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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER No. 1
PUBLIC OPINION IN
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NOTICE

This ZEUS-Report is based on a secondary analysis of surveys in Central and Eastern European countries in 1990 which are labelled Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.1. Data from standard EUROBAROMETER surveys are also used in the report.

Although prepared on behalf of "Surveys, Research, Analyses" (EUROBAROMETER) Unit, Directorate General X Audiovisual, Information, Communication, Culture of the Commission of the European Community, all responsibility for this report remains with ZEUS.

ABSTRACT

The Commission of the European Communities DGX-Surveys, Research, Analyses (EUROBAROMETER) Unit undertook a set of polls in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990. In this "Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.1" representative samples in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the European part of the USSR have been drawn. On the one hand, people were asked to evaluate the economic and democratic reform process in their countries, and on the other hand, their perceptions of Europe in general and the European Community in particular have been reviewed.

When asking for a general evaluation of 'the way things are going' in each country about one out of two respondents takes a wait-and-see position or judges the development negatively.

Regarding economic reforms, people generally hold a favourable attitude towards the introduction of a free market economy. However, only a majority of Polish respondents evaluates the general economic situation as having changed for the better during the last twelve months, and only one third of all respondents expects an improvement in this matter within the next twelve months. The assistance programme offered by the international community is welcomed by a majority of interviewees, and about half the respondents expect this aid to have a positive effect on their country's national development. Further, they want actions to be taken to improve the environment, higher education, and to update their industries and agricultures. As far as democratic reform is concerned, satisfaction with democracy is only reported by a minority of respondents.

In terms of attitudes towards the European Community, Central and Eastern Europeans lack detailed information about it but approve of its assistance programmes which are designed to help their countries. They generally have positive impressions of the aims and activities of the European Community and favour possible membership of their respective countries. The unification of Western Europe in general - including respondent's own country - is supported by a majority of respondents. Central and Eastern Europeans generally have a positive orientation towards the West and particularly towards the European Community.

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INTRODUCTION

As the societies of Central and Eastern Europe break free from the legacy of Leninism, they need fundamental support and assistance. Their needs are pressing, but the timescale for change is long. How do people perceive the ongoing transition? Do they approve the introduction of a free market economy? What are their attitudes towards the European Community? How do they evaluate the democratic improvements they fought for in 1989? The present report attempts to answer these questions by analysing results of surveys conducted in this region in 1990 on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities.

First, the events that have taken place in autumn 1989 will briefly be summarized in chapter one. Further, the development of the relationship between the European Community and the Central and Eastern European countries will be described.

Chapter two reviews the development of polling in Central and Eastern Europe and informs about polling institutions in that region as well as their work prior to the revolutions. It will also look at the validity of the polls carried out by national institutes for the "Survey, Research, Analyses Unit" of the DG X of the Commission of the European Communities.

Chapters three and four will analyse the polling results in-depth, placing opinion polling within the context of the political and economic changes taking place. The third chapter mainly concentrates on those questions referring to people's opinion towards the democratic and economic reforms, while attitudes towards (Western) Europe and particularly towards the European Community are assessed in chapter four. Only those questions are analysed in these two chapters which have been asked in most of the countries.

Chapter five presents 'country profiles' in a sense that those questions that have only been asked in the individual countries are discussed here. Bulgaria and Poland are not considered in this chapter because all questions that have been asked in these countries have been discussed in the preceding two chapters.

Some concluding and summarizing remarks will be made in chapter 6.

The appendix provides pertinent tables and a list of all known polling institutes in Central and Eastern Europe, including contact persons, addresses, telephone and fax numbers.

1. BRIEF POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Most Central and Eastern European countries have experienced enormous changes during the last three years. The fall of Communism through mainly non-violent revolutions paved the way for a more liberal and democratic development with new personal, political and economic opportunities. The struggle for freedom and democracy has long been present in this area and is documented by several revolts after World War II. In 1953, a dramatic riot in East-Berlin was violently defeated by the Soviets. During the next 30 years, the peoples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland also revolted against their communist regimes. However, all these efforts were suppressed. In 1989, Central and Eastern European countries witnessed broad resistance against the regimes, which lead to major changes. This successful revolution started in Poland, where the 'Solidarity' has already been active during the eighties, and Hungary, soon followed by Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Bulgaria. At the end of that year, this movement also reached Romania. After these events in the former 'satellite states', the wave burst upon the Soviet Union as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania announced their independence from the Soviet Union. In the two eastern countries which had resisted participation in the 'Eastern Bloc' - Albania and Yugoslavia - the process of emancipation is still ongoing, but resulting in a civil war in Yugoslavia and large numbers of refugees from both countries.

In the West, one major consequence of the developments in Central and Eastern Europe was the reunification of the two Germanies. When Hungary opened its borders to Austria on September 11, 1990, thousands of East Germans were able to pass through without travel documents. Meanwhile, demonstrations emerged in the big cities of East Germany which were repeated every Monday by a continuously growing number of people. After 40 years of communist ruling, the first free election to the East German parliament was held on March 18, 1990. Four months later, East Germany introduced the West German currency, and substructural elements of its economic and social system. The process of political unification was completed on October 3, 1990.

An analysis of the exact reasons why and the particular point in time when the protests began in Central and Eastern Europe lies beyond the purpose of this report. Nonetheless, a closer look at the structure of these countries reveals some striking similarities in a number of obvious facts. First, all of these countries' economies were almost completely bankrupt - although the national governments painted a rosy picture of their economic situation. Apparently, the communist regimes had not invested in modern machinery and technology for reasons of other priorities or a lack of sufficient financial resources. Second, their infrastructures were underdeveloped and totally neglected. Finally, outrageous environmental

problems were found in all of these countries caused by an outdated industrial technology and a general ignorance towards this whole matter.

Western Europe and particularly the European Community will play a central role in the further development of this region because of its location, both in terms of geography and ideology. During the period of the Cold War, the only official relations between the Eastern Bloc countries and the Community was through COMECON, its trading organisation. Already in 1963, the Community offered bilateral relations to the Soviet Union. In 1974, these offers were also made to the individual Central and Eastern European countries. COMECON thwarted the Community's efforts to establish relations with the individual member countries by insisting that only COMECON rather than its member countries was supposed to perform partnership for negotiations. This was done to underline its international legitimacy, which was not accepted by the European Community. First, the EC did not regard COMECON's structure and its authority as equally powerful. Second, the fact that COMECON was dominated by the Soviet Union was seen as a hindrance for an equal economic integration of its member countries. Third, COMECON did not supply the legal rights to negotiate about its member countries' affairs. As a consequence, the relationship between both organizations remained rather tense for a long time.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became president of the USSR in 1986, the situation completely changed. He accepted the European Community's demands to negotiate with the individual countries directly rather than with COMECON.

The first country signing a commercial and economic cooperation agreement with the European Community was Hungary in September 1988. It was followed by Czechoslovakia in December 1988, Poland in September 1989, the Soviet Union in December 1989, and the GDR and Bulgaria in May 1990. At the same time, several economic assistance programmes were set up to help support the development of Central and Eastern Europe. Among these, the PHARE operation is the most important one. It was originally established by the Group of Seven (G-7) Western European countries to assist Hungary and Poland - the first countries to buckle the system - in reconstructing their economy and establishing democracy. The G-7 was joined by all other EC countries, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, and the US to form 'the Group of 24' (G-24). The PHARE operation which was initially (1989) designed to help reconstructing the Polish and Hungarian economies was coordinated by the European Community. In 1990, the decision was taken to extend the programme to cover Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia. Individual priorities have been established for each Central and Eastern European

country, reflecting their most immediate needs. All countries but Yugoslavia had held free elections by that time on a national basis, and all have started with privatisation and liberalisation - prerequisites for receiving aid.

The Central and Eastern European countries have started to concentrate more on the Western European markets and to reduce their dependency on the Soviet Union. Since 1990, the European Community is more important for Hungarian exports than former COMECON countries. From 1992, Czechoslovakia has planned to change its production according to Western European norms and standards in order to enter the hard currency market.

Generally speaking, the European Community has had a strong effect on East European reformers. Impressed by its endeavour for democracy and balanced economic growth, these countries strive towards participating in this system. Moreover, they anticipate growing difficulties in offering their products to countries of the European Community after the realization of the Single European Market in 1992. None of these countries has yet asked to join the Community. Preconditions are that these countries are asked to establish a functioning, pluralistic democratic system as well as a market oriented economy. Technically speaking, at present times, none of these economies is powerful enough to survive in a market ruled by almost free competition. Hence, it will take some years before their democracies and economies have gained enough stability and strength.

However, nothing illustrates the changes in the EC's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe better than the speed with which the decision to offer negotiations on Association Agreements (Poland, CSFR, Hungary) was made and the positive response it elicited from them.

The Dublin European Council in June 1990 agreed upon an immediate start to discussions with each of the considered countries (with the exception of the former USSR), on the basis of guide-lines to be drawn by the Commission. Association status would not automatically lead to an EC membership, but it was not definitely excluded either. The Commission underlined that all debates with the individual countries were treated as separate cases, and each Association Agreement would be negotiated according to the specific nature and needs of the country. The "European Association Agreements" will not only cover trade and economy matters but also political and cultural cooperation.

Beside the PHARE operation described above, a decision was made by the Council on May 7, 1990, to create (1) a Trans European Mobility Scheme for University Students

(TEMPUS), and (2) a European Training Foundation (ETF). These programmes are open to all non-EC countries but especially to citizens of the G-24 countries. TEMPUS became operational on July 1, 1990 (1) to modernize the systems of higher education and improve vocational training, and (2) to establish links with higher education institutions in the EC.

Further, the European Investment Bank (EIB) plays an important role in financial aid. It has provided loans to Poland and Hungary since 1990, when the Community agreed to undertake guarantees. On February 25, 1991, the Council approved a proposal extending the EIB's activities to the other PHARE countries.

In addition, the European Bank for Reconstructing and Development (EBRD) was created. This bank's purpose is to promote productive and competitive investments in the Central and Eastern European countries, to facilitate the transition towards a market based economy and to accelerate the required structural adjustments.

Considering the short time since the defeat of Communism in the East, cooperation between these countries and the European Community has already been established in a very major way.

2. THE EVOLUTION OF POLLING IN THE REGION

In spite of the Communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe, a very basic infrastructure for market research had been established in most of these countries, capable of conducting surveys on a nationally representative basis. As documented in the list of institutions in the appendix, most research is being carried out by academies or universities. Previously, all investigations were exclusively undertaken for mediatic, academic and economic bodies. Public opinion research the way we know it was neither needed nor welcomed - especially not with the aim to keep the public informed.

The move from the past towards a more liberal future bears many challenges - not least for market and opinion researchers. Their exploration of society as well as of markets will become increasingly necessary for the whole process of renewing their countries' systems by:

- Educating the general public about the principles of the market system, how it functions and how people can get involved;
- Training executives and field forces up to the highest standards - to make survey results a solid basis for decision-making;
- Creating and reinforcing links between these results and the political and economic decision-making-process;
- Ensuring the transparency of democratic processes through public opinion polling on a regular basis.

Being interested in the history and the major objectives of the now existing research institutes we contacted some of them and asked for comments in these respects. Unfortunately, only two organizations - CEMA and EMOR - replied. CEMA is a Yugoslavian research center with 30 years of experience in a variety of fields: marketing; travel and leisure; attitude and motivation; consumer media, advertising and corporate image research, conducted on behalf of very well known international companies. EMOR, the Estonian Market and Opinion Research Centre, started its activities in spring 1988. It cooperates with Latvia and Lithuania and conducts surveys in the field of markets and media as well as household income and expenditure. Both are state owned research institutes. As far as EMOR is concerned, a privatisation is envisaged by end of this year. Information we have about CBOS, a Polish state owned Public Opinion Research Center, implies a similar specialized and well organized structure.

Between 1989 and 1991, the Commission of the European Communities initiated a set of polls in Central and Eastern Europe in order to maintain information on how people perceive the

democratic and economic progress made in their country. The surveys were conducted on a nationally-representative basis with sample sizes ranging from 1000 to 1500. The following analyses are based on these surveys.

COUNTRY	FIELDWORK TIME	INSTITUTE
Hungary	August 1989	GALLUP ¹
Czechoslovakia	January 1990	ECOMA/GALLUP
Greater Moscow	May 1990	USSR ACAD. OF SCIENCES
GDR	May 1990	IPOS/EMNID/USUMA
European USSR ²	June 1990	USSR ACAD. OF SCIENCES
Hungary	October 1990	MODUS
Poland	October 1990	OBOP
Czechoslovakia	October 1990	ECOMA
Bulgaria	December 1990	NPOC/GALLUP

Most people from Central and Eastern Europe have no experience of opinion research, neither personal nor through media. Adding to this, the regimes always invented new instruments for controlling their citizens. The long lasting Communist tradition with its rigorous suppression of free speech might have made the respondents extremely cautious and thus possibly dishonest. For these reasons, we do not know whether respondents answered candidly especially in cases of difficult or sensitive topics. Of course, this problem is always present in survey research, but it might be even more evident in these surveys.

For the Moscow and USSR survey, some methods were applied to test the validity of the results. One way to assess the quality of responses is to ask the interviewers to evaluate each respondent according to the perceived honesty. Raymond M. Duch and James L. Gibson from the department of Political Science at the University of Houston compared the results of this evaluation to findings from a survey conducted in the U.S.A. in 1987. In all three surveys - the

1) Due to technical problems of the data set, analyses of this survey are not included in this report.

2) A primary sample of 1590 respondents was selected. Anticipating a high non-response rate, they additionally drew a sample of 410 respondents. The specific universe were residents of the Republics of: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, and the portion of Russia west of the Ural Mountains. (Duch, Gibson 1991:21)

one conducted in the European Soviet Union, in the area around Moscow and in the U.S.A. - an overwhelming majority was perceived as being relatively open and honest in their responses.

Further, interviewees are known for expressing opinions even if they do not have them, mainly for reasons of social desirability. They neither want to appear uninformed nor poorly informed. In order to assess the degree to which this phenomenon occurs, two questions were included in the questionnaire asking about feelings and trust toward a fictitious group of people. In the first list, respondents were asked to express their feelings towards different peoples, whereas the second asked for the degree of trust they felt towards these peoples. In the first question the fictitious group "Kalakshists" was used, in the second it was "Kukhterists". The honesty of the Soviet respondents can be measured by the degree to which they refused to express any opinion towards these - fictitious - groups. For reasons of comparability a similar question was asked in the above mentioned U.S. survey of 1987 (the fictitious group here was "Society for a New America"). Here, 30 per cent of the respondents held an opinion towards this group, whereas only 15 per cent of the Soviet respondents (Moscow 11 per cent) expressed some kind of attitude towards the non-existing "Kalakshists"; the figures for "Kukhterists" are 14 per cent (Moscow 11 per cent). Apparently, the Soviet respondents were remarkably candid when they did not have an opinion. In addition, no evidence was found in the two Soviet surveys pointing to a fear to express attitudes other than those accepted by the state. In fact, anti-regime opinions were expressed, but this will be reported and analyzed in more detail in a later chapter. Thus, no evidence was found to treat these survey results more cautiously than one would handle other survey results. Since none of these measures for validity control were applied to the other Central and Eastern European surveys considered here, we just have to presume a similar level of candour.

As far as opinion research in these countries is concerned, the situation is very hopeful since a lot has already been done, prior to the drastic political changes. However, much remains to be done and explored, but the basic structures are already available. For countries like Albania or Romania, the situation is different. Here, one has to start from the very beginning.

3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

The recent changes in the countries of the Eastern Bloc pose new challenges to their governments, the entire international community, and particularly to the European Community. Following a long period of slow growth, these countries are dismantling the old, centrally planned system and start to create - among others - a multi-party system and the environment needed for a market economy - the two main prerequisites for the European Community to offer stronger ties with and aid for these countries. These radical reforms, however, must be carried out at the same time as these countries have to deal with massive fiscal and balance of payments deficits as well as high debt burdens.

A comparison between the Central and Eastern European economies reveals a high degree of diversity. Consequently, the problems they have to solve differ in nature and severity. Nonetheless, the common feature of these countries' economies is the legacy of the centrally planned economy. Broadly speaking, it is characterized by centralized resource allocation, monopolized production structures, autarkic trade policy, non-convertible currencies, a widespread use of subsidies, the absence of a free market and private property. All this has led to an extreme distortion of prices for goods, services and the factors of production, labour and capital. In addition, the communist resource management has caused serious environmental problems. The primary structural problem facing all these countries at the end of the 1980s was price distortion. The prices of goods and production input did not reflect the true costs of the resources used. Surplus of some goods and an extreme scarcity of others were the results. Above all, the absence of a commercial banking system or other means or institutions bringing together entrepreneurs and investors contributed to the lack of innovation and adoption in the Central and Eastern European economies. The other factor suppressing flexibility and innovation was the monopolistic industrial structure, which allowed the continuing production of expensive and poor-quality goods, uncompetitive on the world markets, but the only goods available on local markets. These tendencies were intensified by two interrelated issues: the labour market and the absence of a binding income constraint on firms.

Systemic reforms and stabilization tendencies, in turn, give rise to large social costs, for which the social security systems are not yet prepared. However, five broad areas are critical: reforming the enterprise system, developing new institutions of economic governance, modernizing infrastructure, strengthening the social security net, and recovering the environment.

Therefore, in this section we will concentrate on the attitudes of Central and Eastern Europeans towards the democratic and economic development in their respective countries in order to reveal citizens perceptions, evaluations, and possible approvals of the political and ongoing economic changes.

3.1. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ECONOMIC REFORM

3.1.1. Past and Future National Economic Situation

In all countries considered here, several questions were asked concerning the economic reforms taking place in these countries. To start with, people were requested to evaluate the change in the general economic situation in their country during the past twelve months (see Figure 1 and Table 3.A.app) as well as to predict its further development for the next twelve months (see Figure 2 and Table 3.B.app).

As far as the past economic changes are concerned, only 3 per cent of the Bulgarians say that it has improved (a lot or a little) during the last twelve months, whereas nine out of ten (87%) report a deterioration (a little or a lot) of the economic situation in their country. The respective figures for Czechoslovakia (in October 1990) are 12 per cent and 72 per cent. It is only in Poland, where a majority of respondents (52%) believes that the general economic situation in their country has got (a little or a lot) better over the last 12 months.

The respondents' expectations for the future (Figure 2 and Table 3.B.app) reveal a more optimistic view. One quarter of the Bulgarian respondents expect the economic situation to get (a little or a lot) better in the next 12 months, but still two out of five interviewees (42%) expect it to get even (a little or a lot) worse. In January 1990, one third of the Czechoslovakians expect the general economic situation to improve (a lot or a little), and 38 per cent to get worse (a little or a lot). Between January and October 1990 already, the Czechoslovakians become more pessimistic: Twenty-six per cent of the respondents in the October sample - as opposed to 33 per cent in January - expect the general economic situation to improve while 13 per cent more (51 per cent compared to 38 per cent in January) think that it will change for the worse (a lot or a little). In Poland, the prevailing atmosphere at that time seems to be quite hopeful since 41 per cent expect the general economic situation to get (a lot or a little) better, and only 14 per cent predict it to get somehow worse. In Hungary, where only the second question regarding the prediction of the development over the next twelve months was asked, we find a very pessimistic attitude. More than 70 per cent of the

Figure 1

Compared to 12 months ago, how has the national economic situation changed?





Figure 2

Over the next 12 months, how will the national economic situation change?



respondents expect the general economic situation to change for the worse (a little or a lot) in the near future, and only one of 10 interviewees expects it to improve (a little or a lot).

3.1.2. Past and Future Situation of Own Household

Similar questions were asked in the same countries referring to the financial situation of the respondents' own household (see Figures 3, 4 and Tables 3.C.app and 3.D.app). For only 15 per cent of the Bulgarian respondents, their own financial situation has got better (a little or a lot) during the last twelve months; but for a majority of Bulgarians (62%), it got worse (a little or a lot). Nonetheless, one out of five interviewees expects it to improve and 'only' 44 per cent to decrease (Figure 4). A tiny minority (6%) of Czechoslovakians (10/90) reports an improvement of their own financial situation during the last twelve months whereas two out of three (66%) judge their situation as having worsened.

Taking the expectations for the next twelve months into account, only very few (9%) Czechoslovakian respondents (in January 1990) think of their own financial situation as going to improve; while two out of five predict a decline (see Figure 4). In October 1990, the percentage of interviewees predicting an improvement remains the same, but the proportion of those expecting a change for the worse goes up by 16 per cent to 66 per cent (see Table 3.D.app). In Hungary, where only the question about the future development was asked, the situation looks as pessimistic as it does regarding the predicted future development of the general economic situation. Six percent of the respondents express hopes for a possible improvement (a lot or a little) in contrast to 74 per cent who expect a deterioration of their own financial situation. In Poland, the situation appears to be a little more optimistic, although the financial situation changed in more households for the worse (46%) than for the better (18%). In comparison to the other countries considered here, however, Poland is in the best position, at least with respect to citizens' evaluation of the past development as well as the individual outlooks for the upcoming twelve months. One of four respondents expects an improvement and also one of four expects a decrease in the private financial resources.

To sum up, asking for the change over the last twelve months, we only find the Bulgarians perceiving the financial situation of their own household as having improved more than the general economic situation in the country. In all other countries, the comparison between the evaluations of both, the personal and general economic situation, be it for the past or the future show that the chances for improving the general economic situation of the country are seen as

Figure 3

Compared to 12 months ago, how has the own financial situation changed?





Figure 4

Over the next 12 months, how will the own financial situation change?



much better. And, in the respondents' opinion, the country's general economic situation in the past has been much better than the private financial situation.

3.1.3 Free Market Economy

The states' enterprise system plays a central role in every command economy. Its transformation into a market-oriented economy is most important for a successful development of industry, agriculture and services. The macro-economic objectives of reforms are the establishment of monetary, fiscal and financial trade regimes which will serve as stable basis for markets to operate and the establishment of market-determined prices in ruling economic activities. The enforcement of these objectives entails many known and unknown hindrances. Obviously, such a radical change cannot be achieved overnight - it requires a long, intricate process which can hardly be successful without citizens' support; a factor which has to be taken very serious. In all these countries, egalitarian attitudes are deeply rooted, together with a poor work ethic, a lack of discipline, poor qualifications and a low but guaranteed social security payment. When systemic changes take place, it must be remembered that the costs for everyone are going to be high, whereas the effects and benefits maybe fully observable much later.


However, according to the surveys on which these analyses are based, a majority of Bulgarians, Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles approves of the creation of a free market - appreciated most by Hungarians (62%) and least by Bulgarians (46%). About one third in each sample does not express an opinion on this matter (see Figure 5 and Table 3.E.app). This indicates, however, that the governments have to provide more information to make the principles and operations of a market economy more transparent, and to educate the people in this matter. In sum, most people from the four countries are committed to the free market system, although Bulgarians express somewhat more doubts than others.

3.1.4. National Economic Reform Programmes

The question about the attitude towards the national government's economic reform programmes (see Tables 3.F.1, 3.F.2 and 3.F.3) adds to the above mentioned question about the attitude towards a free market economy. Unfortunately, the question wording differs between the countries (see headlines of the three Tables); thus only the Bulgarian and Czechoslovakian (10/90) data allow a direct comparison.

Figure 5

Attitude towards the creation of a free market economy



In Czechoslovakia, where the economic situation is seen as less desolate than in the other countries, 22 per cent think that the reform programme is going too fast. By contrast, only 2 per cent hold the same opinion in Bulgaria, but almost seven of ten interviewees complain about the slow speed (Table 3.F.1). In January 1990, Czechoslovakians were asked if they think that the reform programme will improve the economic situation of the country. Thirty-six percent express their confidence that it will get better, followed by 23 per cent saying that it will get worse, and another 23 per cent expect no change at all (Table 3.F.2). In Poland (Table 3.F.3), opinions are divided. One third of respondents believes that the programme will be successful, another third thinks otherwise, and the rest is undecided. Consequently, in none of these countries are people very satisfied with the way reform programmes are going. The least positive opinion is reported in the economically poorest of the countries analyzed: Bulgaria.

Table 3.F.1

"THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE (NATIONAL) GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME IS GOING ... ?"
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS (10/1990)
Too fast	2	22
Too slow	67	33
About the right speed	11	31
Don't know	20	14
No. of respondents	1492	1490

Table 3.F.2.

"DO YOU THINK THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES WILL MEAN THAT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WILL GET BETTER, WILL GET WORSE OR REMAIN THE SAME OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS ?"
(Figures are in percent)

	CS 01/90
Will get better	36
Get worse	23
Stay the same	23
Don't know	18
No. of respondents	1478

Table 3.F.3.

"THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMME, INITIATED BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IS GENERALLY SUCCEEDING, OR NOT SUCCEEDING IN CURING THE ILLS OF THE POLISH ECONOMY AT THE PRESENT TIME?"
(Figures are in percent)

	PL
Succeeding	32
Not succeeding	35
Don't know	33
No. of respondents	1013

3.1.5 Economic Cooperation with the Community

The important role of the European Community in the transition process has been already emphasized. The Community regards the question of the new shape of political relations in Europe as especially important. In this context, financial aid as well as economic and political advice are the central tasks in the future. Negotiations are about to be completed for "Association Agreements", or "European Agreements", between the European Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Discussions are also being held in Bulgaria about negotiations on the matter. One of the most important aspects of these agreements is the anticipated convergence of each country with the Community. Each country has to ensure that its future legislation is compatible with the Community legislation. The preamble to these Agreements will also lead to greater political convergence. As negotiations are still in progress an overwhelming majority is in favour of these agreements (see Table 3.G.1.). Three quarters of the respondents in each country express their commitment to such an agreement with the European Community, while a negligible minority opposes it and around 20 per cent have not made up their mind.

Table 3.G.1.

"NEGOTIATIONS ARE ABOUT TO TAKE PLACE CONCERNING A TREATY OF ASSOCIATION FOR CLOSER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND (COUNTRY). WOULD YOU BE IN FAVOUR, OR AGAINST, SUCH A TREATY BEING CONCLUDED?"
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	H	PL
In favour	71	78	79	78
Against	2	2	3	4
Don't know	28	20	18	18
No of respondents	1492	1490	989	1013

A general question was asked about closer economic cooperation between the EC and Czechoslovakia (01/90) (see Table 3.G.2). Taking the two categories 'very much in favour' and 'quite in favour' together, about three out of five respondents (59%) are in favour of the initiatives, whereas two out of five do not express an opinion. Between January and October 1990¹, the approval of the plan increases and four out of five (78% compared to 59% in

1) This comparison assumes comparability of indicators in spite of different question wordings.

January) express a positive opinion and the proportion of undecided respondents is cut into half (20% compared to 39%).

Table 3.G.2.

**"HOW MUCH WOULD YOU WELCOME INITIATIVES BY THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY TO SET UP A PROGRAMME OF CLOSER ECONOMIC
COOPERATION WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA?"**

(Figures are in percent)

	CS 01/90
Very much in favour	26
Quite in favour	33
Not very much in favour	2
Not at all in favour	0
Don't know	39
No of respondents	1478

3.2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS

In order to meet the legitimate aspirations of the peoples in Central and Eastern Europe for a decent standard of living, the introduction of a market economy is necessary. However, it can never be successful without simultaneous political reforms. In the classic models of Central and Eastern European states up to 1989, politics was inseparable from economics. The economy was predominantly owned and ruled by the state, while its workers were subordinated to the Communist Party. This Party, however, did not manage the economy in a direct manner, but through the state apparatus - the government, the planning commission, ministerial bureaucracies and enterprises - and key positions were occupied by its members. Thus, the logic of political reforms tends towards an abandonment of the Party's leading role itself, and its replacement by open, competitive politics and some form of multi-party system. Political stability and national consensus, the key conditions for a successful and consistent implementation of economic reform, will heavily depend on the formation of effective governments, committed to, and in close agreement with the principles of economic reform, backed up by a majority of citizens.

By the end of March 1991 free elections had been held in all Central and Eastern European countries considered here, except for full elections to the Polish Parliament and in the Soviet Union. The free elections were held:

June 1989 in Poland

March/April 1990 in Hungary

June 1990 in Bulgaria

June 1990 in Czechoslovakia

Although only one year has passed after these free elections, remarkable changes have already taken place in these countries. The introduction of economic reconstruction is only one aspect of the entire process of systemic reorientation and renewal; the implementation of a democratic governance and a multi-party system is another, but bearing similar difficulties. Especially in these countries where neither free trade nor democracy are traditional elements, all social members, be it individuals or groups, have to be made familiar with the new rules, and - more important - they have to be convinced of their advantages and necessity.

3.2.1. Satisfaction with Democracy

A basic prerequisite for the functioning of democracy is the citizens' acceptance of political decisions and their voluntary support of the political system, which, in social sciences, is referred to as political support. It can be directed to different political objects, like political authorities, the regime, its institutions or the political order in general. One of the most frequently used indicators in comparative social research measuring legitimacy beliefs is the question about 'one's satisfaction with the way democracy works'. Since we know that everyday political events can influence the results of this indicator, it can not be interpreted as a measure of satisfaction with the system in general, especially in Central and Eastern European countries. In these countries, it is probably an indicator of output-oriented attitudes towards the performance of the political authorities.


In Central and Eastern European countries, the question referred to the way democracy is developing in the respective country. As Figure 6 and Table 3.H.1.app display, three out of four Hungarians (75%) are not satisfied with this development which is also the case for a majority of Czechoslovakians (55% in the October survey) and Bulgarians (54%). In Poland, satisfaction and dissatisfaction² are equally distributed (38%/37%) and one out of four

2 'Dissatisfied' combines the percentages of those being 'not very' and 'not at all satisfied', and 'satisfied' combines those being 'very satisfied' and 'fairly satisfied'.

respondents does not express an opinion. Only in East Germany, the development of democracy is evaluated positively with a majority (57%) being satisfied.

Figure 6

How satisfied are you with the way democracy is developing in (country)?



In the January 1990 survey in Czechoslovakia, a different question had been asked, where not 'the way democracy is developing' was referred to but 'the progress democracy had made so far'. At this earlier time point, more than 80% of Czechoslovakian interviewees were satisfied with the democratic progress compared to only 31% who were satisfied with the development of democracy in October 1990. Keeping in mind the limited comparability, these results nevertheless indicate that the optimism at the beginning of 1990 has been replaced by a more sceptical assessment of the situation of democracy in Czechoslovakia at the end of the year (see Table 3.H.2.app).

With respect to the GDR, the results of the survey in May 1990 can be compared with the results of EUROBAROMETER No 34 which included an additional sample in the five new Länder of the united Germany, for the first time. When asked how they assess the way democracy is developing in May 1990, a majority of East Germans (57%) is satisfied while two out of five (41%) are not satisfied. In autumn 1990, around half (49%) is satisfied with the way


democracy has developed in East Germany up to the date of political unification (3rd October 1990) and the other half is not satisfied (47%). Assuming comparability of indicators, a decrease of satisfaction (from 57% to 49%) emerges. This indicates that East Germans' optimistic expectations are developing into a more sceptical evaluation during the difficult process of social and economic unification.

Satisfaction with democracy in Central and Eastern European countries can be compared - in a limited way though - with satisfaction with democracy in the EC member countries. EUROBAROMETER No 34 in autumn 1990 included the question about the 'way democracy works' (see Table 3.I.app). In the European Community, we find the highest level of dissatisfaction with democracy in Italy (76%) which is comparable to that in Hungary (75%). Italians' traditionally high rate of dissatisfaction with democracy can be explained by the ever-changing government coalitions, frequent national elections, and the distance of Italians to the state and the political system in general. The highest level of satisfaction is found in West Germany (81%), followed by Luxembourg (72%), Denmark and Portugal (71%). On EC average, a majority (52%) is satisfied with democracy but with a large minority (43%) expressing dissatisfaction, whereby there is an enormous variation between the countries (see Table 3.I.app). In view of these EC results, the relatively low level of satisfaction with the development of democracy in a period of rapid political, social and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe should not be overinterpreted. In addition, comparisons between East and West have to be treated with caution because Central and Eastern Europeans have such a short experience with the emerging new democratic systems.

3.2.2. Assessment of the Overall Situation

When asked whether they 'feel things in (their country) are going in the right or in the wrong direction', an absolute majority of Czechoslovakians (53%) says that the course taken is right and for one out of four (26%) it is wrong. In Poland, there is a relative majority with a positive opinion (43% versus 30%), and in Bulgaria opinions are more divided with 38% saying 'right direction' and 34% claiming that it is the 'wrong direction' (see Figure 7 and Table 3.J.app). Though the question does not disentangle social, economic and political aspects, it can be considered to indicate an assessment of the overall political situation. At the time of the polls, more people in the three countries were optimistic than pessimistic.

"In general, do you feel things in (country) are going in the right or in the wrong direction?"



3.2.3. On the Application of the Left-Right Selfplacement Schema

In the surveys conducted in Central and Eastern European countries, a western standard instrument for measuring ideological orientations was included: the ten point left-right selfplacement scale with the words 'left' and 'right' at the two ends of the scale. This instrument is regularly included in EUROBAROMETER surveys and should also be included in future Central and Eastern European EUROBAROMETERS for reasons discussed in this paragraph.

Abstract principles like the left-right schema are generally seen as instruments that citizens can use to orient themselves in a complex political world. It allows individuals to make sense of a quickly changing environment and thus reduces the complexity of the political system. Further, the left-right schema is a symbol for the horizontal dimension of space. On the basis of the argument that it is impossible to organize our thoughts and beliefs without the use of spatial 'metaphors', the left-right schema has become one of the most generalized media of political communication. Left-right are called ideological labels, and the self-location on a left-

right scale is called ideological self-identification. In this context, ideology is considered to be a means of orientation guided by abstract principles, and ideological thinking is a form of deductive thinking in which specific attitudes are derived from abstract principles. The filling of the spatial metaphor with political objects is largely determined by the types of political conflicts that dominated during the institutionalisation of the left-right-symbolism in a country. In Western European countries, the meaning of left and right has been predominantly influenced by class and religious cleavages. From the manifestation of these conflicts in organisations and parties, and from the ideological interpretations of these conflicts, people select their specific understanding of left and right. Individuals do this selectively and if some elements from the overall set of meanings are correctly applied the individual left-right scheme is an (incomplete) reflection of the overall collective schema.³

The classical definition of Left and Right is: "By Left we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality, political, economic or social; By Right we shall mean supporting a traditional more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change towards greater equality." (Lipset et al. 1954: 1135). The inclusion of the left-right selfplacement scale in Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No 1 enables us to test its applicability – though in a limited way – and compare the results with results of standard EUROBAROMETER No 34. On the basis of this empirical information it has to be decided if the left-right schema should be applied in future Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETERS.

Results in the East and West

Table 3.K. shows the distribution of the left-right selfplacement scale in the member countries of the European Community, in spring 1990, and Table 3.L. displays the results of the surveys in Central and Eastern European countries. A first inspection of the tables reveals that a majority of respondents locate themselves in the centre of the scale (points 5 and 6) in most countries in the European Community and in all five Central and Eastern European countries. On EC average, the left wing comprises 28 per cent (points 1 to 4), the center 35 per cent (points 5 and 6), and the right camp 20 per cent (points 7 to 10), and one out of seven refuses to place himself on the scale (16%). In comparison with the EC average, the left camp is substantially smaller in Hungary (12%) and Poland (14%), and somewhat smaller in Czechoslovakia (23%). It is bigger in the GDR (32%). Conversely, the right camp is bigger in Hungary (33%), Czechoslovakia (34%) and Poland (30%) and smaller in the GDR (11%) than

³ This analysis of the left-right-schema is based on Fuchs/Klingemann 1989.

on EC average (20%). The size of the political camps in Bulgaria is the same as the EC average.

There is substantial variation between the countries of the European Community as well as between the Central and Eastern European countries. The frequency distributions, however, do not indicate systematic differences in results between EC countries and Central and Eastern European countries with respect to left-right selfplacement.

Recognition of the Left-Right Schema

A basic prerequisite for accepting the left-right-schema as a generalized medium of communication in the sphere of politics is that both the elites and the mass public are aware of the schema. The lowest level of understanding the schema is indicated by the individuals willingness or ability to locate himself on the scale. This willingness is called "Recognition". The second level of understanding is indicated by the individuals willingness or ability to verbalize a meaning for either "left" or for "right". The third level is indicated by the respondents ability to verbalize a meaning for both the "left" and the "right".

Table 3.K.:

LEFT-RIGHT-SELF PLACEMENT in Western Europe (percentages)

	B	DK	FRG	GR	E	F	IRE	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
1 Left	1	1	2	4	4	4	1	6	1	3	1	2	3
2	3	3	3	3	6	4	3	5	1	4	3	2	4
3	6	9	9	6	18	11	7	12	6	12	5	7	10
4	9	13	11	11	11	13	11	9	6	14	8	11	11
5	26	23	20	27	19	26	25	23	28	21	25	34	24
6	10	13	18	7	6	8	11	7	15	13	11	13	11
7	10	14	11	6	5	9	10	4	7	14	9	11	9
8	6	12	10	9	3	6	8	4	7	8	6	7	7
9	1	3	3	4	1	3	4	1	2	2	2	3	2
10 Right	2	2	2	7	2	1	3	2	4	2	2	2	2
REFUSED	8	3	5	11	13	8	3	12	6	2	13	1	7
DK	20	5	7	6	10	8	15	15	16	6	16	7	9

Source: Eurobarometer No 34.0, Autumn 1991

Table 3.L.:

LEFT-RIGHT-SELF PLACEMENT
in Central and Eastern Europe
(percentages)

	H	CS 10/90	DDR*	PL*
1 Left	2	2	4	3
2	2	5	5	1
3	2	7	13	4
4	6	9	10	6
5	7	29	12	28
6	34	15	35	17
7	17	13	9	11
8	7	12	5	7
9	7	5	4	3
10	2	4	1	9
11 Right			1	11
DK	14	1	1	12

* Instead of the 10-point-scale a 11-point-scale was applied here

BULGARIA	
Left	27
Centre	36
Right	23
DK	14

For Bulgaria, no detailed information was provided

On EC average (Table 3.K.), the level of "recognition" is 84 per cent, but with a considerable variation between the countries (Portugal 71% - Denmark, United Kingdom, the Netherlands 92%). In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Table 3.L.), a very high level of recognition is found in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (in 1990). The level of recognition in Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland is higher than it is on EC average. Unfortunately, the interviewees have not been asked to explicitly verbalize their understanding of left and right so that no means are available to assess the second and third level of understanding.

Ideological Self-Identification and Party Support

Another step to inquire the usefulness of the left-right scale in Central and Eastern Europe is to examine the relationship between the own ideological self-placement and the support of political parties. The results in the two countries where both types of indicators are available - the German Democratic Republic and Hungary (Table 3.M.) - show strong evidence that the scale has been used in a proper way. For example, a majority (57%) of the "old" Hungarian Socialist Party MSZP voters locate themselves on the left side of the scale and only very few (14%) on the right. Further, centre-right Populist Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) gathers support (vote intention) by respondents who either locate themselves in the centre (33%) or on the right (58%). Similar results were found in East Germany where a majority (67%) of interviewees who intend to vote for the CDU, a centre party, locate themselves around the middle of the scale. Moreover, no supporter of the former East German Communist party SED (now PDS) places himself on the "right" and only 14 per cent in the "centre". Unfortunately, the question about the intention to vote had not been asked in the other Central and Eastern European countries.

Table 3.M.:

VOTE INTENTION AND LEFT-RIGHT-SELF-PLACEMENT (percentages)

	HUNGARY		
	LEFT	CENTRE	RIGHT
Democratic Forum MDF - HDF	9	33	58
Free Democrats SZDSZ	16	43	41
Small holders party	14	36	51
Christian Democrats KDNP	9	44	47
Socialist Party MSZP	57	29	14
Young Democrats FIDESZ	14	50	36
Independent candidate	9	65	26
Will not vote	9	63	27
Don't know	11	47	42
No. of respondents			830

"Left" encompasses 1,2,3 and 4; "Centre" encompasses 5 and 6; "Right" encompasses 7,8,9 and 10 of the 10-point-scale

Table 3.M. continued:

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC			
	LEFT	CENTRE	RIGHT
Christian Democrats (CDU)	13	67	21
DSU	8	54	38
DA	17	67	17
Social Democrats (SPD)	42	53	4
PDS	85	15	—
Bündnis 90	54	44	2
Free Democrats	20	76	4
Greens and Women's Party	59	41	—
NDPD	—	100	—
No. of respondents			751

"Left" encompasses 1,2,3 and 4; "Centre" encompasses 5,6 and 7; "Right" encompasses 8,9,10 and 11 of the 11-point-scale

Consequently, the left-right-self placement of respondents in the two Eastern samples is largely in line with their party preferences which also indicates the widespread and adequate use of the overall left-right schema.

Ideological Self-Identification and Policy Positions

In a last step, we refer to the content of the left-right scale. As it is known from surveys in Western Europe left-right orientations go along with positions to a variety of political issues. In the surveys conducted in Central and Eastern Europe only one issue was included which can be used to investigate the relationship between an individuals' issue position and his left-right placement. This indicator is a question referring to the degree to which the state should get involved in market affairs. In Western democracies we traditionally find a demand for more state control on the "left". In the Central and Eastern European surveys we find a similar relationship in two countries, i.e. Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In Poland and Hungary, however, no significant relationship emerges (see Table 3.N.). Because we have only data for one particular issue, the evidence is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the results in two of the countries could indicate that the relationship between left-right orientations and issue positions in Eastern European countries is not dramatically different from those in Western democracies. This has of course to be tested for other political issues.

Table 3.N.:

**CORRELATION BETWEEN LEFT-RIGHT SELF-PLACEMENT AND ATTITUDE
TOWARDS A FREE MARKET ECONOMY**

BG	CS	H	PL
-.2081 sig.	-.289 sig.	-.015 not sig.	.008 not sig.

(Pearson's r)

3.2.3.1. Recommendations for the Application of the Left-Right Schema

To sum up, in Western countries, the left-right schema has long been the most general yardstick of political thinking and political communication between political elites and the citizens. As indicated in the introductory remarks, the meaning of left and right may vary between countries and it does not need to be identical between groups and persons. As a general schema however, it is a reflection of the underlying conflicts within western societies (and in the East it most probably will become). Meaning elements of the left-right schema may change or may be re-defined, but the overall quality of the left-right schema as a reference point for general ideological orientations will persist.

Our investigation of the application of the left-right selfplacement scale (i.e. the major Western standard survey instrument measuring ideological orientations) in surveys in Eastern Europe indicates that the respondents accept the scale to express their ideological orientations. They use the scale in a way which turned out to be largely consistent with their party preferences and issue positions. On the background of the above theoretical considerations and the empirical results we therefore recommend to regularly include the left-right selfplacement scale in surveys in Eastern Europe. We even propose to inquire the contents (i.e. individual meanings attributed to the labels) of left and right in these countries. This could be done by including open questions and questions about the important political issues in the countries. By analysing the relationship between issue positions and left-right orientations and its development over time, the institutionalization of the political conflicts and their political representation in the new Central and Eastern European democracies could be monitored.

3.2.4. SUMMARY

The bad economic situation in Central and Eastern European countries is reflected in the overwhelmingly negative evaluation of the national economic and the private financial

situation in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The expectations for the next 12 months are also predominantly pessimistic in both respects in these two countries as well as in Hungary. In Poland only, a majority positively evaluates the past and future economic situation, but the development of the own past and future financial situation is judged less optimistic than that of the national economy.

In view of these results, it does not come as a surprise that the introduction of a free market economy is evaluated positively. The assessment of the national economic reform programmes during this early period in the process of system change reveals a mixed pattern, which probably indicates the uncertainty of people in these times of dramatic changes. In Bulgaria only, a more sceptic assessment emerges and most people perceive the economic reform programme as going too slow. Economic cooperation with the European Community is uniformly welcomed in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland as well as in Bulgaria.

Turning to the assessment of democratic progress reveals that dissatisfaction with "the way democracy is developing" prevails in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction are about equally distributed in Poland and satisfaction prevails in the GDR in May 1990. In the cases where two surveys are available in 1990, i.e. GDR/Ex-GDR and Czechoslovakia, the results indicate a decrease of optimism which was expressed in early 1990. Compared to satisfaction with democracy in EC countries, however, the relatively low level of satisfaction with democracy should not be overinterpreted given the short time of experience with the emerged new democratic systems.

This interpretation is supported by the general evaluation of the overall situation whereby a positive assessment that things are going in the right direction prevails in Czechoslovakia and Poland and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria.

With respect to ideological orientations and their measurement in Central and Eastern European Countries, the results indicate that the left-right scale is accepted and properly used by the respondents so that it is recommended for further use in Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETERS.

4. ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The approval of the European Community by the citizens of its member states is indispensable for its functioning as well as for the realization of European integration. As with any other democratic system, acceptance and voluntary support of the political system by its members are constituting elements of its legitimacy. This can also be applied to the European level. Orientations towards the unification of Europe in general, and the European Community in particular, can be considered as legitimacy beliefs towards a supra-national political system.

With respect to supra-national systems, a distinction between support for political and social integration is made¹. Political integration conceptualizes 'vertical' relations between citizens and the (European) political system (e.g. attitudes towards the European Community and its institutions). Social integration refers to 'horizontal' interactions between populations of the member states (e.g. trust in other peoples or feeling as a European in addition or contrast to a more national identity).

Further distinctions are made between the objects of European orientations. Objects, in this context, are political authorities, the regime as a whole, and the political community². On the European level, the political community refers to the scope of the political system, e.g. admitting new member states. The regime refers to the nature of the political system (e.g. the extent of supra-national legislative power; the division of competences among different institutions). These objects are considered to be organized in a hierarchical way and support should be highest for the political community in general, followed by the political regime, and the political authorities. The general idea of this concept is that a withdrawal of support from incumbents does not automatically affect the more general support for the system as a whole.

After having classified possible objects, we additionally have to differentiate between dimensions of individual orientations. Frequently used distinctions in social research are salience, attitude, behavioural intention, and behaviour.

1 Lindberg, L. N. and Scheingold S. A. (1970), *Europe's Would-Be-Policy. Patterns of change in the European Community*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

2 Niedermayer, Oskar; Westle Bettina (1991): *Classifying Orientations Towards Internationalized Governance*, Paper Prepared for the Meeting of Group 2, BiG-programme of the ESF, Milano, May 1991 - Draft version.

1. Salience:

This dimension of psychological involvement of an individual refers for instance to the knowledge about or the perceived importance of an object.

2. Attitude

This dimension refers to the evaluation of objects. Depending upon the approach, one finds this aspect to be subdivided into different dimensions of attitude. But for the purpose of this report and a limited supply of indicators, we just use this broad category. Attitudes or evaluations can be based on diffuse and affective reactions, but they can also be based on "utilitarian" cost-benefit calculations.

3. Behavioural intentions

This dimension refers to the prerequisite of behaviour, i.e. the intention to act.

4. Behaviour

This dimension refers to overt behaviour or, in case of survey research, to the report of behaviour.

These conceptual distinctions of objects and dimensions of individual orientations are considered as heuristic tools to organize one's thinking about European orientations. They help to disentangle orientations which are of course interwoven in reality and provide yardsticks for the interpretation of the results.

General awareness of the European Community and more specific knowledge of the President of the Commission of the European Communities are investigated first (i.e. salience). The next section deals with reported behaviour concerning sources of information about the EC and more general pattern of media use. The second part of the chapter presents the results of two questions in the tradition of standard EUROBAROMETER surveys (attitudes towards the unification of Western Europe and towards a - possible - Community membership) and a general evaluation of the Community's aims. In contrast to these questions on attitudes towards political integration, the 'feeling as a European citizen' is the only indicator directed to the aspect of social integration. Finally, the evaluation of Western Aid programmes and a short summary conclude this chapter.


4.1. LEVEL OF INFORMATION AND MEDIA USE

4.1.1. Information about the European Community

Asking for people's awareness of the European Community, we find the salience to be very high in all countries but the European part of the USSR (see Figure 8 and Table 4.A.app). In the European part of the Soviet Union the European Community is known by less than half of interviewees. Most aware of the Community are Hungarians (87%), East Germans (86%) and Czechoslovakians (84%).

Figure 8

Have you ever heard of the EC?



Going into more detail, the people were given a list with five people's names in order to assess whether they know the name of the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors. Although a majority of those giving an answer, identified Jacques Delors as being the president, between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of all respondents choose the category 'don't know' (see Table 4.B.). Strictly speaking, most people of Central and Eastern Europe have heard of the European Community, but they lack detailed information about it.

Table 4.B.:

"HERE IS A LIST OF FIVE PEOPLE'S NAMES. CAN YOU TELL ME WHICH OF THE FIVE, IF ANY, IS THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AT THE PRESENT TIME?"

(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	PL
Jean Rey	1	1	1
Franco Maria Malfatti	0	1	2
Jacques Delors	19	22	13
Francois-Xavier Ortoli	0	1	3
Sicco Mansholt	0	1	0
None of them	4	6	3
Don't know	75	68	77
No. of respondents	1492	1490	1013

4.1.2. Media Use and Information Sources

Mass media in countries of Central and Eastern Europe have always been state controlled, and thus only cleared information has been made available to the public. After the deep changes in these countries, the dismantling of old structures, informal channels and 'opinion makers' has made fast progress, and a freer and private press has been introduced. The privatisation and liberalisation of mass media is especially important when taking into account its leading role for e.g. the European Community to inform and educate a broad public about its activities, plans and goals. Table 4.C³ shows patterns of media use in all the considered countries. As it is the case in Western democracies, national TV is used by a majority of people, followed by either national newspapers (Czechoslovakia), or the national radio (Poland and Hungary) or both, to the same extent (Bulgaria). In these countries, only few people get their information from foreign media. One exception, however, is Czechoslovakia, where 20 per cent of the respondents report to watch foreign TV stations in order to get information about daily politics; sixteen per cent report to listen to a foreign radio, and 7 per cent read foreign periodicals. In January 1990, 38 per cent of the Czechoslovakian respondents said that they follow foreign TV, 39 per cent follow foreign radio, and 13 per cent foreign press (see Table 4.D.).

³ This question was designed for multiple responses. Hence, the percentages within a column do not amount to 100%, as it is the case with single response questions.

Table 4.C.:

"HERE IS A LIST OF PLACES WHERE YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS INSTITUTIONS. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?"
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	H	PL
National newspaper	62	72	65	57
Foreign newspapers	5	6	2	2
National TV	73	80	87	87
Foreign TV	5	20	10	7
National radio	62	54	66	71
Foreign radio	9	16	5	9
National periodical	16	27	22	30
Foreign periodical	3	7	2	3
School or university	2	5	6	4
None of them	15	6	0	7
Other	1	1	4	4

Table 4.D.:

"I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER YOU GET INFORMATION BY MASS MEDIA ENTIRELY, TO SOME EXTENT OR YOU USUALLY GET INFORMATION OTHERWISE ?"
(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90			
Entirely	70		
To some extent	26		
Usually otherwise	1		
Don't know	3		
No. of respondents	1478		
"WHICH MASS MEDIA DO YOU FOLLOW, I AM GOING TO READ EVERY SINGLE ONE OUT OF THE SELECTED MASS MEDIA, COULD YOU PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU FOLLOW ANY OF THESE ?"			
	YES	NO	DON'T KNOW
Domestic press	95	2	3
Foreign press	13	84	3
Czechoslovakian radio	93	4	3
Foreign radio	39	58	3
Czechoslovakian TV	96	1	3
Foreign TV	38	60	3

Considering only the three most used media - TV, radio and newspapers - the frequency of their usage varies considerably from country to country. In Bulgaria, 67 per cent watch news on TV on a daily basis, for Czechoslovakia the respective figure is 60 per cent, and for Poland it is only 52 per cent. The second most popular medium for information gathering is reported to be the radio. The daily newspaper, however, is read every day only by 14 per cent of Polish respondents, by 47 per cent of Bulgarians, and by 54 per cent of Czechoslovakians. Basically, it is the Bulgarians and the Czechoslovakians who get more information about the daily politics through mass media. Polish interviewees are the least frequent users (21% never read a newspaper) of these media (see Table 4.E.).

Table 4.E.:

"AND NOW A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT NEWS IN GENERAL. THIS CARD SHOWS THE NUMBER OF TIMES PEOPLE MIGHT WATCH, LISTEN TO OR READ ABOUT THE NEWS. ABOUT HOW OFTEN DO YOU PERSONALLY...
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	PL
..... WATCH NEWS ON TV			
Every day	66	60	52
Several times a week	15	29	34
Once or twice a week	5	8	9
Less often	8	3	3
Never	3	1	1
Don't know	2	0	1
..... READ ABOUT CURRENT POLITICS IN DAILY NEWSPAPER			
Every day	47	54	14
Several times a week	19	25	24
Once or twice a week	8	11	24
Less often	11	9	17
Never	13	1	21
Don't know	3	0	1
..... LISTEN TO NEWS BROADCASTS ON THE RADIO			
Every day	68	52	47
Several times a week	14	25	24
Once or twice a week	3	9	12
Less often	8	12	8
Never	4	2	8
Don't know	2	0	1


Despite the fact that most people get information about political events on a daily basis, only 9 per cent of Bulgarian respondents feel (very or quite) informed about the European Community (see Figure 9 and Table 4.F.app). Eighteen percent of - less informed - Polish respondents feel that they are (very or quite) informed. Taking all countries considered into account, the highest proportion of (very or quite) informed people is found in Hungary (27%). Nevertheless, between 71 per cent (Hungary) and 78 per cent (Bulgaria) feel to be not (very or at all) informed about the European Community. This relatively low level of knowledge can have two reasons. Either people do not watch news or documentaries on the EC, or they are not provided by the TV.

Contrasting the degree of awareness of the European Community with the frequency of exposure and their considered importance for information gathering⁴, newspapers are found to be more efficient in distributing information than television; the radio is located somewhat in between the two. In other words, those people who get information about daily politics mainly via newspapers are more aware of the European Community than those who get this kind of information through television. Respondents whose main source of information is the radio heard about the EC less often than newspaper readers did but more often than TV users. Although very few people listen to foreign radio broadcasts or read foreign magazines, it is a very good means for informing people (96% of the foreign periodical readers have heard of the EC in contrast to 86% of the newspaper readers). The usage of foreign media is correlates highly with higher education. The TV definitely reaches the broadest public, but daily newspapers are a little more efficient in educating people.


⁴ Results are not included in this report

Figure 9


HOW INFORMED DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE EC?
BULGARIA




HOW INFORMED DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE EC?
CZECHOSLOVAKIA



HOW INFORMED DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE EC?
HUNGARY



HOW INFORMED DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE EC?
POLAND



4.2. EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

4.2.1. Unification of Europe and Membership of the Community

The following question is designed to measure the extent of one's general feeling of support for European unification and has a long tradition in Eurobarometer surveys. It aims at a general 'affective' orientation towards European Integration. The historical background of this indicator was the launching of the idea of European Integration after World War II with the purpose of eliminating the deeply rooted antagonisms between some countries of Europe.

In all the countries polled in Central and Eastern Europe, an overwhelming majority is in favour of a general unification of Western Europe, including their respective country. Only small minorities (between 3% in the European part of the USSR and Bulgaria and 14% in Poland) oppose such an idea. The lowest approval - although still very high - is found in the European part of the USSR (56%) (see Table 4.G.).

Table 4.G.:

"IN GENERAL, TO WHAT EXTENT ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE LEADING TO A FORMATION OF A "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE", INCLUDING (COUNTRY) ?"
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS	GDR ¹	H	PL	MOSC ²	USSR ²
For-very much	47	33	43	41	28	32	26
For-to some extent	24	46	40	40	41	33	30
Against-to some extent	3	6	4	3	10	6	6
Against-very much	3	1	1	2	4	3	3
Don't know	24	14	13	14	18	26	36
No of respondents	1492	1490	836	989	1014	504	1561

¹ The question in the GDR was: "ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE?"

² The question in the European part of the USSR and in Moscow was: "IN GENERAL, ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST EFFORTS BEING MADE TO UNIFY WESTERN EUROPE?"

Another standard EUROBAROMETER indicator has also been used in Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No 1. Instead of evaluating the EC membership of a country (standard EUROBAROMETER) the possibility of the country's entrance into the EC had to be evaluated here. This question is interpreted as an indicator of utilitarian evaluation since it can be assumed that the major motivation of Central and Eastern Europeans is economic improvement. Therefore it is not surprising that most Central and Eastern Europeans approve of membership within the next five years, and opposition to this notion is minimal, amounting only to two per cent in each country. Still, the proportion of interviewees who do not express a definite opinion (don't know) is rather high (Table 4.H.).

Table 4.H.:

"WHEN, IF EVER, DO YOU THINK (COUNTRY) SHOULD BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY? SHOULD IT BECOME A MEMBER ... ?"
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	H	PL
Now	36	25	51	55
In 5 years	20	37	25	17
In 10 years	4	12	2	2
later	6	5	3	4
Never	2	2	2	2
Don't know	31	19	17	20
No. of respondents	1492	1490	989	1014
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 01/90				
"IF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE FUTURE, WOULD YOU FEEL ... ?"				
Strongly in favour			37	
Somewhat in favour			22	
Somewhat opposed			1	
Strongly opposed			0	
Don't know			39	
No. of respondents			1478	


Table 4.H. continued:

GDR	
"ON THE WHOLE, DO YOU THINK THAT AN EC MEMBERSHIP OF A REUNITED GERMANY IS A GOOD THING, OR A BAD THING?"	
Good thing	78
Bad thing	1
Neither good nor bad	8
Don't know	13
No. of respondents	819

In line with the preceding question we find about half the respondents in the four countries where the question was asked to have a positive impression of the Community's aims and activities and very few people express a negative impression (between 1% and 3%). In any case, around half of the respondents consider themselves to be neutral or do not express any judgement (see Figure 10 and Table 4.I.app)

Figure 10

How are your impressions of the aims and activities of the European Community?




4.2.2. Feeling as a European Citizen

The indicator 'feeling as a European citizen' is the only one available for a measurement of the dimension of social integration, e.g. an increasing understanding between the populations of the European states. Hungarians show a substantial European identity since two out of three interviewees report to have these feelings (see Figure 11 and Table 4.J.app) 'often' or 'sometimes'. By contrast, only 21 per cent of the Bulgarians (sometimes or often) feel as European, whereas 59 per cent of them 'never' have this feeling. Slightly more than 50 per cent of the Poles and the Czechoslovakians 'often' or 'sometimes' feel as Europeans. Comparing these findings to the results of EUROBAROMETER 33 where Western European citizens were asked the same question, we find a somewhat higher frequency of "European feelings" in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. According to this indicator, however, people in these three countries are pronouncedly more European than the British and the Irish (see Table 4.K.app.).

Figure 11

Do you ever think of yourself not only as (nationality) but also European?



EC12 are figures from EUROBAROMETER 33

4.3. ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN AID PROGRAMMES

As mentioned in chapter 1, the PHARE programme is coordinated by the Commission of the European Communities. This aid programme established five priority areas for the recipients of the aid: (a) Improved Access to Western Markets, (b) Food Supply, (c) Training, (d) the Environment and (e) Investment/Economic Reconstructing. In the first Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER, people were asked to evaluate this programme. First of all, between 20 per cent in Bulgaria and 45 per cent in Poland have not even heard of it. For the Czechoslovakians, it sounds the most promising and one out of four (27%) expects it to have a major impact 'in helping improve the Czechoslovakian economy'. The respective figures are 22 per cent for Hungary, 19 per cent for Bulgaria and 10 per cent for Poland. Only a minor impact, however, is predicted by about one quarter of respondents in Bulgaria and in Czechoslovakia, and one out of three Hungarians and Poles. A small minority (5% to 8%) of respondents expects 'no real impact' (see Table 4.L.).


Table 4.L.

"HAVE YOU ANYTHING HEARD ABOUT ASSISTANCE TO HELP IMPROVE THE (NATIONAL) ECONOMY BEING PROVIDED BY 24 INDUSTRIALISED NATIONS AND COORDINATED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES? <IF YES> DO YOU FEEL THAT THIS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME IS HAVING A MAJOR IMPACT, MINOR IMPACT OR NO REAL IMPACT IN HELPING IMPROVE THE (NATIONAL) ECONOMY?"

	BG	CS 10/90	H	PL
No, not heard	20	21	23	45
Yes, major impact	18	27	22	10
Yes, minor impact	26	24	34	34
Yes, no real impact	7	5	8	8
Don't know	28	22	14	3
No. of respondents	1492	1490	989	1014

When asking for the fields in which cooperation should take place (see Figure 12 and Table 4.M.app) Poles report the strongest desire to cooperate with the European Community in most fields. Industry comes first (91%), followed by environment (90%) and agriculture (89%). These are also the three most preferred fields for cooperation in Bulgaria, but with a different ranking. Here, agriculture comes first (78%) followed by environment (76%) and by the industry (74%). In Czechoslovakia (10/90), the environment (91%) is named first, industry second (88%) and higher education is chosen third (87%). For Czechoslovakians (41%), Poles

(63%), and Bulgarians (58%) the defence sector is considered the least important for a cooperation with the European Community (the exact figures are listed in the appendix Table 4.M.app.).



4.4. SUMMARY

Most people have heard about the European Community which indicates that general saliency of the EC is rather high in Central and Eastern European countries. Those relatively few people who answer the question about the name of the president of the EC Commission mostly choose correctly. The main sources of information about the EC are national television, newspapers and radio while Czechoslovakians most often report using foreign information

sources. The reported frequency of using television, newspapers and radio as sources of political information in general is also highest in Czechoslovakia in comparison to Bulgaria and Poland. Only a mostly small minority of interviewees feels somehow informed about the EC, which indicates a substantial need for more information about the Community.

European Unification including the respective country is uniformly approved as a general aim in Central and Eastern European Countries and substantial majorities would welcome it if their country could become a member of the Community in the near future.

Turning from these indicators of political integration to social integration reveals that a European identity in addition to the national identity is reported slightly more often in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland than on EC average. It is even much more widespread in these countries than for instance in Great Britain and Ireland.

About half of the interviewees in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have not heard of Western Aid programmes or cannot assess their possible impact on the respective national economy. The other half expects some major or minor positive impact. From a list of policy areas in which cooperation could take place, only 'defence' and 'foreign policy' are mentioned by about less than two out of three interviewees in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In all other policy fields cooperation is welcomed by huge majorities.

In general, these results clearly reveal a very positive orientation towards the West and the European Community in Central and Eastern European countries.

5. COUNTRY PROFILES

5.0. BULGARIA AND POLAND

In this chapter we will concentrate on countries of the former Eastern Bloc individually. Only those questions will be analysed here, that were not repeated in other countries. Because all questions that were asked in Bulgaria and Poland have been discussed in earlier chapters already, these countries will not be mentioned here. All pertinent tables of this chapter are provided in the appendix, thus carrying the suffix .app.

5.1. THE SOVIET UNION

When Mikhail Gorbachev came into office in 1985, he began to reorganise Soviet society through Perestroika and Glasnost. These reforms were continuously thwarted by reactionary forces, which mounted into the failed coup of August 18, 1991. Prior to this putsch, Gorbachev declared his readiness to accept the fundamental switch to a multi-party-system and the basic prerequisites of a free market economy. For this, he found widespread support among citizens as well as among other politicians. This support was clearly demonstrated by the resistance to the putschists in August. Despite the fact that the fundamental factors of change are internal, the West has to play a very important role to guarantee further improvements. Because of its size and lagging position in economic reform as well as the political uncertainty - especially at present - the USSR is not eligible for the kind of close relationship with the EC, which is being envisaged for some other Central and Eastern European countries in the future.

"The Soviet government is no longer promoting pan-Europeanism and the Common European House as an alternative to NATO and to Brussels-centred integration but as something complementary to them" (Rollo, 1990:97). In two surveys, people were asked about their opinion towards these concepts (Table 5.1.B.app.). About two out of five of the Soviet interviewees express their undecidedness towards these plans by choosing the category 'don't know'. At the same time, another survey was conducted in the area around Moscow where the same question was asked. On average, people from this area seem to be a bit more informed and therefore more sensitive to daily political events (see Table 5.1.A.app.). Around Moscow, 5 per cent less are unable (or unwilling) to comment on either the Pan-European confederation or the Common-European-House. As far as approval of these concepts is concerned, people

than the rest of the European part of the USSR (53%) is. The same can be said about the evaluation of the Common European House. Most respondents from Moscow (64%) support this idea, as compared to 59% of the other European Soviet respondents (to some extent or very much). The proportion of respondents opposing the plan for a Common-European-House and for a Pan-European-Confederation is less than 5 per cent in both samples. Between these two alternatives, only a rough tendency for preferring the solution of a Common European House over the Pan European Confederation plan is visible, also in both samples. However, the government of the Soviet Union seems to concentrate more on a variety of different European institutions functioning in different spheres and helping to establish closer networks. A strategy which probably is the best to follow, at present times.

Only in the Moscow sample, questions were asked referring to a possible membership of the European Community of their own country (USSR) and other Eastern European countries. As it appears, neither the membership of one's own or another Eastern Bloc country is favoured by a majority of interviewees. Only about 10 per cent (strongly or somewhat) favour the possible membership of the countries listed in Table 5.1.C.app., with no significant discriminations between individual countries. As far as the amount of people (strongly or somewhat) opposing possible membership is concerned, about 70 per cent neither want their own country (European USSR) nor other countries to join the European Community at the time of the survey. On average, about one in five does not express an opinion.

Going more into detail, a time schedule was presented to the respondents in order to assess whether they think that certain countries will join the European Community sometime in the future. As Table 5.1.D.app. shows, only a very small minority (2%-3%) thinks that there will be no membership of these Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover, even 10 per cent claim, Czechoslovakia would never join the European Community. Almost half of the respondents refuse to express an opinion or to suggest a date for possible membership. As Table 5.1.D.app. shows, no dramatic differences emerge regarding the various countries. With respect to 1992, 16 per cent of the respondents of Moscow think that Hungary would be a member by that time, and 10 per cent think Poland would have joined by then. The countries most unlikely to be members by 1992 are Czechoslovakia (3%), Bulgaria (4%), and one's own country (4%). By the year 2000, about 50 per cent think that East Germany (46%)², Hungary (49%), and Poland (46%) will have joined the EC. The perceived probability of Czechoslovakia to ever joining the European Community is considered lowest in comparison to all other countries.

² 46%=(1992=7%) + (1995=21%) + by (2000=18%)

Any moves by the West which may appear to be a direct threat to Soviet security can be especially damaging. Conversely, to cooperate in speeding up the disarmament process would be helpful. Asking people to comment on future strategies with respect to troops reduction (Table 5.1.E.app.), we find a perfectly divided view. Half of the respondents agree upon the idea that "The USA and the USSR should immediately withdraw their troops from the territory of other countries" (46%), while the other 46 per cent of the respondents want them to stay for some more time in order to reduce the troops in a balanced way. When asking "who should be primarily responsible for ensuring peace in Europe", an overwhelming majority (73%) wants the CSCE member countries to be responsible for this very important issue. The two super-powers and the European Community are only mentioned by about one out of seven interviewees (Table 5.1.F.app).

In February 1990, about one out of four respondents (28%) claims that "most Soviet citizens would feel perfectly free to express their opinion", whereas one out of two (55%) is still cautious. It can be assumed that the answers to this question aiming at the status of the basic democratic right 'freedom of expression' would look different nowadays.

5.2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The revolution in Czechoslovakia started on November 17, 1989, when the military violently suppressed a demonstration initiated by students. As a reaction, thousands of people gathered in the streets to show their solidarity with these students. Shortly after that, Alexander Dubcek, the former president of Czechoslovakia, was able to speak to the people after 20 years of oppression. Further, a general strike was declared that finally led to the resignation of the official Communist Party, and Vaclav Havel, who had been discriminated and oppressed for years, became the President of Czechoslovakia on December 12, 1989.

Shortly after that - in January 1990 - a survey was conducted on behalf of the European Community, which will be dealt with in this section.

5.2.1. Issues and Problems and their Handling by the Government

In comparison to most of the other Central and Eastern European countries, Czechoslovakia is in the position of not having serious balance-of-payments or inflation problems to solve. Moreover, in contrast to the other countries, it does not have a very high debt burden. Thus, the priority in Czechoslovakia is to build on the economic reform processes which had already been started in 1989. Asking people to name the most urgent problems facing the country at present (Table 5.2.A.app.), environment is the issue most salient to the population (57%). Updating industry and technology is considered urgent by 40 per cent, followed by the issue of improving the political and social morality of society (31%). The extinction of the Communist Party's monopoly is seen similar urgent with 26 per cent. The least urgent problems, however, are 'public transport' (4%), 'drug problems' (5%), and 'Church/State relations' (6%). Turning from national issues to personal problems reveals that the most urgent problem facing the own family at the moment is the personal economic situation (Table 5.2.C.app.). A majority of interviewees (54%) names living costs/low income whereas the second and third ranking issues (health problems (28%) and working conditions for women with families (27%)) are mentioned by about one out of four.

With respect to the issues the government should concentrate on, the two problems considered to be the most urgent (economic reform (48%) and environmental problems (45%)) rank second and third and a core element of democratic systems, i.e. to hold "free elections", tops the list (54%) (Table 5.2.B.app). This rank order of issues the government should concentrate on also emerges when the interviewees are asked to select the one most important topic from the list of problems. One out of three (33%) chooses "free elections and democracy"

which clearly documents people's desire for the development of a democratic system (Table 5.2.D.app.).

5.2.2. Government Satisfaction, Confidence in Institutions and Political Competence

At the beginning of December 1989, a "Government of National Understanding" was established at the federal level and similar coalition governments were built in the two constituent units of the Czechoslovak federation: Slovakia and the Czech Republic (with the two provinces of Bohemia and Moravia). Asking people for their satisfaction with both the federal government and the two national governments, reveals a clear preference for the federal government (Table 5.2.E.app.). Three out of four (74%) respondents are (very or quite) satisfied with it, whereas about one out of two (56%) is (very or quite) satisfied with the respective national government. The rapid changes and the dominating task of preparing the election of the new federal and republic parliaments in June 1990 make it somewhat difficult to evaluate these results. They indicate, however, an optimistic perspective in January 1990.

Measuring the confidence in national institutions and organizations again reveals the good reputation of the federal government in January 1990. It is the most trustworthy (87% = a great deal plus quite a lot) institution for the citizens. Trust in the mass media is also very high (82%) and the national governments rank third (76%) followed by the movements "Public Against Violence" and the "Civic Forum" and the Parliament (72%-74%). Distrust is by far highest with respect to the Communist Party (84% have not very much or no confidence at all). It is also considerable regarding the Warsaw Treaty (73%), the police (64%), trade unions (64%) and the Courts of Justice (58%) (Table 5.2.F.app.).

Turning from confidence to perceived individual influence or political competence shows that opinions are divided. One third of the Czechoslovakians thinks that one can (most of the time or sometimes) have some effect on political decisions while another third thinks that one 'never' can and twenty-nine per cent think they 'rarely' can influence political decisions (Table 5.2.G.1.app.). With respect to opportunities for influencing the government, one third of the Czechoslovakians thinks that they have increased since September 1989. However, still 49 per cent do not see a change; but only 4 per cent perceive them as having decreased (Table 5.2.G.2.app.).

5.2.3. Past and Future Economic and Political Development

Despite numerous attempts to transform the economy (1958, 1966, 1980, 1987), Czechoslovakia basically remained a command economy. Rollo and Granville (1990: 51) assert that "the recognition in the 1980s of a declining growth rate and of industrial obsolescence led to the adoption of an intensive path of development but not a reform that could make the transition to a market economy. So this failed, too, and despite a strong rise in capital outlays, technological innovation remained slow and the industrial structure and machinery grew more outdated".

To begin with, some specific economic aspects like the expected development of prices reveals that more than 70 per cent of the interviewees expect prices to increase (a little or a lot) over the next twelve months (Table 5.2.H.app.). Considering the fact that most respondents answer that wages have gone up less than food prices during the last years (Table 5.2.I.app.), the situation looks rather pessimistic. The same tendency is visible concerning Czechoslovakians' expectations for the development of unemployment. Here, almost 70 per cent think that unemployment will increase (a lot or a little), 21 per cent, however, expect it to decline (Table 5.2.J.app.).

In general, about four out of five consider the introduction of a free market economy as essential for the economic development of Czechoslovakia. An even higher approval emerges with respect to the "need of a multi-party democratic system" (86%) and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country (93%) whereas a withdrawal of the country from the Warsaw Treaty is 'only' welcomed by forty-six per cent. (Table 5.2.K.app.).

With respect to a basic evaluation of the future course, one third of the interviewees thinks that there is a need for a fundamental change in society. Forty-three per cent, however, prefer an improvement to be accomplished by gradual reforms, while 14 per cent want the present situation to be protected (Table 5.2.L.app.).

Though four out of five Czechoslovakians welcome a free market economy, there is uncertainty regarding its implications. This is demonstrated by the assessment of statements referring to three central aspects of a free market economy: the performance principle, private property and responsibility/ freedom of the individual. The evaluation of these three aspects was measured using a 5-point scale where opposite statements referring to each aspect were placed at the two sides of the scale. Twenty-two per cent agree completely with the statement "There should be greater incentives for individual effort" whereas seventeen per cent agree

completely with "Incomes should be made more equal". One out of four does not express a preference (24%). Total agreement with the 'incentives' statement is 42 per cent versus 32 per cent for more 'equality of income'. Keeping in mind that these statements might be an imperfect measure of the performance principle, the results nevertheless show that a majority is in favour of it. With respect to 'private property', only a minority (19%) agrees that "Private ownership of business should be increased". One out of three (36%) favours more 'public ownership' and two out of five (43%) are undecided. The most preferred aspect is individual responsibility/ freedom. Thirty per cent fully agree that "Individuals should take more responsibilities", total agreement is 55 per cent. More responsibility for the state is welcomed by only 14 per cent and one out of four (27%) is neutral. To sum up, a relative majority (42%) favours the performance principle, an absolute majority (55%) welcomes more individual freedom, but only one out of five (19%) prefers private property (Table 5.2.M.app.).

This ambiguity is further demonstrated by the results of a question asking for the preferred future type of society. Two out of five (39%) want to have a type of Socialism which is more democratic than the one they had. Only one out of five (21%) wants an "essentially non-socialist" free market economy (Table 5.2.N.app.). So it does not come as a surprise that we still find 40 per cent of the respondents who favour (very much or somewhat) the idea of Socialism in contrast to only 26 per cent who (totally or somewhat) oppose it (Table 5.2.O.app.).

With respect to their attitudes towards the Soviet Union, people were asked whether they trust in Gorbachev's words to let Central and Eastern European countries make their own way without intervention, most people (59%) express optimism (a great deal and a fair amount). One third (33%) of the respondents does not trust (not very or not at all) his words (Table 5.2.P.app.). A similar assessment emerges regarding the chances of independent foreign policy of Czechoslovakia in January 1990 (Table 5.2.Q.app.).

Regarding orientations towards the European Community, hardly anybody thinks that it is unimportant for the future of Czechoslovakia. For three out of five (59%), it is very important or important (Table 5.2.R.app.). When asked to choose between the two plans for the Single European Market or the Common European House, most interviewees (45%) do not express an opinion. However, one out of three (34%) prefers the Common European House and one out of five (21%) the Single European Market (Table 5.2.S.app.).

5.2.4. Political Parties and Elections

In Czechoslovakia, and particularly in the Czechoslovakian Lands, there is a long tradition of active participation in clubs, societies and voluntary associations of all kinds dating back to the nineteenth century. This tradition has not completely been extinguished during the past forty years, and rapid emergence of a lively, pluralistic 'civil society' can be expected soon. The main division in the political culture runs along ethnic lines, between Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechs are characterized by an industrial tradition and thus a long established working class movement. A mainly secular, egalitarian and socialist political culture is found here. In the more rural Slovakia, conservative Catholicism dominates. The main political Communist Party in Czechoslovakia (CPCz) claims to have had about 200.000 members before the 1989-crisis. The attraction of Party membership - as it was the case in all other Central and Eastern European countries was to further one's own career prospects. (Rollo 1990: 28-29).

The CPCz did not outlaw all other parties after 1948. Rather, it tolerated the 'National Front' that comprised of four different parties which, of course, could not play the role of a real opposition. One of them is the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, which played a quite important role between government and opposition in the November crisis. Masaryk, its leader, has become a symbol for democratic, progressive political values. The re-establishment of a Social-Democratic Party could have drawn enormous support among the electorate, but, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, Social Democrats have become deeply divided on a variety of issues.

The main opposition force, the 'Civic Forum' was quickly set up in November 1989, with Vaclav Havel - probably the most well-known member of the coordination committee. The Civic Forum's sister organization in Slovakia is the 'Public Against Violence'. Their programme contains the demand for a pluralistic political and economic system, free elections, and radical ecological changes (Rollo 1990: 30).

In January 1990, people were asked which party they would vote for if elections were held tomorrow. The result shows that no clear overall preference is visible for a specific party. With 15 per cent, the Civic Forum is the party with the highest support. The Communist Party is chosen by 9 per cent - the same amount reached by the newly founded Greens (Table 5.2.T.app.). In order to evaluate these results one has to take into account the relatively low awareness of the new parties and their programmes at that time, e.g. only 77 per cent have ever heard of the Civic Forum, in January 1990 (Table 5.2.U.app.).

These party preferences can be contrasted with the results of the elections of June 8-9, 1990, where the Federal Assembly with its two chambers (Chamber of People and Chamber of Nations) was elected as well as the Czech and Slovak National Councils. Concentrating on the results for the Federal Assembly (Table 5.2.V.app) shows that the Civic Forum /Public Against Violence is the clear winner with about 46%. Their success is largely due to the integrating capacity of the leading figure Vaclav Havel, the old and new president of Czechoslovakia.

5.3. THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The former GDR differed in one very important respect from all the other Central and Eastern European countries: The entire population had a legal opportunity to emigrate to the western part of Germany as well as to get immediate citizenship there. In other countries this was only possible for people of ethnic German origin. During the period of communist rule, where migration was effectively prevented, East Germany maintained one of the more effective communist systems. Once the revolution succeeded and borders were pulled down, thousands of East Germans - especially the young and skilled - left East Germany and migrated to the western part. Consequently, East Germany and especially its economy was deeply destabilized.

Following the dramatic events in West German embassies in Budapest, Prague and Warsaw, and the opening of the Hungarian border to Austria in August and September 1989, restrictions on travel were completely lifted with everyone having the personal right to own a passport and to apply for a visa from October 20. Demonstrations of those who stayed in East Germany continued and spread - and so did the concessions made by the regime hoping to maintain power. Erich Honecker, the general secretary of the Communist Party (SED), resigned and was succeeded by Egon Krenz, a member of the same party. A new Politburo was formed, with Egon Krenz being the youngest member (52). The pressure of the people, however, continued so that the Politburo and Krenz had to resign in December 1989, after only three weeks in office. After a turbulent period at the beginning of 1990, the Volkskammer (East German Parliament) election took place on March 18, 1990. The clear victory of the Conservative Party (CDU) came as a surprise. It indicated, however, a strong preference for fast unification. By that time unification with West Germany was considered to be increasingly necessary since the East German economy seemed ready to collapse at any time, with 3000 people per day leaving for the western part of Germany (Rollo 1990: 31-38).

In May 1990, two months after the first free elections to the People's Chamber (Volkskammerwahl), a survey was conducted in - at that time still - separate country, East Germany. In this survey, people were asked if they would go and vote if there were elections held next Sunday, and which party they would vote for. Eighty-six per cent of the interviewees say that they would certainly go and vote, in comparison to 93¹ per cent who actually went to the ballot polls on March 18, 1990 (Table 5.3.A.app.). The results of the vote intention question are shown in Table 5.3.B.app. In addition, people were asked which party they had

¹ Figure taken from a report of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V.

voted for in the last national elections (Table 5.3.C.app). The outcome comes very close to the actual results of the Volkskammerwahl (Table 5.3.D.app.).

The election results (Table 5.3.D.app.) show a clear majority of support for a fast unification, with nearly half the votes going to the centre-right Alliance² for Germany and here mainly to the CDU. Comparing the official results with the outcome of the question recalling the vote, no significant differences are found but for the PDS. Two months after the elections only 11 per cent of the interviewees admitted to have voted for this party, although its actual turnout amounted to 16 per cent. With respect to the vote intention question, about 8 per cent less respondents intend to vote for the CDU (33%) in comparison to the actual turnout figures (40.8%). As far as the Social Democrats (SPD) are concerned, vote intention and actual votes do not differ.

Since October 3 1990, the official date of German unification, the people of former East Germany belong to the European Community. Prior to this event, in May 1990, people were asked to appraise the importance of the Community (Table 5.3.F.app.). Almost 90 per cent of the interviewees say that it is (very or fairly) important. Further, when asking whether West Germany had benefited or not from the European Community, we find close to 70 per cent saying that it had benefited from membership. When asking if the GDR had benefited from Community membership of the Federal Republic, a rather positive attitude is visible with three out of five respondents (62%) claiming their country benefited (Table 5.3.G.app). Further, the overwhelmingly positive attitude of East Germans towards the European Community is also demonstrated by 65 per cent of the respondents saying that they would be very sorry if they were 'told tomorrow that the European Community would be scrapped' (Table 5.3.H.app.), while just 1 per cent would feel relieved.

With respect to the future development of the Community, only one out of two (52%) has heard something about the introduction of the Single European Market (SEM) by 1992. When to assess its effects, about two out of five respondents (37%) say that it is a 'good thing', while one out of two (48%) doesn't give a comment.

² The Alliance for Germany comprised of the CDU, the Demokratischer Aufbruch and the DSU.

5.4. HUNGARY

The first free elections since 1947 were held in March 25 1990 and evoked a radical change in society, as it was the case in all the other Central and Eastern European countries. But, in contrast to the other countries, these changes happened peacefully and almost imperceptibly, without riots, mass demonstrations or a breakdown in public order. A reason for that might be found in the unique history of this country - with economic reforms having been introduced several times since 1956, although inconsistent and with many interruptions but always trying to overcome the totalitarian character of the Hungarian system. Despite the fact that ideological and cultural aspects were liberated and the political and administrative power of the state restricted, the economic system and in particular the question of private property remained untouched. By 1980, the limits of this type of reform process were reached and the country slid into a crisis. In the meeting of the Central Committee of the local Communist Party (HSWP) in March 1988, most reactionary forces had to resign and a social model of market economy was initiated.

In November 1988, a new government was formed under Miklos Nemeth, a young Harvard-trained economist and oppositional parties were formed in order to negotiate a peaceful transition to democracy. In October 1989, the Hungarian Parliament agreed in the summer negotiations, and Hungary was proclaimed a republic by its acting President Matyas Szuros (Rollo 1990: 19-20). The first free elections were held on March 25 (first round) and April 8, 1990 (second round). The results of the first round of general elections as well as the distribution of seats after the second round¹ are documented in Table 5.4.A.app..

The Centre-right Populist Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) emerged as the strongest party in the first round. It was closely followed by the more liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz), while the Independent Smallholders occupying the third place. In the first round, the turnout was only 63.2 per cent.

In the second round the HDF again turned out to be the clear winner. The position of the three strongest parties after the first round was confirmed in the second round. The turnout here was only 40 per cent. (Keesing's 1990: 37325 and 37380).

¹ The Assembly had 386 seats. Under the complex electoral system, there were 176 single-member constituencies, where results were decided either by overall majority in the first round, or in a second round to which candidates would go forward if they finished in the top three or obtain over 15 per cent of the votes. In the first round voters had to indicate their preference for an individual candidate or a party list. Out of more than 50 parties and associations established in the previous 18 months, 28 contested the election but only 12 at the national level. (Keesing's 1990: 37325)

In the October 1990 survey, interviewees were also asked to report their vote intention if there were a general election next Sunday (Table 5.4.B.app.). The answers differ from the results of the elections of five months ago. The strongest party (HDF) lost about 15 per cent, the SzDSz about 5 per cent. The 'Young Democrats' (FIDESZ), whose programme it is to return the country to the political and cultural ideas of Western Europe including a Western-style parliamentary democracy, gained the highest support. A possible explanation of the results could be that the just emerging multi-party system is in a period of transition where alliances between parties and voters are relatively loose and subject to change.

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This report on 'Public Opinion in Central and Eastern Europe 1990' presents results of surveys which were conducted in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union in 1990 on behalf of the European Commission. This set of surveys is labelled Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No. 1.

The first two chapters provide some background information on recent political events and the evolution of polling in this region. In the third and fourth chapter results are presented in a comparative perspective. Questions on attitudes towards the ongoing democratic and economic changes and attitudes towards Europe and the European Community which have been asked in several countries are included here. Results of questions which have only been asked in individual countries are presented in the fifth 'country profile' chapter.

After the revolutions that took place in Central and Eastern European Countries in 1989, the desolate situation of these countries was made public. The collapse of the communist regimes led to a formation of new democratic parties and the introduction of economic and political reform programmes. The international community offered stronger ties with these countries, initiated cooperation programmes like PHARE and generally provides assistance and counsel during the process of changing the economy and the political system. However, democracies need their citizens' support and approval. For these reasons, research on public opinion is important to monitor people's attitudes during the transition processes.

Concerning the evolution of polling in Central and Eastern Europe, chapter two documents that many research institutes are already in operation and a basic infrastructure for market research is available. Many institutes existed before 1989 and were usually linked to academies or universities. Previously, all investigations were exclusively undertaken for mediatic, academic and economic bodies. Concerning the quality of the data, a test (i.e. the evaluation of a fictitious ethnic group) in the surveys in Greater Moscow and the European parts of the Soviet Union revealed that honesty of response was much higher than in a US survey including a comparable test question.

As the third chapter shows, the bad economic situation in Central and Eastern European countries is reflected in the overwhelmingly negative evaluation of the national economic and the private financial situation (in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia). The expectations for the next 12 months are also predominantly pessimistic in both respects in these two countries as well as in Hungary. It is only in Poland, where a majority positively evaluates the past and future

economic situation, but the development of the own past and future financial situation is judged less optimistic than that of the national economy.

In view of these results, it does not come as a surprise that the introduction of a free market economy is evaluated positively. The assessment of the national economic reform programmes during this early period in the process of system change reveals a mixed pattern, which probably indicates the uncertainty of people in these times of dramatic changes. Economic cooperation with the European Community, however, is uniformly welcomed in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland as well as in Bulgaria.

With respect to the progress of democracy, dissatisfaction prevails in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction are about equally distributed in Poland and satisfaction prevails in the former GDR in May 1990. In the GDR/Ex-GDR and Czechoslovakia, where two surveys are available in 1990, the results indicate a decrease of optimism. Compared to democracy satisfaction in EC countries, however, the relatively low level of output-oriented satisfaction with democracy should not be over-interpreted given the short time of experience with the emerging new systems. This interpretation is supported by the positive assessment that things are generally going into the right direction in Czechoslovakia and Poland and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria.

With respect to ideological orientations and their measurement in Central and Eastern European Countries, the results indicate that the left-right scale is accepted and properly used by the respondents. It is recommended for further use in Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETERS to monitor the development of political camps and alliances between citizens and parties.

Chapter four shows, that general awareness of the EC is rather high in Central and Eastern European Countries. National television, newspapers and radio are the main sources of information about the European Community, whereby especially Czechoslovakians report most often the usage of foreign information sources. In this country, the reported frequency of using television, newspapers and radio as sources of political information in general is also highest in comparison to Bulgaria and Poland. Only a mostly small minority of interviewees somehow feels informed about the EC which indicates a substantial need for more information about the Community.

European Unification including the respective country is uniformly approved of in all Central and Eastern European countries. Substantial majorities would also welcome if their

country would become a member of the Community in the near future. A question on the aspect of social integration reveals that a European identity in addition to a national identity is reported slightly more often in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland than on EC average. This comparison is based on results of the standard EUROBAROMETER No 33 in spring 1990. A European identity is even much more widespread in these countries than for instance in Great Britain and Ireland. These results clearly indicate that the identification with Europe of people in Central and Eastern Europe does not significantly differ from that of Western Europeans.

About half of the interviewees in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have not heard of Western Aid programmes or cannot assess their possible impact on their respective national economy. The other half expects some major or minor positive impact. Cooperation between the individual countries and the European Community is highly welcomed in all policy fields.

Chapter five includes 'country profiles' of Czechoslovakia, the former German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the USSR. In the USSR, a larger sample in the European part of the country and a smaller one around Moscow have been drawn. The following comments refer to the Moscow survey. An overwhelming majority of interviewees is opposed to a possible EC membership of Warsaw Pact countries including the Soviet Union. But about half of them expect it to happen nevertheless. With respect to international safety policy, opinions are evenly split between an immediate withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from other countries and the option of a gradual and balanced withdrawal of troops. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is clearly preferred as the major responsible institution to ensure peace.

The survey in Czechoslovakia in January 1990 was the most comprehensive covering a variety of topics. The environment and outdated industry and technology are mentioned as the most urgent problems facing the country. The by far most urgent private problem is the financial situation. The survey was conducted shortly after the building of a "Government of National Understanding" in December 1990 whose main task was the preparation of free elections. So it does not come as a surprise that this task is chosen as the most pressing problem the government should handle before economic and environmental problems. This also explains the very high trust in and satisfaction with the government. In line with these results is the high amount of distrust in 'old' institutions, in particular the communist party and the high amount of trust in new groups like the 'Civic Forum'.

With respect to the development of economic reform a rise in prices and unemployment is expected during the next 12 months. Though the introduction of a free market economy is considered to be essential, there is uncertainty regarding its implications. The performance principle and more individual freedom and responsibility are widely welcomed, but only a minority prefers private ownership. This is in line with a result that more people are still in favour of socialism than against it and that many people would prefer a more democratic type of socialism in Czechoslovakia compared to Western countries. A rather high amount of confidence is expressed that future Czechoslovakian domestic and foreign policy will be free of Soviet influence. The clear victory of the Civic Forum / Public Against Violence in the May 1990 election could not have been predicted from the results of the vote intention question in January. It is most probably due to the enormous prestige and integrative power of Vaclav Havel.

The survey in East Germany took place about two months after the parliamentary election (Volkskammerwahl) in March 1990. The victory of the Conservative Alliance came as a surprise and the high support for the Alliance parties is confirmed in this survey. This indicates the strong preference for fast German re-unification in East Germany. In view of a membership in the European Community in the near future, the EC is evaluated very positive in May 1990.

The positive evaluation of the West in general and the European Community in particular indicates that the transformation from Communist to market-oriented democratic societies is widely accepted as a means to cope with the enormous problems in Central and Eastern Europe. However, there is a lack of knowledge about the West and uncertainty regarding the implications of the ongoing transitions. This is not surprising regarding the early period in the transformation process (1990).

As observed from the West, we also lack information about the societies in Central and Eastern Europe, where the ongoing transition processes encompass the economic, social and political sphere simultaneously.

Cross-nationally comparative surveys like the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER (CEEB) No. 1 help to reduce this information deficit. In future CEEBs, more comparable questions should be included in the surveys in the different countries than in CEEB No. 1. In addition to measuring the salience and evaluation of the European Community, questions on the economic and political situation should regularly be included. Thereby the understanding and evaluation of the principles and implications of the new

economic and democratic structures could be inquired. In analogy to standard EUROBAROMETER surveys, questions on socio-psychological (satisfaction with life) and socio-political attitudes (frequency of political discussion) should also be regularly included. They allow comparisons within the East and between East and West and can be used as background indicators to analyse attitudes towards Europe and the EC. Other topics of interest to be surveyed could be the evaluation of old and new institutions and groups, general evaluation (e.g. trust) of Eastern and Western peoples, ways of living, living standard, aspirations for the future, mobility to name but a few.

In addition to inquiring current issues and topics, the establishing of meaningful trends with as much comparability as possible within Central and Eastern countries as well as between East and West should be aimed at in future Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETERS.

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APPENDIX

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A7

Table 4.J.app:

"DO YOU EVER THINK OF YOURSELF NOT ONLY AS (COUNTRY), BUT ALSO EUROPEAN. DOES THIS HAPPEN ... ?"

A7

Table 4.K.app:

"DO YOU EVER THINK OF YOURSELF NOT ONLY (COUNTRY), BUT ALSO EUROPEAN. DOES THIS HAPPEN ... ?" (EUROBAROMETER 33)

A7

Table 4.M.app:

"WOULD YOU WELCOME, OR NOT WELCOME CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND (COUNTRY) IN THE FOLLOWING FIELDS?"

A8

USSR

Table 5.1.A.app:

"AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE, MR. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, HAS SUGGESTED THE CREATION OF A "PAN-EUROPEAN-CONFEDERATION" OF ALL STATES IN EUROPE WHICH HAVE SEVERAL POLITICAL PARTIES, FREE ELECTIONS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND FREEDOM OF THE MASS MEDIA. HAVE YOU READ IN THE PAPER, SEEN ON TELEVISION, HEARD OVER THE RADIO, OR FROM OTHER PEOPLE, ABOUT THE PROPOSAL BY THE FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TO CREATE A "PAN-EUROPEAN-CONFEDERATION?"

A9

Table 5.1.B.app:

1 "IN GENERAL, ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST A "PAN-EUROPEAN-CONFEDERATION" OF ALL STATES IN EUROPE WHICH HAVE SEVERAL POLITICAL PARTIES, FREE ELECTIONS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND FREEDOM OF THE MASS MEDIA?"

2 "IN GENERAL, ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE?"

A9

Table 5.1.C.app:

"IF MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT WERE TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE FUTURE, HOW WOULD YOU REACT? PLEASE TELL ME FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING."

A10

Table 5.1.D.app:

"IF YOU THINK THESE COUNTRIES WILL JOIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SOMETIMES, THEN WHEN? BY 1992, 1995, BY THE YEAR 2000, AFTER THE YEAR 2000, OR NEVER? PLEASE TELL ME FOR EACH?"

A10

ZEUS

Table 5.1.E.app:

"SOME SAY THE USA AND THE USSR SHOULD IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE. OTHERS SAY, THEY SHOULD STAY TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL EVOLUTION, BUT THEY SOON SHOULD START REDUCING THEIR TROOPS IN A BALANCED WAY. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION?"

A11

Table 5.1.F.app:

"WHO SHOULD BE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING PEACE IN EUROPE: THE USSR, THE USA, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, OR ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, I.E. INCLUDING THE USA AND CANADA? PLEASE MENTION ALL WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE.

A11

Table 5.1.G.app:

"AMONG THE PERSONALITIES THAT I AM GOING TO READ OUT, WOULD YOU PLEASE TELL ME FOR EACH OF THEM WHETHER YOU WOULD LIKE HIM OR HER, IN THE FUTURE, TO PLAY A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN EUROPE, OR WHETHER THE PERSON IS UNKNOWN TO YOU?"

A12

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Table 5.2.A.app:

"WHAT ARE THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY AT THE MOMENT?"

A13

Table 5.2.B.app:

"WHAT ARE THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS FACING THE GOVERNMENT AT THE MOMENT? BY THIS I MEAN WHAT SHOULD THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT CONCENTRATE ON?"

A14

Table 5.2.C.app:

"WHAT ARE THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING YOUR FAMILY AT THE MOMENT?"

A14

Table 5.2.D.app:

"OUT OF ALL THESE PROBLEMS WHICH SINGLE ONE SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT CONCENTRATE ON THE MOST?"

A15

Table 5.2.E.app:

"AND HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH THE PRESENT FEDERAL (NATIONAL) GOVERNMENT?"

A15

Table 5.2.F.app:

"PLEASE LOOK AT THIS CARD AND TELL ME FOR EACH ITEM LISTED, HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE YOU HAVE IN THEM. IS IT A GREAT DEAL, QUITE A LOT, NOT VERY MUCH, NONE AT ALL?"

A16

Table 5.2.G.1.app:

"DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE LIKE YOURSELF CAN HAVE SOME EFFECT ON THE WAY POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE MADE?"

A17

ZEUS

Table 5.2.G.2.app:

"SINCE DECEMBER 1989, DO YOU FEEL THAT YOUR OWN OPPORTUNITIES FOR INFLUENCING THE GOVERNMENT HAVE INCREASED, STAYED THE SAME, OR DECREASED?"

A17

Table 5.2.H.app:

"AND OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS DO YOU THINK THAT THE GROWTH IN PRICES WILL BE A LOT, A LITTLE, REMAIN THE SAME OR WILL DECLINE?"

A17

Table 5.2.I.app:

"GENERALLY SPEAKING, WOULD YOU SAY THAT OVER THE LAST YEARS, WAGES HAVE GONE UP LESS THAT FOOD PRICES, MORE THAN FOOD PRICES OR WAGES AND FOOD HAVE KEPT PLACE WITH EACH OTHER?"

A18

Table 5.2.J.app:

"AND OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS DO YOU THINK THAT THE UNEMPLOYMENT WILL INCREASE A LOT, A LITTLE OR NOT AT ALL?"

A18

Table 5.2.K.app:

"PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT THE RECENT CHANGES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:"

A19

Table 5.2.L.app:

"PLEASE SELECT AMONG THESE THREE THE OPINION WHICH COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR OWN?"

A19

Table 5.2.M.app:

"WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS. PLEASE GIVE AN ANSWER ON THE FOLLOWING SCALE WHERE 1 MEANS THAT YOU COMPLETELY AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT ON THE LEFT, AND 5 MEANS YOU COMPLETELY AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT ON THE RIGHT OR YOU CAN CHOSE ANY NUMBER IN BETWEEN."

A20

Table 5.2.N.app:

"THERE ARE MANY VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SOCIETY. WHICH OF THESE ALTERNATIVE VIEWS COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR POINT OF VIEW?"

A21

Table 5.2.O.app:

"PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT SOCIALISM. BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF SOCIALISM, WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU ARE... "

A21

Table 5.2.P.app:

"THE SOVIET UNION HAS SAID IT WILL ALLOW EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO "DO THINGS THEIR WAY". HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL IN FACT ALLOW CZECHOSLOVAKIANS TO MAKE THEIR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICS?"

A22

ZEUS

Table 5.2.Q.app:

"AND WHAT IF CZECHOSLOVAKIA SEEKS TO CONDUCT ITS OWN FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENTLY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT? HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALLOW CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO CONDUCT ITS OWN FOREIGN POLICY?"

A22

Table 5.2.R.app:

"WHETHER OR NOT YOU TAKE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MATTERS, DO YOU FEEL THAT THESE ARE VERY IMPORTANT, IMPORTANT, NOT VERY IMPORTANT OR UNIMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA?"

A22

Table 5.2.S.app:

"WHAT IS MORE URGENT TO YOU, THAT THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET COMES ABOUT BY 1992 OR THAT WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE COME CLOSER TOGETHER IN WHAT HAS BECOME REFERRED TO AS "THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE"?"

A23

Table 5.2.T.app:

"IF NATIONAL ELECTIONS WERE TO BE HELD TOMORROW, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU GIVE YOUR VOTE FOR?"

A23

Table 5.2.U.app:

"WHICH PARTIES ON THIS LIST HAVE YOU HEARD OF?"

A24

Table 5.2.V.app:

FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS

A24

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Table 5.3.A.app:

"IF THERE WERE VOLKSKAMMER ELECTIONS TO BE HELD NEXT SUNDAY, WOULD YOU GO AND VOTE?"

A25

Table 5.3.B.app:

"WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?"

A25

Table 5.3.C.app:

"AND WHICH PARTY DID YOU VOTE FOR IN THE LAST VOLKSKAMMER ELECTION?"

A26

Table 5.3.D.app:

RESULTS FROM THE ELECTION TO THE PEOPLE'S CHAMBER (VOLKSKAMMERWAHL)

A26

Table 5.3.E.app:

"NO MATTER IF YOU HAVE TIME TO INFORM YOURSELF ABOUT THE EC, DO YOU THINK OF THE EC AS:"

A27

Table 5.3.F.app:

"HAS THE FRG1 (GDR2) BENEFITED OR NOT BENEFITED FROM THE EC?"

A27

ZEUS

Table 5.3.G.app:

**"IF YOU WERE TOLD TOMORROW THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
WOULD BE SCRAPPED, WOULD YOU BE VERY SORRY, INDIFFERENT,
OR RELIEVED?"**

A27

Table 5.3.H.app:

"HAVE YOU EVER HEARD OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET?"

A28

Table 5.3.I.app:

**"DO YOU THINK THAT THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET COMING BY
1992 WILL BE A GOOD THING, OR A BAD THING FOR PEOPLE LIKE
YOU?"**

A28

HUNGARY

Table 5.4.A.app:

**PERCENTAGES OF VOTES GAINED BY PARTIES IN THE FIRST ROUND
OF ELECTIONS, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 386 ELECTIVE SEATS
AFTER THE SECOND ROUND**

A29

Table 5.4.B.app:

"WHOM WOULD YOU VOTE FOR NEXT SUNDAY?"

A29

Table 3.A.app:

"COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, DO YOU THINK THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN (COUNTRY) HAS"
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	PL
Got a lot better	0	2	6
Got a little better	3	10	46
Remained the same	5	13	14
Got a little worse	26	42	18
Got a lot worse	61	30	11
Don't know	6	3	5
No. of respondents	1492	1490	1014

Table 3.B.app:

"AND OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS, DO YOU THINK THAT THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN (COUNTRY) WILL CHANGE?"
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS* 01/90	CS 10/90	H	PL
Get a lot better	1	4	2	1	5
Get a little better	23	29	24	10	36
Stay the same	16	22	14	11	23
Get a little worse	18	31	27	34	9
Get a lot worse	24	7	24	40	5
Don't know	18	8	8	4	22
No of respondents	1492	1478	1490	989	1014

* In the January sample, the answering categories were: - improve a lot; improve a little, remain the same; decline a little; decline a lot.

ZEUS

Table 3.E.app:

"DO YOU PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THE CREATION OF A FREE MARKET ECONOMY, THAT IS ONE LARGELY FREE FROM STATE CONTROL, IS RIGHT OR WRONG FOR (COUNTRY'S) FUTURE ?"

(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	H	PL
Right	46	58	62	61
Wrong	24	13	13	14
Don't know	29	29	26	25
No. of respondents	1492	1490	986	1014

ZEUS

Table 3.H.1.app:

"ON THE WHOLE, ARE YOU VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED, OR NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS DEVELOPING IN (COUNTRY) ?"

(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	GDR ¹ (FRG)	GDR ² (GDR)	H	PL
Very satisfied	2	4	8	4	2	4
Fairly satisfied	27	26	36	53	17	34
Not very satisfied	34	43	44	33	44	32
Not at all satisfied	20	12	9	8	31	6
Don't know	17	15	4	3	6	25
No. of respondents	1492	1490	837	837	989	1014

People from East Germany were asked to evaluate the democratic progress both, in ¹West Germany and ²East Germany.

Table 3.H.2.app:

"HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE TOWARDS BECOMING A DEMOCRACY?"

(Figures are in percent)

	CS 01/90
Very satisfied	38
Fairly satisfied	45
Not very satisfied	12
Not at all satisfied	3
Don't know	3
No. of respondents	1478

ZEUS

Table 3.I.app.:

"ON THE WHOLE, ARE YOU VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED OR NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS IN (YOUR COUNTRY) ? WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE ... ?"
(Figures are in percent)

	B	DK	FRG	GDR	GR	E	F	IRE	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
VERY	5	15	19	5	8	14	5	11	2	20	12	6	8	9
FAIRLY	51	55	62	44	36	43	37	48	20	52	55	65	42	43
NOT VERY	26	22	13	33	34	31	32	20	43	19	25	14	30	29
NOT AT ALL	12	7	2	14	19	8	19	13	33	4	4	7	14	14
DK	6	1	4	3	4	5	8	8	3	6	3	9	6	5
NA	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: EUROBAROMETER 34.0 - Fall 1990

Table 3.J.app.:

"IN GENERAL, DO YOU FEEL THINGS IN (COUNTRY) ARE GOING IN THE RIGHT OR IN THE WRONG DIRECTION?"
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS	PL
Right direction	38	53	43
Wrong direction	34	26	30
Don't know	28	21	27
No. of respondents	1492	1176	1041

ZEUS

Table 4.A.app:

"AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, 12 STATES OF WESTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE FORM TOGETHER THE "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY". HAVE YOU EVER HEARD OF THE "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY", OR "COMMON MARKET" AS IT IS ALSO CALLED?"

(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	GDR ¹	H	MOSCOW ²	PL	USSR ⁴
Heard	70	84	86	87	62	75	49
Not heard	13	16	11	13	24	18	33
Don't know	17	0	3	0	14	7	18
No. of respondents	1492	1490	837	989	504	1014	1561

Table 4.F.app.:

"TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL YOU KNOW ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, HOW WELL INFORMED DO YOU FEEL ABOUT ITS AIMS AND ACTIVITIES. DO YOU FEEL ... ?"

(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	H	PL
Very informed	1	1	2	1
Quite informed	8	19	25	17
Not very informed	56	61	54	58
Not at all informed	19	15	17	15
Don't know	17	4	2	9
No. of respondents	1492	1490	989	1014

¹ The question in the GDR was: "HAVE YOU EVER HEARD OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?"

² The question wording in the USSR and the Moscow survey was: "AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, 12 STATES OF WESTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE FORM TOGETHER THE "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY". HAVE YOU READ IN THE PAPER, SEEN ON TELEVISION, HEARD OVER THE RADIO, OR FROM OTHER PEOPLE ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?"

ZEUS

Table 4.I.app:

**"WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE AIMS AND ACTIVITIES
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ARE GENERALLY ... ?"**
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	H	PL
Positive	47	48	48	51
Neutral	14	24	25	27
Negative	1	2	3	2
Don't know	38	27	24	21
No. of respondents	1455	1490	984	1014

Table 4.J.app:

**"DO YOU EVER THINK OF YOURSELF NOT ONLY AS (COUNTRY), BUT ALSO
EUROPEAN. DOES THIS HAPPEN ... ?"**
(Figures are in percent)

	BG	CS 10/90	H	PL	EC12*
Often	4	13	23	9	15
Sometimes	17	40	43	42	31
Never	59	36	30	41	51
Don't know	20	12	4	9	3
No. of respondents	1492	1490	988	1013	11581

* Source: EUROBAROMETER 33, spring 1991. Figures are of the EC average

Table 4.K.app.

**"DO YOU EVER THINK OF YOURSELF NOT ONLY (COUNTRY), BUT ALSO
EUROPEAN. DOES THIS HAPPEN ... ?"**
(Figures are in percent)

	B	DK	FRG	GR	E	F	IRE	I	L	NL	P	UK	EC12
Often	14	16	12	28	16	19	11	20	17	8	7	12	15
Sometimes	38	32	27	28	36	38	21	37	35	29	40	16	31
Never	46	50	53	41	47	41	67	43	42	60	45	71	51
Don't know	2	2	7	3	1	2	2	1	6	3	7	1	3

Source: EUROBAROMETER 33 - Spring 1990

ZEUS

Table 4.M.app.:

**"WOULD YOU WELCOME, OR NOT WELCOME CLOSER COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND (COUNTRY) IN THE FOLLOWING
FIELDS?"**

(Figures are in percent)

BULGARIA			
	welcome	not welcome	dont't know
Culture	74	2	25
Agriculture	78	2	20
Industry	74	3	23
Higher Education	73	2	25
Defence	58	7	35
Foreign Policy	67	4	30
Environment	76	1	23
Human Rights	74	1	25
Professional training	71	1	28
Youth Exchange	69	3	28

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 10/90			
	welcome	not welcome	dont't know
Culture	78	5	17
Agriculture	82	3	15
Industry	88	2	10
Higher Education	87	2	11
Defence	41	23	36
Foreign Policy	63	11	27
Environment	91	2	8
Human Rights	79	4	17
Professional training	86	2	11
Youth Exchange	85	3	12

POLAND			
	welcome	not welcome	dont't know
Culture	84	4	12
Agriculture	89	3	8
Industry	91	2	8
Higher Education	79	6	15
Defence	63	13	24
Foreign Policy	70	9	21
Environment	90	2	8
Human Rights	84	4	12
Professional training	82	4	15
Youth Exchange	85	4	11

ZEUS

USSR

ZEUS

Table 5.1.A.app.:

"AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE, MR. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, HAS SUGGESTED THE CREATION OF A "PAN-EUROPEAN-CONFEDERATION" OF ALL STATES IN EUROPE WHICH HAVE SEVERAL POLITICAL PARTIES, FREE ELECTIONS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND FREEDOM OF THE MASS MEDIA. HAVE YOU READ IN THE PAPER, SEEN ON TELEVISION, HEARD OVER THE RADIO, OR FROM OTHER PEOPLE, ABOUT THE PROPOSAL BY THE FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TO CREATE A "PAN-EUROPEAN-CONFEDERATION?"
(Figures are in percent)

	USSR	MOSCOW
Yes	31	39
No	48	42
Don't know	20	19
No. of respondents	1561	504

Table 5.1.B.app.:

1 "IN GENERAL, ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST A "PAN-EUROPEAN-CONFEDERATION" OF ALL STATES IN EUROPE WHICH HAVE SEVERAL POLITICAL PARTIES, FREE ELECTIONS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND FREEDOM OF THE MASS MEDIA?"

2 "IN GENERAL, ARE YOU FOR OR AGAINST THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE?"

(Figures are in percent)

	PAN-EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION 1		COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE 2	
	USSR	MOSCOW	USSR	MOSCOW
For very much	28	32	34	37
For to some extent	25	26	25	27
Against to some extent	2	1	2	2
Against very much	1	2	1	2
Don't know	44	39	38	33
No. of respondents	1561	504	1561	504

Table 5.1.C.app.:

"IF MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT WERE TO JOIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE FUTURE, HOW WOULD YOU REACT? PLEASE TELL ME FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING."

(Figures are in percent)

MOSCOW							
	BG	CS	GDR	H	PL	RO	SU
Strongly in favour	4	5	5	4	4	4	4
Somewhat in favour	5	6	6	7	7	8	6
Somewhat opposed	33	32	31	31	32	31	29
Strongly opposed	36	36	36	35	34	34	38
Don't know	22	22	22	23	22	23	22
No. of respondents	504	504	504	504	504	504	504

Table 5.1.D.app.:

"IF YOU THINK THESE COUNTRIES WILL JOIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SOMETIMES, THEN WHEN? BY 1992, 1995, BY THE YEAR 2000, AFTER THE YEAR 2000, OR NEVER? PLEASE TELL ME FOR EACH?"

(Figures are in percent)

MOSCOW							
	BG	CS	GDR	H	PL	RO	SU
By 1992	4	3	7	16	10	8	4
By 1995	14	7	21	19	18	16	14
By 2000	22	15	18	14	18	19	21
After 2000	13	19	8	7	8	11	12
Never	3	10	2	2	2	2	3
Don't know	44	46	44	42	44	45	46
No. of respondents	504	504	504	504	504	504	504

Table 5.1.E.app.:

"SOME SAY THE USA AND THE USSR SHOULD IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE. OTHERS SAY, THEY SHOULD STAY TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL EVOLUTION, BUT THEY SOON SHOULD START REDUCING THEIR TROOPS IN A BALANCED WAY.

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION?"

(Figures are in percent)

	MOSCOW
The USA and the USSR should immediately withdraw	46
The USA should withdraw but the USSR should stay	3
The USSR should withdraw but the USA should stay	0
Both should stay for some time, but reduce their troops in a balanced way	46
Don't know	5
No. of respondents	504

Table 5.1.F.app.:

"WHO SHOULD BE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING PEACE IN EUROPE: THE USSR, THE USA, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, OR ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, I.E. INCLUDING THE USA AND CANADA? PLEASE MENTION ALL WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE.

(Figures are in percent)

	MOSCOW		
	MENTIONED	NOT MENTIONED	DON'T KNOW
The USSR	18	9	74
The USA	15	8	77
The European Community	16	8	76
All Helsinki CSCE participant countries	73	8	19
No. of respondents	504	504	504

ZEUS

Table 5.1.G.app.:

**"IN YOUR OPINION, WOULD MOST SOVIET CITIZENS FEEL PERFECTLY FREE
TO EXPRESS THEIR PERSONAL OPINIONS IN AN INTERVIEW SUCH AS THIS, OR
DO YOU THINK SOME OF THEM MIGHT WANT TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT HOW
THEY RESPONDED?"**
(Figures are in percent)

USSR	
They would feel perfectly free to express opinions	28
They might want to be careful about how they responded	55
Not sure	14
No answer	2
No. of respondents	1561

ZEUS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Table 5.2.A.app.:

**"WHAT ARE THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY AT
THE MOMENT?
(Figures are in percent)**

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90	
Environment	57
Outdated industry and technology	40
Morality of society (political and social)	31
Finish the monopoly of the Communist Party	26
Provision of health care	25
Changes in working morality and motivation	24
Cost of living	24
Healthy food	20
Low school standards	18
Fear of inflation	17
Provision of social services	16
Bureaucracy	16
Constitutional and other legal reforms	15
Provision of housing	15
Corruption	15
Better choice of consumer goods	15
Convertible currency	13
Pensions	11
Provision of facilities for young families	11
Crime	11
Fear of unemployment	11
Relationship between Czechs and other socialist countries	9
Alcoholism	8
Dirtyness in public places	8
Access to information	7
Church/state relations	6
Drugs	5
Public transport	4
Other	18
Don't know	3

Table 5.2.B.app.:

"WHAT ARE THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS FACING THE GOVERNMENT AT THE MOMENT? BY THIS I MEAN WHAT SHOULD THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT CONCENTRATE ON?"
(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90	
Preparing free elections	54
Economic reform	48
Environmental problems	45
Social and health problems	32
Problems of the home market (supply of goods)	25
Schooling and education	20
Relationships with countries in the West	19
Reform of the legal and constitutional system	18
Reducing bureaucracy	15
Relationships with other socialist countries	13
Government support for private enterprise	12
Reform of agriculture	9
Public transport	4
Other	15
Don't know	3

Table 5.2.C.app.

"WHAT ARE THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FACING YOUR FAMILY AT THE MOMENT?"
(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90	
Cost of living/lack of income	54
Health problems	28
Problems of women with families having to work	27
Housing problems	21
Problems with schools and education	11
Fears of unemployment	10
Working too long hours	10
Living with in-laws	9
Care of the elderly	9
Divorce problems/marital problems	7
Other	14
Don't know	4

ZEUS

Table 5.2.D.app.

**"OUT OF ALL THESE PROBLEMS WHICH SINGLE ONE SHOULD THE
GOVERNMENT CONCENTRATE ON THE MOST?"**
(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90	
Preparing free elections and democracy	33
Economic reform	21
Social and health problems	11
Environment	16
Public transport	1
Relationships with other Socialist countries	1
Relationships with countries in the West	1
Schooling and education	2
Problems of the home market	4
Reform of the legal and constitutional system	5
Government support for private enterprise	1
Reducing bureaucracy	1
Reform of agriculture	1
Unemployment	4
Inflation	4

Table 5.2.E.app:

**"AND HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH THE PRESENT FEDERAL (NATIONAL)
GOVERNMENT?"**
(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90		
	FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Very satisfied	41	24
Quite satisfied	33	32
Neither	13	18
Not very satisfied	4	5
Not at all satisfied	2	3
It depends	3	4
Don't know	5	13

ZEUS

Table 5.2.F.app.:

"PLEASE LOOK AT THIS CARD AND TELL ME FOR EACH ITEM LISTED, HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE YOU HAVE IN THEM. IS IT A GREAT DEAL, QUITE A LOT, NOT VERY MUCH, NONE AT ALL?"

(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90					
	a great deal	quite a lot	not very much	none	don't know
Church	24	30	20	21	5
Army	14	38	29	17	3
Education system	4	41	39	11	5
Press, TV, radio	20	62	14	3	1
Parliament	24	48	20	6	3
Police	4	28	39	25	4
Civic Forum	34	39	15	9	3
Trade Unions	4	27	38	24	7
Public against violence	28	36	14	9	13
Federal Government	45	42	9	2	2
National Government	28	48	14	4	6
Warsaw Treaty	2	15	32	41	10
National Committees	4	28	42	23	3
Communist Party	3	10	20	64	3
Courts of Justice	4	33	40	18	6
Czechoslovakian Socialist Party	5	31	19	15	30
Czechoslovakian Christian Party	7	29	18	15	30

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Table 5.2.G.1.app:

**"DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE LIKE YOURSELF CAN HAVE SOME EFFECT
ON THE WAY POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE MADE?"**

(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
Most of the time	3
Sometimes	30
Rarely	29
Never	32
Don't know	6

Table 5.2.G.2.app:

**"SINCE DECEMBER 1989, DO YOU FEEL THAT YOUR OWN OPPORTUNITIES FOR
INFLUENCING THE GOVERNMENT HAVE INCREASED, STAYED THE SAME, OR
DECREASED?"**

(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
Increased	32
decreased	49
Stayed the same	4
Don't know	16

Table 5.2.H.app:

**"AND OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS DO YOU THINK THAT THE GROWTH IN
PRICES WILL BE A LOT, A LITTLE, REMAIN THE SAME OR WILL DECLINE?"**

(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
A lot (growth)	32
A little (growth)	39
Remain the same	17
Decline	2
Don't know	11

Table 5.2.K.app:

"PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT THE RECENT CHANGES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:"

(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 10/90		
	agree	disagree	don't know
A free market economy is essential to our economic development	79	4	17
We need a multi-party democratic system	86	3	12
Czechoslovakia should withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty	46	27	27
The Soviet Union should withdraw all its troops from Czechoslovakia	93	2	5

Table 5.2.L.app.:

"PLEASE SELECT AMONG THESE THREE THE OPINION WHICH COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR OWN?"

(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
There is a need of fundamental change in our social structure	31
We must protect our present social structure against all subversive forces	14
We must improve our society through gradual reforms	43
I am of other opinion	5
Don't know	7

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Table 5.2.M.app.:

"WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS. PLEASE GIVE AN ANSWER ON THE FOLLOWING SCALE WHERE 1 MEANS THAT YOU COMPLETELY AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT ON THE LEFT, AND 5 MEANS YOU COMPLETELY AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT ON THE RIGHT OR YOU CAN CHOSE ANY NUMBER IN BETWEEN."

(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90	
Incomes should be made more equal	
1	17
2	15
3	24
4	20
5	22
There should be greater incentives for individual effort	
Don't know	4
Private ownership of business should be increased	
1	7
2	12
3	43
4	18
5	18
Government ownership of business and industry should be increased	
Don't know	2
Individuals should take more responsibilities for providing for themselves	
1	30
2	25
3	27
4	8
5	4
The State should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	
Don't know	4

Table 5.2.N.app.

"THERE ARE MANY VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SOCIETY. WHICH OF THESE ALTERNATIVE VIEWS COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR POINT OF VIEW?"

(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
The Socialist society along the lines of what have already experienced in Czechoslovakia	2
A more democratic type of Socialism, as found in some countries in the West	39
A free market economy which is essentially non-socialist as found in some other countries in the West	21
Specific Czechoslovakian solution, unique to the country	28
Other	2
Don't know	7

Table 5.2.O.app:

"PEOPLE HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT SOCIALISM. BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OF SOCIALISM, WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU ARE... "

(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
Very much in favour	12
Somewhat in favour	28
Neither	30
Somewhat against	15
Totally against	11
Don't know	5

Table 5.2.P.app:

"THE SOVIET UNION HAS SAID IT WILL ALLOW EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO "DO THINGS THEIR WAY". HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL IN FACT ALLOW CZECHOSLOVAKIANS TO MAKE THEIR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICS?"
(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
A great deal	22
A fair amount	37
Not very much	23
No confidence at all	10
Don't know	7

Table 5.2.Q.app:

"AND WHAT IF CZECHOSLOVAKIA SEEKS TO CONDUCT ITS OWN FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENTLY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT? HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALLOW CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO CONDUCT ITS OWN FOREIGN POLICY?"
(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
A great deal	17
A fair amount	38
Not very much	28
No confidence at all	10
Don't know	8

Table 5.2.R.app.

"WHETHER OR NOT YOU TAKE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MATTERS, DO YOU FEEL THAT THESE ARE VERY IMPORTANT, IMPORTANT, NOT VERY IMPORTANT OR UNIMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA?"
(Figures are in percent)

	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90
Very important	26
Important	33
Not very important	3
Unimportant	0
Don't know	38

Table 5.2.S.app:

"WHAT IS MORE URGENT TO YOU, THAT THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET COMES ABOUT BY 1992 OR THAT WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE COME CLOSER TOGETHER IN WHAT HAS BECOME REFERRED TO AS "THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE"?"
(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90	
Single European Market	21
European House	34
Don't know	45
No of respondents	1478

Table 5.2.T.app:

"IF NATIONAL ELECTIONS WERE TO BE HELD TOMORROW, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU GIVE YOUR VOTE FOR?"
(Figures are in percent)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1/90	
Communist Party	9
Cz. Socialist Party	5
Cz. Christian Party	7
Cz. Social Democratic Party	4
Cz. Agricultural Party	2
Green Party	9
Democratic Party	7
Freedom Party	1
Civic Forum	15
Public against Violence	5
Other Party	2
Would not vote	15
Does not know yet	22

Table 5.2.U.app:

"WHICH PARTIES ON THIS LIST HAVE YOU HEARD OF?"

Communist Party	83
Cz. Socialist Party	67
Cz. Christian Party	67
Cz. Social Democratic Party	52
Cz. Agricultural Party	57
Green Party	71
Democratic Party	40
Freedom Party	38
Civic Forum	77
Public against Violence	69
"WHICH OF THESE PARTIES, IF ANY, DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THEIR OBJECTIVES OR PROGRAMMES?"	
Communist Party	41
Cz. Socialist Party	24
Cz. Christian Party	24
Cz. Social Democratic Party	14
Cz. Agricultural Party	18
Green Party	40
Democratic Party	11
Freedom Party	6
Civic Forum	39
Public against Violence	27

Table 5.2.V.app:

FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS
 (Figures are in percent)

	CHAMBER OF PEOPLE	CHAMBER OF NATIONS
Civic Forum/ PAV	46.6	45.9
CPCz	13.6	13.7
CDU/CDM	12.0	11.3
MSD-SMS	5.4	3.6
Slovak National Party	3.5	6.2
Coexistence	2.8	2.7
Others	16.1	16.6

Source: Keesing's Record Of World Events 1990. Volume 36, No.6, pp.37542-37543.

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Table 5.3.A.app.

**"IF THERE WERE VOLKSKAMMER ELECTIONS TO BE HELD NEXT SUNDAY,
WOULD YOU GO AND VOTE?"**

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	
Yes	86
No	10
Don't know, no answer	4
No. of respondents	837

Table 5.3.B.app.

"WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?"

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	
CDU	33
DSU	3
DA	1
SPD	23
PDS	8
BÜNDNIS 90	6
LIBERALS (LDP,DFP,FDP)	6
DBD	2
GREENS AND INDEPENDENT WOMENS' PARTY	2
NDPD	0
Others	0
Don't know, no answer	4
Refused	12
No. of respondents	837

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Table 5.3.C.app.

**"AND WHICH PARTY DID YOU VOTE FOR IN THE LAST VOLKSKAMMER
ELECTION?"**

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	
CDU	37
DSU	4
DA	1
SPD	20
PDS	11
BÜNDNIS 90	4
LIBERALS (LDP,DFP,FDP)	6
DBD	2
GREENS AND INDEPENDENT WOMENS' PARTY	2
NDPD	0
Others	1
Don't know, no answer	9
Refused	6
No. of respondents	837

Table 5.3.D.app.:

**RESULTS FROM THE ELECTION TO THE PEOPLE'S CHAMBER
(VOLKSKAMMERWAHL)**

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	
CDU (Conservatives)	40.8
DSU	6.3
DA	0.9
SPD (Social Democrats)	21.9
PDS (Former SED)	16.4
BÜNDNIS 90	2.9
LIBERALS (LDP,DFP,FDP)	5.3
DBD (Farmers' Party)	2.1
GREENS AND INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S PARTY	2
NDPD	0.3
Others	4
No. of those aged 18 and older	12.426.443
No. of actual voters	(93.38%) 11.604.418

Source: Bericht der Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. No. 56, p.8.

Table 5.3.E.app.

"NO MATTER IF YOU HAVE TIME TO INFORM YOURSELF ABOUT THE EC, DO YOU THINK OF THE EC AS:"

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	
Very important	50
Fairly important	39
Not very important	3
Not important at all	1
Don't know	8
No. of respondents	837

Table 5.3.F.app

"HAS THE FRG¹ (GDR²) BENEFITED OR NOT BENEFITED FROM THE EC?"

	FRG	GDR
Benefited	69	62
Not benefited	10	14
Don't know	21	25
No. of respondents	837	837

Table 5.3.G.app.:

"IF YOU WERE TOLD TOMORROW THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WOULD BE SCRAPPED, WOULD YOU BE VERY SORRY, INDIFFERENT, OR RELIEVED?"

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	
Very sorry	65
Indifferent	14
Relieved	1
Don't know	20
No. of respondents	837

Table 5.3.H.app.:

"HAVE YOU EVER HEARD OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET?"

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	
Yes	52
No	41
Don't know	8
No. of respondents	837

Table 5.3.I.app.:

**"DO YOU THINK THAT THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET COMING BY 1992
WILL BE A GOOD THING, OR A BAD THING FOR PEOPLE LIKE YOU?"**

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	
Good thing	37
Bad thing	3
Neither good nor bad	13
Don't know	48
No. of respondents	837

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Table 5.4.A.app.:

**PERCENTAGES OF VOTES GAINED BY PARTIES IN THE FIRST ROUND OF
ELECTIONS, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 386 ELECTIVE SEATS AFTER THE
SECOND ROUND**

HUNGARY		
	FIRST ROUND*	SEATS AFTER THE SECOND ROUND**
MDF - HDF	24.7	164
SzDSz	21.4	92
Independent Smallholders' Party	11.8	44
HSP	10.9	33
FIDESZ	8.9	21
Christ. Democr. People's Party	6.5	21
Independents		6
Joint Candidates		4
Agrarian Alliance		1

Source: Keesing's 1990: *37325 and **37380)

Table 5.4.B.app.

"WHOM WOULD YOU VOTE FOR NEXT SUNDAY?"

HUNGARY	
Democratic Forum MDF - HDF	10
Free Democrats SZDSZ	16
Small holders party	7
Christian Democrats KDNP	4
Socialist Party MSZP	4
Young democrats FIDESZ	23
Independent candidate	3
Will not vote	20
Don't know	2
No. of respondents	965

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