | 19 | 20 | 18 | 17 | 17 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 8752 | 2021 | 1298 | 2046 | 1822 | 335 | 1230 |

Appended Table 4

DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON THE PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDE INDEX
BY DEGREE OF TRUST IN FOREIGN PEOPLES

| Index Score | Total | Americans (U.S.A.) | | | | | Russians | | | | |
|----------------|-------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|
| | | A lot of trust | Some trust | Little trust | No trust | D.K. N.A. | A lot of trust | Some trust | Little trust | No trust | D.K. N.A. |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 16 | 12 | 11 | 6 | 5 | 17 | 16 | 13 | 9 | 7 |
| + 5 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 14 | 10 | 7 | 11 | 20 | 17 | 13 | 11 |
| + 4 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 18 | 15 | 11 | 16 | 23 | 20 | 17 | 13 |
| + 3 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 18 | 16 | 19 | 18 | 14 |
| + 2 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 16 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 11 | 13 | 15 | 13 |
| + 1 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 19 | 15 | 12 | 8 | 9 | 12 | 14 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 7 |
| Undecided | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 21 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 16 |
| - 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| No reply | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,11 | 3,43 | 3,27 | 3,02 | 2,30 | 1,93 | 3,07 | 3,64 | 3,32 | 2,78 | 2,22 |
| N | 8749 | 1970 | 4062 | 1480 | 539 | 698 | 299 | 1675 | 2751 | 3191 | 833 |

(4) See pp. 194 - 198

| Index Scores | Italians | | | | | | Germans | | | | | |
|-----------------|----------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|---------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|
| | Total | A lot of trust | Some trust | Little trust | No trust | D.K. N.A. | Total | A lot of trust | Some trust | Little trust | No trust | D.K. N.A. |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 12 | 20 | 16 | 13 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 20 | 14 | 8 | 4 | 4 |
| + 5 | 15 | 17 | 18 | 15 | 12 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 19 | 13 | 10 | 9 |
| + 4 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 18 | 17 | 14 | 19 | 20 | 22 | 21 | 17 | 13 |
| + 3 | 17 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 15 | 18 | 20 | 18 | 20 | 19 | 14 |
| + 2 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 14 |
| + 1 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 14 | 14 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 15 |
| Indifferent | 5 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 7 |
| Undecided | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 16 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 16 |
| - 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 3 |
| No reply | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,06 | 3,56 | 3,49 | 3,14 | 2,67 | 2,25 | 3,04 | 3,87 | 3,51 | 2,96 | 2,43 | 2,16 |
| N | 6927 | 197 | 2007 | 2492 | 1423 | 808 | 6730 | 672 | 2497 | 1564 | 1372 | 625 |

| Index score | French | | | | | | Chinese | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|----------------|------------|--------------|----------|-----------|---------|----------------|------------|--------------|----------|-----------|
| | Total | A lot of trust | Some trust | Little trust | No trust | D.K. N.A. | Total | A lot of trust | Some trust | Little trust | No trust | D.K. N.A. |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| + 6 | 13 | 17 | 15 | 13 | 10 | 6 | 12 | 22 | 18 | 15 | 11 | 9 |
| + 5 | 16 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 14 | 11 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 19 | 15 | 13 |
| + 4 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 14 | 12 | 19 | 12 | 19 | 21 | 20 | 14 |
| + 3 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 13 | 17 | 12 | 19 | 16 | 18 | 16 |
| + 2 | 12 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 11 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 |
| + 1 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 10 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 13 |
| Indifferent | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| Undecided | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 20 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 11 |
| - 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| No reply | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Mean score | 3,19 | 3,52 | 3,42 | 3,21 | 2,74 | 2,19 | 3,11 | 3,20 | 3,51 | 3,50 | 3,09 | 2,66 |
| N | 6703 | 694 | 3059 | 1712 | 610 | 628 | 8749 | 145 | 618 | 1588 | 4822 | 1576 |

5. What kind of educational institution did you last or are you now attending ?

- primary school
- a secondary college, athenaeum or high school
- a technical or vocational school
- a non-university centre of higher education
- a university or similar institution
- other (specify)

.....

6. Commune :

Province :

7. Do you know the names of the countries which are members of the common Market, i.e. of the European Economic Community to use its official name ? (INT : DO NOT PROMPT. GIVE THE R. TIME TO THINK. WRITE DOWN ALL THE COUNTRIES NAMED.)

8. Suppose a referendum were held today in the countries of the common Market to decide upon the following issued. How would you vote ? Are you for or against the common Market evolving toward the creation of a United States of Europe ?

- for
- against
- don't know (D.K. , N.R.)

9. Are you for or against the entry of Great Britain into the common Market ?

- for
- against
- D.K. , N.R.

10. Are you for or against the election of a european parliament by direct universal suffrage, i.e. a parliament elected by all the citizens of the member countries ?

- for
- against
- D.K. , N.R.

11. Would you accept that above the Belgian government there be a European government responsible for common policy in the areas of foreign affairs, defense, and economic questions ?

- for (would accept)
 - against (would not accept)
 - D.K. , N.R.
-

12. In the event of the election of a president of the United States of Europe by universal suffrage, would you vote for a candidate who isn't a Belgian if you felt his personality and program better suited your opinions than those of Belgian candidates ?

- would vote for a non-Belgian candidate
 - would not
 - D.K., N.R.

13. Would you say you're very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable toward european unification ?

- very favorable
 - somewhat favorable
 - indifferent
 - somewhat unfavorable
 - very unfavorable
 - D.K., N.R.

14. Would you be favorable, opposed or indifferent to the proposal that

| | favorable | opposed | indifferent | D.K., N.R. |
|---|-----------|---------|-------------|------------|
| - the Belgian money be replaced by a european currency | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| - the Belgian olympic team sent to the next games be dissolved into a european team | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| - the Belgian flag be replaced by a european flag in important ceremonies | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

15. Among the following countries which are not members of the common Market, are there any you'd like to see join ? Which ones ? (HAND OVER CARD A)

1. Denmark
 2. Spain
 3. East Germany
 4. Poland
 5. USSR
 6. Switzerland
 None of those
 D.K., N.R.

16. Regarding the different ways of Europe may unify, which of these three do you prefer ?

1. "There's no european government, but the governments of each country should meet regularly to decide upon common policy."
2. "There's a european government which takes care of important matters, but each country keeps its own government to handle its own special problems."
3. "There's a european government which takes care of all important matters and the member countries no longer have national governments."

None of these ways
D.K., N.R.

17. If to-morrow you were told that the common Market is being abandoned, would you feel very sorry, a little sorry, indifferent or relieved ?

- very sorry
- a little sorry
- indifferent
- relieved
- D.K., N.R.

18. Would you be willing to make certain personal sacrifices, financially for example, to ensure that european unification takes place : would you be very, somewhat, hardly or not at all willing to do this ?

- very willing
- somewhat willing
- hardly willing
- not at all willing
- D.K., N.R.

19. Do you think that so far the common Market has had a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable effect on your standard of living ?

- very willing
- somewhat willing
- hardly willing
- not at all willing
- D.K., N.R.

20. Are you satisfied with your present living conditions ?

- Yes
- No
- D.K., N.R.

21. Do you think your living conditions will improve a lot during the next five years ?

- Yes
- No
- D.K., N.R.

22. Talking about the United States of Europe, one hears a lot of things. I'm going to read a certain number of opinions one hears. For each one, I'd like to know whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree.

| | Strongly agree | Agree | Disagree | Strongly disagree | D.K., N.R. |
|---|----------------|-------|----------|-------------------|------------|
| 1) I'm proud to be a Belgian | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2) The United States of Europe should become a third power as strong as the United States of America and the USSR | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3) All is well with us and the way things are, so why change ? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4) The United States of Europe would be a first step toward world government which would abolish war | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5) The unification is impossible because we speak different languages | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6) In the United States of Europe, the cost of living would be higher and there'd be a bigger risk of unemplo- | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7) Nothing can be changed about the fact that the strong always rule over the weak | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8) In the setting of the United States of Europe, european scientists could catch up with Americans | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9) I've got nothing, in principle, against foreign workers but there 're really too many of them in our country | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10. In the United States of Europe, the different peoples run the risk of losing what's distinctive about their way of life | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11. In the United States of Europe, the most privileged segments of the population will have better chances of improving their status | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. In the United States of Europe, the standard of living will probably be higher | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

23. Now I'm going to name some things people may like to see get done. For each one, please tell me if you strongly hope it gets done, if you feel indifferent about it or if you tend to be against it.

(INT : HAND OVER CARD B)

| | strongly hopes | Indifferent | Against | D.K., N.R. |
|--|-------------------|-------------|---------|---------------|
| 1) that Belgium have a strong army | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 2) that there be no more world wars | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 3) that I live in a free country where everyone can freely say what he thinks | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 4) that I can travel freely in all countries without any red tape | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 5) that Belgium play a major role in world politics | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 6) that I haven't any financial troubles in buying a car or a house, for example | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 7) that Belgium make great scientific discoveries | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

24. Recently there have been large student demonstrations in many countries. Generally speaking, do you feel very favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable toward students who demonstrate ?

- very favorable
- somewhat favorable
- somewhat unfavorable
- very unfavorable
- D.K., N.R.

25. On this card (SHOW THE CARD) are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion.

- 1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action.
- 2) Our society must be gradually improved by intelligent reform.
- 3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.
- 4) Don't know, No Response.

26. a) Now I'd like to suggest a certain number of concrete goals to you. (INT : HAND OVER CARD D). Of the following things, which are the two you feel are the most desirable ?

1. Ensure greater job security
2. Make our society more humane
3. Increase wages
4. Ensure the participation of workers in business management.

b) (INT. HAND OVER CARD E) And of the following things, which are the two you feel are the most desirable ?

1. Maintain law and order
2. Improve the participation of citizens in political decisions of the government
3. Fight rising prices
4. Guarantee the freedom of speech, so that everyone can freely say what he thinks.

27. Now I'd like to ask you some questions about the trust that different peoples throughout the world instill in you. I'll read the names of different peoples and please tell me if you have a lot, some, little or no trust at all in them. You can answer with the help of this card. (INT. HAND OVER CARD F)

| | A lot of trust | Some trust | Little trust | No trust | D.K., N.R. |
|----------------------------------|----------------|------------|--------------|----------|------------|
| 1. Americans (the United States) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. Russians | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. Italians | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4. Germans | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5. French | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. Chinese | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. British | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. Swiss | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

28. I'd like to suggest some more concrete policy goals to you. (INT: HAND OVER CARD J). For each objective, I'd like to ask whether you feel it's an absolutely essential objective, an important objective, an objective of secondary importance, or not important at all.

| | Absolutely essential | Important objective | Objective of second- ary im- portance | Not impor- tant at all | D.K., N.R. |
|--|-------------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---------------|
| 1. Ensure greater job security | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 2. Make our society more humane | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 3. Ensure the participation of workers in business manage- ment. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4. Help underdeveloped countries | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5. Increase wages | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6. Stop manufacturing atomic bombs | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7. Abolish capitalism | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8. Reform the educational system | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9. Fight communism | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10. Guarantee the freedom of speech | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11. Maintain law and order | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12. Foster private enterprise in economic activity | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 13. Provide jobs for young people | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 14. Guarantee decent retirement pensions to old people | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

29. Do you yourself participate in political activities, do you follow politics with some interest without participating actively or don't politics interest you especially or not at all ?

- participate personally
 - interested without participating
 - some interest
 - no interest
 - D.K., N.R.
-

30. Can you tell me who presently is ...

- ... the Prime Minister in Belgium ?
(INT : WRITE DOWN)
 - ... the Minister of Foreign Affairs ?
(INT : WRITE DOWN)
-

31. Do you watch news broadcasts on television ...

- every day
 - several times a week
 - once or twice a week
 - less often
 - never
 - D.K., N.R.
-

32. Do you read news about current political events in the newspapers ...

- every day
 - several times a week
 - once or twice a week
 - less often
 - never
 - D.K., N.R.
-

33. Do you listen to news broadcasts on the radio ...

- every day
 - several times a week
 - once or twice a week
 - less often
 - never
 - D.K., N.R.
-

34. Have you ever traveled abroad ? (IF YES) In what countries did you spend at least one day ? (INT : INSIST ON ANSWERS AND WRITE THEM DOWN).

35. Among present-day parties is there a political party you feel closer to than others ?

- Yes
- No (GO TO Q. 37)
- D.K., N.R. (GO TO Q. 37)

36. Do you feel strongly or only weakly attached to this party ?

- strongly
- weakly
- D.K., N.R.

37. (HAND OVER CARD H) If general elections were held to-morrow to elect deputies, for which of the following parties would you most likely vote or for which one would you vote if you had the right to vote ? (INT : THE LAST PHRASE APPLIES ONLY TO YOUNG PEOPLE BELOW VOTING AGE).

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| - P.S.B. | Socialist Party |
| - P.S.C./C.V.P. | Christian Social P. |
| - P.L.P. | Liberal P. |
| - Comm. | Communists |
| - Rassemblement Wallon | Wallon Movement |
| - F.D.F. | Wallon Nationalist Party |
| - V.U. | Flemish Nationalist Party |
| - Other party (INT : WRITE DOWN) | |
| | |
| - None (GO TO Q.41) | |

38. Do you know if your parents had a preference for a particular political party ?

- Yes
- No (GO TO Q.41)

39. Was it a political party of the same tendency as you'd vote for now or was it of another tendency ?

- same tendency (GO TO Q. 41)
- other tendency
- D.K., N.R. (GO TO Q. 41)

40. What was the political tendency of your parents ? (INT : WRITE DOWN)

41. Do you know whether the representatives of ... (INT : NAME THE PARTY GIVEN IN Q. 37) ... are favorable or not to european unification ? Choose your response among the following :

- very favorable
 - somewhat favorable
 - somewhat unfavorable
 - very unfavorable
 - D.K., N.R.
-

42. If this party were to take a position on european unification contrary to your own, do you think it's certain, likely, unlikely or very unlikely that you'd vote for another party ?

- certain
 - likely
 - unlikely
 - very unlikely
 - D.K., N.R.
-

43. Do you belong to a union ?

- Yes (GO TO Q. 45)
 - No
-

44. Even though you're not a member, do you feel close to a union ?

- Yes
 - No (GO TO Q. 48)
-

45. What union is that ?

- F.G.T.B.
 - C.S.C.
 - C.G.S.L.B.
 - Other (INT : WRITE DOWN)
 -
 - D.K., N.R.
-

46. Do you feel strongly or only weakly attached to this union or not at all ?

- strongly attached
 - weakly attached
 - not at all
 - D.K., N.R.
-

47. Do you know if the leaders of this union are very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable to european unification ?

- very favorable
- somewhat favorable
- somewhat unfavorable
- very unfavorable
- D.K., N.R.

48. (INT : IF R. IS NOT THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD) Does the head of your household belong to a union ?

- Yes
- No (GO TO Q. 50)

49. Which union is that ?

- F.G.T.B.
- C.S.C.
- C.G.S.L.B.
- Other (INT : WRITE DOWN)
-
- D.K., N.R.

50. Do you belong to a religion ?

- Yes
- No (GO TO Q. 53)

51. Which one ?

- catholic
- protestant
- other (INT : WRITE DOWN)
-

52. Do you go to religious services several times a week, once a week, several times a year or never ?

- several times a week
- once a week
- several times a year
- never

53. Would you please tell me at about what level you'd place your family's financial means. You can answer by indicating a number going from 1 to 7 on this scale. (INT : HAND OVER CARD I). The number 1 means a poor family ; 3, a family with modest means ; 5, a well off family ; and 7, a wealthy family. The other numbers give you an opportunity to choose intermediate positions. (INT : CIRCLE NUMBER R. 2 GIVES)

| | | | | | | |
|------|---|--------------|---|-----------------|---|---------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| poor | | modest means | | fairly well off | | wealthy |