MARCH 1995 No. 5

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (18 COUNTRIES' SURVEY)

MAJORITIES EVERYWHERE DISSATISFIED WITH THEIR DEMOCRACY.



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGHLIGHTS

The European Commission's EUROBAROMETER surveyed 18,834 people in 18 Central and Eastern European countries face-to-face in their homes during November 1994 to assess public attitudes towards the European Union, as well as about political and economic change in the region.

* Despite positive GDP growth in many Phare partner countries during 1994, 51% of people from the region say their household incomes fell during that year. Less people are, however, pessimistic (30% "will get worse") about 1995. With GDP still falling in the CIS, results there are clearly worse (63% "got worse" 1994; 39% "will get worse" 1995). While support for the free market holds steady in Phare partner countries at two-to-one in favour, it falls in the CIS again (-7), standing more than two-to-one against almost everywhere.

* Support for the market economy surges in Romania (+19) compared to a year ago. Since 1991, support has increased 36 points there. Right at the other end of the scale, Russia (West of Urals) registered a 25 points drop over the same time period - almost three-to-one are opposed there now.

* The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union on 1st January 1995 is likely to make a big difference in the EU's standing in many Phare partner countries. In the Baltic states, only a quarter think their country's future is tied to the old EU of 12, but this doubles if the results of "other European countries like Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland, some of which may be joining the EU shortly" are added.

* Russia's perceived importance in other CIS countries grows again. Last time, 72% of Armenians saw Russia as where their country's future lies, an increase of 43 points over 1992. This time 71% of Belarussians express the same feeling, an increase of 21 points over 1993. Georgians still largely resist (27% "Russia") this pull. By contrast, Russia's perceived importance in Baltic countries continues to decline (-5).

* The image of the EU in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) improves substantially (+12) as double the number of people see their country's future tied to the EU compared to last time (+18 to 36%). Thus the EU overtakes America (26%).

* On average people in Phare partner countries believe the European Union and their country equally benefit from their mutual relationship. In the CIS, more say it is either an equal relationship or more beneficial to the EU than their own country.

* Absolute majorities in all Europe Agreement countries believe private business will be the clear winner as their country increases its ties with the EU. Relative majorities also believe their country's educational system and their health and social security system will benefit. Czech and Polish farmers are perceived as losers by most of their fellow country people. An absolute majority of farmers (58% versus 17%) in the region also believe they will lose out.

* Only 4% of Bulgarians were satisfied with the development of their democracy in the run up to their General Election of 18th December 1994. 91% were dissatisfied, a rise of 22 points over the past year alone.

INTRODUCING THE EUROBAROMETER

Standard EUROBAROMETER public opinion surveys have been conducted in the European Union (EU) every Spring and Autumn since 1973 on behalf of Directorate-General X for Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual of the European Commission. Up to now, each time around 12,800 persons of the 15+ age group have been interviewed EU-wide face-to-face on a nationally-representative basis in 12 Member States. Reports have been published on the results every June and December. A trends volume comes out every March. From 1995 in addition, a continuous tracking EUROBAROMETER of the general public as well as a top decision-makers' EUROBAROMETER will commence within the expanded European Union.

Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER started in Autumn 1990 when nationally-representative surveys were undertaken for the European Commission in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. For the second wave of research, the number of countries was expanded and included nationally-representative samples from Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Russia west of the Urals as well. Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.3 further added Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine, while taking into account the split of Czechoslovakia. Georgia and Moldova were not surveyed in 1993 while Georgia and Kazakhstan were added in 1994. In virtually all of the 18 countries covered by Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No. 5, a nationally representative sample of around 1,000 persons of the 15+ age group were interviewed face-to-face in their homes. The only major exception was Georgia, where Abkhazia was not surveyed for obvious reasons.

The survey was coordinated with the help of GfK EUROPE, Ad hoc Research, in cooperation with Fessel und GfK Austria. Dataprocessing was undertaken by GfK MAFO Germany.

Although the same technical standards for surveys available in most of the European Union cannot necessarily be expected to be found in Central and Eastern Europe at the present time, the results, cautiously read, do allow us a fascinating insight into the attitudes of the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe as they face revolutionary times.

In accordance with the normal practice for this type of survey, the European Commission disclaims all responsibility for questions, results and commentaries. This report, drawn up by the Survey Research Unit of Directorate-General X for Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual in cooperation with the External Information Unit of the same Directorate-General, is an internal document of the European Commission.

For further information, please contact:

Karlheinz Reif, Head of Unit,
Survey Research Unit
EUROBAROMETER
Tel.: ++/322.299.9441
Fax: ++/322.299.9205

George Cunningham, Administrator,
Project Manager, Central and Eastern
EUROBAROMETER
External Information Unit
Tel.: ++/322.299.9171
Fax: ++/322.299.9288

CONTENTS

MAJOR NEWS ITEMS AROUND TIME OF FIELDWORK: 4TH - 28TH NOVEMBER 1994

29 October	Hans van den Broek announced to succeed Sir Leon Brittan as EU Commissioner with responsibility for Central and Eastern Europe.
31 October	Luxembourg meeting of EU foreign ministers for the first time incorporates foreign ministers from Europe Agreement countries.
Early November	Big rises in Ukranian prices under new Government austerity programme.
4 November	HZDS-led bloc ousts interior and privatisation ministers in Slovakia during an extraordinary parliamentary session after deputies from outgoing coalition government walk out.
5 November	Proposed constitutional changes in Albania rejected in referendum.
9 November	Czech Government sets 1999 as its hoped-for target date for entry into the European Union. A Committee for Integration headed by the Prime Minister is formed. Sir Leon Brittan is reported by the Czech media to have confirmed 1999-2000 as "realistic" during an official visit to Prague.
9 November	The Bosnian Serb assembly declares a state of war and a general mobilisation in the face of large-scale territorial losses in north and south-western Bosnia.
13 November	Swedes vote 52:48% to approve their country's accession to the European Union.
16 November	The Ukrainian Parliament ratifies the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
21 November	Another electricity "black-out" in Georgia begins.
24 November	Poland and Hungary express concern at not being invited to the EU summit at Essen. All six Europe Agreement countries finally receive invitations on 28 November.
28 November	Norwegians vote 52:48% to stay out of the European Union.
28 November	The Twelve give a "green light" to start negotiations for association agreements with the 3 Baltic states. Opening negotiations with Slovenia remain blocked because of a dispute between Slovenia and Italy.

1. ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMS

1.1 Overall situation

1994 was the fifth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of old-style communism in many Central and Eastern European capitals. The event was generally more commemorated than celebrated. For life after the fall of the Wall had been harsh on the majority of citizens, whose high expectations in those heady days of "velvet revolutions" have yet to materialise.

Yet hope is perhaps just around the corner, at least in Phare[1]partner countries. Many of them are just experiencing their first GDP growth for a number of years. And while most citizens still say they have less money in their pockets than last year, the benefits of economic recovery - as long as it is sustained both in political and economic terms - may slowly filter through more and more people in the region.

By contrast, no hope seems yet in sight for the lives of most ordinary citizens living in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries surveyed this year. The increasingly-dangerous situation in Russia in particular has been further aggravated by the human and economic cost of the Russian army's full-scale assault on the city of Grozny in Chechnya, which started just after the completion of the fieldwork for this Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER survey.

The Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER also has its fifth anniversary this year. It continues to be the largest multi-country survey of the region in terms of number of countries covered and length of time-series for in-depth trend analysis.

[1]Phare (originally "Poland and Hungary: Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy") is the name of the European Union's assistance programme to Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. For the purposes of this survey "Phare" denominates the average values of the views of the permanent residents of the above countries, weighted by the respective country's population size.

COUNTRIES POLLED FOR CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROBAROMETER No.5 (Autumn 1994)

(European Union 12 data given for comparison)





Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, DG II for EU12, estimates and forecasts.
Conversion US$ 1.19 = ECU 1. GDP percapita at purchase price parity. n.d. = no data available.



TEXT FIGURE 1



TEXT FIGURE 2



TEXT FIGURE 3 EUROBAROMETER



TEXT FIGURE 4 EUROBAROMETER

HUNGARY: NET REPLIES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES



TEXT FIGURE 5 EUROBAROMETER

LATVIA: NET REPLIES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES



TEXT FIGURE 6 EUROBAROMETER



TEXT FIGURE 7 EUROBAROMETER

POLAND: NET REPLIES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES



TEXT FIGURE 8

EUROBAROMETER



TEXT FIGURE 9 EUROBAROMETER

EUROPEAN RUSSIA: NET REPLIES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES



TEXT FIGURE 10 EUROBAROMETER



TEXT FIGURE 11 EUROBAROMETER

It is time to remember that it was the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER that first revealed to decision-makers and opinion-formers around the world how quickly public disillusionment with the development of democracy had set in among most citizens in Phare partner countries (Autumn 1991 survey No.2) and just how many people felt that they themselves had been better-off under the previous political system (Autumn 1992 survey No.3).

These may have been considered surprising - even embarrassing - results at the time but these public attitudes lay the foundations for the return to power of so-called reformed communist parties in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and now Bulgaria.

Trends from at least four surveys are now available for almost[2] all Phare partner countries as well as for Russia, West of the Urals.[3]

In **Albania**, most people[4] continue to be more optimistic than pessimistic about whether their country's direction is right or wrong, back the idea of a market economy and believe there is respect for human rights[5] (see Text Figure 1). Albanians remain among the most positive concerning all those issues. However there are the first signs of erosion of confidence with significant falls concerning the "country direction" indicator in particular this time around.

---

[2]Slovenia was not surveyed before Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER (CEEB) N°3 (Autumn 1992).

[3]The whole of Russia is surveyed for the first time in CEEB5. Thus, while trends are for "European Russia", West of the Urals, all other current results are for "Russia".

[4]Results are for the PERMANENT RESIDENTS of these countries, not the ethnic groups of the region. Thus, in particular, "Estonians" and "Latvians" include all ethnic minorities permanently resident in those countries, whether they have the right to vote or not.

[5]In Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER N°3, an open-ended question was asked to clarify what people understood by the term "human rights". It showed that individual human rights concerns are expressed primarily in economic and social hardship terms, while those saying there is respect for human rights mainly give more conventional, political explanations, such as relatively newly-won freedoms.

Most Albanians have always been more dissatisfied than satisfied with the development of their democracy - according to our survey's findings - and this has worsened this time around. A majority of Albanians rejected proposed changes to their country's constitution in a referendum on 5th November 1994, just before fieldwork began for Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.5. Although some commentators praised Albanians for the maturity of their democracy in saying "no", the lack of a publicly-approved constitution clearly continues to impede that country's democratic development.

The most negative result comes this time from **Bulgaria**, where those dissatisfied with democracy out-numbered those satisfied by a mighty 23-to-1 shortly before Bulgarians went to vote on 18th December 1994 (Text Figure 2). One recalls how, in Autumn 1991, the hiatus surrounding the victory of the Union of Democratic Forces was recorded in Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.2 by a positive jump on all indicators. Bulgarian disillusionment with the development of their democracy is now on such a scale that experience elsewhere (see standard EUROBAROMETER trends[6] concerning the rather slow improvement in highly negative levels of dissatisfaction with democracy in Italy during 1994) shows confidence in the political system in Bulgaria is unlikely to recover dramatically in the short term with any change of parties in Government.

The **Czech Republic** continues to do well (Text Figure 3). Along with Albania it is the only country which has consistently three out of our four indicators more positive than negative. There has, however, been a gradual erosion of confidence taking place - particularly in support for the market economy - over the past four years. Along with many other countries, the Czech Republic has had its share of recent corruption scandals concerning its privatisation programme. Yet, compared to other countries, it has the largest private sector (65% of GDP) in the region and its privatisation programme is well in hand. Its market economy is therefore quite developed already.

[6]Standard EUROBAROMETER trends, covering the views of EU citizens since 1973, are available annually from DG X Survey Research Unit.

Estonia has also had a good run in our survey, particularly concerning more positive public attitudes towards their market economy and their country's direction (Text Figure 4). People's belief in their country's human rights record has slipped after major improvements registered in 1992 and 1993. In 1994, Estonia is estimated to have had the best economic growth of all Baltic countries (6% GDP growth). The citizenship issue between ethnic Estonians and their minorities is, however, not yet resolved.

Hungarian views about their market economy and human rights have remained largely stable and positive since a year ago (Text Figure 5). People also have become more positive about their country's direction and the development of their democracy[7] since the general election and formation of a new reformed communist-led government in July 1994. Nevertheless, the overall mood concerning those two latter indicators still remains largely negative.

Unlike Estonians, most **Latvians** and **Lithuanians** are becoming increasingly disillusioned (Text Figures 6 & 7). Popular support for the market economy looks in danger in both countries. In Lithuania, significant falls in people's positive attitudes towards their country situation and human rights record seem to have levelled off, but remain in the negative.

Poles' support in principle for the market economy remains stable and positive, despite news throughout 1994 of a political "go-slow" in privatising state enterprises (Text Figure 8). The honeymoon period of the new government is clearly over with Polish attitudes towards their country's direction, democracy and human rights falling back to at least the rather negative levels of Autumn 1992.

Romania goes against the trend this year, with a large rise in support for the market economy among its citizens (Text Figure 9). In Autumn 1991, it was the only country among Phare partner countries where outright support for the market economy was lacking. This year, it is top of the supporters' league. By contrast Romanian concerns about the state of their human rights continue to increase. Only Lithuanians among people living in Phare partner countries are more worried about the issue.

---

[7] The computing error which mixed up the CEEB1 trend result of the democracy indicator between Hungary and Poland in the CEEB 4 report has now been corrected.

Russia's future continues to be in doubt as matters get worse and worse (Text Figure 10). The Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.4a post-election survey in December 1993 already showed the mood of Russians, West of the Urals, to be more pessimistic than a month earlier[8]. This year, the situation worsens even further with significant falls on all four indicators, with belief that the country's direction is wrong increasing the most sharply.

Slovakia's[9] results are more mixed, being little different from last year's (Text Figure 11). The Slovak general election of 2nd October 1994 was indecisive, being followed by a care-taker administration during the fieldwork period of this Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER. Satisfaction with democracy remains virtually unchanged from a year ago: very much in the negative. Slovaks remain divided about the market economy but believe in general that human rights are respected (but note differences between the views of the ethnic majority and minorities on page 30).

Overall, virtually every country continues to experience problems, particularly concerning public satisfaction with how democracy is developing. All our trend indicators drop or roughly stay stable. Hungary seems to register the most hopeful result overall compared to last time.

Asked in Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.5 about **whether they feel things in their country are going in the right or wrong direction,** people in the CIS countries surveyed[10] are now more than four-to-one convinced that things are going in the wrong (66%) rather than right (16%) direction. This is a significant worsening of last year's situation (+11 "wrong"), largely because of the developing situation in Russia West of the Urals (+20 "wrong"). There is, however, some relief in Belarus (-10 "wrong") compared to last time (Annex Figure 1).

---

[8]Russia West of the Urals was surveyed twice in 1993, one month before (pre-election) and one month after (post-election) the Parliamentary elections. See CEEB4 report for details of the results.

[9]Note the sample size for Slovakia was smaller than the usual 1,000 persons interviewed until this survey: 471 for CEEB1; 354 for CEEB2; 734 for CEEB3; 684 for CEEB4.

[10]For the purpose of this survey, "people in the CIS" is the combination of the views of the permanent residents of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Russia and the Ukraine - as well as Central Asian Kazakhstan - weighted by population size. Note comparisons with CEEB4 are only for Armenia, Belarus, "European" Russia and the Ukraine combined, weighted by population size.

Most people (50%) in Phare partner countries also believe their country's direction is wrong, while a third say it is right (33%).

An absolute majority in Albania, the Czech Republic and Estonia says their country is going in the right direction. The results in Slovenia, Romania and Latvia are less clear-cut. Outright majorities believe their country is on the wrong path in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and especially Lithuania.

Pessimism in Phare partner countries increases since last time (+7 "wrong"), particularly in Poland (+16), Albania (+14) and Latvia (+12). However, significantly more Slovenes (+10 "right") now think their country is on the right track.

The CIS fares poorly. Outright majorities of at least two-to-one everywhere surveyed say their country's direction is wrong, with three-quarters of Armenians being the most negative in this respect.

Things look decidedly rosier in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) than last time. Now an absolute majority say things are going in the right (52%) rather than wrong (40%) direction.

1.2 Household Finances

There have been major improvements in the economic prospects of most Phare partner countries compared to a year ago. At the time of the last Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER - according to the statistics of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for 1993 - four countries' economies had grown - Albania's (11%), Poland's (4%), Romania's (1%) and Slovenia's (1%). The economy of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - hurt by the side-effects of UN sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro as well as Greece's own embargo of her - slid 15% in 1993. All CIS economies except Uzbekistan's declined as well.

According to the "Economist Intelligence Unit" estimates for 1994 and forecasts for 1995, the gulf between Phare partner and CIS countries will have grown bigger still (see map on pages 6 &7). With the sole exception of Bulgaria (with zero GDP growth), all Phare partner countries are estimated to have had positive GDP growth in 1994. What is more, every country is expected to have at least 2% GDP growth in 1995.

In the CIS, however, the economic slump looks set to continue, bringing misery to most of its people. In 1994, Georgia had the worst economic performance (-35% GDP growth) among CIS countries surveyed. The precipitous 1994 falls in GDP economic growth of Belarus (-22%), Kazakhstan (-25%), Russia (-15%) and Ukraine (-23%) look to soften in 1995 (-9%, -4%, -2% and -5% respectively), still bringing no real relief to their citizens. In CIS countries surveyed this year, only Armenia's economy is estimated to have grown (2%) in 1994.

Despite the rosier outlook in Phare partner countries, the effects of economic growth still seem not to have alleviated the lives of most of their citizens. **An absolute majority (51%) say (in November 1994) they think the financial situation of their household has got a little or a lot worse compared to twelve months ago.** A third (31%) says it stayed the same while only a sixth (17%) says it got better (Annex Figure 2).

This worrying result is compounded in the case of Poland. Poland's GDP exceptionally has been growing for three years now, after the radical economic reforms initiated in early 1990 caused a major short-term plunge in Polish living standards. Yet the benefits still have not flowed into most people's pockets. An absolute majority of Poles say that their household finances declined in 1994, exactly the same result as last year's survey when they were asked about their incomes in 1993. For 1995 moreover, most expect their household incomes will either stay the same or decline.

The other fast growing economy[11] - Albania - has never registered this problem. Despite high unemployment levels (estimated at 60% in towns), most Albanians continue to say their lot is getting better. In no other country is there anywhere near such confidence about what happened in 1994 (or indeed in previous years).

---

[11] Of course, Albania started from the lowest level of all Phare partner countries.

For 1994, absolute majorities in all CIS countries and in half of the Phare partner countries say their household incomes fell. Russia registers the most positive result in the CIS, with only 56% (sic!) saying their household incomes fell. Half of all Slovenes say their household finances held steady. Apart from Albania and Slovenia, the most encouraging results among Phare partner countries are in Estonia, Romania and the Czech Republic.

Compared to the results of last year (household income in 1993), the fall in incomes continues unabated in the CIS (-4 "got better") but has lessened somewhat among Phare partner countries (+4 "got better"), particularly in Baltic countries (-10 "got worse"). The pressure eases particularly in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (-19 "got worse"), Slovenia (-17), Romania (-11), Lithuania (-11) and Estonia (-10).

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a notable 25% of those interviewed say their household incomes increased (double the percentage registered in our last survey), while a third each say their incomes stayed the same or fell.

There is less pessimism among people in Phare partner countries about 1995. More Bulgarians and Romanians (both +17, compared to what they say about 1994) expect their household finances to increase in 1995. Certainly in no country are people more pessimistic compared to their experiences in 1994. An absolute majority of people from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia estimate their household finances will improve in 1995, the same proportion as in Albania. On the other hand, in the CIS, an absolute majority of Armenians fear their incomes will fall again (Annex Figure 3).

Thus, on balance, **people in Phare partner countries are divided about what will happen concerning their household finances in 1995 (25% "get better", 34% stay the same, 30% get worse"), while those in the CIS are both more pessimistic (16:23:39 respectively) as well as many more just not knowing what will happen** (22% in the CIS, compared to 11% in Phare partner countries).

People's hopes for 1995 must, however, be treated with caution. In last year's survey, expectations for 1994 in Phare partner countries were remarkably similar to this year's (1994 expectations - 26% "get better: 30% "stay the same": 32% "get worse"). Perceptions of the actual result in 1994 (17:31:51) was significantly worse than anticipated and only a little bit better than the actual perceived result for 1993 (13:29:56).

1.3 Market economy and economic reform

The well-known difference between people's views in Phare partner countries and the CIS on this topic continues to grow.

Asked **whether they personally feel that the creation of a market economy, that is one largely free from state control, is right or wrong for the future of their country,** people from Phare partner countries are convinced almost by a majority of two-to-one that the market economy is right (52%) rather than wrong (28%) for their country. By contrast, the citizens of the CIS say by a majority of more than two-to-one that a market economy is wrong (57%) rather than right (24%) for their country (Annex Figure 4).

Since last year, there has not been any change in the result for Phare partner countries as a whole. However there have been some major shifts of opinion in some individual countries.

The remarkable news is that support for the market economy has shot up in Romania (+19 "right") compared to last time. On the other hand, opposition to it has risen heavily in Bulgaria and Lithuania (both +13 "wrong").

Absolute majorities favour the market economy in Romania and Albania, while more are favourable than not in Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Hungary. However, opinion is divided in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Latvia this time around.

Looking at the countries surveyed in the CIS, we find majorities against the market economy everywhere, especially in Armenia (69% "wrong") and Russia (63% "wrong"). Indeed opposition to the market economy has significantly grown again (+12) in Russia and now stands at almost three-to-one against.

There also continues to be a majority (50%) against the market economy in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with a third in favour (35%).

Frustration at their economic condition means people want change. Thus many say that economic reforms are too slow, even if some of those very same people oppose the principle of a market economy. The protest coming from many in the CIS is that economic reforms are too slow (35%) or that they just do not exist (27% give this answer spontaneously). Merely 6% in the CIS say the reform process is going at about the right speed while 15% say it is going too fast (Annex Figure 5).

In Georgia[12], almost half of all those interviewed (45%) says spontaneously that there are no economic reforms and almost another third (29%) that they are going too slowly. More people in every CIS countries say there are no reforms than in any Phare partner country. The percentage of Russians West of the Urals saying there are no economic reforms increase the most (+10) among CIS countries surveyed last time.

The demand for economic reform continues unabated in Phare partner countries as well. 45% of people say economic reforms are going too slowly, a greater percentage than those who say economic reforms are going "too fast" (15%) and "about the right speed" (16%) combined. In fact, since a year ago, the percentage of those in Phare partner countries who think reforms are going too slowly has increased (+6), particularly in Romania (+18) and Slovakia (+15).

This time, absolute majorities in Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania think economic reforms are going too slowly, while they outnumber those who say they are going about the right speed or too fast combined in Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and Hungary.

---

[12]Georgia was surveyed for the first time in CEEB3 (Autumn 1992). Results are not directly comparable between then and now because Abkhazia could not be surveyed this time.

Only in the Czech Republic is there a rough balance of views, with as many saying economic reforms are going too fast or too slow (26% each), and a third (32%) saying the speed is about right. Since 1993, there has been a major fall (-18) in Czechs saying the speed is about right, with those saying it is too slow (+5) and too fast (+8) gaining ground.

In Phare partner countries, spontaneous comments that there are no economic reforms are highest in Bulgaria (15%), Latvia (14%), Estonia (12%) and Lithuania (10%).

Almost half of those living in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia say economic reforms are going too slowly, a quarter that the speed is about right, while a sixth say the pace is too fast.

1.4 Democracy and human rights

Amongst all indicators, the levels of dissatisfaction with the development of democracy everywhere in the region must create the greatest concern.

In the last survey, it was noted that there was little change in dissatisfaction levels between Autumn 1992 and Autumn 1993. **This time around, however, dissatisfaction with the development of democracy increases substantially in both Phare partner (+9 "dissatisfied", now 66%) and CIS (+8, now 78%!) countries.**

Only in Hungary does the percentage of those dissatisfied fall significantly (-8 "dissatisfied"), although two-thirds of Hungarians still remain unhappy.

More than two-to-one are dissatisfied with the development of their democracy in Phare partner countries as a whole (26% "satisfied": 66% "dissatisfied") while dissatisfaction levels are a staggering seven-to-one (11%:78%) in the CIS (Annex Figure 6).

In not a single country surveyed do those satisfied with their democracy outnumber or even equal those dissatisfied. The 'least worst' result is in the Czech Republic (44% "satisfied: 53% "dissatisfied"). Unhappiness with democratic development increases the most in Bulgaria (+22 "dissatisfied"), Poland (+14), European Russia (+12) and Romania (+11). The numbers of those dissatisfied also rise in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (+14).

Dissatisfaction levels in Phare partner countries are highest in post-election Slovakia (whose 2nd October 1994 general election did not deliver a decisive result) and pre-election Bulgaria.

People in Central and Eastern Europe were asked **to what degree they feel there is respect for individual human rights[13] in their country or not**. As with democracy, the situation has got worse since last time. In both Phare partner (+6 "not much/at all respect") and Euro-CIS countries (+5) surveyed last time, the percentage saying there is "not much/at all respect" has increased.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, many have lost their feeling of social and economic security which - under communism - constituted the bulk of what they understood to be "human rights".

Thus the deterioration in the perceived human rights situation continues, as it had done between Autumn 1992 and Autumn 1993 in both Phare partner countries (1992-3 trend: +8 "not much/at all respect") and the CIS (+10).

Now 55% of people living in Phare partner countries say there is "not much/at all" respect for human rights and a mighty 79% in the CIS say the same. 38% say there is a "lot/some respect" of human rights in Phare partner countries and the result is 17% in the CIS.

In Phare partner countries, the perceived decline in respect for human rights is the highest this time in Romania (+22 "not much/at all respect") and Estonia (+13). In the CIS, the problem grows the most in Belarus (+12). Similar trends are recorded in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (+11).

---

[13]See footnote 5 about the different meanings of the term "human rights" in the region.

Two-thirds of people living in Slovakia say there is "a lot/some respect" for human rights in their country, the highest result anywhere in the region. Nevertheless this disguises a rift in opinion among the ethnic groups within that country - while most of the ethnic majority is quite convinced (68:26) that this is the case, the ethnic minorities (n=120) are more divided (42:50) about it.

Most people in Hungary, Albania and the Czech Republic say there is at least some respect of human rights in their country. Everywhere else - in Phare partner countries as well as all CIS countries - the majority say there is "not much/at all respect".

Three-quarters or more of the people in all CIS countries say there is "not much/at all respect" except in Kazakhstan where the problem does not seem quite as acute (39% "a lot/some respect" : 55% "not much/at all respect").

Ethnic minorities are not much out of step with their ethnic majorities concerning their perceived human rights situation in the CIS as a whole. 74% of ethnic majorities say there is "not much/at all respect", compared to 72% of ethnic minorities. The same is also true broadly-speaking in Europe Agreement countries (54% and 59% respectively).

However, there is a substantial difference in the Baltic states. In Latvia, the ethnic majority is divided about whether there is respect (44%) or not (53%), while ethnic minorities (n=448) combined are two-to-one of the opinion that there is not (31:63). In Estonia, the gap in opinion (ethnic majority 51:45; ethnic minority (n=349) 32:67) is even greater.

The citizenship issue persists in Estonia and Latvia. Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.5 asked in all Phare partner countries surveyed whether their residents (aged 18 or over) had the right to vote. The result is that 98%-100% in all countries say they have the right to vote except those residents surveyed in Estonia (70%) and in Latvia (71%).

Taking the Baltics as a whole, the survey shows that 98% of ethnic majorities have the right to vote there, but less than half their ethnic minorities say they do (42%). In Lithuania, almost all ethnic minorities (n=167) say they can vote (96%) but this is certainly not the case in Latvia (42%) and particularly Estonia (24%).

2. THE EUROPEAN UNION

2.1 Where do countries' futures lie?

As political developments unfold in the region, shifts occur in people's perceptions of where their country's future may lie. Asked for the first time in Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.3, three key players were perceived as the most important forces in the region - the European Community[14], Russia and, to a lesser degree, the United States (Annex Figures 8-12).

The results this time show that **the entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden into the European Union on 1st January 1995 is likely to have a major beneficial impact on the EU's standing in many Phare partner countries** (Text Figure 12).

Russia's perceived importance in other CIS countries as a whole continues to grow while, by contrast, its position declines further in the Baltic states (Text Figure 13).

In countries that have signed "Europe Agreements" to gain associate status with the European Union - Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia - the European Union is where 35% of people say their country's future lies. Another 9% say their future is with "other European countries like Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland, some of which may be joining the European Union shortly". 5% say spontaneously it is with Germany.

[14]The European Union (EU) came into existence on 1st November 1993 when the Treaty of Maastricht came into force. The CEEB5 questionnaire introduces the subject of the EU by explaining that "the name 'European Community' was changed to 'European Union' last year".

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE? - FOR PEOPLE LIVING IN...



*"OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LIKE AUSTRIA,SWITZERLAND,SWEDEN AND FINLAND,SOME OF WHICH MAY BE JOINING THE EUROPEAN UNION SHORTLY."

TEXT FIGURE 12

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE? RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE IN THE CIS AND BALTICS.



TEXT FIGURE13

EUROBAROMETER

Looking at the results of individual "Europe Agreement" countries, the European Union is the top result in the Czech Republic (40%), Poland (37%), Romania (37%) and Bulgaria (33%). It is in first place in Hungary as well, but with only 22% (the spontaneous response "Germany" adds another 9%, though). The European Union has strengthened its position in Bulgaria (+9) compared to last year's poor result (24%, then a drop of 13 points from Autumn 1992). Any public concerns about the implications of delays in the adoption of the Interim Europe Agreement with Bulgaria in 1993 seems to have been largely cleared up.

In Slovakia, the European Union (32%) is first equal with "other European countries...some of which may be joining the European Union shortly" (28%). The impact of the latter group of European countries is also significant in the Czech Republic (27%) and Hungary (16%), but much less so in Poland (6%), Bulgaria (4%) and Romania (1%).

It is in the Baltic states where the new EU members will bolster the position of the Union the most. This is welcomed news as Europe Agreement negotiations with the Baltic states have just begun. Thus while only 24% of people there say the European Union is where there country's future lies, the same percentage say it is with "other European countries...some of which may be joining the European Union shortly". 4% believe it is specifically with Germany.

In Albania, the European Union continues its dominant popularity (64%) while it is also in first place in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (36%), where it overtakes (+18) the United States (26%). Far fewer people in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (-22) say spontaneously they should rely on themselves, compared to last time.

Slovenia is the only country where the European Union significantly loses ground (-10) compared to last time. Nevertheless, the increase in the results for "other European countries...some of which may be joining the European Union shortly" (+8) may improve the situation longer-term. Negotiations for a Europe Agreement with Slovenia are currently blocked because of a dispute between that country and Italy.

By contrast, Russia and the CIS draw closer together. Compared to the result in European Russia last time, "other CIS countries" (+7) have clearly overtaken "the United States" (-6) in that country. Now 28% of Russians say their country's future lies with other CIS countries while 21% say its future lies with the United States.

In other CIS countries, half (49%) say their future lies with Russia while the European Union and the United States only get 11% each. Last time, 72% of Armenians saw Russia as where their country's future lies, an increase of 43 points over 1992. This time 71% of Belarussians feel the same way, an increase of 21 points over 1993.

The result is that Russia's perceived importance is greatest now in Belarus (71%) and Armenia (70%). Then comes Ukraine (48%) and Kazakhstan (40%). Georgians still largely resist the pull (27%), although Russia still comes top there. In Kazakhstan, Turkey registers a significant result, coming second (18%) after Russia.

Since a year ago, the importance of the European Union falls significantly (-12) in the Ukraine.

On the other hand, Russia's perceived importance in the Baltic states continues to decline (-5), particularly in Lithuania (-14). Almost all Russian troops had left the Baltic states by 31st August 1994.

It is interesting to note that ethnic minorities in the Baltic States put the European Union in first place (29%), followed by Russia (21%). The ethnic majorities there place "other European countries...some of which may be joining the EU shortly" in first place (31%), followed by the European Union (25%).

2.2 The European Union's image in the region.

Asked whether their **impressions of the aims and activities of the European Union are generally positive, neutral or negative, more people in Phare partner countries say their impressions are positive (42%) rather than "neutral" (28%) or negative (6%).** Since last year, there has been a slight improvement overall, with a few more positive (+2) and less negative attitudes (-3) (Annex Figure 13).

On the other hand, the results within the CIS are far less positive for the EU this time around (-10 "positive"). Those who say they "don't know" also rose significantly (+8). In the CIS now, 28% view the European Union positively, 33% neutrally and 5% negatively. A third say they "don't know" in the CIS (35%) compared to a quarter (24%) in Phare partner countries.

In Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.4, we saw how the European Union's image has declined in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland over the previous three years. Trade disputes, delays in the implementation of Europe Agreements and unrealistically high expectations after the fall of the Berlin Wall may have all been factors in the decline.

This time attitudes towards the European Union stay roughly stable in Phare partner countries. The biggest rise in positive attitudes occurs in Slovenia (+7) and the biggest falls in Slovakia (-7) and Lithuania (-11) (Text Figures 14-25).

In the CIS, the greatest fall in positive attitudes occurs in Ukraine (-14), while those saying "don't know" rise (+16).

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia sees a big rise in the positive image of the European Union (+12), with less people being negative (-8) about it as well. In Autumn 1992, only 20% viewed the EU positively, 29% neutrally and 34% negatively. In Autumn 1994, 39% are positive, 34% neutral and only 16% negative.

Overall, the image of the European Union in Phare partner countries is more positive than neutral and negative combined in Albania, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria. As many people say it is neutral as positive in Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia and Hungary. In the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania, public attitudes towards the European Union are on balance more "neutral".



TEXT FIGURE 14



TEXT FIGURE 15



TEXT FIGURE 16



TEXT FIGURE 17



TEXT FIGURE 18



TEXT FIGURE 19



TEXT FIGURE 20



TEXT FIGURE 21



TEXT FIGURE 22



TEXT FIGURE 23

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN SLOVAKIA



TEXT FIGURE 24 EUROBAROMETER

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN SLOVENIA



TEXT FIGURE 25 EUROBAROMETER

It is very noticeable among Phare partner countries that a third of Bulgarians and Hungarians do not even have a view on such a basic question about the European Union, irrespective of the fact that the Europe Agreements are developing a special relationship between the European Union and their countries. In April 1994, Hungary was the first Central European country to apply formally for EU membership. Much of the general public in these countries clearly lacks general information about the EU to be able to make a judgement.

In the CIS, the image of the European Union is more positive than neutral or negative combined only in Armenia. It is as positive as neutral in Kazakhstan, Belarus and the Ukraine, while being more neutral than anything else in Russia and Georgia.

Despite these mixed results, it must be emphasised that **in no country - whether Phare partner or CIS - is there less than a two-to-one majority saying their image of the European Union is positive rather than negative. In no country does more than a sixth of the population hold a negative impression of the European Union.**

The overall impression from Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.5 is not that the image of the European Union is at all bad, but that the European Union is becoming less visible and indeed less interesting to people in some countries of the region.

2.3 Who benefits most from the relationship?

The European Union has been at the forefront of the world's assistance efforts in Central and Eastern Europe. Latest G-24 Assistance statistics show that EU Member states and EU institutions combined contributed around 30 billion ECU or 39% of world assistance given to Phare partner countries during the period 1990-94 (international financial institutions came second with 29%, then the United States with 12%). Of this, the Phare programme itself committed 4.3 billion ECU over the same period. Phare's new 1995-99 multi-annual assistance budget is projected to be a baseline figure of 1.08 billion ECU per annum. The 1995 Tacis programme budget for CIS countries is expected to be 0.47 billion ECU.

Data on trade between the European Union and the six associated countries during the first half of 1994 shows a continuing expansion of mutual trade and, because of a 29% rise in EU imports from associated countries, a significant decrease in the EU's trade surplus. Nevertheless, while Slovakia has a trade surplus, the other associated countries still have trade deficits with the European Union.

Asked **who benefits the most out of the relationship between their country and the European Union, the result in Phare partner countries is balanced. 20% say their country benefits the most, 20% that the European Union benefits the most, and 38% that both equally benefit** (Annex Figure 14).

An absolute majority of Albanians say their country benefits the most. In all three Baltic states, more people assess that their country benefits than believe the European Union to be the chief beneficiary. The relationship is more balanced in the cases of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and perceived as rather more beneficial towards the European Union in Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

The situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is also balanced (24% "our country": 38% "both": 26% "European Union").

In the CIS, views are divided between those that say that both parties benefit equally (31%) and those that say the European Union benefits the most (26%). Only an eighth believe their country gains more from the relationship (12%). A third cannot - or do not want to - give an answer to the question. In Russia, the predominant view is that the European Union gains most from the relationship (36%).

2.4 Communicating the European Union to people

How best can the EU communicate to people in the region? **Concerning people's information sources about the EU, it is hardly a surprise that national television comes first in Phare partner countries (80% "main source"), Russia (72%) and the rest of the CIS (53%). But television broadcasts from Russia (51%) are as important as national television broadcasts (53%) in the rest of the CIS** (Annex Figures 15-24).

Television reigns supreme everywhere except in the Baltic states, where the national press is as important as national television in Latvia and Lithuania and more important than national television in Estonia. In fact, Estonian television comes third as an important information source about the EU, after both Estonian newspapers and Estonian radio.

The most avid Western media users are Albanians, 30% of whom say they use western media as an information source about the EU (and 23% say "western television"), followed by 24% of Romanians, 23% of Slovenes and 22% of Slovaks. In Phare partner countries overall, western media in some form or other is used by 14% of the population. The least usage of any western media in this respect is in Poland (7%) and Hungary (8%).

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, television (83%) is twice as important as the next two information sources - national radio (38%) and national newspapers (32%). Other sources are of minimal use, none exceeding more than 7%.

In Phare partner countries, greatest readers of national periodicals are Slovaks (45%), Czechs (37%) and Poles (26%). Slovaks (14%) and Czechs (10%) most frequently get information about the EU at work. The Government is an important information source about the EU in Slovakia (13%), Albania (10%) and the Czech Republic (9%).

Schools/universities are obviously only a potential source for those who study in them. 30% of students in Europe Agreement countries, 26% in the Baltics and even 22% in the CIS outside Russia say it is a main source of information about the EU for them.

Nowhere does personal contact with EU citizens (3%), travel to EU countries (2%) or information provided directly from EU Delegations (2%) seem to have much direct impact on the general public among Phare partner countries. The same is true in the CIS as a whole.

The highest numbers of people in Phare partner countries saying they have no information sources about the EU are in Hungary (14%), Bulgaria (12%) and Lithuania (12%).

Within Russia, Russian television (72%), Russian newspapers (42%) and Russian radio (36%) totally dominate. No other source of information receives more than 6%.

In other CIS countries, the impact of Russian media is quite considerable. 73% of people living in Kazakhstan use Russian media, 62% in Belarus, 54% in Ukraine but only 36% in Georgia and 30% in Armenia. Indeed in Kazakhstan, Russian television (66%) is far more an important information source about the EU than Kazakh television (35%).

Georgia is clearly the most cut-off when it comes to hearing about the EU. 19% of Georgians say they have no information source about the EU. Neither (compared to other countries) is Georgian television (34%), Russian television (26%) and Georgian newspapers (25%) a major source for many. Because of the general turmoil in that country - with frequent electricity cuts - it is perhaps unsurprising. The results may be rather low in Armenia for much the same reasons.

This question was first asked in Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No.3 two years ago and its wording has been considerably modified this time around. Results are not very comparable as a consequence. The only very general comment that might be made relating to Phare partner countries is that national television has maintained its important role in reporting news about the EU with the apparent exception of Estonia and Hungary, while the importance of national radio in this respect seems to have diminished everywhere except Lithuania (where it is the lowest result of all Phare partner countries anyhow).

2.5 European integration - who think they will win or lose?

Asked **who is likely to benefit or lose out as ties between their country and the European Union increase, absolute majorities in all Europe Agreement countries say private business will be the clear winner.** Relative majorities also believe their country's educational system as well as their health and social services will benefit (Annex Figures 25-31).

On average, results for Europe Agreement countries also show more saying that government civil servants and state enterprises will benefit than not. But views on manual workers are divided, and people think on balance that farmers and low income groups may lose out.

Czech and Polish farmers are perceived as losers by most of their fellow country people. Moreover **most farmers themselves (58%) in Europe Agreement countries believe they will lose out.**

Most private sector owners are confident closer ties with the European Union will benefit them. Relative majorities of state enterprise workers and government civil servants think they may benefit too. Low income earners are divided about their fate, with almost half saying there will be no impact on them or that they just "don't know" (Annex Figure 32).

The most positive answers (except on the issue of civil servants) come from Romania, which also records the least number of people saying "don't know". However, Bulgarians and Hungarians are the most numerous in say they "don't know" in answer to all these questions.

Since the first time the question was asked two years' ago, all countries experience falls in the numbers of people saying that manual workers (from -12 "benefit" in Poland to -22 in Romania), low income groups (from -12 in Poland to -28 in Romania), their educational system (from -2 in Bulgaria to -18 in the Czech Republic) and health and social services (from -3 in Bulgaria to -22 in the Czech Republic) will benefit from closer ties with the European Union. Exceptionally, more Bulgarians than two years' ago consider that their state enterprises will benefit (+10) rather than lose out (-9) in the process.

ANNEXES

GRAPHICS OF FULL RESULTS

NOTES ON ANNEX FIGURES

* All numbers portrayed in the graphics are percentages.

* Respondents who gave no answer to a question or who answered "don't know" are not shown.

* Where more than one positive or negative answer is possible, the responses are often combined.

* Totals for Phare partner countries and the CIS (the part of the Commonwealth of Independent States surveyed this year) are weighted by the population size of each country associated with it.

* The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is shortened to its acronym FYROM. It is shown separately because it is not currently an official recipient of Phare assistance, nor - clearly - a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY - RIGHT OR WRONG ?/ EVOLUTION DU PAYS - BONNE OU MAUVAISE VOIE ?



Q. IN GENERAL, DO YOU FEEL THINGS IN (OUR COUNTRY) ARE GOING IN THE RIGHT OR WRONG DIRECTION ?/

EN GENERAL, ESTIMEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION DANS (NOTRE PAYS) EVOLUE DANS UNE BONNE OU DANS UNE MAUVAISE VOIE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 1

EUROBAROMETER

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - PAST 12 MONTHS / FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 DERNIERS MOIS



Q. COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, DO YOU THINK THAT THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAS GOT A LOT BETTER, GOT A LITTLE BETTER, STAYED THE SAME, GOT A LITTLE WORSE OR GOT A LOT WORSE ?/

PAR RAPPORT A CE QU'ELLE ETAIT IL Y A 12 MOIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION FINANCIERE DE VOTRE MENAGE EST ACTUELLEMENT BIEN MEILLEURE, UN PEU MEILLEURE, INCHANGEE, UN PEU MOINS BONNE OU BIEN MOINS BONNE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 2

EUROBAROMETER

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - NEXT 12 MONTHS
FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS



Q. AND OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS, DO YOU EXPECT THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD WILL GET A LOT BETTER, GET A LITTLE BETTER, STAY THE SAME, GET A LITTLE WORSE OR GET A LOT WORSE ?/

ET DANS LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION FINANCIERE DE VOTRE MENAGE SERA BIEN MEILLEURE, UN PEU MEILLEURE, INCHANGEE, UN PEU MOINS BONNE OU BIEN MOINS BONNE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 3

EUROBAROMETER

MARKET ECONOMY - RIGHT OR WRONG ?/
ECONOMIE DE MARCHE- BONNE OU MAUVAISE ?



Q. DO YOU PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THE CREATION OF A MARKET ECONOMY, THAT IS ONE LARGELY FREE FROM STATE CONTROL, IS RIGHT OR WRONG FOR (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE ?/

PERSONELLEMENT, PENSEZ VOUS QUE LA CREATION D'UNE ECONOMIE DE MARCHE, C'EST-A-DIRE TRES PEU CONTROLE PAR L'ETAT, SOIT UNE BONNE OU UNE MAUVAISE CHOSE POUR L'AVENIR DE (NOTRE PAYS) ?

ANNEX FIGURE 4

EUROBAROMETER

ECONOMIC REFORMS - TOO FAST OR TOO SLOW ?/
REFORMES ECONOMIQUES - TROP RAPIDES OU TROP LENTES ?



Q. THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING, DO YOU FEEL THAT (OUR COUNTRY'S) ECONOMIC REFORMS ARE GOING TOO FAST, TOO SLOW OR ABOUT THE RIGHT SPEED ?/

ETANT DONNE L'EVOLUTION ACTUELLE, ESTIMEZ-VOUS QUE LES REFORMES ECONOMIQUES (DANS NOTRE PAYS) PROGRESSENT TROP RAPIDEMENT, TROP LENTEMENT OU COMME IL CONVIENT ?

ANNEX FIGURE 5

EUROBAROMETER

SATISFACTION WITH DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY / SATISFACTION AVEC LA DEMOCRATISATION



Q. ON THE WHOLE, ARE YOU VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED OR NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS DEVELOPING IN (OUR COUNTRY) ?/

DANS L'ENSEMBLE, ETES-VOUS TRES SATISFAIT, PLUTOT SATISFAIT, PLUTOT PAS SATISFAIT OU PAS DU TOUT SATISFAIT DE LA FACON DONT LA DEMOCRATIE S'INSTALLE DANS (NOTRE PAYS) ?

ANNEX FIGURE 6

EUROBAROMETER

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS / RESPECT DES DROITS DE L'HOMME



Q. HOW MUCH RESPECT IS THERE FOR INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS NOWADAYS IN (OUR COUNTRY) ? DO YOU FEEL THERE IS A LOT OF RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS, SOME RESPECT, NOT MUCH RESPECT OR NO RESPECT AT ALL ?/

COMMENT RESPECTE-T-ON LES DROITS DE L'HOMME ACTUELLEMENT(DANS NOTRE PAYS)? ESTIMEZ-VOUS QU'IL Y A BEAUCOUP DE RESPECT POUR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME, UN PEU DE RESPECT, PAS BEAUCOUP DE RESPECT OU PAS DE RESPECT DU TOUT ?

ANNEX FIGURE 7

EUROBAROMETER

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?/
OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?



EUROPEAN UNION IS FIRST EQUAL WITH "OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LIKE AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN ETC." IN SLOVAKIA (32% VERSUS 28% RESPECTIVELY), LATVIA AND LITHUANIA (BOTH 24% VERSUS 23% RESPECTIVELY).THE EU IS FIRST PLACE IN HUNGARY, BUT WITH ONLY 22%.

ANNEX FIGURE 8

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?/ OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?



(NB. ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED / UNE SEULE RESPONSE PERMISE)

* RUSSIA EXCLUDED / RUSSIE EXCLUE

Q. AS THINGS NOW STAND, WITH WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED UP ? ... THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION (SPONTANEOUS: GERMANY) /

DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR (DE NOTRE PAYS) SOIT LE PLUS ETROITEMENT LIE ? ... LES ETATS-UNIS, L'UNION EUROPEENE (SPONT:ALLEMAGNE)

ANNEX FIGURE 9

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?/ OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?



(NB. ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED / UNE SEULE REPONSE PERMISE)

* RUSSIA EXCLUDED / RUSSIE EXCLUE

Q. AS THINGS NOW STAND, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED TO ?
...OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LIKE AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN AND FINLAND, SOME OF WHICH MAY BE JOINING THE EU SHORTLY; OTHER CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES /

DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERA LE PLUS ETROITEMENT LIE ?
...AUTRES PAYS EUROPEENS TELS L'AUTRICHE, LA SUISSE, LA SUEDE ET LA FINLANDE, DONT CERTAINS POURRAIENT REJOINDRE L'UE PROCHAINEMENT; AUTRES PAYS D'EUROPE CENTRALE ET DE L'EST.

ANNEX FIGURE 10

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?/ OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?



(NB. ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED / UNE SEULE RESPONSE PERMISE)

* RUSSIA EXCLUDED / RUSSIE EXCLUE

Q. AS THINGS NOW STAND,WITH WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED UP ? ...RUSSIA (FOR RUSSIA : "OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDANT STATES");TURKEY /

DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR (DE NOTRE PAYS) SOIT LE PLUS ETROITEMENT LIE ?... LA RUSSIE (POUR LA RUSSIE : " AUTRES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE DES ETATS INDEPENDANTS); LA TURQUIE

ANNEX FIGURE 11

EUROBAROMETER

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE ?/ OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS ?

	JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA/ JAPON, COREE DU SUD	SPONT: NONE OF THESE/ AUCUN DES DEUX
CZECH REPUBLIC	2	1
PHARE	1	1
BULGARIA	1	1
ESTONIA	1	1
ROMANIA	1	1
SLOVAKIA	1	1
LITHUANIA	0	0
LATVIA	0	1
SLOVENIA	0	1
HUNGARY	0	2
POLAND	0	2
ALBANIA	0	3
FYROM	3	4
KAZAKHSTAN	4	2
GEORGIA	2	4
CIS*	1	1
UKRAINE	1	1
ARMENIA	0	1
BELARUS	0	1

(NB. ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED / UNE SEULE RESPONSE PERMISE)

* RUSSIA EXCLUDED / RUSSIE EXCLUE

Q. AS THINGS NOW STAND,WITH WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED UP ? ...JAPAN/ SOUTH KOREA; (SPONTANEOUS:OTHER/ NONE OF THESE) /

DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR (DE NOTRE PAYS) SOIT LE PLUS ETROITEMENT LIE ?...LE JAPON/ LA COREE DU SUD; (SPONT.:AUTRE/ AUCUN)

ANNEX FIGURE 12

IMAGE OF EUROPEAN UNION / IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE



Q. AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, 12 STATES OF "WESTERN" EUROPE FORM TOGETHER THE "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY".THE NAME "EUROPEAN COMMUNITY" WAS CHANGED TO "EUROPEAN UNION" LAST YEAR. WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOUR IMPRESSION OF THE AIMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE, NEUTRAL, OR NEGATIVE ?/

COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ SANS DOUTE, 12 ETATS D'EUROPE "OCCIDENTALE" FORMENT LA "COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE". L'ANNEE DERNIERE, LE NOM DE "COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE" A ETE CHANGE EN "UNION EUROPEENNE". DIRIEZ-VOUS QUE VOS IMPRESSIONS QUANT AUX BUTS ET ACTIVITES DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE SONT EN GENERAL POSITIVES, NEUTRES OU NEGATIVES ?

ANNEX FIGURE 13

EU-(OUR COUNTRY) RELATIONS:WHO BENEFITS MOST?
RELATIONS UE-(NOTRE PAYS): QUI EN BENEFICIE LE PLUS ?



Q. WHO DO YOU THINK BENEFITS THE MOST OUT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ? IS IT THE EUROPEAN UNION, (OUR COUNTRY) OR DO BOTH EQUALLY BENEFIT ?

QUI PENSEZ-VOUS BENEFICIE LE PLUS DES RELATIONS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET L'UNION EUROPEENNE ? EST-CE L'UNION EUROPEENNE, (NOTRE PAYS) OU LES DEUX TOUT AUTANT ?

ANNEX FIGURE 14

EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU/
SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 15

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 16

EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



* FOR BALTIC STATES, EU DELEGATION IS IN STOCKHOLM.

Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE17

EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



* POUR LES PAYS BALTES, LA DELEGATION DE L'UE EST A STOCKHOLM

Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 18

EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE19

EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



* POUR LA SLOVAKIE, LA DELEGATION DE L'UE EST A PRAGUE

Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 20

EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 21

EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



(NB * EXCLUDES RUSSIA) # EU DELEGATION IN MOSCOW COVERS CIS EXCEPT UKRAINE

Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 22

EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



* EU DELEGATION IN MOSCOW COVERS CIS EXCEPT UKRAINE

Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 23 EUROBAROMETER

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU / SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR LA UE



NB* EU DELEGATION IN KIEV FOR UKRAINE

Q. HERE IS A LIST OF WAYS YOU MIGHT HEAR ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS AND ITS POLICIES. WHICH OF THEM ARE YOUR MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION, ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND ITS POLICIES ?/

VOICI DIFFERENTS MOYENS PAR LESQUELS VOUS POURRIEZ ENTENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE AU SUJET DES ACTIVITES DE L'UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, DE SES INSTITUTIONS AT DE SA POLITIQUE. LESQUELS D'ENTRE EUX CONSTITUENT VOS PRINCIPALES SOURCES D' INFORMATION SUR L' UNION/COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE, SES INSTITUTIONS, ET SA POLITIQUE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 24

EUROBAROMETER

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/
LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE/ L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 25

EUROBAROMETER

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE/ L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 26

EUROBAROMETER

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE/ L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 27

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/
LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?

HUNGARY	BENEFIT/ Y GAGNERAIENT	LOSE OUT/ Y PERDRAIENT	SPONT: NO IMPACT / SANS IMPACT
ENTREPRISES PRIVEES	54	10	4
SYSTEME EDUCATIF	47	10	6
SERVICES SOCIAUX ET DE SANTE	42	13	10
ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES	41	22	3
AGRICULTEURS	34	27	5
TRAVAILLEURS MANUELS	29	28	9
FONCTIONNAIRES NATIONAUX	28	20	12
GROUPES A FAIBLES REVENUS	25	28	12

Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE/ L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 28

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE/ L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 29

EUROBAROMETER

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE/ L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 30

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE/ L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC LA UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q. DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/ UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET LA COMMUNAUTE/ L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 32

ANNEXES

HOW THE POLL WAS DONE

COORDINATION AND DETAILS OF PARTICIPATING INSTITUTES

Overall co-ordination:	DG X.B (EUROBAROMETER) and DG X.C (External Information)
Co-ordination assistance:	GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research
Statistical Data Processing:	GfK MAFO Germany
Regional coordination:	GfK Bulgaria for Albania Bulgaria and FYROM
	AISA for Czech and Slovak Republic
	ROMIR for Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Russia

Index Albania, Quendrae Studimeve sociale Rr. "R. Collaku" 15 Nr. 212 Tirana - ALBANIA	Spiro DEDE	tel./fax: 355.42.28456
Department of Sociology Yerevan State University Yerevan - ARMENIA	Ludmila ARUTUNIAN	tel.: 78852.594648 fax: 78852.521921 78852.562668 (home fax)
NOVAK Belinskij str. 16/39 P.O. Box 157 220113 Minsk, BELARUS	A. VARDOMATSKII	tel: 70172.683902 fax: 70172.629266
GfK Bulgaria 10 Tzar Osvoboditel Blvd 1000 Sofia, BULGARIA	Dr. Svetoslav SLAVOV	tel.: 3592.870.249 fax: 3592.870.249
AISA Lesanka 2a, 141 141 00 Praha 4 CZECH REPUBLIC	Marek BOGUSZAK	tel.: 422.24245521/5522 fax: 422.24245523
Saar Poll Ltd Box 3336 EE0090 Tallin, ESTONIA	Andrus SAAR	tel.: 3722.438735/438881 fax: 3726.312486
Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research Partisanska bb. P.O. Box 435 91000 Skopje, FYROM	Jordan JAKIMOVSKI	tel.: 3899.1258222 fax: 3899.1361282
Georgian Institute of Public Opinion 123 Agmashenebeli avenue 380002 Tbilisi, GEORGIA	Merab PACHULIA	tel.: 78832.968679/237012 fax: 78832.999616 e-mail: paata gsrc.kheta.georgia.su
MODUS Mazsa ter 2-6 1107 Budapest, HUNGARY	Emöke LENGYEL	tel.: 361.260.7501/7973 361.261.6761 361.262.8028 fax: 361.261.2945
GILLER Institute 9, Tchaikovsky St. 480004 Almay, KAZAKHSTAN	L. GUREVICH	tel.: 3272.328.866 fax: 3272.399.895

Latvian Facts Brivibas Str. 106-2 LV 1001 Riga, LATVIA	Aigars FREIMANIS	tel.: fax:	3712.9348608 3712.9293201 3712.274936
Baltic Survey, 47, Didlaukio Str., 2057 Vilnius, LITHUANIA	Rasa ALISHAUSKIENE	tel.: fax:	3702.762790 3702.762462 3702.762681 3702.652102
Pentor ul. Flory 9m4 00-586 Warsaw, POLAND	Jacek DOHNALIK	tel.: fax:	4822.498120 4822.498129 4822.498151 4822.493031
Research Team Romania 2 Iancu de Hunedoura Avenue bl. H6, suite 31, sector 1 Bucharest, ROMANIA	Aura BOTOROG	tel.: fax:	40.1.6503770 40.1.3110672
ROMIR 2nd Brestskay U B.29a, Room 211 123056 Moscow, RUSSIA	Elena BASHKIROVA Andrei SUKOLOV	tel.: fax:	7095.2519801 7095.2517332 7095.8827098
GRAL Marketing Dunajska 29/IV 61000 Ljubljana, SLOVENIA	Rudi TAVCAR	tel.: fax:	38661.311167 38661.1323154
SOCIS 12, Shelkovychanaya Str. Kiev, UKRAINE	Tanya KOSHECHKINA	tel.: fax:	7044.2286432 7044.2282297

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - INTRODUCTION

Between 4th and 28th November 1994, the institutes listed above conducted the fifth wave of the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER (CEEB) on behalf of the **European Commission**, Directorate General X for Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual, Survey Research (EUROBAROMETER) Unit, in co-operation with the External Information Unit of the same Directorate-General. All requests for further information should be addressed to Mr George CUNNINGHAM, External Information Unit, (T120 - 08/95), European Commission, B-1049 Brussels. Tel. 32-2-299.91.71, Fax. 32-2-299.92.88.

Compared to CEEB4 (Autumn 1993) two more countries were added, namely Georgia and Kazakhstan.

All EUROBAROMETER data are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse 40, D-5000 Köln 41). They are at the disposal of all institutes which are members of the European Consortium for Political Research, of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and all those interested in social science research.

DETAILS ON SAMPLING

A total of 18 countries in Central and Eastern Europe were surveyed: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. In total 18,834 citizens aged 15 years and over were interviewed face-to-face in their private residences in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. The survey was fully nationally-representative except in Georgia, where the region of Abkhazia could not be covered due to the state of war.

As with Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No. 2, 3 and 4, each institute adopted a multi-stage random probability sample design. There were slight variations in each country's sample design to take account of its individual characteristics and population structure. In each of the 18 countries (with the exception of Georgia) surveyed, interviews were conducted throughout every region within its national boundaries.

SAMPLING POINTS

Albania	150
Armenia	100
Belarus	112
Bulgaria	148
Czech Republic	128
Estonia	171
FYROM	101
Georgia	119
Hungary	100
Kazakhstan	102
Latvia	125
Lithuania	106
Poland	251
Romania	134
Russian Federation	157
Slovakia	114
Slovenia	153
Ukraine	73
TOTAL	2,344

The sampling points for each country were selected, in the first instance, via a division into its major socio-economic areas. A list of these is appended. Within each of these areas smaller electoral or administrative districts were randomly selected and, taking into account such factors as the relative size of the population living in rural and urban settlements, the number and distribution of sampling points in each of these districts was finalised.

In general ten interviews were conducted around each sampling point, with individuals being selected via one of four main methods, these being:

(I) Double clustered random address sample + next birthday in the household

(II) Contact randomly selected from a list of the electorate. In most cases such lists were no more than three years old.

(III) Random selection of addresses from published, or specially commissioned lists, with individuals being selected via a Kish matrix or other random method.

(IV) Random route from a selected starting point (often the central bus station in larger settlements) with individuals again being selected via a Kish matrix or other random method.

Quite understandably, in many instances address or electoral data was not available for the population below the age of enfranchisement, and therefore quotas were imposed to ensure that the correct number of 15-17 year olds were interviewed.

The maximum number of interviews in any individual household was one. All interviews were conducted face-to-face by fully-trained interviewers in people's homes.

In each country the final sample was representative of the adult population aged 15+ years (exceptions were Georgia: Abkhazia not included; Russian Federation: Far North and inaccessible regions of Siberia; Estonia: the islands of Saarema and Hiiumaa)

REALISATION OF FIELDWORK

	FIELDWORK	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
Albania	7 - 16 November	1034
Armenia	10 - 24 November	1000
Belarus	6 - 27 November	1099
Bulgaria	4 - 11 November	1045
Czech Republic	9 - 20 November	1062
Estonia	4 - 14 November	1002
FYROM	7 - 16 November	1000
Georgia	7 - 23 November	1000
Hungary	11 - 27 November	1018
Kazakhstan	7 - 21 November	1000
Latvia	10 - 24 November	1000
Lithuania	10 - 18 November	1008
Poland	11 - 15 November	1004
Romania	9 - 15 November	1281
Russian Federation	9 - 27 November	1000
Slovakia	9 - 20 November	995
Slovenia	21 - 28 November	1086
Ukraine	4 - 23 November	1200
TOTAL	4 - 28 November	18,834

WEIGHTING OF DATA

Where possible, the results for each country were post-weighted by a matrix of highest level of education completed within age, and also according to the regional distribution and sex of the country's adult population. Where information was not available for education within age, the results were weighted by each factor separately, and also by region.

In Romania education was not weighted because actual data for this demographic did not exist.

Weighting by an interlocking matrix of age and education was possible in Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia. The overall results for Central and Eastern Europe as a whole were weighted according to each country's 15+ population. The data for each country's population by sex, age, education and region was provided by participating national institutes.

	POPULATION TOTAL(15+yrs)	PROPORTION OF EAST EUROPE POPULATION (in %)
Albania	2.702.400	1.01
Armenia	2.633.300	0.99
Belarus	7.814.759	2.94
Bulgaria	6.878.285	2.59
Czech Republic	8.324.261	3.13
Estonia	1.188.775	0.45
FYROM	1.353.959	0.51
Georgia	4.042.061	1.52
Hungary	8.244.274	3.11
Kazakhstan	11.217.539	4.22
Latvia	2.051.746	0.77
Lithuania	2.842.640	1.07
Poland	29.393.330	11.06
Romania	17.813.891	6.71
Russian Federation	113.043.000	42.60
Slovakia	4.080.423	1.54
Slovenia	1.560.938	0.59
Ukraine	40.351.000	15.20
TOTAL	**265.545.581**	**100%**

AREAS COVERED

ALBANIA
Tirana
Northern
Central
Southern

ARMENIA
Ararat
Sevan
Shirak
Lori
Yerevan
Siunik
Aghstev

BELARUS
Brest
Vitebsk
Gomel
Grodno
Minsk (city)
Minsk (region)
Mogiljov

BULGARIA
Varna
Lovetch
Sofia-city
Sofia-region
Plovdiv
Bourgas
Haskovo
Montana
Rousse

CZECH REPUBLIC
Prague
Central Bohemia
Southern Bohemia
Western Bohemia
Northern Bohemia
Eastern Bohemia
Southern Moravia
Northern Moravia

ESTONIA
North-West
North-East
South-East
South-West
West

FYROM
Skopje
Tetovo
Shtip Region
Bitola
Ohrid Region
Kumanova Region
Along Varpar Regions

GEORGIA
Tbilisi
Ajara
Kolkheti
Kartl-Kakheti
Kvemo Kartli
Meskhet-Javakheti
Samachablo

HUNGARY
Central
Northern Hungary
Northern Great Plain
Southern Great Plain
Southern Transdanubia
Northern Transdanubia

KAZAKHSTAN
Capital
South
Central
East
North
West

LATVIA
Riga
Vldzeme
Zemgale
Kurzeme
Latgale

LITHUANIA
Zemaitija
Aukstaitija
Suvalkija
Dzukija
Vilnius/ SE Lithuania

POLAND
Central
Eastern
Malopolska
Silesia
North-western
Wielkopolska

ROMANIA
Crisana
Maramuresh
Banat
Oltenia
Muntenia
Dobrudja
Moldavia
Ardeal
Bucuresti

RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Northern
Northern-Western
Central
Volgo-Vjatsky
Tsentralno Chernozjemny
Povolzhsky
North-Caucasian
Urals

SLOVAKIA
Bratislava
Central Slovakia
Eastern Slovakia
Western Slovakia

SLOVENIA
Gorenjska (NW)
Primorska (W + SW)
Osrednja Slovenija (W. Central)
Koroska in Savinjska (E. Central)
Dolenjska in Posavje (South East)
Stajerska in Prekmurje (North East)

UKRAINE
Kiev
Northern
Central
North-Eastern
North-Western
Eastern
Western
South Western
Southern
Crimea
South-East

BACKTRANSLATION

As a new element of quality control, backtranslation was used to check the contents of the questionnaires in the original languages.The procedure was as follows:

The questionnaires **in English** were sent to the institutes. The local institutes were asked to translate the English version into the local language(s). These local versions were then backtranslated into English by professional translators. Apart from Albania, where a backtranslation had been carried out last year, most backtranslations showed considerable differences with regard to the content of the original English version. After a lot of discussion and analyses with the local institutes, most differences **were not mistakes** but different interpretations of the translators who had often translated too literally or misunderstood the context. Nevertheless, several mostly minor mistakes were discovered in a number of questionnaires (items missing, differences between showcards and questions, etc...)

Given the nature of the mistakes and the adaptations afterwards we can assume that the comparability of the results of CEEB4 (1993) and CEEB5 (1994) is not endangered.

GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research

GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research, located in Brussels, is GfK's coordination centre for all international ad hoc research with a turnover of over 70 million ECU in 1993. It is present in most countries of the European Union, in all former EFTA-countries, and in major Central and Eastern European countries, making 21 countries in total. Outside Europe, GfK is represented in the USA, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong and Australia. The total turnover of GfK is about 180 million ECU making it number 4 in the world. Almost all the institutes are owned by the German mother company, GfK AG, founded in 1929.

GfK, through Dr. Rudolf Bretschneider, Managing Director of Fessel und GfK Austria (1959), was one of the first western research companies to found institutes in Hungary (1989), Poland (1990), Czech Republic (1991), Russia (1992), Slovakia (1993) and Bulgaria (1994). Agreements have been reached with companies in Romania (1995), Croatia (1995) and FYROM (1995). All together, almost 200 researchers are employed and trained by GfK in Central and Eastern Europe.

GfK has carried out several studies for the EU amongst which are the **EUROBAROMETER West** (in Denmark since 1989), the **Consumer Confidence Barometer** (in Germany since 1980) and the **Retail Barometer** (in Denmark since 1980).

For further details please contact:

GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research
Mr. Mark Hofmans
Managing Director
Buro & Design Center
Heysel Esplanade PB 84
B - 1020 BRUSSELS
Tel.: 32.2.475.28.00
Fax: 32.2.475.28.02

ISBN 92-826-7102-X

9 789282 671023

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, CULTURE, AUDIOVISUAL –
SURVEY RESEARCH UNIT – RUE DE LA LOI 200, B-1049 BRUSSELS

Catalogue number: CC-AO-95-001-EN-C