




CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

EIGHTEEN COUNTRIES SURVEY - AUTUMN 1992



COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

HIGHLIGHTS

The Commission of the European Community's EUROBAROMETER polled 18,500 people in 18 Central and Eastern European countries during November 1992 to assess public support for the EC, as well as for political and economic changes. Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.3 is the most comprehensive survey conducted in the region to date:

- * Despite all the hardships, the concept of the free market has more than two-to-one support in non-CIS countries with a relative majority against in CIS states. Irrespective of their views on this matter, people on balance say the process of both economic reform and privatisation should be speeded up.

- * Marginally more people from non-CIS states think human rights are being respected than not. Two-thirds of people living in CIS countries think otherwise. Those positive mainly give "political" reasons; those negative, "economic" ones.

- * Two-thirds of Romanians are now in favour of a market economy, overcoming their suspicions of last year. However, the Baltic states experience major falls in those thinking their country is on the right track, in support for the free market and satisfaction with the development of democracy. In European Russia, a relative majority is now against the free market.

- * Fears of a dictatorship within the next 12 months are not prevalent except in Armenia and Moldova, where people are divided about what will happen next. In non-CIS countries, more think the present political system is better for them; in CIS countries, many more think the past political system worked better for them.

- * An absolute majority of people say there should be little or no state control over their media. This view is as strongly felt in CIS as non-CIS countries.

- * The vast majority of people in the region (71%) have heard of the EC. 44% are positive about it, 27% neutral and only 4% negative. Already high last year, support for associate and full EC membership has actually increased outside the CIS. Now, 78% of people in the whole region support membership sometime in the future and 68% favour "Europe Agreements". More people see advantages than disadvantages to possible EC membership for their country. Top comes the hope that living standards and trade will improve.

- * A quarter of people in the region (excluding Russia) see their country's future tied up mainly with the EC (26%), followed by Russia (19%) and the USA (17%). Russians are not sure if theirs is primarily with the USA (25%) or other CIS members (23%), while the EC comes third (14%) among them.

- * Over a third of Albanians say they "definitely" intend to leave their country to live and work in Western Europe. For the region as a whole, 1.2% - representing around 2.7 million - say they are definite about going, while 7.3% - representing 16.7 million people - say they "definitely" or "probably" will do so.

INTRODUCING THE EUROBAROMETER

Standard EUROBAROMETER public opinion surveys have been conducted in the European Community every Spring and Autumn since 1973 on behalf of the Directorate-General for Audiovisual, Information, Communication, Culture of the Commission of the European Community. Standard EUROBAROMETER surveys nos. 1 to 31 were carried out by national institutes belonging to the 'European Omnibus Surveys' (EOS-Gallup Europe) and since then by national institutes associated with INRA (EUROPE). Currently around 12,800 persons of the 15+ age group are interviewed EC-wide face-to-face on a nationally-representative basis in all 12 Member States. Reports are published on the results every June and December. A trends volume comes out every March.

Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER surveys started in Autumn 1990 when nationally-representative surveys were undertaken for the Commission in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. For the second wave of research, the number of countries was expanded and included nationally-representative samples from Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Russia west of the Urals as well. Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.3 has further added Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and the Ukraine, while taking account of the split into two parts of former Czechoslovakia. In each of 18 countries now surveyed, around 1,000 persons of the 15+ age group were interviewed face-to-face in their own homes.

Gallup UK assisted in the co-ordination and data-processing for the project. We also wish to thank CEMA in Croatia and the Institute for Political Studies in Serbia (with co-ordination assistance from MAI East Europe and SPEM in Slovenia) for fielding a short version of the questionnaire free of charge in their countries.

Although the same technical standards for surveys available in the European Community cannot necessarily be expected to be found in Central and Eastern Europe at the present time, the results, cautiously read, do allow us a unique insight into the attitudes of the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe as they face revolutionary times.

In accordance with the normal practice for this type of survey, the Commission disclaims all responsibility for questions, results and commentaries. This report, drawn up by the 'Surveys, Research, Analyses' Unit of the Director-General for Audiovisual, Information, Communication, Culture, is an internal document of the European Commission.

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ANNEXES

MAJOR NEWS ITEMS PRIOR TO AND DURING MAIN FIELDWORK: 30th OCTOBER -17th NOVEMBER 1992

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| 24th October | Hungary and Slovakia dispute building of Danube Dam. |
| 27th October | New constitutional plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina put forward by negotiators Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance. Russian President Yeltsin bans the National Salvation Front, a new alliance of communists and nationalists. |
| 28th October | First summit between EC and its East European associate members - Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland - held in London. Bulgarian UDF coalition government loses confidence vote and resigns. |
| 29th October | Russian troop withdrawal from Baltics halted. |
| 30th October | Fighting breaks out in Russian Ingushetia and North Ossetia - 277 people killed in first 12 days. |
| 3rd November | Yugoslav Prime Minister Panic narrowly escapes no-confidence motion in Parliament. |
| 6th November | An ethnic riot in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's capital, Skopje, leaves 6 dead. |
| 8th November | 300,000 Germans demonstrate in Berlin against ongoing attacks on refugees. |
| 9th November | UK - Russian bilateral friendship treaty signed. |
| 11th November | Russia swaps military hardware for debt with Hungary. |
| 15th November | The ex-communist Democratic Labour Party win Lithuania's General Election. |
| 17th November | Romania initials a Europe Agreement for EC associate membership. |

1. ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMS

1.1 Overall situation

1992 began with a major historic event - the departure of the old Soviet Union and its replacement with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Baltic States and Georgia emphasised their newly-found independence by refusing to join it.

Russia experienced a new "Time of Troubles". President Yeltsin's popularity eroded as economic change under his youthful reformist Prime Minister Gaidar began to bite. The rouble collapsed in spectacular fashion - one ecu, being officially valued at less than a rouble in 1988, became worth more than 300 roubles by the end of 1992. Ukraine's response was to issue new currency to emphasise its independence and try to safeguard its economy against the rouble's fall - inflation increased to an estimated 2,000% for 1992 as the value of the new Ukrainian coupon promptly fell faster than the rouble¹.


Overall, the Net Material Product for the CIS as a whole is estimated to have fallen 18% in 1992 alone. Armenia's almost fell by half.

Parliamentary and/or Presidential elections were held during the last year in the Ukraine (1st December 1991), Bulgaria (19th January 1992), Albania (22nd March), the Czech and Slovak Republics (5/6th June), Estonia (20th September), Romania (27th September), Georgia (11th October) and Lithuania (15th November). In a number of cases, economic problems and ethnic tensions helped elect nationalist and/or former communist leaders, often displaying less commitment towards rigorous economic reform. Particularly in the CIS, this reflects in part an absence of established political parties.

¹Political analysis contained in this report originates from many sources, including internal EC reports, the United Nations, The Economist, Financial Times and national institutes participating in the survey.

COUNTRIES POLLED FOR CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROBAROMETER No.3 (Autumn 1992)

(European Community data given for comparison)



ESTONIA

1993 GDP per head 498 ECU
1992 GDP growth -20%; 1993 -5%
1992 Inflation 500%; 1993 1,000%

RUSSIA

1993 GDP per head 755 ECU
1992 GDP growth -16.5%; 1993 -8%
1992 Inflation 2,000%; 1993 750%

BELARUS

1993 GNP per head NDA
1992 GNP growth -14.9%; 1993 -17%
Inflation NDA

UKRAINE

1993 GDP per head 154 ECU
1992 GDP growth -23%; 1993 -15%
1992 Inflation 2,000%; 1993 1,000%

GEORGIA

1993 GNP per head NDA
1992 GNP growth -17.3%; 1993 -5.8%
Inflation NDA

MOLDOVA

1993 GNP per head NDA
1992 GNP growth -24.1%; 1993 -11.7%
Inflation NDA

ROMANIA

1993 GDP per head 553 ECU
1992 GDP growth -7%; 1993 -1.2%
1992 Inflation 145%; 1993 80%

BULGARIA

1993 GDP per head 830 ECU
1992 GDP growth -10%; 1993 -3.5%
1992 Inflation 110%; 1993 70%

ARMENIA

1993 GNP per head NDA
1992 GNP growth -33%; 1993 -4%
Inflation NDA

(MACEDONIA)

NO DATA AVAILABLE

ALBANIA

1993 GNP per head NDA
1992 GNP growth -24.5%; 1993 -1.5%
1992 Inflation 500%; 1993 350%

Sources: The Economist "The World in 1993"; PlanEcon; Eurostat.
NDA = No data available. 1992 - Estimates; 1993 - Forecasts.

The number of countries being polled by the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER has substantially increased: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine from the former USSR; Slovenia and "Macedonia" from the former Yugoslavia (a few questions were also asked in Croatia and Serbia); and the Czech Republic and Slovakia was split in anticipation of Czechoslovakia's dissolution.

Fighting in the region also meant that not all parts of some countries could be surveyed - Armenia (90% coverage), Georgia (90%) and Moldova (82%). As war zones are in areas with large ethnic minorities, the views of these minorities are inevitably under-represented relative to a national sample, but correct according to the areas actually covered.

Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.3 has achieved the most comprehensive coverage of any poll in the region to date².

Asked whether they feel **their country is generally going in the right or wrong direction**, most people in the region as a whole say their country is going in the wrong (51%) rather than right (31%) direction. Although just as many people living in TACIS³ (51%) as PHARE⁴ (50%) countries say things are going in the wrong direction, more express optimism in PHARE (37%) than TACIS (28%) countries (Annex Figure 1).

Absolute majorities of Albanians, Slovenes and Czechs say things are going in the right direction, as well as a relative majority of Estonians⁵. Bulgarians, Macedonians and recently-separated Slovaks are divided on the issue.

²Results occasionally need to be interpreted with particular caution in some countries given the conditions under which surveys can take place, especially Albania, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. Further analysis will be undertaken concerning Albania's results in particular.

³TACIS is the name of the EC's programme of "Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States". For the purposes of this survey they are the CIS members : Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Russia (West of Urals) and the Ukraine, plus Georgia. By population size, TACIS countries make up 63.3% of the region's total.

⁴PHARE (originally "Aid for the Economic Reconstruction of Poland and Hungary") is the name of the EC's assistance programme to all other states surveyed: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. By population size it is 36.7% of the region's total.

⁵Results, unless otherwise stated, are for the PERMANENT RESIDENTS of these countries, not the ethnic groups of the region. "Macedonians" are the permanent residents of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia throughout the text.

Throughout this survey, Albanians often reveal the most positive attitudes of all Central and Eastern Europeans concerning their economic and political conditions as well as their opinions of the EC. In part, their apparent enthusiasm is much to do with the nightmare dictatorship from which they have just escaped. Anything is better, it seems, than what preceded their current plight.

Most people otherwise say their country is going in the wrong direction, particularly in former Soviet Union states and the early reformers - Poland and Hungary. Armenia has the least people saying things are proceeding in the right direction. Still struggling to recover from their devastating earthquake in 1988 and their war with Azerbaijan, two-thirds of Armenians say their country is going in the wrong direction while only a sixth say it's direction is right.


Compared to Autumn 1991⁶, pessimism on this measure has increased (-3 "right"; +9 "wrong") in PHARE countries overall. In Latvia (-33, +31), Lithuania (-31; +36) and Romania (-17; +16), majorities of people had been saying things were on the right track last year - now most say the opposite. People in the Baltics as a whole show the greatest negative change here (-28; +29) - as well as on other major measures - compared to last time (Text Figure 1).

People consider 1992 to have been a bad year for their **country's economy and people's household finances**. Around seven out of ten (71%) say the economic situation in their country got worse compared to twelve months ago, while only a seventh (15%) say things got better. Just over a tenth (11%) say matters stayed the same. More people in TACIS (78%) than PHARE countries (60%) say it got worse. Only Albanians reckoned on balance their economy had improved (5% "a lot", 40% "a little better") while, at the other end of the spectrum, almost all Armenians say matters became worse (18% "a little", 74% "a lot worse") (Annex Figure 2).

⁶In Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.2 (Autumn 1991), 96.5% of the current population of PHARE countries was polled. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Slovenia are not included in last year's figures. Only European Russia can be compared among TACIS countries for the same reason. Last year's data have now been weighted to enable direct comparison with this year's results. Trends concerning PHARE countries overall and the Baltics as a whole are given when questions are comparable, as well as those countries where majorities reversed their positions on issues compared to last year.

BALTICS IN TROUBLE

% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES



NB: BALTIC STATES COMBINED, WEIGHTED BY POPULATION SIZE

Decline in reported income levels is not quite as pronounced during the same period. For the region as a whole, six out of ten (60%) say their household finances declined while a sixth (17%) say they improved. The result is virtually the same for TACIS (16:62) and PHARE (18:57) countries as a whole (Annex Figure 3).

Everywhere, household incomes seem on the whole to have fallen in 1992. Relative majorities in Slovenia and Romania say they lost out financially - as did absolute majorities everywhere else. Armenia had the greatest numbers of people saying their household finances had declined⁷.

Compared to 1992, there is some more optimism about prospects for 1993. Now a quarter (25%) expect economic conditions to improve while two out of five (41%) predict further decline. A fifth say the economic condition of their country will remain largely unchanged (18%). Results in PHARE countries as a whole (30% "better" : 21% "same" : 37% "worse") show hopes that economies might stabilise while results in TACIS countries reveal that people on balance feel the decline will continue (21:17:44) (Annex Figure 4).

Absolute majorities of Albanians and Slovenes - and relative majorities of Bulgarians - reckon their country's economy will improve, while Macedonians, Georgians and Romanians are divided on the subject. Czechs are also uncertain as to what the future might hold for them in their new state, and most Slovaks are prepared for the worst in theirs. Everywhere else people consider their countries in the economic doldrums. They are joined in their gloom by absolute majorities of Armenians, Hungarians and Belarussians as well as relative majorities elsewhere.

On balance, people in the whole region are expecting their household finances to diminish in 1993 (22% "better"; 24% "same"; 36% "worse"). Marginally more people in PHARE countries are optimistic in this respect (28:27:33) than those living in TACIS countries (19:22:37).

⁷ Due to a technical error, questions on past and future household finances were incorrectly asked in Albania and have therefore been excluded from the survey.

Relative majorities of Romanians, Slovenes, Macedonians, Georgians and Bulgarians feel on balance their financial positions will improve rather than decline. Slovakia has the most people saying they will have less money in their pockets (54%) - more than in Hungary (52%) or Armenia (51%) (Annex Figure 5).

The European Community (EC) has also been going through a major economic downturn, though not nearly as serious as that in Central and Eastern Europe. Two-thirds of EC citizens (67%) say their country's economies got worse last year, although almost half say their household finances (49%) remained unchanged. However, for those that were affected, incomes declined in twice as many cases (33%) as increased (17%)⁸.

Pessimism also prevails in the EC about 1993, with almost half (48%) saying their country's economy will deteriorate. Nevertheless, people still consider their household finances will, on balance, remain largely unchanged despite foreseen difficulties for the economy of their country (22% "better; 47% "same"; 26% "worse") (Annex Figure 2-5).

Irrespective of these problems, every EC country except the United Kingdom experienced real GDP growth in 1992. By contrast, every economy in Central and Eastern Europe declined without exception. This increased the gap between the income levels of EC citizens and their Eastern neighbours. By the end of 1992 Slovenia, the wealthiest Central and Eastern European country, had half the GDP per head of Portugal, the economically-poorest country in the European Community.

⁸See standard EUROBAROMETER No.38 (Autumn 1992) report.

1.2 Prospects for economic reform

Virtually all countries in the region had economic reform programmes up and running in 1992 with varying degrees of commitment to establishing a market economy.

Early economic reforming countries - the new Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - had gone sufficiently far down that road to be considered by "western" experts as ready for economic growth in 1993. Many other economies - particularly TACIS and Baltic states - are still in "free-fall" as difficult political decisions for reform are delayed and inflation erodes the purchase power of citizens.

There is commitment to the market economy in Central and Eastern Europe, but it is by no means universal. In PHARE countries, there is more than two-to-one support (57:25) among those who believe the **creation of a free market economy is right for their country's future**. In TACIS countries, controversy rages, with more against (36:45). For the region as a whole, 6 percentage points separate those who believe in the free market (44%) and those who don't (38%) (Annex Figure 6).

Apart from Latvia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, more people in the PHARE states are "for" rather than "against" the market economy. By contrast there are majorities "against" in all TACIS countries, with greatest doubts expressed in Armenia and Belarus. Only Georgia has a relative majority in favour of it.

Overall, people living in PHARE countries increased their support for the market economy (+4 "right"; 0 "wrong") compared to a year ago, despite all the difficulties.

Changes in attitude towards the market economy are very significant compared to a year ago. The pain of Russia's economic reform programme is evident as anger against the free market mounts (-5 "right"; +10 "wrong"), with more now opposing than supporting. The fall in support is greatest in Latvia (-27; +28), reversing previous majority support.

On the other hand, Romania's gradual acceptance of the market economy - nudged along by its recent initialling of an Association Agreement with the EC - is reflected in most of its citizens' embrace of the free market compared to the opposite a year ago (+25;-21).

Whatever people's views on the market economy, Central and Eastern Europeans want their countries out of the economic difficulties they are in. For the region as a whole, more than four out of ten (44%) say their **country's economic reforms** are going "too slow", a tenth (11%) "about the right speed" and a sixth (16%) "too fast". An eighth (12%) remark spontaneously that there are no economic reforms.

Results for PHARE (44:17:16) are not dissimilar to those from less free market-committed TACIS countries (43:7:17), although people from TACIS countries (14%) are more likely than those from PHARE countries (9%) to comment that there are no economic reforms taking place (Annex Figure 7).

Support for speeding-up economic reform is noticeable, particularly in Moldova, Slovenia, Georgia and Albania. Percentages of those saying economic reform is proceeding too slowly outnumber people saying it is too fast **plus** people saying the right speed everywhere; except Lithuania, which is divided on the subject; and the Czech and Slovak Republics, where most people are satisfied things are going at the right speed.

Last year, most Romanians thought economic reform to be progressing at the right speed. This year, the dominant view is that those reforms should be speeded up ("too slow" +21, "right speed" -30). In PHARE countries as a whole, there has been an increase in those saying economic reform has been going too slow (+8), with drops in those saying it is going too fast (-4) and about the right speed (-8).

Privatisation is on the economic reform agenda everywhere. Impressive starts have been made in many countries in selling off shops and restaurants to the private sector. The retail trade has blossomed in most countries, driving food shortages off the streets.

Privatisation of larger enterprises has already started to benefit citizens in some countries. By the end of 1992, more than 8 billion ecu of company shares were expected to be transferred to the 8.5 million citizens of the former Czechoslovakia participating in an innovative privatisation voucher give-away scheme. Poland and Hungary are also well down the privatisation path, among others. Even Russia is ambitiously trying to privatise 6,500 medium and large state enterprises by the end of 1993.

Similarly to economic reform, almost half (45%) the people in the region as a whole think the **process of privatising their country's state enterprises** is going "too slow", an eighth (12%) "about the right speed" and a seventh (15%) "too fast". People in TACIS countries are more likely to want things to go less slowly (47:9:12) than PHARE countries (43:18:20) where the privatisation process is more advanced (Annex Figure 8).

Only in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Lithuania are people divided as to whether privatisation should go faster rather than slower. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, where economic reforms first started, more are saying that privatisation is going too slowly, but at least as many are now saying that the speed is fine or too fast.

Clearly, despite disillusionment and perhaps even the remains of old ideological distrust of the market economy, the majority of people from TACIS - as well as PHARE countries - still want economic reforms and the privatisation of their state enterprises to succeed.

1.3 Citizenship and democracy

Citizenship is an issue in the Baltic states. In Estonia, it is automatically available to pre-1941 residents and their descendants. Other permanent residents may qualify for citizenship after a language test and satisfying residency requirements. Some people who migrated to Estonia during Soviet rule do not currently possess voting rights. In Latvia, discussions are underway about the citizenship rights of those who have only resided there since the time of Soviet rule.

Because of problems with citizenship, Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER interviewed all permanent residents in its survey. The recent break-up of the former Soviet Union meant more than 5% of the permanent residents of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia say they are not entitled to citizenship of their new state or just do not know. A quarter of Estonians and Latvians say the same - although it must be said that this "quarter" is more definite about its position in Estonia (23% "not entitled"; 3% "don't know") than in Latvia (13% "not entitled"; 12% "don't know") (Annex Figure 9).

More than two-thirds of people (68%) in the region as a whole say they would turn out to **vote if there were a General Election in their country "tomorrow"**. This result includes those not able to vote for various reasons. More said they would turn out in PHARE countries (74%) than in TACIS ones (64%).

Keenest to vote would be Lithuanians, who indeed exercised that right just before and after Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER polling occurred. People living in Armenia, Poland and Moldova show the least interest in participating in General Elections at the time of the survey (Annex Figure 10).

In those countries, choosing a party to support can be bewildering experience. A Romanian finds it all very confusing: *"Now there are about 200 parties and thousands of political leaders, you need a lifetime just to learn their names"*.

Similar to their enthusiasm for voting, **Lithuania - just like last time - continues to be the only country in Central and Eastern Europe where more of its citizens are satisfied rather than dissatisfied with the development of their democracy**. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Georgia and Slovenia, people are divided on the issue. Everywhere else, absolute majorities are dissatisfied, especially in the TACIS countries of Armenia, Belarus, European Russia and the Ukraine (Annex Figure 11).

Dissatisfaction with the development of democracy increased in PHARE countries (-2 "satisfied"; +10 "dissatisfied") compared to a year ago, especially for those living in the Baltic states (-10; +17).

Overall, people in the region are more than three-to-one (69:20) dissatisfied with the development of their democracy. While people in PHARE countries are dissatisfied by a majority of two-to-one (61:32), citizens of TACIS countries are unhappy by a majority of more than five-to-one (73:13).

This crisis is not limited to the "new" democracies. The standard EUROBAROMETER, after tracking the issue in the European Community for 17 years, reported for the first time in Autumn 1992 that more EC citizens are dissatisfied (56%) rather than satisfied (41%) with the way their democracy works in their country⁹. While EC citizens from the northern members - Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg - express the most satisfaction, Italy has the least happy citizens in this respect.

People were asked the likelihood of a **"non-democratic" dictatorship existing in their country within the next 12 months**. People in Central and Eastern Europe are two-to-one (52:26) of the opinion that a dictatorship will not come about in their country within this period. People in TACIS countries are, however, less sure of this (47:29) than those in PHARE countries (61:20) (Annex Figure 12).

Moldovans and Armenians are divided as to whether this will happen to their country. Georgians are two-to-one of the opinion that a dictatorship will not happen; however, 9% spontaneously say a dictatorship already exists there. It is significant that these countries are at war and politically highly unstable. A large (33-34%) minority of people living in Latvia and European Russia also expressed fears about a forthcoming dictatorship.

Asked whether, **taking everything into account, people think things are better for them now under the present political system or things were better for them before under the previous political system**, half (50%) say that they were better off previously while only just over a quarter (27%) say things are better for them now. A sixth (16%) say "neither" (Annex Figure 13).

There is, however, a major difference in attitudes between people in PHARE and TACIS countries. In PHARE countries, more think the present system better (41%) than the past system (36%). In TACIS countries, on the other hand, more people are reminiscent of how much better things were in the old days (59%) than now (19%).

⁹. In the standard EUROBAROMETER, respondents are asked about their satisfaction *WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS* in their country: in the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER, *WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS DEVELOPING* in their country. See standard EUROBAROMETER No.38 (Autumn 1992) report.

Majorities of people from Albania, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia praise their current system. People in Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Poland are divided on the issue. Relative or absolute majorities elsewhere - including surprisingly many Hungarians - say that things were better before.

This does not indicate that most people in these countries would prefer to see the return of communism. They simply find times much harder in the transition period from a command to a market economy than when shortages existed but goods were at least affordable.

1.4 Human rights

Almost twice as many people feel there is **no respect for individual human rights** in their country as say there is respect (32% "respect": 56% "no respect") in the region surveyed. While marginally more people in PHARE countries say there is respect than not (47:41), people in TACIS countries are almost three-to-one of the opinion that there is no respect (24:65). The negative view is also dominant in the Baltic states as a whole (39:50) (Annex Figure 14).

Absolute majorities of people in Slovakia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania say human rights are respected in their countries. People are divided on the issue in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Estonia while everywhere else there is an absolute majority saying there is no respect. Poland is the only country outside the Baltic states and TACIS countries to have a majority saying human rights are not respected.

Since Autumn 1991, the view that human rights are respected declined in PHARE countries (-8 "respect"; +4 "no respect"), especially Latvia (-16; +12) where more people now say there is no respect than respect. However, the immensely negative view of most Estonians last year has moderated (+19 "respect"; -24 "no respect"). Despite their major ethnic problems, Estonians are now divided on the issue.

Those saying human rights are respected primarily gave "freedom" (33%) as their reason, followed by the restoration of democracy (15%), ability to travel abroad (15%) and more economic opportunities (14%). Gaining independence (6%) and good ethnic relations (6%) are cited by relatively few in the region as a whole (Annex Figure 15).

Freedom is the top reason in almost all countries, especially Armenia (59%), Albania (58%) and Poland (53%). In Estonia, freedom and more economic opportunities comes first (both 13%). In Latvia, gaining independence (22%) is marginally more important than "freedom" and more economic opportunities (both 20%). In all cases, reasons for respect of human rights are interpreted primarily in political terms.

PHARE countries (67%) have more people giving reasons for human rights being respected than TACIS countries (47%) among those expressing that view. **However many more people from both TACIS (79%) and PHARE (81%) countries give reasons for non-respect of human rights.**

In PHARE/TACIS countries, human rights concerns are expressed primarily in economic terms.

Among these people, **economic hardship is the first concern (32%)**, followed by rising crime and violence (23%). An eighth (12%) worry about political problems, while less than a tenth complain of ex-communists still in control (8%), ethnic/ nationalistic tension (8%), ethnic riots/trouble (7%), rise of right-wing extremism (4%) and too many refugees (3%) (Annex Figure 16-17).

As one Hungarian put it: *"You can't have human rights if you have no money to enjoy them"*. A Ukrainian also complains: *"Money is power. Everything depends if you are rich or poor"*. A Belarussian: *"The most important rights have been lost - right for housing, for education, for a health service"*.

People in many countries also complain of contradictory or non-existing laws in many fields, as legislators still struggle to lay the legal foundations of a democratic society and market economy. In former Czechoslovakia, some people (2% of all polled) spontaneously mentioned they would like to see the creation of an ombudsman, to whom ordinary people could bring their complaints.

Economic hardship tops the list of complaints about non-respect for human rights in all countries except in Albania, where rising crime/violence (59%) and economic hardship (53%) are both mentioned by more than half of those complaining - these two are equally first in Slovakia (both 31%); in Georgia and the Czech Republic, where the crime rate takes first place (56% & 26% respectively); and in Hungary, where political problems (39%) and economic hardship (38%) tie for first place. However, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ethnic problems (28%) are ahead of economic hardship (25%) as the main concern.

There is little difference between the key results in TACIS and PHARE countries except that twice as many talk of ethnic riots/troubles in TACIS (8%) than in PHARE (4%) countries. Political problems are also cited more frequently in PHARE (16%) than TACIS countries (11%). As well as in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ethnic problems rank high among human rights concerns in Georgia (37% overall, including 27% "ethnic riots/trouble"), Latvia (30%), Estonia (29%), Armenia (27%), Moldova (27%) and Slovakia (23%).

People belonging to minorities were asked whether they feel **disadvantaged, or not disadvantaged in their country because of their nationality/ethnic background**. Given the ethnic tensions existing in some countries, this is obviously a very direct question which many people belonging to minorities may have felt uneasy in answering (to a possibly non-minority interviewer).

Nevertheless, over a third of minorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (50%), Estonia (49%), Latvia (42%) and Moldova (37%) say they feel disadvantaged. Nearly half (45%) of those in Georgia would not answer. The number of people belonging to a minority in our sample is too small (less than n=100) to gauge results in Albania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (Annex Figure 18).

Ethnic rights continue to be a major source of conflict in Central and Eastern Europe. **In the whole region surveyed, ethnic minorities make up less than five percent of the population in only five countries** - Albania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

1.5 Freedom of the press

A definitely crucial aspect of human rights is the free flow of information. Especially when it comes to making a democratic choice, nothing is more important than having free access to information from the media.

Central and Eastern Europeans as a whole believe **national radio** on balance is the **most trustworthy media source of news and current affairs** (54% "trust" ; 33% "no trust"), followed by national television (53:41). They are divided as to whether they believe what is written in national newspapers (40:38) and national magazines (27:24). Too few give an opinion about "western" television (16:14) and "western" radio (15:13) to say much more that it remains controversial among the third that feel they can give an opinion (Annex Figures 19-25).

Although people living in TACIS and PHARE countries have virtually equal amounts of faith in how news and current affairs is being reported on their national television (TACIS 52% "trust": 42% "no trust"; PHARE 55:40), people in PHARE countries are more likely to trust other national media sources: their radio (TACIS 49:36; PHARE 61:28), newspapers (TACIS 37:41; PHARE 46:35) and periodicals (TACIS 24:25; PHARE 32:21). People living in TACIS countries are also twice as likely to distrust "western" television (18%) and radio (17%) as people from PHARE countries (both 8%).

Georgia is the only country where a majority of people giving their opinion consistently does not trust any of its national media. The same is true for most Armenians, except concerning national radio, over which they are divided, and Moldovans, except when they voice their uncertainty over national television. Georgians and Moldovans also express the greatest distrust of "western" media (along with Belarussians concerning "western" radio).

The Czech Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia are the five countries where a majority of people expressing an opinion finds all four national media trustworthy. A quarter of all Czechs, Lithuanians and Slovaks trust the two "western" media sources, radio and television.

In the EC, the press is not under state control. But the broadcast media - television and radio - is normally divided between those in the "public service" domain and others belonging to private companies. The growth of satellite and cable television in particular over the past few years has meant that national governmental barriers to private broadcasting in Western, Central and Eastern Europe are being eroded faster than ever before.

In Central and Eastern Europe, all media had been controlled by the state under the previous political system. Moves are underway to free the media. Most countries now have a thriving independent national press. In the broadcasting area, private radio stations have been set up. Poland, among others, is trying to reduce government control over its television network.

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, most people are of the opinion that there should be "not very much/no" state control over television and radio (57:34) as well as "not very much/no" state control over the press (57:35) (Annex Figures 26-27).

This view is as strongly felt in TACIS (television/radio 56:35; press 55:36) as PHARE countries (59:33; 59:34).

In both cases, most Moldovans and Macedonians want a great deal/fair amount of state control of their broadcast and print media. Most Albanians want their national broadcast media to continue to be largely controlled, but are divided about their press. Romanians are split on both issues. In all other countries, most people want little or no control. Especially a majority of Lithuanians, Poles, Slovenes and Hungarians.

2. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

2.1 How European do Europeans feel?

Only a twelfth (8%) of Central and Eastern Europeans "often" think of themselves as not only their nationality/ethnic background but also European. A quarter think of themselves as European "sometimes" (24%), and well over a half "never" (61%) (Annex Figure 28).

People in TACIS countries are less likely to think of themselves as European (6% "often"; 21% "sometimes"; 66% "never") than those from PHARE countries (11:30:51).

Those who feel themselves European the most are people from countries that are, or have been, the most isolated in Europe. Hence, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has over a third of its citizens saying they feel European "often". Romania and Albania, both of which had very repressive regimes previously, are next. The fewest are in the Ukraine, European Russia and Belarus, the three biggest CIS states that were surveyed, as well as in the Czech Republic.

2.2 Awareness and image of the Community

A substantial majority (71%) of Central and Eastern Europeans interviewed say they have heard of the European Community. By comparison, most (55%) in the region as a whole have heard of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE), while fewer than half have heard of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (43%) (Annex Figures 29-31).

In all three cases, awareness is higher in PHARE than in TACIS countries: 12 points for the EC (TACIS 67%; PHARE 79%); 5 points for the CSCE (53;58) and 17 points for the EBRD (37%;54%). Since Autumn 1991, EC awareness has increased (+3) in PHARE countries as a whole.

Slovenes are the most aware of all three bodies, followed by Macedonians concerning both the EC and CSCE, and Romanians concerning the EBRD. In all countries, the EC is the most well-known of the three bodies. Armenians and Georgians are among those with the lowest awareness levels in the region.

Asked whether their impressions of the aims and activities of the European Community are generally positive, neutral or negative, many more people (44%) in the region say their impression is positive, as compared to neutral (27%) or negative (4%) (Annex Figure 32).

Results from TACIS countries (42% "positive"; 27% "neutral; 3% "negative) are not much different from PHARE countries (47:27:5). Albania - currently heavily dependent on EC assistance - is the most positive. Over half of all Romanians and Bulgarians - whose countries have just initialled Europe Agreements for EC association - are also positive. Poland, Moldova, the Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Belarus, Latvia and European Russia have more people feeling positive than neutral or negative.

People from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are the most negative towards the EC - probably because of the continuing non-recognition of their country. They are followed by almost a quarter of all Georgians.

At the current time, the EC as a whole is experiencing a fall in public support among its citizens. This decline started well before the Maastricht "summit" of December 1991¹⁰. Nevertheless majorities of EC citizens in all countries continue to favour EC membership.

¹⁰See standard EUROBAROMETER No.38 (Autumn 1992) report.

2.3 Learning more about the Community

Less than a quarter of Central and Eastern Europeans (22%) say they are interested a great deal or to some extent in the EC, its institutions and its policies. Just over seven out of ten (71%) say they are not very much or not at all interested (Annex Figure 33).

However, this disguises the fact that people from PHARE countries are much more interested (36% "interested": 60% "not interested") than those from more geographically-distant TACIS countries (14:78) - especially people coming from Belarus, European Russia and the Ukraine once again. There is also **not much interest expressed by people living in the Baltic states (24:68).**

Albanians are unsurprisingly the most interested, followed by Moldovans and Romanians. Moldova, being ethnically close to Romania and desirous of strong relations with it, shows great interest as the latter draws closer to the EC.

To test a minimal knowledge about the EC, people were asked whether they could **name the city or cities in which major EC institutions are located.** Brussels and/or Luxembourg and/or Strasbourg but no other city was considered correct.

Less than one in ten (9%) from the region as a whole can give the correct answer. However, almost **five times as many people in PHARE countries (18%) are correct compared to TACIS countries (4%) (Annex Figure 34).** Romanians and Slovaks came top in their knowledge of the correct location of EC institutions, followed by Slovenes and Czechs. Apart from Moldova, all TACIS countries scored 8% or less.

How best can the EC communicate what it does for people in the region¹¹? **Concerning EC information sources, national television broadcasts are the most important medium for nearly three-quarters of people living in the region (72%), followed by newspapers (55%), just ahead of radio (53%). Periodicals trail in fourth place (17%) (Annex Figures 35-43).**

¹¹Due to technical error, this question was incorrectly asked in Armenia, and has therefore been excluded from the survey.

Then come non-media methods of learning about the EC - official government statements (9%) and discussion at work (8%).

For people still studying, schools and universities are plausibly a much more important source of information about the EC (23%) than for the population at large (4%). This is especially true in PHARE (41%) rather than TACIS (16%) countries.

For those using western media sources (14%), "western" radio (8%) continues to be more important than television (6%), but "western" broadcast media continue to be much more important than print - newspapers (3%) and periodicals (2%). EC publications are unsurprisingly read by very few (2%).

Concerning domestic media, national television is the most important medium of information about the EC in TACIS (66%) and especially PHARE countries (83%). However, in the Baltic states, television is almost on a par (66%) with newspapers (64%). While newspapers are the second most important source in TACIS countries (49%), it is as important as radio in PHARE countries (65% and 66% respectively).

Periodicals are most avidly read for news by more than a third of Slovaks, Czechs and Poles. Official government statements are a key source for more than one in six Romanians and Poles. Over a fifth of Slovaks and Czechs get news about the EC at work.

Concerning "western" media sources, radio is a significant source of information for more than a sixth of Romanians; while television is especially prominent for at least a sixth of Albanians, Czechs, Estonians, Slovaks and Slovenes.

2.4 'Europe Agreements' and full EC membership

On 17th November 1992, Romania initialled a Europe Agreement with the EC, granting that country EC associate status after the signing and ratification process has taken place. Romania becomes the fourth Central and Eastern European country after the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, to achieve this status although the ratification process for the Czech Republic and Slovakia may be delayed because of their recent break-up.

After the completion of Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.3, Bulgaria initialled a Europe Agreement (22nd December 1992) with the EC as well. A delegation of members of the European Parliament also recommended recently that the EC should consider the possibility of negotiating a Europe Agreement with Slovenia.

Just under half of all Central and Eastern Europeans (47%) say they have heard of Europe Agreements for closer political, economic and cultural ties agreed or under negotiation between the EC and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The results are the same for TACIS (47%) and PHARE (46%) countries (Annex Figure 44).

As negotiations reached their peak, almost two-thirds of Bulgarians say they have heard of this Agreement, along with more than half of all Albanians, Belarussians, Moldovans and Russians. By contrast, the Agreement is only known by a sixth of Lithuanians.


Particularly low are the results for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, where only around two out of five say they are aware of the Europe Agreement. Poland's result is average for the region, with around half having heard of it.

Those Albanians, Macedonians and Romanians who are already aware of the Europe Agreement are the most interested in hearing more about it. People living in PHARE countries show more interest (70% "very" or "somewhat") than those in TACIS countries (55%) among those who have already heard (Annex Figure 45).

Irrespective of whether they have heard of it or not, more than two-thirds (68%) of Central and Eastern Europeans say they are in favour of this kind of Europe Agreement between the EC and their country. Hardly anyone (4%) is against the idea (Annex Figure 46).

More people in PHARE (78%) than TACIS countries (63%) are in favour. Greatest support is found in formerly politically isolated states - Albania, Romania (accompanied by Moldova) as well as the currently isolated former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This is also true of the most advanced "outsider" to this process, Slovenia.

SUPPORT FOR CLOSER TIES WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY



Full EC membership, now or in the future, is supported overwhelmingly by four out of five (78%) Central and Eastern Europeans with virtually no opposition (4%). People from PHARE states (82%) are more eager for their countries to become full members than TACIS countries (75%), again primarily due to higher "don't know" rates in the latter (Annex Figure 47).

Results everywhere except Albania show people being more supportive of their country becoming a full rather than associate EC member - Russians, west of the Urals, especially so (55% "associate"; 70% "full") (Text Figure 2).

Support for EC association (+3) and full (+3) membership among people in PHARE countries has increased from already very high levels registered a year ago.

Most Central and Eastern Europeans realise that full membership will not happen overnight (if at all). While a sixth say their country should be a full member now (17%), a quarter say it should happen in about five years' time (24%), another sixth (15%) in ten years' time and around the same number later or never (18%) (Annex Figure 48).

Speed is more of the essence in PHARE (42% "now"; 26% "in five years' time") than TACIS (3;23) countries.

Those who want the quickest integration of all are the Macedonians and Romanians, most of whom say it should happen straight away. The six countries (assessing the Czech Republic and Slovakia independently) which have, or are about to conclude Europe Agreements rank among the first nine in desiring full EC membership quickly. Albanians are more cautious, with the majority saying full EC membership should happen within five or ten years.

Current thinking is that no Central and Eastern European country will attain full EC membership before the end of the 20th Century. However, enlargement negotiations are beginning with a number of European Free Trade Association countries. There is a possibility that political events in the region may speed the EC's process of negotiations for at least those Central and Eastern European countries with the soundest economies.

2.5 Closer ties to the EC: benefits and drawbacks

Improved living standards (27%) and better trading conditions (22%) are the two most prominent reasons why Central and Eastern Europeans think full EC membership might be advantageous for their countries. Financial and economic aid (17%) is seen to be forthcoming and there will be more scope for European economic cooperation (15%). Such a move would help establish the free market (12%), abolish travel restrictions (11%) and make any remaining shortages disappear (11%).

To a much lesser degree, the benefits are perceived as political - there will be more European political cooperation (7%), peace and stability will return to Europe (7%), democracy will take better root (5%), leading to improvements in security and defence matters (5%). A third (33%) say there are no benefits or cannot think of any (Annex Figure 49).

Improved living standards are the top perceived benefit everywhere - especially for hard-pressed Albanians (75%). The exception are people coming from economically-sounder economies - Slovenes (44%), Poles (43%), Czechs (32%), Slovaks (31%) and Hungarians (26%) - for all of whom improved trade comes first; and among Armenians (49%), many of whom hope primarily for financial and economic assistance.

Disadvantages are also seen mainly in economic terms, but not to such a degree. Some people worry about economic domination the most (12%) as well as unemployment (10%). There is a fear of an influx of foreigners, buying up the country (8%), emigration (6%), political domination (6%), social inequalities (5%) and an increase in crime and decadence (5%). Very few mention loss of cultural identity, recently-gained sovereignty and possible falls in living standards (all 2-3%). Well over half cannot think of a disadvantage or do not know (63%) (Annex Figure 50).

Economic domination is a big worry in Poland (31%), while many Albanians fear an increase in crime and decadence (34%) as well as the scope for greater social inequalities (27%) and emigration (26%). No other single issue is mentioned by more than a fifth of any country's population.

Occasionally, local issues come to the fore. In Romania, a few (7%) note that future EC membership might help the unification of their country with Moldova. Other Romanians (2%) fear it may encourage Hungarian "interest groups" to claim territorial autonomy for Transylvania.


Asked which institutions and bodies are likely to benefit or lose out in their country as its ties with the EC increase, Central and Eastern Europeans reckon their country's private businesses will benefit rather than lose out (65% "benefit"; 7% "lose out"), as well as health and social services (50:10), the educational system (47:10), state enterprises (43:23), farmers (38:19), manual workers (37:20), civil servants (31:20) and low income groups (30:25) (Annex Figures 51-59).

Absolute or relative majorities in both TACIS and PHARE countries as a whole feel each sector is likely to benefit more than lose out. The only exception is low income groups, whose potential fate causes uncertainty in TACIS countries (24:25).

Large majorities everywhere have no doubt that private businesses would do well. Albanians are the most - or second most - convinced that their country will benefit in all aspects, except when it comes to their farmers (and still an absolute majority say they will benefit). Negative majorities are only found in Poland concerning the possible fate of their state enterprises as well as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia concerning their farmers. Belarussians, on balance, say low income groups and civil servants will lose out rather than benefit.

Of all current countries signed up for EC association, people from Hungary - along with Romania - express the least doubts concerning the benefits of closer ties with the EC.

OUR COUNTRY'S MOST IMPORTANT PARTNER IN THE FUTURE



**NB: NO CLEAR RESULT WAS OBTAINED IN GEORGIA (USA/EC/OURSELVES);
LATVIA (OTHER "WESTERN"/RUSSIA); FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF
MACEDONIA (EC/USA); ROMANIA (EC/USA); RUSSIA (SEE ABOVE)**

TEXT FIGURE 3

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

3. ISSUES FACING EUROPE

3.1 Where do countries' futures lie?

The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet Union has left many states free to choose their own futures as independent countries. The result is that countries are pursuing new links both within and outside the region for a variety of reasons - security, geographical and ethnic proximity, hoped-for financial assistance, export markets for their products and, thus, long-term economic well-being - to name but a few.

Taking the results for the region as a whole excluding European Russia¹², more than a quarter see **the future of their country most closely tied up with the EC (26%)**, almost a fifth (19%) with Russia and a sixth (17%) with the United States. Another quarter mention other possible "tie-ups": other European countries like Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland (8%), other Central and Eastern European countries (6%), Japan/South Korea (2%) and Turkey (1%)¹³. Relatively few say spontaneously that they should depend on themselves (4%) or that none of the above possibilities are suitable (1%) (Text Figure 3) (Annex Figures 60-63).

In PHARE countries, people are almost twice as likely to believe links will be closer with the EC (32%) than the United States (18%), the runner-up. Among people living in the Baltic states, links with Russia (29%) tie for first place with other European countries like Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland (28%).

The results of only 3 countries are decisive. Absolute majorities of Albanians see their future with the EC; absolute majorities of Belarussians still see theirs tied to Russia; and an absolute majority of Estonians say it lies with other European countries like Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland.

¹²As "Russia" was one of the answer categories, Russians West of the Urals were asked "other CIS countries" as a substitute. Hence, European Russia results are reported separately from the rest of the region.

¹³Six percent spontaneously named Germany. Due to a technical error, "Germany" was explicitly offered in Poland, where 16% chose it - hence the regional total for this category is somewhat overestimated.

The EC comes top in 5 other countries, all of which have agreed - or are about to conclude - Europe Agreements for EC association: the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia.

Ironically, the people in the country which has just initialled a Europe Agreement - Romania - are divided whether their country's future lies with the EC or the United States. People in Moldova are most likely to believe theirs is tied to the United States.

Russians have no clear preference either, their views being largely split between those saying it is the United States and those seeing ties evolving with other CIS countries. Ukrainians and Lithuanians see their futures mainly tied up with Russia.

People living in the Caucasian area - Armenia and Georgia - seem to have more of an independent streak. Although Russia comes top in Armenia, those Armenians spontaneously saying it should be none of them, **plus** those that declare they should depend on themselves, are more numerous. Similarly in Georgia, although preferences are more for the United States, almost as many say it should be the EC as well as that they should depend on themselves.

One of the remarkable results is how people living in PHARE countries see little future in long-term links among themselves. Despite the formation of the Visegrad Group and other inter-governmental regional bodies, only a small proportion (7%) see other Central and Eastern European countries as their major partner in the future - as few as seeing it still with Russia (7%).

3.2 Western assistance programme

Since its inception in 1989, the number of countries benefiting from the PHARE assistance programme has more than quadrupled. The annual budget for the programme has doubled from 500 million ECU in 1990 to 1040 million ECU in 1993.

The European Community also budgeted 510 million ECU to CIS countries and Georgia in 1993 under the TACIS technical assistance programme with the aim of accelerating economic reforms based on private ownership and the development of pluralistic democracy.

Nevertheless, only a quarter (25%) of Central and Eastern Europeans say they are satisfied with the amount of assistance that "western" countries have given to their country up to now. More than four out of ten (44%) say they are dissatisfied (Annex Figure 64).

People living in TACIS countries are three-to-one dissatisfied with the amount of aid (46:15), while people in PHARE countries are divided (41:40). Those in the Baltics are marginally more satisfied (39%) than dissatisfied (34%).

More than half of all Albanians, Slovenes, Romanians, Moldovans and Georgians say they are satisfied. Absolute majorities expressing dissatisfaction are found in Slovakia, Belarus and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Slovakia's complaint that the vast majority of foreign investment and assistance ended up in the Czech Lands was just one of the reasons given for their recent separation.

PHARE's reported awareness level in PHARE countries (30%) is only three-fifths of TACIS' reported awareness level in TACIS countries (50%) (Annex Figure 65).

Lowest awareness levels for PHARE are found in Poland and Hungary, the two countries that were the first recipients of funds and who even leant their names to the title of the programme. Among PHARE countries, the programme is best known in Bulgaria. Belarussians are the most numerous to have heard of TACIS.

Those who say they are aware of PHARE/TACIS were asked their interest in knowing more about it. There is marginally more interest shown in PHARE (70% "very" plus "somewhat") than TACIS (64%) countries. Greatest expressions of interest are found among Albanians, followed by Moldovans, Macedonians and Romanians (Annex Figure 66).

3.3 Fair trade

With the collapse of the former Soviet Union - and major problems with intra-CIS trade - Central and Eastern Europe as a whole has substantially increased its proportion of trade with the EC. In spite of growing disparities between countries, the overall trade balance in 1992 appears to be generally equilibrated between the EC and Central and Eastern European countries outside the CIS.

Asked whether important trading partners are seen to be "fair" or "unfair" little differences are discernable concerning the EC (29% "fair", 20% unfair"), the United States (30:21) and Japan (29:17). But people (excluding Russian opinion for obvious reasons) are two-to-one (20:39) of the view that Russia is unfair in trade with their country. Russians themselves are even more numerous in thinking other CIS countries unfair (8:41) (Annex Figures 67-70).

Lithuanians are the most likely to feel the EC, United States and Japan are fair, as well as feeling the most often that Russia is unfair. An absolute majority of Macedonians and a relative majority of Armenians think the EC unfair, while Poles and Slovaks are divided on the issue.

As trade takes off with the EC, more people in PHARE countries are saying the EC is an unfair trader (-1 "fair"; +6 "unfair") compared to a year ago.

An absolute majority of Macedonians and relative majority of Bulgarians think Russia is a fair trader. While Hungarians and Albanians are divided, all other countries have majorities saying Russia is unfair, especially those living in the Baltic states (13:54).

Half of all Central and Eastern Europeans (50%) say they are aware of EC trade issues concerning their country, and how their country's enterprises might benefit from them. Awareness levels are not very different between TACIS (52%) and PHARE (47%) countries. More than six out of ten Belarussians, Bulgarians and Russians say they are aware of these issues (Annex Figure 71).

Most interest among those who have heard about these issues can be found in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, whose trade is severely affected by the international community's sanctions imposed on Serbia (Annex Figure 72).

3.4 Emigration to Western Europe

As the Single Market came into being, EC interior ministers expressed their concern about possible increases in immigration from third countries by delaying the opening of the EC's internal frontiers. The arrival of 600,000 people from former Yugoslavia in Western Europe - among many others from Eastern Europe and North Africa - has led to an increase in xenophobia in Western Europe.

Three out of ten (29%) of all those interviewed in Eastern Europe say they have **seriously considered going to work in a Western European country**. Most (68%) have not considered. 1% say spontaneously they have already worked there (Annex Figure 73).

Asked how **likely it is that they might move to Western Europe to live and work**, only 1.2% say they would definitely go, while another 6.1% of those who have considered say they would probably go. This translates into around 2.7 million "definites" or about 16.7 million "definites" **plus** "probables" (Annex Figure 74).

Almost as many in TACIS (28%) as PHARE (30%) countries consider going. The same is true about their more concrete intentions to live and work in Western Europe (8% and 10% respectively).

Apart from Albania, Armenia and Georgia, where results have to be interpreted with utmost caution, the highest percentage of those "definitely going" is in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (5%)¹⁴. The sum of those who are definite about going **plus** those who say they will probably go varies from 22% in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to 4% in Hungary.

The highest percentages for those who spontaneously say they have already worked in Western Europe are found in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (5%) and Poland (4%).

¹⁴Due to technical error, the Moldovan result is not available. Thus both regional and TACIS results exclude it (the weight of Moldova in TACIS countries is 1.76%. In the total of the entire region surveyed, it is 1.12%).

3.5 The break-up of Yugoslavia and other States

On New Year's Day 1993, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. Once the Czech Republic and Slovakia are readmitted to the CSCE as separate countries, the CSCE's European membership will stand at around fifty, one and a half times what it was just two years' ago.

If the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER had had permission - and the research infrastructure had existed - to poll the region before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the survey would have been conducted in just 9 countries. Now three times as many countries cover the same geographic area, including the Central Asian Republics.

Yet the break-up of Central and Eastern Europe has had its "price". Few countries in the region have been lucky enough to have a "velvet dissolution". Bloody war is sweeping the former Republics of Yugoslavia, while separatist forces are fighting governments in many states of the former Soviet Union.

Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER asked people which of the following two viewpoints came closest to their own: that **"countries should stop breaking up because it creates too much instability in the region"** or whether **"it is up to the people of each country to decide their own future"** (Annex Figure 75).

An absolute majority of Central and Eastern Europeans (53%) believe the people should be allowed to decide this issue for themselves, but a significant minority (38%) think countries should stop breaking up. The view that people should be allowed to decide for themselves is prevalent more in PHARE (61:29) than TACIS (49:44) countries.

People in those countries which had fought hardest for their independence and achieved it (and could be surveyed) - the Baltic states (79:16) and Slovenia - are the most ardent in their belief that the people's will should count. So is Albania. Absolute majorities believe this everywhere except in the TACIS countries of Belarus, Moldova and European Russia, where the issue divides people.

The consequences of breaking up can be hard. A Russian is angry: *"Our boys go to war and lose their lives in different republics; other countries of the CIS must solve their problems by themselves."*

As war enveloped the newly-recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations (UN) sent peace-keepers and (especially the EC) large quantities of humanitarian assistance, particularly to the beleaguered city of Sarajevo. For precautionary reasons, UN observers were also sent to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to try to prevent the conflict spreading there. The EC and UN initiated mediation efforts under the joint-chairmanship of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance.

Majorities of Central and Eastern Europeans expressing an opinion believe **efforts of international bodies in trying to help resolve the conflict in former Yugoslavia have been, on the whole, rather ineffective** (Annex Figures 76-80).

By two-to-one or more, people judge that the EC (31:17), CSCE (28:14) and NATO (30:12) are not doing a good job. Although slightly more are negative about the UN's performance (33%), its positive ratings are proportionately higher (23%). Around a tenth (11-12%) in each case say spontaneously that their work is neither effective nor ineffective. While people from TACIS and PHARE countries agree about the relative ineffectiveness of the EC, CSCE and NATO, people from TACIS countries are divided (24:24) about the UN's role in this respect.

Relative majorities of Georgians - embroiled in their own war in separatist Abkhazia and knowing all about the difficulties of finding a durable solution - are the only ones to say the efforts of all these international bodies in former Yugoslavia are effective. Moldovans - at the Transnistria battlefield - also on balance think the UN's role in former Yugoslavia effective but are divided about the EC's involvement. Romanians' views are also split about all these international bodies - similarly the Ukrainians and Russians about the UN specifically.

Highest scores for ineffectiveness for all of them come from people living in countries adjoining the fighting - the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia and Albania - plus those whose countries had first signed Europe Agreements - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER ventured into Croatia and Serbia¹⁵ to ask a few questions about people's general attitudes towards the EC and the conflict raging in former Yugoslavia. Because of the difficult situation in Kosovo, coupled with the devastation of much of eastern Croatia - now under UN supervision - not all areas could be covered by the survey. Nevertheless, the message of the results is very clear.

It can come as no surprise - given the interests of both states in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina - that attitudes are among the most extreme found in Central and Eastern Europe on many measures.

Croatians are overwhelmingly in favour of leaving it up to people to decide whether states should break up, more so than in any other country. Serbs are also more than two-thirds in favour (Annex Figures 81-84).

Croatia joins other former Yugoslav Republics - Macedonia and Slovenia - in having the highest proportion of people aware of the EC. Almost half of all Serbs have a negative impression of the EC, the harshest view of all Central and Eastern Europeans. Croats' impression of the EC is on balance more positive than negative.


Serbs are the most numerous of all in dismissing the impact of international interventions in former Yugoslavia (only 2%-6% "effective"), along with most Croats.

¹⁵ The survey in Croatia was conducted face-to-face with 1000 persons, 11th - 30th November 1992. 1,264 persons were interviewed similarly in Serbia during the period 20th - 27th November 1992.

NOTES ON ANNEX FIGURES

- * All numbers portrayed in the graphics are percentages.
- * Respondents who gave no answer to a question or who answered "don't know" are not shown.
- * For some questions, respondents were allowed to give more than one answer. In these cases, the total answers are often more than 100 per cent. All questions where multiple answers were permissible are clearly labelled.
- * Where more than one positive or negative answer is possible, the responses are often combined.
- * Totals for the entire region surveyed ("Region Total") are weighted by population size for each country. European Russia has the largest weight (38.56%).
- * The title of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is shortened to (Macedonia).
- * EC totals (weighted by population aged 15 or over per country) are shown for some graphics for comparison purposes.
- * Results for Albania, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova should be interpreted with utmost caution, given the conditions under which the survey took place there.

DIRECTION OF COUNTRY - RIGHT OR WRONG ?/ EVOLUTION DU PAYS - BONNE OU MAUVAISE VOIE





*Q. IN GENERAL, DO YOU FEEL THINGS IN (OUR COUNTRY) ARE GOING IN THE
RIGHT OR IN THE WRONG DIRECTION ?/*

*EN GENERAL, ESTIMEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION DANS (NOTRE PAYS) EVOLUE
DANS UNE BONNE OU DANS UNE MAUVAISE VOIE ?*

ANNEX FIGURE 1

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP



ECONOMIC SITUATION - PAST 12 MONTHS/ SITUATION ECONOMIQUE - LES 12 DERNIERS MOIS



Q. COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, DO YOU THINK THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN (OUR COUNTRY) HAS GOT A LOT BETTER, GOT A LITTLE BETTER, STAYED THE SAME, GOT A LITTLE WORSE OR GOT A LOT WORSE ?/

PAR RAPPORT A CE QU'ELLE ETAIT IL Y A 12 MOIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION ECONOMIQUE GENERALE DE (NOTRE PAYS) EST ACTUELLEMENT BIEN MEILLEURE, UN PEU MEILLEURE, INCHANGÉE, UN PEU MOINS BONNE OU BIEN MOINS BONNE ?

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - PAST 12 MONTHS* / FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 DERNIERS MOIS*





*ALBANIA EXCLUDED/ALBANIE EXCLUE

Q. COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, DO YOU THINK THAT THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAS GOT A LOT BETTER, GOT A LITTLE BETTER, STAYED THE SAME, GOT A LITTLE WORSE OR GOT A LOT WORSE ?/

PAR RAPPORT A CE QU'ELLE ETAIT IL Y A 12 MOIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION FINANCIERE DE VOTRE MENAGE EST ACTUELLEMENT BIEN MEILLEURE, UN PEU MEILLEURE, INCHANGE, UN PEU MOINS BONNE OU BIEN MOINS BONNE ?

ECONOMIC SITUATION - NEXT 12 MONTHS SITUATION ECONOMIQUE - LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS





Q. AND OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS, DO YOU THINK THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN (OUR COUNTRY) WILL GET A LOT BETTER, GET A LITTLE BETTER, STAY THE SAME, GET A LITTLE WORSE OR GET A LOT WORSE ?/

ET DANS LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION ECONOMIQUE GENERALE DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERA BIEN MEILLEURE, UN PEU MEILLEURE, INCHANGÉE, UN PEU MOINS BONNE OU BIEN MOINS BONNE ?

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - NEXT 12 MONTHS*

FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS*




*ALBANIA EXCLUDED/ALBANIE EXCLUE

Q. AND OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS, DO YOU EXPECT THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD WILL GET A LOT BETTER, GET A LITTLE BETTER, STAY THE SAME, GET A LITTLE WORSE OR GET A LOT WORSE ?/

ET DANS LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION FINANCIERE DE VOTRE MENAGE SERA BIEN MEILLEURE, UN PEU MEILLEURE, INCHANGE, UN PEU MOINS BONNE OU BIEN MOINS BONNE ?

MARKET ECONOMY - RIGHT OR WRONG ?/ ECONOMIE DE MARCHÉ - BONNE OU MAUVAISE ?



Q. DO YOU PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THE CREATION OF A FREE MARKET ECONOMY, THAT IS ONE LARGELY FREE FROM STATE CONTROL, IS RIGHT OR WRONG FOR (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE ?/


PERSONNELLEMENT, PENSEZ VOUS QUE LA CREATION D'UNE ECONOMIE DE MARCHÉ, C'EST-A-DIRE TRÈS PEU CONTRÔLÉ PAR L'ÉTAT, SOIT UNE BONNE OU UNE MAUVAISE CHOSE POUR L'AVENIR DE (NOTRE PAYS) ?




ANNEX FIGURE 6

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

ECONOMIC REFORMS - TOO FAST OR TOO SLOW ?/ REFORMES ECONOMIQUES - TROP RAPIDES OU TROP LENTES ?

SPONT:
NO REFORMS/
PAS DE REFORMES




 TOO SLOW/TROP LENTE
 ABOUT RIGHT/JUSTE CE QU'IL FAUT
 TOO FAST/TROP RAPIDE

Q. THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING, DO YOU FEEL THAT (OUR COUNTRY'S) ECONOMIC REFORMS ARE GOING TOO FAST, TOO SLOW OR ABOUT THE RIGHT SPEED ?/

ETANT DONNE L'EVOLUTION ACTUELLE, ESTIMEZ-VOUS QUE LES REFORMES ECONOMIQUES (DANS NOTRE PAYS) PROGRESSED TROP RAPIDEMENT, TROP LENTEMENT OU COMME IL CONVIENT ?

PRIVATISATION - TOO FAST OR TOO SLOW ?/ PRIVATISATION - TROP RAPIDE OU TROP LENTE ?




TOO SLOW/TROP LENTE
 ABOUT RIGHT/JUSTE CE QU'IL FAUT
 TOO FAST/TROP RAPIDE

Q. DO YOU THINK THE PROCESS OF PRIVATISING (OUR COUNTRY'S) STATE ENTERPRISES IS GOING TOO FAST, TOO SLOW OR ABOUT THE RIGHT SPEED ?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE PROCESSUS DE PRIVATISATION DES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES (DE NOTRE PAYS) PROGRESSED TROP RAPIDEMENT, TROP LENTEMENT OU COMME IL CONVIENT ?

CITIZENSHIP/CITOYENNETE

ENTITLED/QUALITE



Q. ARE YOU, OR ARE YOU NOT ENTITLED TO BE A CITIZEN OF (OUR COUNTRY)?/


AVEZ-VOUS OU N'AVEZ-VOUS PAS LA QUALITE DE CITOYEN DE (NOTRE PAYS) ?

ANNEX FIGURE 9

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

INTENTION TO VOTE IN GENERAL ELECTION/ INTENTIONS DE VOTE AUX ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES


WOULD VOTE/VOTERAIT



Q. IF THERE WERE A "GENERAL ELECTION" TODAY (SAY IF CONTACT UNDER VOTING AGE OR NOT ALLOWED TO VOTE "AND YOU HAD A VOTE"), WOULD YOU GO AND VOTE IN THE NEXT "GENERAL ELECTION" ?/

S'IL Y AVAIT DES "ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES" AUJOURD'HUI (SI LA PERSONNE N'EST PAS EN AGE DE VOTER OU N'A PAS LE DROIT DE VOTE, DITES "ET SI VOUS POUVIEZ VOTER), IRIEZ-VOUS VOTER LORS DES PROCHAINES "ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES" ?


SATISFACTION WITH DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY/ SATISFACTION AVEC LA DEMOCRATISATION



Q. ON THE WHOLE, ARE YOU VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED OR NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS DEVELOPING IN (OUR COUNTRY) ?/

DANS L'ENSEMBLE, ETES-VOUS TRES SATISFAIT, PLUTOT SATISFAIT, PLUTOT PAS SATISFAIT OU PAS DU TOUT SATISFAIT DE LA FACON DONT LA DEMOCRATIE S'INSTALLE DANS (NOTRE PAYS) ?

LIKELIHOOD OF NON-DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP WITHIN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS* / PROBABILITE D'AVOIR UNE DICTATURE NON DEMOCRATIQUE DANS LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS*




*ALBANIA EXCLUDED/ALBANIE EXCLUE

**Q. HOW LIKELY DO YOU THINK IT IS, IF AT ALL, THAT A NON-DEMOCRATIC
DICTATORSHIP WILL EXIST IN (OUR COUNTRY) WITHIN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS ?
DO YOU THINK IT IS VERY LIKELY, QUITE LIKELY, QUITE UNLIKELY OR VERY
UNLIKELY (SPONTANEOUS: ALREADY A DICTATORSHIP)./**

**SELON VOUS, QUELLE EST LA PROBABILITE QU'UNE DICTATURE NON
DEMOCRATIQUE EXISTE EVENTUELLEMENT DANS (NOTRE PAYS) ENDEANS LES
DOUZE PROCHAINS MOIS ? PENSEZ-VOUS QUE C'EST TRES PROBABLE, ASSEZ
PROBABLE, ASSEZ IMPROBABLE OU TRES IMPROBABLE (SPONTANE : IL S'AGIT
DEJA D'UNE DICTATURE) ?**


POLITICAL SYSTEM - THINGS FOR YOU BETTER NOW, OR BEFORE ?/ REGIME POLITIQUE - SITUATION POUR VOUS MEILLEURE MAINTENANT OU AVANT ?



**Q. TAKING EVERYTHING INTO ACCOUNT, DO YOU FEEL THINGS ARE BETTER
FOR YOU NOW UNDER THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM OR DO YOU THINK
THINGS WERE BETTER FOR YOU BEFORE UNDER THE PREVIOUS POLITICAL
SYSTEM (SPONTANEOUS : NEITHER) ?/**

**EN PRENANT TOUT EN CONSIDERATION, ESTIMEZ-VOUS QUE LES CHOSES SONT
MEILLEURES POUR VOUS MAINTENANT, SOUS LE REGIME POLITIQUE ACTUEL,
OU PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES CHOSES ETAIENT MEILLEURES AVANT, SOUS LE
PRECEDENT REGIME POLITIQUE (SPONTANE : SOUS AUCUN DES DEUX) ?**

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS RESPECT DES DROITS DE L'HOMME




*Q. HOW MUCH RESPECT IS THERE FOR INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS NOWADAYS
IN (OUR COUNTRY) ? DO YOU FEEL THERE IS A LOT OF RESPECT FOR
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS, SOME RESPECT, NOT MUCH RESPECT OR NO
RESPECT AT ALL?/*

*COMMENT RESPECTE-T-ON LES DROITS DE L'HOMME ACTUELLEMENT (DANS
NOTRE PAYS) ? ESTIMEZ-VOUS QU'IL Y A BEAUCOUP DE RESPECT POUR LES
DROITS DE L'HOMME, UN PEU DE RESPECT, PAS BEAUCOUP DE RESPECT OU
PAS DE RESPECT DU TOUT ?*

HOW ARE HUMAN RIGHTS RESPECTED ?/ COMMENT LES DROITS DE L'HOMME SONT RESPECTES ?

REGION



**ASKED ONLY OF THOSE WHO SAID THERE WAS "A LOT OF" OR "SOME" RESPECT. MULTIPLE ANSWERS PERMITTED. TOTAL CAN EXCEED 100%./
POSE UNIQUEMENT A CEUX AYANT DECLARE QU'IL Y AVAIT "BEAUCOUP DE RESPECT" OU "UN PEU DE RESPECT".**

REPONSES MULTIPLES PERMISES. TOTAL PEUT ETRE SUPERIEUR A 100%.

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS FOR SAYING THAT THERE IS (ANSWER AT AF 14) NOWADAYS IN (OUR COUNTRY) ? AND ARE THERE ANY OTHER REASONS ?/

QUELLES SONT LES RAISONS QUI VOUS FONT DIRE QU'IL Y A (REPONSE A AF 14) ACTUELLEMENT DANS (NOTRE PAYS) ? ET Y A-T-IL D'AUTRES RAISONS ?
ANNEX FIGURE 15

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

HOW ARE HUMAN RIGHTS DISRESPECTED ?/ COMMENT LES DROITS DE L'HOMME NE SONT PAS RESPECTES ?



**ASKED ONLY OF THOSE WHO SAID THERE WAS "NOT MUCH" OR "NO RESPECT AT ALL". MULTIPLE ANSWERS PERMITTED. TOTAL EXCEEDS 100%./
POSE UNIQUEMENT A CEUX AYANT DECLARE QU'IL N'Y AVAIT "PAS BEAUCOUP DE RESPECT" OU "PAS DE RESPECT DU TOUT".
REPONSES MULTIPLES PERMISES. TOTAL SUPERIEUR A 100%.**

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS FOR SAYING THAT THERE IS (ANSWER AT AF 14) NOWADAYS IN (OUR COUNTRY) ? AND ARE THERE ANY OTHER REASONS ?/


QUELLES SONT LES RAISONS QUI VOUS FONT DIRE QU'IL N'Y A (REPONSE A AF 14) ACTUELLEMENT DANS (NOTRE PAYS) ? ET Y A-T-IL D'AUTRES RAISONS ?

ANNEX FIGURE 16

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

TOP REASON HOW HUMAN RIGHTS DISRESPECTED/ RAISON PRINCIPALE POUR LAQUELLE LES DROITS DE L'HOMME NE SONT PAS RESPECTES

RESPONSE ITEM: "ECONOMIC HARDSHIP"
REPOSE: "DIFFICULTES ECONOMIQUES"




**ASKED ONLY OF THOSE WHO SAID THERE WAS "NOT MUCH" OR "NO RESPECT
AT ALL". MULTIPLE ANSWERS PERMITTED. TOTAL EXCEEDS 100%./
POSE UNIQUEMENT A CEUX AYANT DECLARE QU'IL N'Y AVAIT "PAS BEAUCOUP
DE RESPECT" OU "PAS DE RESPECT DU TOUT".
REPOSES MULTIPLES PERMISES. TOTAL SUPERIEUR A 100%.**

Q. QUESTION WORDING: SEE ANNEX FIGURE 16/

LIBELLE QUESTION: CF. ANNEX FIGURE 16

SITUATION CONCERNING MINORITY RIGHTS AS JUDGED BY ETHNIC MINORITIES/ SITUATION EN MATIERE DE DROITS DES MINORITES, VUE PAR LES MINORITES ETHNIQUES




**(NB: ONLY COUNTRIES WHERE OVER 10% OF THE POPULATION ARE ETHNIC MINORITIES - RESULTS FOR MINORITIES ONLY/
UNIQUEMENT DANS LES PAYS OU LES MINORITES ETHNIQUES CONSTITUENT PLUS DE 10% DE LA POPULATION - RESULTATS POUR LES MINORITES UNIQUEMENT)**

Q. DO YOU FEEL DISADVANTAGED, OR NOT DISADVANTAGED IN (OUR COUNTRY) BECAUSE OF YOUR NATIONALITY/ETHNIC BACKGROUND ?/

VOUS SENTEZ-VOUS DESAVANTAGE OU PAS DESAVANTAGE DANS (NOTRE PAYS) DU FAIT DE VOTRE NATIONALITE/ORIGINE ETHNIQUE ?


TRUST IN THE MEDIA/ CONFIANCE DANS LES MEDIAS



Q. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN TV, RADIO AND NEWSPAPERS REPORTING OF NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS. FOR EACH CATEGORY I READ OUT, PLEASE TELL ME HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN ITS NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS COVERAGE ... VERY MUCH TRUST, A FAIR AMOUNT OF TRUST, NOT VERY MUCH TRUST OR NO TRUST AT ALL./

J'AIMERAIS SAVOIR DANS QUELLE MESURE VOUS FAITES CONFIANCE AUX NOUVELLES ET AUX ACTUALITES QUE RAPPORTENT LA TV, LA RADIO ET LES JOURNAUX. POUR CHACUNE DES CATEGORIES QUE JE VAIS VOUS LIRE, VEUILLEZ ME DIRE QUEL DEGRE DE CONFIANCE VOUS ACCORDEZ A LEUR FACON DE COUVRIR LES NOUVELLES ET LES ACTUALITES ... FORT CONFIANCE, ASSEZ CONFIANCE, PAS FORT CONFIANCE OU PAS CONFIANCE DU TOUT.

TRUST IN OUR COUNTRY'S TELEVISION/ CONFIANCE DANS LA TELEVISION DE NOTRE PAYS




Q. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN TV, RADIO AND NEWSPAPER REPORTING OF NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS. FOR EACH CATEGORY I READ OUT, PLEASE TELL ME HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN ITS NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS COVERAGE ... VERY MUCH TRUST, A FAIR AMOUNT OF TRUST, NOT VERY MUCH TRUST OR NO TRUST AT ALL./

J'AIMERAIS SAVOIR DANS QUELLE MESURE VOUS FAITES CONFIANCE AUX NOUVELLES ET AUX ACTUALITES QUE RAPPORTENT LA TV, LA RADIO ET LES JOURNAUX. POUR CHACUNE DES CATEGORIES QUE JE VAIS VOUS LIRE, VEUILLEZ ME DIRE QUEL DEGRE DE CONFIANCE VOUS ACCORDEZ A LEUR FACON DE COUVRIR LES NOUVELLES ET LES ACTUALITES ... FORT CONFIANCE, ASSEZ CONFIANCE, PAS FORT CONFIANCE OU PAS CONFIANCE DU TOUT.

ANNEX FIGURE 20

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

TRUST IN "WESTERN" TELEVISION/ CONFIANCE DANS LA TELEVISION OCCIDENTALE




Q. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN TV, RADIO AND NEWSPAPER REPORTING OF NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS. FOR EACH CATEGORY I READ OUT, PLEASE TELL ME HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN ITS NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS COVERAGE ... VERY MUCH TRUST, A FAIR AMOUNT OF TRUST, NOT VERY MUCH TRUST OR NO TRUST AT ALL./

J'AIMERAIS SAVOIR DANS QUELLE MESURE VOUS FAITES CONFIANCE AUX NOUVELLES ET AUX ACTUALITES QUE RAPPORTENT LA TV, LA RADIO ET LES JOURNAUX. POUR CHACUNE DES CATEGORIES QUE JE VAIS VOUS LIRE, VEUILLEZ ME DIRE QUEL DEGRE DE CONFIANCE VOUS ACCORDEZ A LEUR FACON DE COUVRIR LES NOUVELLES ET LES ACTUALITES ... FORT CONFIANCE, ASSEZ CONFIANCE, PAS FORT CONFIANCE OU PAS CONFIANCE DU TOUT.

ANNEX FIGURE 21

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

TRUST IN OUR COUNTRY'S RADIO/ CONFIANCE DANS LA RADIO DE NOTRE PAYS




Q. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN TV, RADIO AND NEWSPAPER REPORTING OF NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS. FOR EACH CATEGORY I READ OUT, PLEASE TELL ME HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN ITS NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS COVERAGE ... VERY MUCH TRUST, A FAIR AMOUNT OF TRUST, NOT VERY MUCH TRUST OR NO TRUST AT ALL./

J'AIMERAIS SAVOIR DANS QUELLE MESURE VOUS FAITES CONFIANCE AUX NOUVELLES ET AUX ACTUALITES QUE RAPPORTENT LA TV, LA RADIO ET LES JOURNAUX. POUR CHACUNE DES CATEGORIES QUE JE VAIS VOUS LIRE, VEUILLEZ ME DIRE QUEL DEGRE DE CONFIANCE VOUS ACCORDEZ A LEUR FACON DE COUVRIR LES NOUVELLES ET LES ACTUALITES ... FORT CONFIANCE, ASSEZ CONFIANCE, PAS FORT CONFIANCE OU PAS CONFIANCE DU TOUT.

ANNEX FIGURE 22

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

TRUST IN "WESTERN" RADIO/ CONFIANCE DANS LA RADIO "OCCIDENTALE"




Q. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN TV, RADIO AND NEWSPAPER REPORTING OF NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS. FOR EACH CATEGORY I READ OUT, PLEASE TELL ME HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN ITS NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS COVERAGE ... VERY MUCH TRUST, A FAIR AMOUNT OF TRUST, NOT VERY MUCH TRUST OR NO TRUST AT ALL./

J'AIMERAIS SAVOIR DANS QUELLE MESURE VOUS FAITES CONFIANCE AUX NOUVELLES ET AUX ACTUALITES QUE RAPPORTENT LA TV, LA RADIO ET LES JOURNAUX. POUR CHACUNE DES CATEGORIES QUE JE VAIS VOUS LIRE, VEUILLEZ ME DIRE QUEL DEGRE DE CONFIANCE VOUS ACCORDEZ A LEUR FACON DE COUVRIR LES NOUVELLES ET LES ACTUALITES ... FORT CONFIANCE, ASSEZ CONFIANCE, PAS FORT CONFIANCE OU PAS CONFIANCE DU TOUT.

ANNEX FIGURE 23

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

TRUST IN OUR COUNTRY'S NEWSPAPERS/ CONFIANCE DANS LA PRESSE DE NOTRE PAYS




Q. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN TV, RADIO AND NEWSPAPER REPORTING OF NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS. FOR EACH CATEGORY I READ OUT, PLEASE TELL ME HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN ITS NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS COVERAGE ... VERY MUCH TRUST, A FAIR AMOUNT OF TRUST, NOT VERY MUCH TRUST OR NO TRUST AT ALL./

J'AIMERAIS SAVOIR DANS QUELLE MESURE VOUS FAITES CONFIANCE AUX NOUVELLES ET AUX ACTUALITES QUE RAPPORTENT LA TV, LA RADIO ET LES JOURNAUX. POUR CHACUNE DES CATEGORIES QUE JE VAIS VOUS LIRE, VEUILLEZ ME DIRE QUEL DEGRE DE CONFIANCE VOUS ACCORDEZ A LEUR FACON DE COUVRIR LES NOUVELLES ET LES ACTUALITES ... FORT CONFIANCE, ASSEZ CONFIANCE, PAS FORT CONFIANCE OU PAS CONFIANCE DU TOUT.

ANNEX FIGURE 24

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP


TRUST IN OUR COUNTRY'S MAGAZINES/ CONFIANCE DANS LES MAGAZINES DE NOTRE PAYS



Q. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN TV, RADIO AND NEWSPAPER REPORTING OF NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS. FOR EACH CATEGORY I READ OUT, PLEASE TELL ME HOW MUCH TRUST YOU HAVE IN ITS NEWS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS COVERAGE ... VERY MUCH TRUST, A FAIR AMOUNT OF TRUST, NOT VERY MUCH TRUST OR NO TRUST AT ALL./

J'AIMERAIS SAVOIR DANS QUELLE MESURE VOUS FAITES CONFIANCE AUX NOUVELLES ET AUX ACTUALITES QUE RAPPORTENT LA TV, LA RADIO ET LES JOURNAUX. POUR CHACUNE DES CATEGORIES QUE JE VAIS VOUS LIRE, VEUILLEZ ME DIRE QUEL DEGRE DE CONFIANCE VOUS ACCORDEZ A LEUR FACON DE COUVRIR LES NOUVELLES ET LES ACTUALITES ... FORT CONFIANCE, ASSEZ CONFIANCE, PAS FORT CONFIANCE OU PAS CONFIANCE DU TOUT.


FOR STATE CONTROL OF TV AND RADIO ?/ CONTROLE DE L'ETAT SUR LA TV ET LA RADIO ?



Q. HOW MUCH CONTROL, IF ANY, DO YOU FEEL THE STATE SHOULD HAVE OVER THE FOLLOWING: RADIO AND TELEVISION IN (OUR COUNTRY) ? DO YOU THINK THE STATE SHOULD HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF CONTROL, A FAIR AMOUNT OF CONTROL, NOT VERY MUCH CONTROL OR NO CONTROL AT ALL ?/

DANS QUELLE MESURE, SI VOUS JUGEZ QU'IL DOIT LE FAIRE, TROUVEZ-VOUS QUE L'ETAT DEVRAIT EXERCER UN CONTROLE SUR : LA RADIO ET LA TELEVISION DANS (NOTRE PAYS) ? TROUVEZ-VOUS QUE L'ETAT DEVRAIT EXERCER BEAUCOUP DE CONTROLE, ASSEZ DE CONTROLE, PAS BEAUCOUP DE CONTROLE OU AUCUN CONTROLE ?


FOR STATE CONTROL OF THE PRESS ?/ CONTROLE DE L'ETAT SUR LA PRESSE ?






Q. HOW MUCH CONTROL, IF ANY, DO YOU FEEL THE STATE SHOULD HAVE OVER THE FOLLOWING: PRESS IN (OUR COUNTRY) ? DO YOU THINK THE STATE SHOULD HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF CONTROL, A FAIR AMOUNT OF CONTROL, NOT VERY MUCH CONTROL OR NO CONTROL AT ALL ?/

DANS QUELLE MESURE, SI VOUS JUGEZ QU'IL DOIT LE FAIRE, TROUVEZ-VOUS QUE L'ETAT DEVRAIT EXERCER UN CONTROLE SUR : LA PRESSE DANS (NOTRE PAYS) ? TROUVEZ-VOUS QUE L'ETAT DEVRAIT EXERCER BEAUCOUP DE CONTROLE, ASSEZ DE CONTROLE, PAS BEAUCOUP DE CONTROLE OU AUCUN CONTROLE ?

FREQUENCY OF THINKING ONESELF EUROPEAN/ FREQUENCE DU SENTIMENT D'ETRE EUROPEEN




 OFTEN/SOUVENT
 SOMETIMES/QUELQUESFOIS
 NEVER/JAMAIS

Q. DO YOU EVER THINK OF YOURSELF AS NOT ONLY A (YOUR NATIONALITY/ETHNIC BACKGROUND) BUT ALSO A EUROPEAN ? DOES THIS HAPPEN OFTEN, SOMETIMES OR NEVER ?/

VOUS ARRIVE-T-IL DE PENSER QUE VOUS ETES NON SEULEMENT UN (VOTRE NATIONALITE/ORIGINE ETHNIQUE), MAIS AUSSI UN EUROPEEN ? CECI VOUS ARRIVE-T-IL SOUVENT, QUELQUEFOIS OU JAMAIS ?


AWARENESS OF THE EC/ NOTORIETE DE LA CE



Q. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TELL ME WHETHER YOU HAVE, OR HAVE NOT HEARD OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ALSO KNOWN AS THE "EC" OR "COMMON MARKET" ?/

J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS AVEZ OU NON ENTENDU PARLER DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, AUSSI CONNUE SOUS LE NOM DE "CE" OU DE "MARCHE COMMUN" ?


AWARENESS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE/ NOTORIETE DE LA CONFERENCE SUR LA SECURITE ET LA COOPERATION EN EUROPE



*Q. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TELL ME WHETHER YOU HAVE, OR HAVE NOT HEARD
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, OR
"CSCE"./*

*J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS AVEZ OU NON ENTENDU PARLER DE
LA CONFERENCE SUR LA SECURITE ET LA COOPERATION EN EUROPE, OU
"CSCE"*



AWARENESS OF EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT/ NOTORIETE DE LA BANQUE EUROPEENNE POUR LA RECONSTRUCTION ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT



*Q. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TELL ME WHETHER YOU HAVE, OR HAVE NOT HEARD
OF THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, OR
"EBRD"./ SITE*

*J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS AVEZ OU NON ENTENDU PARLER DE
LA BANQUE EUROPEENNE POUR LA RECONSTRUCTION ET LE DEVELOPPEMENT
OU "BERD".*


IMAGE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ IMAGE DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE



Q. AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, 12 STATES OF "WESTERN" EUROPE FORM TOGETHER THE "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY". WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE AIMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE, NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE ?/

COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ SANS DOUTE, 12 ETATS D'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE FORMENT LA "COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE". DIRIEZ-VOUS QUE VOS IMPRESSIONS QUANT AUX BUTS ET ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE SONT EN GENERAL POSITIVES, NEUTRES OU NEGATIVES ?

INTEREST IN EC AFFAIRS/ INTERET POUR LES AFFAIRES DE LA CE



Q. HOW INTERESTED WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ? ARE YOU INTERESTED A GREAT DEAL, TO SOME EXTENT, NOT VERY MUCH OR NOT AT ALL ?/


A QUEL POINT ETES-VOUS INTERESSE PAR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ? ETES-VOUS TRES INTERESSE, ASSEZ INTERESSE, PAS TRES INTERESSE OU PAS DU TOUT INTERESSE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 33

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

EC GENERAL KNOWLEDGE QUESTION/ QUESTION SUR LA CONNAISSANCE GENERALE DE LA CE


CORRECT/CORRECTE



Q. DO YOU HAPPEN TO KNOW IN WHICH CITY OR CITIES THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ARE LOCATED ? (IF YES) IN WHICH CITY OR CITIES ? - (CORRECT: BRUSSELS AND/OR STRASBOURG AND/OR LUXEMBOURG, AND NO OTHER CITY)/

SAVEZ-VOUS EVENTUELLEMENT DANS QUELLE(S) VILLE(S) SE SITUE(NT) LES INSTITUTIONS LES PLUS IMPORTANTES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ? (SI OUI) DANS QUELLE(S) VILLE(S) ? - (CORRECT: BRUXELLES ET/OU STRASBOURG ET/OU LUXEMBOURG, ET AUCUNE AUTRE VILLE)

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC*/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE*




***ARMENIA EXCLUDED/ARMENIE EXCLUE**

Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE




Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE


CZECH REPUBLIC ESTONIA



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?


INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE




Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE


(MACEDONIA) MOLDOVA



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?


INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?


INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?


INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EC/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA CE



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS ET DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS ET SA POLITIQUE ?


AWARENESS OF "EUROPE AGREEMENTS"/ **NOTORIETE DES "ACCORDS EUROPEENS"**



Q. PLEASE TELL ME WHETHER YOU HAVE OR HAVE NOT HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT "EUROPE AGREEMENTS" FOR CLOSER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL TIES AGREED - OR CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION - BETWEEN THE EC AND BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, POLAND AND ROMANIA ?/

J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS AVEZ OU NON ENTENDU PARLER DES "ACCORDS EUROPEENS" QUI VISENT UN LIEN POLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE ET CULTUREL PLUS ETROIT ET QUI ONT ETE CONCLUS - OU QUI SONT EN COURS DE NEGOCIATION - ENTRE LA CE ET LA BULGARIE, LA TCHECOSLOVAQUIE, LA HONGRIE, LA POLOGNE ET LA ROUMANIE ?

INTEREST IN KNOWING MORE ABOUT "EUROPE AGREEMENTS"*/ INTERET D'EN SAVOIR DAVANTAGE SUR LES "ACCORDS EUROPEENS"*



VERY INTEREST./
TRES INTERESSE
 SOMEWHAT INTEREST./
ASSEZ INTERESSE
 NOT REALLY INTEREST./
PAS VRAIMENT INTERESSE

*ASKED ONLY OF THOSE AWARE/POSE SEULEMENT A CEUX QUI SONT CONSCIENT DE ...

Q. PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED, SOMEWHAT INTERESTED OR NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN KNOWING MORE ABOUT "EUROPE AGREEMENTS" FOR CLOSER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL TIES AGREED - OR CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION - BETWEEN THE EC AND BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, POLAND AND ROMANIA ?/

J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS SERIEZ TRES INTERESSE, ASSEZ INTERESSE OU PAS VRAIMENT INTERESSE D'EN SAVOIR DAVANTAGE SUR LES "ACCORDS EUROPEENS" QUI VISENT UN LIEN POLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE ET CULTUREL PLUS ETROIT ET QUI ONT ETE CONCLUS - OU QUI SONT EN COURS DE NEGOCIATION - ENTRE LA CE ET LA BULGARIE, LA TCHECOSLOVAQUIE, LA HONGRIE, LA POLOGNE ET LA ROUMANIE ?

SUPPORT FOR "EUROPE AGREEMENTS"/ APPUI AUX "ACCORDS EUROPEENS"



Q. IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER YOU HAVE HEARD ABOUT IT OR NOT, ARE YOU IN FAVOUR OF, OR AGAINST, THIS KIND OF ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP "EUROPE AGREEMENT" BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND (OUR COUNTRY) ?/

INDEPENDEMMENT DU FAIT QUE VOUS EN AYEZ OU NON ENTENDU PARLER, ETES-VOUS FAVORABLE OU DEFAVORABLE A CES "ACCORDS EUROPEENS" ENTRE LA CE ET (NOTRE PAYS), QUI PREVOIENT UN STATUT DE TYPE "MEMBRE ASSOCIE" ?



SUPPORT FOR EC MEMBERSHIP/ APPUI A L'APPARTENANCE A LA CE



Q. IF (OUR COUNTRY) WERE TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS A FULL MEMBER IN THE FUTURE, WOULD YOU FEEL STRONGLY IN FAVOUR, SOMEWHAT IN FAVOUR, SOMEWHAT OPPOSED OR STRONGLY OPPOSED ?/

SI, DANS LE FUTUR, (NOTRE PAYS) DEVAIT JOINDRE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, EN TANT QUE MEMBRE A PART ENTIERE, Y SERIEZ-VOUS TRES FAVORABLE, PLUTOT FAVORABLE, PLUTOT OPPOSE OU TRES OPPOSE ?

EC MEMBERSHIP: WHEN ?/ APPARTENANCE A LA CE: QUAND ?



Q. WHEN, IF EVER, DO YOU THINK (OUR COUNTRY) SHOULD BECOME A FULL MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ? SHOULD IT BECOME A MEMBER NOW, IN 5 YEARS' TIME, IN 10 YEARS' TIME, LATER OR NEVER ?/

QUAND, SI JAMAIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE (NOTRE PAYS) DEVRAIT DEVENIR MEMBRE A PART ENTIERE DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ? DEVRAIT-IL DEVENIR MEMBRE MAINTENANT, DANS 5 ANS, DANS 10 ANS, PLUS TARD OU JAMAIS ?

ADVANTAGES OF EC MEMBERSHIP/ AVANTAGES DE L'APPARTENANCE A LA CE




**MULTIPLE ANSWERS PERMITTED. TOTAL EXCEEDS 100%./
REPOSES MULTIPLIES PERMISES. TOTAL SUPERIEUR A 100%.**

Q. WHAT ADVANTAGES, IF ANY, DO YOU FEEL THERE MIGHT BE FOR (OUR COUNTRY) IF IT WERE TO BECOME A FULL MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ? ANY OTHERS ?/

QUELS AVANTAGES, S'IL Y A EN A, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE (NOTRE PAYS) POURRAIT TIRER DE SA PLEINE APPARTENANCE A LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ? Y EN A-T-IL D'AUTRES ?

DISADVANTAGES OF EC MEMBERSHIP/ DESAVANTAGES DE L'APPARTENANCE A LA CE




**MULTIPLE ANSWERS PERMITTED. TOTAL EXCEEDS 100%./
REPOSES MULTIPLIES PERMISES. TOTAL SUPERIEUR A 100%.**

**Q. WHAT DISADVANTAGES, IF ANY, DO YOU FEEL THERE MIGHT BE FOR (OUR
COUNTRY) IF IT WERE TO BECOME A FULL MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY ? ANY OTHERS ?/**

**QUELS DESAVANTAGES, S'IL Y A EN A, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE (NOTRE PAYS)
POURRAIT TIRER DE SA PLEINE APPARTENANCE A LA COMMUNAUTE
EUROPENNE ? Y EN A-T-IL D'AUTRES ?**


WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EC BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA CE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ... ?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ... ?

STATE ENTERPRISES - WINNERS OR LOSERS ?/ ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES - GAGNANTES OU PERDANTES ?



*Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN
(OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY INCREASE - STATE ENTERPRISES ?/*

*PENSEZ-VOUS QUE ... LES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES ... DE (NOTRE PAYS)
SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE
(NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ?*


PRIVATE BUSINESS - WINNER OR LOSER ?/ SECTEUR PRIVE - GAGNANT OU PERDANT ?



*Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN
(OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY INCREASE - PRIVATE BUSINESS ?/*

*PENSEZ-VOUS QUE ... LE SECTEUR PRIVE ... DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIT
SUSCEPTIBLE D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS)
ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ?*


CIVIL SERVANTS - WINNERS OR LOSERS ?/ FONCTIONNAIRES - GAGNANTS OU PERDANTS ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INCREASE - CIVIL SERVANTS ?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE ... LES FONCTIONNAIRES ... DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ?


FARMERS - WINNERS OR LOSERS ?/ AGRICULTEURS - GAGNANTS OU PERDANTS ?



**Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN
(OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY INCREASE - FARMERS ?/**

**PENSEZ-VOUS QUE ... LES AGRICULTEURS ... DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT
SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS)
ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ?**


MANUAL WORKERS - WINNERS OR LOSERS ?/ OUVRIERS MANUELS - GAGNANTS OU PERDANTS?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN
(OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY INCREASE - MANUAL WORKERS ?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE ... LES OUVRIERS MANUELS ... DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT
SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS)
ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ?

PEOPLE ON LOW INCOMES - WINNERS OR LOSERS?/ PERSONNES A REVENUS MODESTES - GAGNANTS OU PERDANTS ?




Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN
(OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY INCREASE - PEOPLE ON LOW INCOMES ?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE ... LES PERSONNES A REVENUS MODESTES ... DE (NOTRE
PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS
ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ?

ANNEX FIGURE 57

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP


EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM - WINNER OR LOSER ?/ SYSTEME D'EDUCATION - GAGNANT OU PERDANT ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN
(OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY INCREASE - EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE ... LE SYSTEME D'EDUCATION ... DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIT
SUSCEPTIBLE D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS)
ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ?

HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES - WINNERS OR LOSERS ?/ SERVICES SOCIAUX ET DE SANTE - GAGNANTS OU PERDANTS ?




Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INCREASE - HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES ?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE ... LES SERVICES SOCIAUX ET DE SANTE ... DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ?

ANNEX FIGURE 59

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?* / OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?*




(NB: ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED THROUGHOUT AF 60-63/
UNE SEULE REPONSE PERMISE POUR L'ENSEMBLE DES GRAPHIQUES AF 60-63)

*EUROPEAN RUSSIA EXCLUDED/RUSSIE EUROPEENE EXCLUE

Q. AS THINGS NOW STAND, WITH WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU
SEE (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED UP ?
... THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (SPONTANEOUS:
GERMANY)/

DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS
SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR (DE NOTRE PAYS) SOIT LE PLUS
ETROITEMENT LIE ? ... LES ETATS-UNIS, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE
(SPONT.: ALLEMAGNE)

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?* / OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?*




(NB: ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED THROUGHOUT AF 60-63/
UNE SEULE REPONSE PERMISE POUR L'ENSEMBLE DES GRAPHIQUES AF 60-63)
*EUROPEAN RUSSIA EXCLUDED/RUSSIE EUROPEENE EXCLUE

Q. AS THINGS NOW STAND, WITH WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE
(OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED UP ?
... OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LIKE AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN AND
FINLAND; OTHER CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES/

DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS
SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR (DE NOTRE PAYS) SOIT LE PLUS
ETROITEMENT LIE ?

... AUTRES PAYS EUROPEENS TELS L'AUTRICHE, LA SUISSE, LA SUEDE ET LA
FINLANDE; AUTRES PAYS D'EUROPE CENTRALE ET DE L'EST

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?*/ OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?*



**(NB: ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED THROUGHOUT AF 60-63/
UNE SEULE REPONSE PERMISE POUR L'ENSEMBLE DES GRAPHIQUES AF 60-63)**

***EUROPEAN RUSSIA EXCLUDED/RUSSIE EUROPEENE EXCLUE**

**Q. AS THINGS NOW STAND, WITH WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE
(OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED UP ?**

**... RUSSIA (FOR RUSSIA: "OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
INDEPENDENT STATES"); TURKEY/**

**DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS
SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR (DE NOTRE PAYS) SOIT LE PLUS
ETROITEMENT LIE ? ... LA RUSSIE (POUR LA RUSSIE: "AUTRES PAYS DE LA
COMMUNAUTE DES ETATS INDEPENDANTS); LA TURQUIE**

ANNEX FIGURE 62

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?*/ OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?*


| | JAPON, COREE DU SUD/ JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA | SPONT: NONE OF THESE/ AUCUN DES DEUX |
|----------------|--|--|
| ROMANIA | 4 | 2 |
| SLOVAKIA | 3 | 1 |
| BELARUS | 2 | 1 |
| POLAND | 2 | 1 |
| REGION TOTAL* | 2 | 1 |
| SLOVENIA | 2 | 0 |
| UKRAINE | 2 | 1 |
| HUNGARY | 2 | 2 |
| ALBANIA | 1 | 0 |
| BULGARIA | 1 | 0 |
| ESTONIA | 1 | 0 |
| CZECH REPUBLIC | 1 | 1 |
| LATVIA | 1 | 1 |
| MOLDOVA | 1 | 0 |
| ARMENIA | 0 | 21 |
| LITHUANIA | 0 | 0 |
| GEORGIA | 0 | 1 |
| (MACEDONIA) | 0 | 3 |

(NB: ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED THROUGHOUT AF 60-63/
UNE SEULE REPONSE PERMISE POUR L'ENSEMBLE DES GRAPHIQUES AF 60-63)
*EUROPEAN RUSSIA EXCLUDED/RUSSIE EUROPEENE EXCLUE

Q. AS THINGS NOW STAND, WITH WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE
(OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED UP ?
... JAPAN/SOUTH KOREA; (SPONTANEOUS: NONE OF THESE)/

DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS
SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR (DE NOTRE PAYS) SOIT LE PLUS
ETROITEMENT LIE ? ... LE JAPON/LA COREE DU SUD; (SPONT.: AUCUN)


SATISFACTION WITH "WESTERN" ASSISTANCE/ SATISFACTION A L'EGARD DE L'AIDE "OCCIDENTALE"



Q. WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU ARE GENERALLY VERY SATISFIED, SOMEWHAT SATISFIED, SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED OR VERY DISSATISFIED WITH THE AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE THAT "WESTERN" COUNTRIES HAVE GIVEN TO (OUR COUNTRY) UP TO NOW ?/

DIRIEZ-VOUS QUE VOUS ETES EN GENERAL TRES SATISFAIT, ASSEZ SATISFAIT, ASSEZ INSATISFAIT OU TRES INSATISFAIT DE L'AMPLEUR DE L'AIDE QUE LES PAYS OCCIDENTAUX ONT APPORTEE DANS (NOTRE PAYS) JUSQU'A PRESENT ?
ANNEX FIGURE 64 EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

AWARENESS OF "TACIS"/"PHARE" ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME/ NOTORIETE DU PROGRAMME D'AIDE "TACIS"/"PHARE"




*Q. PLEASE TELL ME WHETHER YOU HAVE OR HAVE NOT HEARD ANYTHING
ABOUT AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME - OFTEN CALLED "TACIS" ¹/"PHARE" ² -
TO (OUR COUNTRY) FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ?/*

*J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS AVEZ OU NON ENTENDU PARLER
D'UN PROGRAMME D'AIDE (A NOTRE PAYS), QUI EST SOUVENT APPELE
"TACIS" ¹ /"PHARE" ² ET QUI EST ISSU DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ?*

¹ ASKED IN CIS AND GEORGIA/POSE EN CEI ET GEORGIE

² ASKED IN ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT CIS AND GEORGIA/POSE PARTOUT SAUF EN CEI ET EN GEORGIE

INTEREST IN KNOWING MORE ABOUT "TACIS"/"PHARE" ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME* / INTERET D'EN SAVOIR DAVANTAGE SUR LE PROGRAMME D'AIDE "TACIS"/"PHARE"*



*ASKED ONLY OF THOSE AWARE/POSE SEULEMENT A CEUX QUI SONT CONSCIENT DE ...

Q. PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED, SOMEWHAT INTERESTED OR NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN KNOWING MORE ABOUT AN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME - OFTEN CALLED "TACIS"³/"PHARE"⁴ TO (OUR COUNTRY) FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ?/

J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS ETES TRES INTERESSE, ASSEZ INTERESSE OU PAS VRAIMENT INTERESSE D'EN SAVOIR DAVANTAGE AU SUJET D'UN PROGRAMME D'ASSISTANCE A (NOTRE PAYS), QUI EST SOUVENT APPELE "TACIS"³/"PHARE"⁴ ET QUI EST ISSU DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ?


³ ASKED IN CIS AND GEORGIA/POSE EN CEI ET GEORGIE

⁴ ASKED IN ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT CIS AND GEORGIA/POSE PARTOUT SAUF EN CEI ET EN GEORGIE

ANNEX FIGURE 66

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP


FAIRNESS OF TRADING PARTNERS - EC/ LOYAUTE DES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX - CE



Q. SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF (OUR COUNTRY'S) TRADING PARTNERS USE UNFAIR PRACTICES THAT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR (OUR COUNTRY) TO SELL PRODUCTS THERE. FROM WHAT YOU KNOW OR HAVE HEARD, TELL ME IF YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TRADE PARTNERS ARE FAIR OR UNFAIR TO (OUR COUNTRY) WHEN IT COMES TO TRADE - EC ?/

CERTAINES PERSONNES CROIENT QUE CERTAINS DES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX (DE NOTRE PAYS) FONT USAGE DE PRATIQUES DELOYALES QUI FONT QUE (NOTRE PAYS) A DES DIFFICULTES POUR Y VENDRE DES PRODUITS. D'APRES CE QUE VOUS SAVEZ OU AVEZ ENTENDU, DITES-MOI SI VOUS PENSEZ QUE LES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX SUIVANTS SONT LOYAUX OU DELOYAUX ENVERS (NOTRE PAYS) EN MATIERE DE COMMERCE - LA CE ?

FAIRNESS OF TRADING PARTNERS - USA/ LOYAUTE DES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX - EU




Q. SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF (OUR COUNTRY'S) TRADING PARTNERS USE UNFAIR PRACTICES THAT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR (OUR COUNTRY) TO SELL PRODUCTS THERE. FROM WHAT YOU KNOW OR HAVE HEARD, TELL ME IF YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TRADE PARTNERS ARE FAIR OR UNFAIR TO (OUR COUNTRY) WHEN IT COMES TO TRADE - USA ?/

CERTAINES PERSONNES CROIENT QUE CERTAINS DES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX (DE NOTRE PAYS) FONT USAGE DE PRATIQUES DELOYALES QUI FONT QUE (NOTRE PAYS) A DES DIFFICULTES POUR Y VENDRE DES PRODUITS. D'APRES CE QUE VOUS SAVEZ OU AVEZ ENTENDU, DITES-MOI SI VOUS PENSEZ QUE LES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX SUIVANTS SONT LOYAUX OU DELOYAUX ENVERS (NOTRE PAYS) EN MATIERE DE COMMERCE - LES EUA ?

ANNEX FIGURE 68

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

FAIRNESS OF TRADING PARTNERS - JAPAN/ LOYAUTE DES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX - JAPON




Q. SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF (OUR COUNTRY'S) TRADING PARTNERS USE UNFAIR PRACTICES THAT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR (OUR COUNTRY) TO SELL PRODUCTS THERE. FROM WHAT YOU KNOW OR HAVE HEARD, TELL ME IF YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TRADE PARTNERS ARE FAIR OR UNFAIR TO (OUR COUNTRY) WHEN IT COMES TO TRADE - JAPAN ?/

CERTAINES PERSONNES CROIENT QUE CERTAINS DES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX (DE NOTRE PAYS) FONT USAGE DE PRATIQUES DELOYALES QUI FONT QUE (NOTRE PAYS) A DES DIFFICULTES POUR Y VENDRE DES PRODUITS. D'APRES CE QUE VOUS SAVEZ OU AVEZ ENTENDU, DITES-MOI SI VOUS PENSEZ QUE LES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX SUIVANTS SONT LOYAUX OU DELOYAUX ENVERS (NOTRE PAYS) EN MATIERE DE COMMERCE - LE JAPON ?

ANNEX FIGURE 69

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

FAIRNESS OF TRADING PARTNERS - RUSSIA* / LOYAUTE DES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX - RUSSIE*



*EUROPEAN RUSSIA EXCLUDED/RUSSIE EUROPEENE EXCLUE

Q. SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF (OUR COUNTRY'S) TRADING PARTNERS USE UNFAIR PRACTICES THAT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR (OUR COUNTRY) TO SELL PRODUCTS THERE. FROM WHAT YOU KNOW OR HAVE HEARD, TELL ME IF YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING TRADE PARTNERS ARE FAIR OR UNFAIR TO (OUR COUNTRY) WHEN IT COMES TO TRADE - RUSSIA (FOR RUSSIA: "OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES") ?/


CERTAINES PERSONNES CROIENT QUE CERTAINS DES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX (DE NOTRE PAYS) FONT USAGE DE PRATIQUES DELOYALES QUI FONT QUE (NOTRE PAYS) A DES DIFFICULTES POUR Y VENDRE DES PRODUITS. D'APRES CE QUE VOUS SAVEZ OU AVEZ ENTENDU, DITES-MOI SI VOUS PENSEZ QUE LES PARTENAIRES COMMERCIAUX SUIVANTS SONT LOYAUX OU DELOYAUX ENVERS (NOTRE PAYS) EN MATIERE DE COMMERCE - LA RUSSIE (EN RUSSIE: "D'AUTRES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE DES ETATS INDEPENDANTS")

ANNEX FIGURE 70

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

AWARENESS OF BENEFITS OF EC TRADE/ CONNAISSANCE DES BENEFICES DU COMMERCE CE

HEARD/ENTENDU





**Q. PLEASE TELL ME WHETHER YOU HAVE OR HAVE NOT HEARD ANYTHING
ABOUT EC/(OUR COUNTRY) TRADE ISSUES, AND HOW (OUR COUNTRY'S)
ENTERPRISES MIGHT BENEFIT FROM THEM ?/**

**J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS AVEZ OU NON ENTENDU PARLER DE
DEBOUCHES COMMERCIAUX CE/(NOTRE PAYS), ET DE LA FACON DONT LES
ENTREPRISES (DE NOTRE PAYS) POURRAIENT EN PROFITER ?**

INTEREST IN KNOWING MORE ABOUT BENEFITS OF EC TRADE*

INTERET D'EN SAVOIR DAVANTAGE SUR LES BENEFICES DU COMMERCE CE*




*ASKED ONLY OF THOSE AWARE/POSE SEULEMENT A CEUX QUI SONT CONSCIENT DE ...

Q. PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED, SOMEWHAT INTERESTED OR NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN KNOWING MORE ABOUT EC/(OUR COUNTRY) TRADE ISSUES, AND HOW (OUR COUNTRY'S) ENTERPRISES MIGHT BENEFIT FROM THEM ?/

J'AIMERAIS QUE VOUS ME DISIEZ SI VOUS SERIEZ TRES INTERESSE, ASSEZ INTERESSE OU PAS VRAIMENT INTERESSE D'EN SAVOIR DAVANTAGE SUR LES DEBOUCHES COMMERCIAUX CE/(NOTRE PAYS), ET SUR LA FACON DONT LES ENTREPRISES (DE NOTRE PAYS) POURRAIENT EN PROFITER ?

PEOPLE CONSIDERING EMIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE/ PERSONNES ENVISAGEANT D'EMIGRER EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE




*Q. HAVE YOU EVER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED GOING TO WORK IN A COUNTRY
IN WESTERN EUROPE ? (SPONTANEOUS: HAVE ALREADY WORKED THERE)/*

*AVEZ-VOUS DEJA ENVISAGE SERIEUSEMENT D'ALLER TRAVAILLER DANS UN
PAYS D'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE ? (SPONTANE: A DEJA TRAVAILLE LA-BAS)*

ANNEX FIGURE 73

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

LIKELIHOOD OF EMIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE*/ **PROBABILITE D'EMIGRER EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE***




* MOLDOVA EXCLUDED - EMIGRATE = DEFINITELY OR PROBABLY; NOT EMIGRATE = PROBABLY NOT OR DEFINITELY NOT

Q. HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT YOU WILL MOVE TO WESTERN EUROPE TO LIVE AND WORK ? DO YOU THINK THAT YOU WILL DEFINITELY MOVE TO WESTERN EUROPE TO LIVE AND WORK, PROBABLY MOVE TO WESTERN EUROPE TO LIVE AND WORK, PROBABLY NOT MOVE TO WESTERN EUROPE TO LIVE AND WORK OR DEFINITELY NOT MOVE TO WESTERN EUROPE TO LIVE AND WORK ?/

QUELLE EST LA PROBABILITE POUR QUE VOUS DEMENAGIEZ EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE POUR Y VIVRE ET Y TRAVAILLER ? PENSEZ-VOUS QUE VOUS DEMENAGEREZ CERTAINEMENT EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE POUR Y VIVRE ET Y TRAVAILLER, QUE VOUS DEMENAGEREZ PROBABLEMENT EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE POUR Y VIVRE ET Y TRAVAILLER, QUE VOUS NE DEMENAGEREZ PROBABLEMENT PAS EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE POUR Y VIVRE ET Y TRAVAILLER OU QUE VOUS NE DEMENAGEREZ CERTAINEMENT PAS EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE POUR Y VIVRE ET Y TRAVAILLER ?


BREAK-UP OF COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE/ ECLATEMENT DES PAYS EN EUROPE CENTRALE ET DE L'EST



Q. BEARING IN MIND EVERYTHING HAPPENING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AT THE MOMENT, SOME PEOPLE SAY: "COUNTRIES SHOULD STOP BREAKING UP BECAUSE IT CREATES TOO MUCH INSTABILITY IN THE REGION", WHILE OTHERS SAY: "IT IS UP TO THE PEOPLE OF EACH COUNTRY TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE". WHICH OF THESE TWO VIEWPOINTS COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR OWN ?/

EN GARDANT A L'ESPRIT TOUT CE QUI SE PASSE ACTUELLEMENT EN EUROPE CENTRALE ET DE L'EST, CERTAINES PERSONNES DISENT: "LES PAYS NE DEVRAIENT PLUS ECLATER CAR CELA CREE TROP D'INSTABILITE DANS LA REGION", TANDIS QUE D'AUTRES DISENT: "IL APPARTIENT A LA POPULATION DE CHAQUE PAYS DE DECIDER DE SON FUTUR". LEQUEL DE CES DEUX POINTS DE VUE SE RAPPROCHE LE PLUS DU VOTRE ?


EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA/ EFFICACITE DE L'INTERVENTION INTERNATIONALE EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE



Q. VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES ARE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING BODIES HAVE BEEN ON THE WHOLE RATHER EFFECTIVE OR RATHER INEFFECTIVE IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT ?/

DIVERSES AUTORITES INTERNATIONALES TENTENT D'AIDER A RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE. PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES AUTORITES SUIVANTES SONT, EN GENERAL, PLUTOT EFFICACES OU PLUTOT INEFFICACES DANS LEURS TENTATIVES DE RESOLUTION DE CE CONFLIT ?

EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATIONS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA/ EFFICACITE DES NATIONS UNIES EN ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE




Q. VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES ARE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING BODIES HAVE BEEN ON THE WHOLE RATHER EFFECTIVE OR RATHER INEFFECTIVE IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT ? - UNITED NATIONS/

DIVERSES AUTORITES INTERNATIONALES TENTENT D'AIDER A RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT EN ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE. PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES AUTORITES SUIVANTES SONT, EN GENERAL, PLUTOT EFFICACES OU PLUTOT INEFFICACES DANS LEURS TENTATIVES DE RESOLUTION DE CE CONFLIT ? - NATIONS UNIES

ANNEX FIGURE 77

EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

EFFECTIVENESS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA/ EFFICACITE DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE




Q. VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES ARE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICT THE YUGOSLAVIA. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING BODIES HAVE BEEN ON THE WHOLE RATHER EFFECTIVE OR RATHER INEFFECTIVE IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT ? - EC/

DIVERSES AUTORITES INTERNATIONALES TENTENT D'AIDER A RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE. PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES AUTORITES SUIVANTES SONT, EN GENERAL, PLUTOT EFFICACES OU PLUTOT INEFFICACES DANS LEURS TENTATIVES DE RESOLUTION DE CE CONFLIT ? - CE

ANNEX FIGURE 78 EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP


EFFECTIVENESS OF CSCE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA/ EFFICACITE DE LA CSCE EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE



Q. VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES ARE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING BODIES HAVE BEEN ON THE WHOLE RATHER EFFECTIVE OR RATHER INEFFECTIVE IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT ? - CSCE/

DIVERSES AUTORITES INTERNATIONALES TENTENT D'AIDER A RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE. PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES AUTORITES SUIVANTES SONT, EN GENERAL, PLUTOT EFFICACES OU PLUTOT INEFFICACES DANS LEURS TENTATIVES DE RESOLUTION DE CE CONFLIT ? - CSCE

EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA/ EFFICACITE DE L'OTAN EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE



Q. VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES ARE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING BODIES HAVE BEEN ON THE WHOLE RATHER EFFECTIVE OR RATHER INEFFECTIVE IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT ? - NATO/


DIVERSES AUTORITES INTERNATIONALES TENTENT D'AIDER A RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE. PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES AUTORITES SUIVANTES SONT, EN GENERAL, PLUTOT EFFICACES OU PLUTOT INEFFICACES DANS LEURS TENTATIVES DE RESOLUTION DE CE CONFLIT ? - OTAN

ANNEX FIGURE 80


EUROBAROMETER/GALLUP

CROATIAN POSITION SUMMARISED/ RESUME DE LA POSITION CROATE


HEARD/ENTENDU



EC IMAGE/IMAGE DE LA CE




EAST EUROPE BREAK UP?/ ECLATEMENT EUROPE DE L'EST?



QUESTION WORDING: SEE REFERENCE
IN BRACKETS FOR EACH RESPONSE ABOVE
LIBELLE QUESTION: CF. SUPRA NO.
DU GRAPHIQUE ENTRE PARENTHESES

CROATIAN POSITION SUMMARISED/ RESUME DE LA POSITION CROATE




Q. VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES ARE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING BODIES HAVE BEEN ON THE WHOLE RATHER EFFECTIVE OR RATHER INEFFECTIVE IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT ?/


DIVERSES AUTORITES INTERNATIONALES TENTENT D'AIDER A RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT EN ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE. PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES AUTORITES SUIVANTES SONT, EN GENERAL, PLUTOT EFFICACES OU PLUTOT INEFFICACES DANS LEURS TENTATIVES DE RESOLUTION DE CE CONFLIT ?

SERBIAN POSITION SUMMARISED/ RESUME DE LA POSITION SERBE


HEARD/ENTENDU



EC IMAGE/IMAGE DE LA CE




EAST EUROPE BREAK UP?/ ECLATEMENT EUROPE DE L'EST?



QUESTION WORDING: SEE REFERENCE
IN BRACKETS FOR EACH RESPONSE ABOVE
LIBELLE QUESTION: CF. SUPRA NO.
DU GRAPHIQUE ENTRE PARENTHESES

SERBIAN POSITION SUMMARISED/ RESUME DE LA POSITION SERBE



Q. VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BODIES ARE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. IN YOUR OPINION, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING BODIES HAVE BEEN ON THE WHOLE RATHER EFFECTIVE OR RATHER INEFFECTIVE IN TRYING TO HELP RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT ?/

DIVERSES AUTORITES INTERNATIONALES TENTENT D'AIDER A RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT EN ANCIENNE YUGOSLAVIE. PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES AUTORITES SUIVANTES SONT, EN GENERAL, PLUTOT EFFICACES OU PLUTOT INEFFICACES DANS LEURS TENTATIVES DE RESOLUTION DE CE CONFLIT ?

ANNEXES

GRAPHICS OF FULL RESULTS

ANNEXES

HOW THE POLL WAS DONE

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER N°3 (Autumn 1992)

Overall Co-ordination: DGX.B-SRA (EUROBAROMETER) in co-operation with GALLUP UK

Statistical Data Analysis: GALLUP UK

Within Region: ROMIR for Belarus, European Russia and Ukraine

BBSS for Albania, Bulgaria, (Macedonia), Moldova and Romania

GSRC for Armenia and Georgia

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER No. 3

Between 30th October and 17th November 1992 the institutes listed above conducted the third wave of the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER at the request of the Commission of the European Community, Directorate General X Audiovisual, Information, Communication, Culture, "Surveys, Research, Analyses, (EUROBAROMETER)" Unit.

Gallup UK is an independent market and opinion research company based in London. It was co-responsible for the international co-ordination of the survey and carried out the statistical analysis of the data.

The results of the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER are made available through the "Surveys, Research, Analyses" Unit of DGX, Commission of the European Communities. All requests for further information should be addressed to either Mr. Karlheinz REIF or Mr George CUNNINGHAM, EUROBAROMETER, (T120 - 1/107), The European Commission, B-1049 Brussels. Tel. 32-2-299.94.41, Fax. 32-2-299.92.05.

All EUROBAROMETER data are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse 40, D-5000 Köln 41). They are at the disposal of all institutes which are members of the European Consortium for Political Research, of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and all those interested in social science research.

DETAILS ON SAMPLING

A total of 18 countries in Central and Eastern Europe were surveyed: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, European Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. In total 18,469 citizens aged 15 years and over were interviewed face-to-face in their private residence in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole.

In Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, some areas could not be covered by the survey due to hostilities. The North East, Vaik and Zangezur were not surveyed in Armenia, resulting in a 90% coverage of that country. 90% of Georgia could be surveyed, including 68% of Abkhazia. The Transnistria area of Moldova was also omitted from the survey due to fighting, so 82% of the country was covered.

In each of these cases the final sample was representative of that proportion of the country which could be covered.

As with Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.2, each institute adopted a multi-stage random probability sample design. There were slight variations in each country's sample design to take account of its individual characteristics and population structure. In every case, the full geographical spread of the population was covered.

Except for Moldova, at least 100 sampling points were selected within each country.

SAMPLING POINTS

| | |
|----------------|-----|
| Armenia | 122 |
| Albania | 130 |
| Belarus | 105 |
| Bulgaria | 150 |
| Czech Republic | 128 |
| Estonia | 115 |
| Georgia | 122 |
| Hungary | 100 |
| Latvia | 252 |
| Lithuania | 100 |
| (Macedonia) | 150 |
| Moldova | 99 |
| Poland | 250 |
| Romania | 124 |
| Euro-Russia | 106 |
| Slovakia | 112 |
| Slovenia | 100 |
| Ukraine | 120 |

| | |
|--------------|-------------|
| TOTAL | 2385 |
|--------------|-------------|

The sampling points for each country were selected, in the first instance, via a division into its major socio-economic areas. A list of these is appended. Within each of these areas smaller electoral or administrative districts were randomly selected and, taking into account such factors as the relative size of the population living in rural and urban settlements, the number and distribution of sampling points in each of these districts was finalised.

In general ten interviews were conducted around each sampling point, with individuals being selected via one of three main methods, these being:-

- i) Contact randomly selected from a list of the electorate. In most cases such lists were no more than three years old.
- ii) Random selection of addresses from published, or specially commissioned lists, with individuals being selected via a Kish matrix or other random method.
- iii) Random route from a selected starting point (often the central bus station in larger settlements) with individuals again being selected via a Kish matrix or other random method.

Quite understandably, in many instances address or electoral data was not available for the population below the age of enfranchisement, and therefore quotas were imposed to ensure that the correct number of 15-17 year olds were interviewed.

The maximum number of interviews in any individual household was one. All interviews were conducted face-to-face by fully-trained interviewers in people's homes.

In each country the final sample was representative of the adult population aged 15+ years.

REALISATION OF FIELDWORK

| | FIELDWORK DATES | NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Albania | 1 November - 11 November | 1049 |
| Armenia | 2 November - 16 November | 918 |
| Belarus | 4 November - 13 November | 1030 |
| Bulgaria | 31 October - 9 November | 1312 |
| Czech Republic | 1 November - 16 November | 924 |
| Estonia | 1 November - 15 November | 1000 |
| Georgia | 2 November - 15 November | 1038 |
| Hungary | 30 October - 10 November | 1000 |
| Latvia | 5 November - 15 November | 1000 |
| Lithuania | 1 November - 11 November | 1000 |
| (Macedonia) | 1 November - 8 November | 1002 |
| Moldova | 30 October - 14 November | 1000 |
| Poland | 13 November-17 November | 999 |
| Romania | 7 November - 13 November | 1000 |
| European Russia | 1 November - 15 November | 1000 |
| Slovakia | 1 November - 16 November | 734 |
| Slovenia | 7 November - 17 November | 1063 |
| Ukraine | 31 October - 15 November | 1400 |
| <hr/> | | |
| TOTAL | 30 October - 17 November | 18469 |
| EC 12 (Comparison) | 2 November - 30 November | 13024 |

WEIGHTING OF DATA

Where possible, the results for each country were post-weighted by a matrix of highest level of education completed within age, and also according to the regional distribution of the country's adult population. Where information was not available for education within age, the results were weighted by each factor separately, and also by region.

Weighting by an interlocking matrix of age and education was possible in: Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, European Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The overall results for Central and Eastern Europe as a whole were weighted according to each country's 15+ population. The data for each country's population by age, education and region was provided by participating national institutes.

| | POPULATION TOTAL(15 + yrs) (000s) | PROPORTION OF EAST EUROPE POPULATION |
|-----------------|---|--|
| Albania | 2242 | 0.97 |
| Armenia | 2245 | 0.98 |
| Belarus | 7815 | 3.39 |
| Bulgaria | 6800 | 2.95 |
| Czech Republic | 8146 | 3.53 |
| Estonia | 1222 | 0.53 |
| Georgia | 3893 | 1.69 |
| Hungary | 8374 | 3.64 |
| Latvia | 2096 | 0.91 |
| Lithuania | 2842 | 1.23 |
| (Macedonia) | 1354 | 0.59 |
| Moldova | 2570 | 1.12 |
| Poland | 28,239 | 12.27 |
| Romania | 17,738 | 7.71 |
| European Russia | 88,772 | 38.56 |
| Slovakia | 3952 | 1.73 |
| Slovenia | 1562 | 0.68 |
| Ukraine | 40,343 | 17.52 |
| <hr/> | | |
| TOTAL | 230,205 | 100.00% |

In Croatia, where 1000 adults aged 15+ were interviewed, fieldwork was completed between 11th and 30th November 1992. The 1264 interviews in Serbia were conducted with adults aged 18+ between 20th and 27th November.

AREAS COVERED

Albania

Tirana
Northern
Central
Southern

Armenia

Ararat
Sevan
Central
Shirak
Lory
Yerevan

Belarus

Brest
Vitebsk
Gomel
Grodno
Minsk
Mogiljev

Bulgaria

Varna
Razgrad
Mihailovgrad
Lovetch
Sofia-city
Sofia District
Plovdiv
Bourgas
Haskovo

Czech Republic

Prague
Central Bohemia
Southern Bohemia
Western Bohemia
Northern Bohemia
Eastern Bohemia
Southern Moravia
Northern Moravia

Estonia

North-Western
North-Eastern
South-Eastern
South-Western
Western

Slovakia

Bratislava
Central Slovakia
Eastern Slovakia
Western Slovakia

Georgia

Abkhazia
Adjara
Kolkheti
Karti-Kakheti
Meskhet-Djavakheti
Kvemo Kartli
Central

Hungary

Central
Northern Hungary
Northern Great Plain
Southern Great Plain
Southern Transdanubia
Northern Transdanubia

Lithuania

Zemaitija
Aukstaitija
Suvalkija
Dzukija
Pietrycui Lietuva

Moldova

Balti
Tighina
Cahul
Chisinau

Romania

Oltenia
Muntenia
Dobrogea
Moldova
Transilvania
Crisana-Maramures, Banat
Bucuresti

Slovenia

Gorenjska
Primorska
Osrednja Slovenija
Koroska in Savinjska
Dolenjska in Posavje
Stajerska in Prekmurje

Latvia

Riga
Vidzeme
Zemgale
Kurzeme
Latgale

(Macedonia)

Skopski, Povardarski
Pelagoniski, Kumanovski
Ohrid, Bregalnicky
Polostaski

Poland

Central
Eastern
'Little Poland' Southern
Silesia
Western Pomerania
Great Poland

European Russia

Northern
Northern-Western
Central
Volgo-Vjatsky
Central (Black Earth)
Along Volga
North-Caucasian
Urals

Ukraine

Kiev
Northern
Central
North-Eastern
North-Western
Eastern
Western
South Western
South
Krym

GALLUP

Gallup in the UK is a member of the Gallup International Group of companies which has recognized affiliates in 50 countries worldwide, including almost all EC and EFTA countries. The British company was formed in 1937 and is the largest independent research organisation in Britain. Throughout the worldwide group, all companies are independently-owned and managed by their working directors. The headquarters of the Membership Association of Gallup International is in London.

Gallup International has had nearly 20 years of close association with the European Commission. Initially, the French affiliate of Gallup International directed by Madame Helen Riffault pioneered the standard EUROBAROMETER survey conducted at least twice a year in all EC countries on behalf of the Commission. This became the basis of the EUROBAROMETER report over the 15 year period 1973-1989. Currently under the direction of Madame Nicole Jamar, EOS Gallup Europe has been responsible for the 'FLASH EUROBAROMETER' framework contract for up to five years since 1990. This involves telephone and face-to-face omnibus surveys in all twelve EC countries.

Gallup in the UK was one of the Western pioneers of research in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, with early surveys in Eastern Europe stretching back to 1972. It conducted the first direct measures of voting intentions, political opinion and media awareness by a western pollster in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. Subsequently, most of the companies participating in the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER have had a close working relationship with Gallup International and many are candidates for recognition by this body.

In 1991 Gallup in the UK together with Gallup France, and working with Princeton Survey Research Associates, coordinated the largest simultaneous study ever conducted at that time in both Eastern and Western Europe across twelve countries, in a one hour interview which addressed attitudes towards a wide variety of political and social problems including ethnic tensions. This major study, commissioned by the Los Angeles Times, consisted of both quantitative and qualitative research, and under the title 'The Pulse of Europe', was featured in a series of ten CNN television documentaries. In 1990 Gallup UK conducted a major 17 country survey in Western Europe on behalf of the Readers Digest Association concerning consumer habits. In 1992 Gallup UK set up a continual television audience measurement survey on behalf of Russian Federation Television, and this research instrument has now been extended to cover Bulgaria.

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