I.S.S.N. 1012-2249

MARCH 1997 No. 7

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (20 COUNTRIES' SURVEY)



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

HIGHLIGHTS

Central and Eastern Eurobarometer No. 7 interviewed 20.865 persons face to face in their homes in twenty Central and East European countries during November 1996 to assess public opinion about the European Union and the political and economic climate in the region. In addition -and for the first time- 1.643 "decision-makers/opinion-formers having an impact on European integration" were questioned at random by telephone in the ten central European and Baltic candidate countries which have applied for EU membership. The key results are :

- Both Romania (80%) and Poland (70%) are solid in favour of EU membership and have by far the most positive image of the EU (65% and 58% respectively). Relative majorities are in favour of EU membership in the five other candidate countries (43%-49%) outside the Baltic states. The image of the EU has improved significantly since a year ago in Bulgaria, Romania (both +15) and Poland (+12). The decline in the EU's positive image in the Czech Republic has bottomed out and the situation remains largely stable in Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.

- The Baltic states now have the least number of people positive about the EU among candidate countries. There have been substantial falls in the number of citizens who would vote for EU membership (Estonia -15, Latvia -13, Lithuania -7) since a year ago. The EU's image has worsened in Latvia in particular (-9). Nowadays, only a quarter (24%) of Baltic people have a positive image of the EU. The extent of the decline is similar in citizen support for NATO membership in both Estonia (-15) and Lithuania (-10).

- Public support for NATO membership is weaker than that for the EU in all countries except Estonia. While both Romania (76%) and Poland (65%) are both solid in favour again, there is a big gap in the popularity of NATO between those countries and the rest. Although there is no relative majority against NATO membership in any country, the large number of undecideds creates a cloud of uncertainty concerning how any future referenda may turn out.

- Decision-makers/opinion-formers in the candidate countries are much more positive (80%) and less negative (3%) about the EU than their general publics (49% and 6% respectively). Absolute majorities of decision-makers/opinion-formers are positive about the EU everywhere in candidate countries, even if in Estonia they are more reticent (50% positive, 43% neutral).

- People living in the candidate countries see the future of their country increasingly linked to the European Union (40%), followed by the United States (17%). The European Union leads in all candidate countries with the exception of Latvia where Russia has gained first position compared to last year. Notable gains for the European Union have also occurred in South-Eastern Europe. Russians see the future of their country linked with the USA and with the other CIS countries first (27% each), and citizens of the other CIS states see theirs linked above all with Russia (52%).

- The private sector is perceived to be benefiting the most from closer ties between the candidate countries and the European Union. Compared to last year, Government civil servants are more optimistic and farmers more pessimistic about benefiting from the integration process.

- The overall situation in Central and Eastern Europe looks more promising than last year's. In the candidate countries, 43% now believe that their country is going in the right direction (+6 compared to last year). The same view is held by 56% in South-Eastern Europe but by only 20% in CIS countries. The situation still remains unsatisfactory as regards views about the development of democracy and human rights.

INTRODUCING THE EUROBAROMETER

Standard EUROBAROMETER public opinion surveys have been conducted in the European Union (EU) several times a year since Autumn 1973 on behalf of Directorate-General X for Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual of the European Commission. As from January 1996, around 16,300 inhabitants of the 15 Member States, aged over 15, have been interviewed face-to-face on a nationally-representative basis. Reports on the results have been regularly published and a "trends" volume appears once a year. Furthermore European Continuous Tracking is published every 3 months in "Europinion", showing the views of 800 EU citizens per month in each of the Member States. In 1996, a survey of top decision-makers was conducted as a pilot study.

Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER started in Autumn 1990 when nationally-representative surveys were undertaken on behalf of the European Commission in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. For the second wave of research, the number of countries was expanded and included nationally-representative samples from Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Russia west of the Urals as well. Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER no. 3 included in addition Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine, while taking into account the split of Czechoslovakia. Georgia and Moldova were not surveyed in 1993 while Georgia and Kazakhstan were added in 1994. In 1995, the survey was extended to Croatia. Yugoslavia was included in 1996. In virtually all of the 20 countries covered by Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER no. 7, a nationally-representative sample of around 1000 persons per country were interviewed in their homes.

The survey was coordinated with the help of GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research, in cooperation with Fessel-GfK Austria. Data processing was undertaken by GfK Data Services Germany.

The report for 1997 also includes the main results of a short survey for the first time among top decisions-makers and opinion-formers in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. A total of 1.643 persons were interviewed in the ten countries.

In accordance with the normal practice for this type of survey, the European Commission disclaims all responsibility for questions, results and commentaries. This report is published by the Public Opinion Surveys and Research Unit of Directorate-General X for Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual in cooperation with the External Information Unit of the same Directorate-General and is an internal document of the European Commission.

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ANNEXES

MAJOR NEWS ITEMS AROUND TIME OF FIELDWORK:

25 OCTOBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1996

October	Committee for European Integration established in Poland.
20 October	General elections in Lithuania - victory for the incumbent Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party.
28-30 October	EU/Slovakia joint Parliamentary Committee holds its 3rd meeting in Bratislava.
2-3 November	Presidential elections in Bulgaria are won by opposition leader Peter Stoyanov.
3 November	General elections in Romania result in a relative majority for the opposition Democratic Convention. First ballot of presidential election.
5 November	Russian president Boris Yeltsin in hospital for heart operation.
10 November	General elections in Slovenia. A relative majority is won by the Liberal Democrats of Slovenia under incumbent Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek.
11 November	EU/Slovenia Interim Agreement signed in Brussels.
11 November	Mr. Ter-Petrosian, winner of the Armenian presidential elections, is sworn into office.
12 November	Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, is admitted to the Walter Reed Hospital in Washington D.C. for medical treatment.
17 November	Second ballot of presidential elections in Romania - victory for the opposition candidate Emil Constantinescu.
17 November	Local elections in Serbia. The four-party coalition Zajedno (Together) won in 30 cities including Belgrade and another 14 of the country's 18 largest urban areas. Serbian opposition leaders lead protests soon after against attempts by the ruling Serbian Socialist Party to overturn their victories in local elections.
20-21 November	EU/Hungary Joint Parliamentary Committee holds its 6th meeting in Brussels.
21 November	Mass protest in Zagreb against Croatian government plans to shut down the country's last independent radio station, "Radio 101".

1. ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMS

After the "annus mirabilis" of 1989, countries in the central and eastern half of Europe were confronted with a twofold task - the transformation of a command economy into a market economy and simultaneously the establishment and consolidation of democratic rules and institutions. As regards economic transformation in particular, virtually no recent or historical experiences of a similar challenge existed. Reform countries, supported by the international community, had to find their own way of dealing with the huge problems involved.

Before looking at the detailed results of **Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER no. 7** for 1996 and at the long-term trends presented in this report, one should keep in mind the major **differences between the twenty countries covered by CEEB7**. Taking GDP per head in real terms as a yardstick, only Slovenia among **candidate countries**[1] has a GDP per capita more than 50% of the EU average. By contrast, GDP in Lithuania amounts to about 20% of the average for the 15 member states of the EU. In **South-Eastern Europe**[2] GDP per head in Croatia is more than twice as high as in Albania. Finally in **CIS countries**[3], GDP per head in real terms is estimated at about 3.600 ECU for Russia, the respective value for Georgia being about 780 ECU or some 4% of the European Union average.

1.1. Economic development and household finances

The macro economic situation in most candidate countries further improved in 1996 albeit at a slower pace than last year. GDP growth remains quite satisfactory. Exceptions are Bulgaria where real GDP declined and Lithuania, Latvia and Hungary where only modest growth rates were achieved in 1996. **Inflation continues** to fall nearly everywhere except in Bulgaria, but still remains in double figures in most countries. **Unemployment** is exceptionally low in the Czech Republic (3,3% in 1996) but on average throughout Central Europe amounts to about 10% or more of the work force.

1 Candidate countries having applied for EU membership in the region are : Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia

2 South-Eastern Europe for the purposes of this survey are: Albania, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia

3 The CIS countries surveyed were Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia and the Ukraine

COUNTRIES POLLED FOR CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROBAROMETER No. 7 (Autumn 1996)

(European Union 15 data given for comparison)



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (European Commission, DG II: for Bulgaria; Eurostat for EU15).
Conversion US$ 1.199 = 1 ECU. GDP per capita at purchase price parity. 1996 - estimates; 1997 - forecasts.


ESTONIA
1996 GDP per head 3.638 ECU
1996 GDP growth 3%: 1997 4%
1996 inflation 25%: 1997 20 %
RUSSIA
1996 GDP per head 3.593 ECU
1996 GDP growth -1%: 1997 3%
1996 inflation 39%: 1997 25%
BELARUS
1995 GDP per head 2.601 ECU
1996 GDP growth -5%: 1997 4%
1996 inflation 150%: 1997 80%
UKRAINE
1996 GDP per head 1.668 ECU
1996 GDP growth -5%: 1997 1%
1996 inflation 64%: 1997 35%
KAZAKHSTAN
1996 GDP per head 1.861 ECU
1996 GDP growth 1%: 1997 3%
1996 inflation 52%: 1997 35%
GEORGIA
1995 GDP per head 784 ECU
1995 GDP growth 2%
1995 inflation 250%
ROMANIA
1996 GDP per head 3.879 ECU
1996 GDP growth 5%: 1997 5%
1996 inflation 34%: 1997 27%
BULGARIA
1996 GDP per head 3.850 ECU
1996 GDP growth -7,6%: 1997 -3%
1996 inflation 110%: 1997 100%
FYROM
1996 GDP per head 1.894 ECU
1996 GDP growth 3%: 1997 5%
1996 inflation 7%: 1997 8%
ALBANIA
1995 GDP per head 1.660 ECU
1996 GDP growth 5%: 1997 5%
1996 inflation 5%: 1997 5%
ARMENIA
1995 GDP per head 1.556 ECU
1996 GDP growth 7%
1996 inflation 16%

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - PAST 12 MONTHS/ FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 DERNIERS MOIS



HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - NEXT 12 MONTHS/ FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS



BETTER/MEILLEURE | UNCHANGED/INCHANGEE | WORSE/MOINS BONNE

**) DG II, EUROPEAN COMMISSION

TEXT FIGURE 1

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - PAST 12 MONTHS/ FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 DERNIERS MOIS RUSSIA/RUSSIE





HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - NEXT 12 MONTHS/ FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS RUSSIA/RUSSIE



BETTER/MEILLEURE UNCHANGED/INCHANGEE WORSE/MOINS BONNE

**) DG II, EUROPEAN COMMISSION

TEXT FIGURE 2

Poland was the first country to suffer from the difficulties of the transformation process but was also the first to recover. After a continuous upswing for the last four years, gross domestic product in Poland regained its pre-transformation level by the end of 1996. High growth rates have also been achieved in the **Czech Republic**, in **Slovakia** and **Slovenia.** **Hungary's** progress was slower but is expected to improve next year.

In the Baltics, Estonia shows a continuing trend for growth. **Latvia** has overcome the crisis of 1995 and **Lithuania** is on a moderate growth path since 1994.

Romania has achieved considerable success in macro economic stabilisation, albeit with considerable inflationary pressure. By contrast, **Bulgaria** faces a deep economic crisis with a sharp decline of its GDP in 1996 and a three digit level of inflation. Bulgaria is also behind other candidate countries as regards pro-market reforms.

In **South-Eastern Europe, Albania** was able to achieve a 5% growth of its GDP in 1996. In Croatia, the economic difficulties of last year have been overcome and the country has entered a growth pace which is expected to continue in the near future. A similar trend holds true for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Inflation is less than 10% in all three of the above mentioned countries.

The economic outlook appears to be much gloomier for CIS countries, although the bottom of the recession seems to have been reached in most countries and rays of hope are brightening the horizon. Russia and Belarus can expect real GDP growth in 1997, as can the Ukraine to a very limited extent. Armenia already reported a return to growth in 1994. Kazakhstan should attain a growth of about 3% next year, while economic growth is expected in Georgia as well. Inflation in CIS countries covered by CEEB7 is still high but well below the hyper inflation of the early nineties.

In the ten candidate countries 18% say that the **financial situation of their household has improved in the past twelve months;** 36% say that their finances stayed the same and 45% think that they got worse in 1996. Thus there is a clear **net majority of citizens for the second year running who consider their financial situation as either improving or stable** (text and annex figure 1), a situation very different indeed from the one found in CEEB2 - CEEB5 for 1991-1994.

An above average improvement of household finances is perceived in **Estonia** (26%), **Romania** (23%), the **Czech Republic** (22%), **Slovakia** (22%) and **Poland** (21%); in these countries between one third and 40% (Slovakia) of respondents nevertheless still note a deterioration of the situation. In Slovenia 46% see a stable situation, 13% an improvement and 40% a worsening of their situation; in Lithuania 13% note an improvement, 42% a stabilisation and 43% a deterioration of their household finances. On the other hand an absolute majority of interviewees in Latvia (53%), Hungary (72%) and especially Bulgaria (80%) reveal a pessimistic view of the development of their household finances over the past 12 months.

Compared to CEEB6, substantially fewer Romanians[4] say their financial condition has worsened (CEEB6: 51% worse; CEEB7: 38% worse). By contrast household finances have fallen dramatically in Bulgaria (CEEB6: 42% worse; CEEB7: 80% worse) showing the devastating effects of the country's general economic crisis on individual households as well.

In a long-term perspective (1991-96), however, one finds a **positive trend for the development of household finances in all candidate countries,** except Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria. This subjective view reflects the high GDP growth and the reduction in inflation in most countries as well as the relatively slow and sometimes interrupted pace of change in Hungary and Latvia. In Romania there is no clear trend with regard to the development of household finances although the subjective state of personal finances has been more positive than in neighbouring Bulgaria in most of the years surveyed by CEEB. Bulgaria is the only country where the evaluation of household finances is definitively worse in 1996 than in any of the previous years since 1991.

In South-Eastern Europe, citizens' opinions are more positive still. Optimism at the time of the survey was **most prevalent** in **Albania,** where 75% thought that their present financial situation was better than last year with only 6% holding the opposite view. Thus opinions in Albania followed closely the country's economic upswing which started in 1993. In 1991 (CEEB2) only 27% of Albanians saw an improvement of their household finances, in 1993 this view was already shared by 60%, in 1994 by 53% and in 1995 by 76%. However the recent collapse of pyramid investment schemes have led to riots by many impoverished Albanians who had invested their money in them. These pyramid schemes may not only have fuelled Albanians' rosy views of their lives as seen during several past Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, but it is also likely to change substantially their views on the state of their household finances in 1997.

In **Yugoslavia,** 34% note an improvement, another 34% no change, while 31% believe that things got worse last year. In **Croatia,** 19% felt there was an improvement, 42% did not note any significant change and 38% say that things got worse. The ending of war in Bosnia may have given rise to more optimistic perceptions in these countries. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia only 13% note an improvement, 41% a stable situation and 46% a deterioration in their household finances. Although the latter percentage is still high in absolute numbers it is definitely lower than in the early nineties when more than half of the people in FYROM (61% in CEEB3 for 1992, 56% in CEEB4 for 1993) thought that things had got worse.

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4 Results are for permanent residents of these countries, not the ethnic groups of the region. Thus, in particular, "Estonians" and "Latvians" include all ethnic minorities permanently resident in those countries, regardless of whether they have the right to vote.

The future development of household finances during 1997 is generally considered in a more positive light than in the past. In the candidate countries 33% expect an improvement of their financial situation over the next 12 months, 33% think that there will be no change and only 26% fear that the situation of their household will get worse (see text figure 1 and annex figure 2). In 1995 optimistic (28% better) and pessimistic (27%) views were still rather evenly distributed (stay the same: 34% in CEEB6).

Optimism is flying high in Romania (74% better, +34 compared to CEEB6; the same: 15%, -8; worse: 8%, -24). In Slovenia 31% expect an improvement (42% the same, 19% worse), in Estonia 30% hope for a better situation (46% the same, 19% worse). In Poland (24% better, 40% the same, 23% worse), the Czech Republic (21% better, 45% the same, 26% worse) and Slovakia (22% better, 40% the same, 33% worse) people are more cautious as regards their financial expectations compared to last year; in Lithuania few citizens are optimistic (20% better, 44% the same) but the number of those fearing a negative development (25%) is the lowest ever since 1991.

In Latvia only 17% expect a positive development while 47% see no change and 30% think that their financial situation will get worse. In Hungary pessimism is still predominant (15% better, 26% the same, 53% worse) albeit less so than last year (CEEB6: 11% better, 63% worse). Bulgarians again show the greatest increase in the number of pessimists: while 20% hope for an improvement of the financial situation of their household (-14 compared to CEEB6), 23% believe that the very unsatisfactory situation of the past 12 months will continue for the immediate future and 46% expect that things will further deteriorate (+28 compared to CEEB6).

In Romania, future expectations are increasingly optimistic for the second year running now while Bulgarians seem to have buried their hopes for economic improvement or at least for stabilisation which was still predominant last year. In the other candidate countries -with exception of the Baltic states- expectations for the future generally are changing less than the evaluation of past developments. Evidently people adapt their expectations to past experience : economic growth continues but at a slower pace.

In **South-Eastern Europe** the **future is seen in a rosy light** (56% better, 25% the same, 11% worse). **Albanians** in particular at that time hoped that their household finances would improve in 1997 (75%) thus continuing the positive outlook already visible last year. In Yugoslavia 60% hold positive expectations (22% the same, 11% worse). In Croatia, 45% believe that the financial situation of their household will improve, 33% do not expect changes and 13% see a negative development. The least optimism is to be found in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where still 37% expect an improvement compared to CEEB6, 38% do not think that things will change and 19% are afraid that their financial position will get worse. Optimism in FYROM has constantly declined since 1994 when a majority expected a positive development. However, there has been no increase in the number of respondents who expect a decline of their financial situation.

In **CIS countries**, the **development of household finances over the past 12 months is viewed very negatively** with a mere 11% believing that the situation has improved, 26% saying that it stayed the same and 61% stating that their household finances got worse. Above average improvements are seen in Georgia (27% better, 28% the same, 44% worse) and in Armenia (23% better, 30% the same, 47% worse) but the situation seemed to be much better last year in Georgia (CEEB6 in Georgia: 39% better, 23% worse). A notable decline has also taken place in Kazakhstan where only 10% note an improvement but 68% a worsening of their household finances (CEEB6: 18% better, 55% worse). In Belarus the situation is said to be better by 19% (1995: 15%), unchanged by 37% (1995: 30%) and worse by 40% (1995: 54%). Russians see the situation as similar to last year (11% better, 26% the same, 62% worse). The least positive view on household finances is held by Ukrainians (9% better, 65% worse).

In a long-term perspective however (1991-96), the evaluation of household finances for the previous 12 months has not seen much improvement in **Russia** (text figure 2). 1993 was decidedly the best of many bad years, with "only" 53% of Russians saying their finances got worse and as "many" as 21% thinking they would have more money in 1994. Only about a tenth of Russians currently seem to be benefiting from the reforms that have taken place so far.

In Georgia 49% are expecting an improvement in 1996 and 16% a decline. In Armenia the respective numbers are 29% and 34%. In Kazakhstan the future of household finances is considered to be gloomier than a year ago (improving: 29%, -22 compared to CEEB6; worsening: 39%, +16).

1.2. Market economy

It is now seven years since the countries surveyed by Central and Eastern Eurobarometer started the great transformation from state-led economies to **market economies**. This transformation is **supported** by a **majority** of the people in the ten **candidate countries**.

More precisely, asked **whether they personally feel that the creation of a market economy, that is, one largely free from state control, is right or wrong for the future of their country**, 56% of citizens from the candidate countries think that a market economy is right, while 27% think it is wrong (annex figure 3)

The **strongest rise** in **pro-market** opinons among candidate countries occurred in **Romania** (net difference between supporters and critics in CEEB6: +38, in CEEB7: +64). By contrast, opposition to a market economy has, compared with a year ago, visibly increased in Lithuania (annex figures 8-17).

Among **candidate countries, support for a market economy is strongest in Romania** (net difference: +64), followed by **Poland** (net difference: +36) and **Estonia** (net difference: +21). Opinion on this matter is rather divided in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. However, anti-market views are not in a majority in any candidate country.

In a mid-term perspective pro-market opinions have risen in Romania, Bulgaria and Estonia. In Hungary the climate is slightly more positive than last year after a longer decline. The recent decline in pro-market opinions in Poland should not be overestimated since public opinion is still largely positive on this matter and ups and downs have also occurred in previous years. A word of caution has to be added in the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Both countries have taken big steps towards a market economy in the last years and critical voices there obviously reflect differing opinions about specific measures more than a judgement on the transformation process itself (annex figures 8-17).

In **South-Eastern Europe** too there is a **net majority for a market economy:** 55% of citizens in these countries say that a market economy is right, while 26% take the opposite view (annex figure 3). The result is therefore about identical to that of candidate countries.

Support for a market economy in the region is greatest in **Albania** (76% "right", 13% wrong) thus continuing a long-term pro-market trend. In **Croatia** market support is almost as pronounced (60% "right", 21% wrong). In **Yugoslavia** 48% feel that the creation of a market economy is right for their country (29% "wrong"). Least support is found in the **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** (43% "right", 39% "wrong"); nevertheless promarket opinions have significantly gathered strength there over time (annex figures 18 and 19).

The situation is very different in the CIS countries that were surveyed. In five out of six countries (Georgia excluded) there are more people opposed to a market economy than there are in favour (annex figures 3 and 20-25).

Thus a **market economy** has greatest support in **Georgia** (50% "right", 38% "wrong") and in **Belarus** (34% "right", 37% "wrong"). In Kazakhstan and Armenia opposition to a market economy has risen sharply compared to last year, while the critical view of the majority has remained stable in Ukraine (24% "right", 52% "wrong"). In **Russia,** 24% of interviewees think that the free market is "right" and 59% believe that it is "wrong" for Russia.

1.3. Democracy and human rights

Satisfaction with the development of democracy is still relatively low in candidate countries: 55% of citizens interviewed say that they are not very or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in their respective countries while 38% feel either very or fairly satisfied (annex figure 4).

One should note, however, that what is understood by both democracy and human rights is not restricted to the institutional structure or to the rules of the game of the democratic process, although empirical studies in the region show that a strictly "formal" understanding of this concept is more common now than it was at the beginning of the democratisation process; for the time being notions of "social democracy" (e.g. social security and material well-being) are still quite important.

Although the respective percentages remain stable for the whole area compared with the CEEB6 results for last year, there have been important changes in some of the countries (annex figures 8-17).

In **Romania**, the **satisfaction** rate with democracy **has risen from 37% in 1995 to 54% this year** (net difference satisfaction-dissatisfaction in CEEB6: -21, in CEEB7: +11), a development evidently related to recent political changes. In **Slovenia** dissatisfaction fell from 60% last year to 53% this year. In both countries satisfaction with democracy has increased since 1994. Minor but visible improvements on this issue have also taken place in **Hungary** (where the absolute level of satisfaction is still rather low, however), **Lithuania** and **Estonia.**

On the other hand, opinions on the development of democracy have become worse in the Czech Republic (net difference in CEEB6: -4, in CEEB7 -21) - the second lowest value in the CEEB democracy trend measured in this country; in Poland (net difference in CEEB6: +12, in CEEB7: -2); in Bulgaria (net difference in CEEB6: -67, in CEEB7: -81) and in Slovakia (net difference in CEEB6: -40, in CEEB7: -53).

In absolute terms, satisfaction with democracy in the ten candidate countries is highest in Romania where a majority is satisfied[5] and in Poland where opinion on this issue is split into two nearly even equal groups. Dissatisfaction is most outspoken in Bulgaria (86% dissatisfied), Slovakia (74% dissatisfied), Hungary (72% dissatisfied) and Latvia (70% dissatisfied). In all latter four countries, a very critical view has been prevalent for most of the period surveyed by CEEB.

The absolute highest level of satisfaction with democracy as well **as the most impressive rise** of this opinion is registered in **Albania**[6]; 75% of those interviewed say that they are satisfied with the way democracy is developing in their country and only 24% feel dissatisfied. The net difference of the indicator democracy satisfaction thus rose from -33 (CEEB5) to +18 (CEEB6) and +51 in 1996 (CEEB7). The Albanian mood is very different indeed from opinions on the development of democracy held in Croatia (net difference: -12), Yugoslavia (net difference: -12) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (net difference: -18) (annex figures 4, 18, 19).

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5 The poll was carried out immediately after the victory of the opposition in the Romanian parliamentary elections, which probably influenced the results of this question.

6 Once again the reader is reminded that this survey took **place before the recent** disturbances in Albania concerning the collapse of pyramid investments.

In the CIS countries surveyed, satisfaction with democracy is generally low with the highest levels of dissatisfaction found in Russia (82% dissatisfied, 8% satisfied), Armenia (79% dissatisfied, 19% satisfied) and Kazakhstan (75% dissatisfied, 17% satisfied).

In Ukraine and Belarus the situation has improved compared to last year and to a lesser degree also in European Russia. The opposite is true for Georgia and Kazakhstan. The state of opinion remains unchanged in Armenia. With the partial exception of Georgia the general opinion on democracy or at least how the new system actually works is thus very different from the public view in most of the candidate countries or in South-Eastern Europe even though there are some hints of a relatively small improvement (annex figures 4 and 20-25).

Public perception on how human rights are respected is still poor in most of the candidate countries: in 1996, 38% said it was satisfactory while 56% were critical (see annex figure 5).

Only in Romania did the interviewees notice a **visible improvement** compared to last year but the absolute level still remains very low. A more or less stable picture is found in Estonia (50% respected, 49% not respected) and - on a very different level - in Lithuania (17% respected, 75% not respected).

Furthermore only **Hungary** has a clear majority which views human rights as being respected (50% versus 43%) but Hungarian opinion on this issue has worsened over the last years. Critical voices also increased in Slovakia (net difference respected versus not respected: -21) continuing the downwards movement from last year to some extent. This was also true of Poland, Latvia and of Bulgaria. Opinions on this issue show a long-term negative trend in Bulgaria and in the Czech Republic. In Slovenia too, people report a lack of respect for human rights (annex figures 8-17).

An **increasing concern for the situation** of human rights is also characteristic for **South-Eastern Europe** (see annex figures 5, 18, 19). In Albania the view is slightly less optimistic than last year although a great majority still takes a positive view (71% respected versus 25% not respected) and similarly in Croatia (65% respected, 27% not respected). Interestingly enough, 60% in Yugoslavia also believe that human rights are respected while 31% do not. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 52% criticise a lack of respect for human rights while 46% say that human rights are respected (however net difference in CEEB6: +14, in CEEB7: -6).

In CIS countries, the **level of dissatisfaction** regarding **respect for human rights** is generally **higher** than in the candidate countries or in South-Eastern Europe **but** there is a **trend towards an improvement** of the situation everywhere except in Kazakhstan (see annex figures 5 and 20-25).

In Georgia 59% think that human rights are not respected (38% respected), in Belarus 63% (32% respected), in Kazakhstan 64% (34% respected). Negative opinions are even higher in Armenia (71% not respected), in Ukraine (71% not respected) and in Russia (82% not respected).

There is evidence that people in the candidate countries and especially in the democratically more stable ones tend to react with more sensitivity to perceived shortcomings in this area, whereas people in less stable political cultures are equally bound to notice improvements of a situation which is generally regarded as very problematic. This is not only typical of the evaluation of the state of human rights but also for opinions such as the functioning of democracy or the development of a market economy.

1.4. Overall situation

The overall situation in the whole region looks more promising than last year. In the economic sphere, rays of hope are brightening the horizon, promising either a stabilisation of an upward trend or a positive turn after a period of decline. In the political sphere the development of democracy and human rights - although still not satisfying for the majority of citizens in the whole region - is seen more positively especially in most of those countries where many wishes were left unfulfilled during the first phase of the transformation process.

In the ten **candidate countries** opinions on overall developments are divided this time with 43% believing that their country is going in the right direction and another 42% fearing the opposite (annex figures 6 and 8-17 for country trends). But last year there was still a net majority of pessimists (37% "right", 45% "wrong") and two years ago the general mood was even gloomier (31% "right", 51% "wrong").

There are, however, big differences between each country and these differences have increased over time. **Romania took a big leap forward** in CEEB7: 75% of its inhabitants there are convinced that things are going in the right direction and only 18%, in the wrong direction (in CEEB6 the respective percentages were 39% ("right") and 52% ("wrong"). Optimism encompasses both political and economic development. The opposite holds true for neighbouring Bulgaria where a mere 10% see a "right" development but 73% a "wrong" one (CEEB6: 34% "right", 42% "wrong"). Opinions in Romania evidently reflect high hopes related to the change in government and promises of fundamental reforms. Bulgarians, on the other hand, find themselves in a situation of economic disaster. The widespread political dissatisfaction in this country has resulted in the victory of the opposition candidate at the presidential elections in November 1996, but as the presidency in Bulgaria does not have real executive powers there was no change in the direction of national politics. The unstable situation also found its expression in large-scale political protests in January 1997.

Optimism is also **predominant** in **Estonia** (59% "right", 32% "wrong") and in **Slovenia** (53% "right", 27% "wrong").

In the **Czech Republic**, there are more optimists (48%) than pessimists (39%) but positive opinion suffered a sharp decline after a long period of stability, a development also confirmed by the notable gains of the opposition in the parliamentary elections in summer. In **Poland**, opinion is divided (40% "right", 38% "wrong"). In **Latvia** (35% "right", 51% "wrong") and in **Lithuania** (27% "right", 52% "wrong") a pessimistic outlook prevails. Public opinion on this issue is showing a continuous negative trend in Latvia while citizens feel relatively more optimistic in Lithuania than they did last year.

The general mood is very pessimistic in Slovakia (26% "right", 66% "wrong") as it has been in most years surveyed with the exception of (the end of) 1992 at the eve of Slovakia's state-formation. The overall view is also very gloomy in Hungary (14% right, 74% wrong) albeit a little less so than last year. Hungarians have maintained a very pessimistic standpoint, an opinion perhaps influenced not only by economic difficulties and unfulfilled political hopes but probably also reflecting the loss of the country's former image as the leader of economic and political reforms.

In **South-Eastern Europe**, Albanians remained highly optimistic (75% "right", 13% "wrong") at the time of the survey. A great majority of citizens here not only believed things were going in the right direction, but were also very satisfied about the development of democracy and human rights and strongly advocated a market economy.

CEEB7 also asked people in Albania at that time why they thought that their country was going in the right or in the wrong direction[7]. About one third of the respondents answered that freedom and stability were increasing. There was also a widespread notion of general improvements in the country and of better living conditions. 23% refered to an improvement of the economy. The possibility to find work outside the country and get income from abroad reinforced this optimistic outlook. Finally a few also believed in more cooperation either with Europe or the USA, thus bringing to an end the long isolation they had suffered from under the old regime (see annex figure 7). Reasons for a negative development on the other hand were mainly found in political or administrative shortcomings (bad policy, bad laws, corruption). Only very few respondents (4% each) mentioned economic difficulties (unemployment or high prices) or an overall absence of benefits or help.

7 Open-ended question. The freely given answers were coded afterwards into various categories. 13% of respondents did not answer the question or gave answers which could not be interpreted in a clear (positive or negative) way.

In Yugoslavia (54% "right", 33% "wrong")[8] and Croatia (52% "right", 26% "wrong"), the overall situation is viewed in a positive light, although opinion in Croatia has deteriorated (+14 "wright") compared to CEEB6 results for 1995. A negative trend is also observed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where 43% think the country is moving in the right direction and 48% hold opposite view (CEEB5 and CEEB6 showed a net predominance of positive opinions; annex figures 6 and 19).

In **CIS countries**, people in Belarus are equally divided between optimists (37%) and pessimists (37%). For the past 4 years pessimists in Belarus have been in clear majority (see annex figures 6 and 20-25). In **Ukraine** (19% "right", 58% "wrong") and in **Russia** (18% "right", 63% "wrong") a negative view of the overall situation still prevails but the overall opinion was even gloomier in previous years. People in these three countries seem to believe that the **bottom line has been reached** and the **future looks more promising** especially as far as the economic situation is concerned.

On the other hand opinions about how things are going have worsened in the smaller CIS countries surveyed. Both in Georgia (39% "right", 54% "wrong") and Kazakhstan (27% "right", 60% "wrong") the optimistic spirit of last year has turned into a net majority of critics of the overall development. In Armenia (31% "right", 64% "wrong") there is no significant change compared to the previous year.

8 Given the widespread protest movements and the high level of political conflict in Yugoslavia, which started shortly after the poll was carried out, the results for this country need a more detailed and profound analysis, which would exceed the scope of this report.

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE? RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE IN THE CIS AND BALTICS
OU SE SITUE L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS? L'INFLUENCE DE LA RUSSE AUX CEI ET PAYS BALTIQUES



Q: AS THINGS NOW STAND, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED TO?

Q: DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERA LE PLUS ETROITEMENT LIE?

TEXT FIGURE 3

2. THE EUROPEAN UNION

2.1. Where does the future of different countries lie?

The European Union has improved its standing in the ten candidate countries. 40% of the citizens there think that "the future of their country is most closely tied up" with the European Union (see annex figure 26). Compared with last year this opinion has **increased by 6 points**. The United States of America comes next (17%), followed by "other Central and Eastern European countries" (7%) and Russia (6%).

Opinion has changed most in favour of the EU in Romania (+10 compared to CEEB6), but visibly also in Slovenia (+8), in Bulgaria (+7), in the Czech Republic (+7), in Poland (+6) and in Slovakia (+6). Practically no change has occurred in Hungary. By contrast, in the Baltic states where the perceived importance of the EU took a step forward in 1995, there has been a reversal trend in 1996.

The **EU** is **undisputed first in Slovenia** (CEEB7: 52%). **High** ratings are also achieved in **Poland** (46%), the **Czech Republic** (44%), **Estonia** (42%), **Romania** (40%), **Slovakia** (38%) and **Bulgaria** (34%).

In Hungary 27% see the European Union as the future partner of their country (the USA coming next with 22%), as do 27% of the people in Latvia. The cumulative effects of the EU losing and Russia gaining ground makes Latvia the only country where the EU ranks only second (Russia: 31%, EU: 27%). In Lithuania, only 25% see the EU as the future partner of their country but no other countries have reached a comparable position (Russia coming second with 14%).

The United States of America are given their strongest rating by the candidate countries in Romania (35%) continuing an upward trend since 1993 and in Hungary (22%, +7 compared with CEEB6). In Poland 14% see the USA as the future partner for their country and so do 13% in Slovenia.

"Other Central and Eastern European countries" were chosen in significant numbers in Hungary and in Slovakia (12% each), in the Czech Republic (10%) as well as in Poland and Estonia (8% each).

Russia has its strongest impact on Latvia (31% with considerable gains for two years now) and is holding its position in Estonia (18%) and in Lithuania (14%). In Bulgaria 15% consider Russia as a partner for the future which is a drastic decline compared to last year (23% in CEEB6). Russia has also lost importance in the view of Romanians (-5).

"Other European countries like Norway and Switzerland which remain outside the Union" were most frequently suggested by Czechs (17%), followed by Slovaks (14%) and Estonians (14%). Generally these countries already lost much of their former importance in 1995 after three former members of this group (Sweden, Austria and Finland) joined the EU.

Germany (cited spontaneously by interviewees as it is not among the categories read out) was nominated most frequently in Hungary (10%, +7) and in Poland (8%).

Notable gains for the European Union can also be observed in South-Eastern Europe. In **Albania** (46%) and the **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** (39%) **the EU ranks first** (see annex figure 27). In FYROM (29%) the USA has lost in importance probably due to increased EU activities and the end of open conflict in the region. In Croatia too the EU is named more often (27%, +7) than in 1995, although the USA still holding its first place here (39%). Spontaneous nominations for Germany have fallen in Croatia but are still visible there (14%, -8). Yugoslavia, which has been included in the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer for the first time, shows very divided opinions on the subject: 20% quoting either the EU or the USA and 19% Russia.

In **CIS countries**, Russia comes first everywhere (text figure 3 and annex figure 27), holding an especially strong and increasing position in Belarus (76%, +8). Compared to last year Russia is also more often seen as a partner for the future in Georgia (51%, +17). The contrary holds true for Armenia (67%, -9) and Ukraine (46%, -8). In both cases the USA has gained in importance (Armenia: 18%, +7; Ukraine: 17%, +7) holding or winning the second position. In Russia itself 27% name the USA equally with "other CIS states" (27%, -8).

The **European Union** is seen as the **future partner** by 12% in the CIS states excluding Russia and by 13% in Russia. The EU's standing is highest in Ukraine (still only 15%).

The only other country which has a major role in any country is Turkey (15% in Kazakhstan).

On the whole, the European Union is the clear favourite as a future partner in the candidate countries (40% EU, 17% USA, 7% other Central and Eastern countries, 6% Russia) and comes equal with the USA in South-Eastern Europe (28% EU, 29% USA, 9% Russia and 6% other Central and Eastern European Countries). In CIS countries excluding Russia, Russia prevails easily with 52% followed by the USA (13%) and the European Union (12%).

2.2. The European Union's image in the region

The image of the European Union has markedly improved among people living in candidate countries. While a year ago 40% said that their "impressions of the aims and activities of the European Union" were generally positive (23% neutral, 6% negative) **in 1996 nearly half of the people in this region** (49%) **hold a positive view of the EU** (28% neutral, 6% negative)[9]. **The European Union's image** is even **more positive among** the **decision-makers and opinion-formers in the candidate countries**[10]. Of the **persons** belonging to **this group**, 80% say that their **impression of the EU is generally positive**, 14% define their view as neutral and 3% say that it is negative (text figures 4 and 5).

The **positive opinion** among the general public is **most evident** in **Romania** (65%), **Poland** (58%) and Bulgaria (42%). These three countries also show the most pronounced rise in positive perceptions of the European Union (+15, +12 and +15 respectively). In Poland the percentage of positive impressions has improved constantly for three years now (annex figures 28-37).

In Slovenia the majority positive view (35% positive, 13% negative) has remained stable compared to last year, the situation is similar in Slovakia (34% positive, 7% negative) and Hungary (33% positive, 11% negative). Citizens in the Czech Republic are judging the aims and activities of the European Union visibly more positively than last year (33% positive, +7 compared to CEEB6).

In contrast the image of the European Union deteriorated in Latvia and Estonia: In Latvia 26% have a positive opinion (CEEB6: -9), in Estonia 24% (-6). In Lithuania, positive attitudes are limited to 22% of the population. The change is mainly due to an increase of neutral impressions since negative views have remained largely stable (12% Latvia, 10% in Estonia, 4% in Lithuania).

The deterioration of the European Union's image in the Baltics is not of recent origin but can be traced back at least to 1993. Compared with the results of the first CEEB in 1990 both positive opinions have declined and the number of negative ones - albeit still not very high - has increased. This development is different from the one in most other candidate countries, where the decline of originally very high positive opinions has been reversed in later years.

The positive change in the impression of the aims and activities of the European Union in most of the candidate countries and the image problems in the Baltics correspond mainly to the respective changes in opinions about where the country's future lies (chapter 2.1. in this report). It is also interesting to note that the image of the European Union among decision-makers and opinion-formers is lowest in Latvia and Estonia although positive opinions in this group are significantly higher than in the population in general.

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9 The percentage of don't knows decreased especially in the ten candidate countries

10 A random sample of 1.643 candidate country decision-makers/opinion-formers were surveyed by telephone for the first time this year. The sample was drawn from a specially created European Commission database of 33.000 "decision-makers/opinion-formers having an impact on European integration" who receive the bimonthly magazine "European Dialogue" published by the Commission as part of its pre-accession strategy.

IMAGE OF EUROPEAN UNION / IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE



Q: AS YOU KNOW, 15 STATES OF "WESTERN" EUROPE FORM TOGETHER THE "EUROPEAN UNION". WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE AIMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE, NEUTRAL, OR NEGATIVE ?/

Q: COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ PEUT-ETRE, 15 ETATS D'EUROPE "OCCIDENTALE" FORMENT L' "UNION EUROPÉENNE". DIRIEZ-VOUS QUE VOS IMPRESSIONS QUANT AUX BUTS ET ACTIVITES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE SONT EN GENERAL POSITIVES, NEUTRES OU NEGATIVES ?

IMAGE OF EUROPEAN UNION AMONG CANDIDATE COUNTRIES' DECISION-MAKERS / OPINION-FORMERS
IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE PARMI LES DECIDEURS / LEADERS D'OPINION DANS LES PAYS CANDIDATS



Q: AS YOU KNOW, 15 STATES OF "WESTERN" EUROPE FORM TOGETHER THE "EUROPEAN UNION". WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE AIMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE, NEUTRAL, OR NEGATIVE ?/

Q: COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, 15 ETATS D'EUROPE "OCCIDENTALE" FORMENT L' "UNION EUROPEENNE". DIRIEZ-VOUS QUE VOS IMPRESSIONS QUANT AUX BUTS ET ACTIVITES DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE SONT EN GENERAL POSITIVES, NEUTRES OU NEGATIVES ?

TEXT FIGURE 5

Among **decision-makers and opinions-formers** the most positive view of the **European Union** is in **Romania** (89% positive) **closely followed** by **Poland** (88% positive). Next come Hungary (86%), Slovakia (84%) and Bulgaria (80%). In Lithuania 78% hold a positive view and so do 73% in Slovenia and 68% in the Czech Republic. Decision-makers and opinions-formers in Latvia are more critical showing 65% positive, 21% neutral and 7% negative impressions. The impression is least positive in Estonia with 50% holding positive, 43% neutral and 4% negative opinions.

Differentiating between **single groups of decision-makers and opinions-formers,** one finds the above-the-average positive views on the EU among parliamentarians (89%) and members of non-governmental organisations (88%) followed by academics (85%) and representatives of political parties (83%). Positive opinions are a little less outspoken among members of local government (78%), journalists (77%) and members of the central government (74%). In all these groups there are practically no negative impressions on the EU and the non-response rate is irrelevant. Some, but few, negative opinions (5%) about the aims and activities of the EU are expressed by businessmen in the candidate countries (18% of this group having a neutral and the great majority of 74% a positive impression).

In **South-Eastern Europe** the average impression of the aims and activities of the European Union is somehow less enthusiastic than in the candidate countries (37% of the interviewees in this region have a positive impression, 20% a neutral and 11% a negative one).

Albania comes first with 52% of positive impressions (-12 compared to last year). This change, however, is not accompanied by an increase of negative views (currently only 2% in total) but by more "don't knows". In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 43% hold a positive view, 18% a neutral and 9% a negative one (annex figures 38 and 39). In Croatia the EU is seen in a positive way by 40% (26% neutral, 9% negative). The impression of the European Union is least positive in Yugoslavia where 29% of citizens show a positive, 20% a neutral and 16% a negative opinion. The comparatively high percentage of negative views is not really surprising considering the conflict of opinions between the Yugoslav government and the EU in recent times. What seems interesting is rather the absolute low level of negative opinions; an indicator that public opinion in the country does not necessarily reflect official points of view.

A **positive image of the European Union** in South-East Europe is mostly created by the impression that the EU helps in the general development of the country and in gaining a higher standard of living[11]. Especially people in Albania and Croatia share this view. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Albania many respondents also refer to economic and financial aid coming from the EU. Other **reasons for a positive image** of the European Union are the feeling of belonging to Europe and the EU's contributions to the maintenance of peace. Open borders and the freedom to travel is put forward only by relatively few people, as indeed is the reason of human rights and democracy (annex figure 46).

11 The open-ended question about the reason for a positive, neutral or negative impression of the aims and activities of the European Union was asked only in South-Eastern Europe and in CIS countries.

By and large, positive answers are given most frequently in Albania. In Yugoslavia one finds the least number of positive arguments and, if so, they are mostly related to overall development and higher living standards.

On the other hand, a **negative impression** of the aims and activities of the European Union is **justified** mainly by the argument that people do not benefit from contacts with the EU. Only few respondents perceive the European Union as a threat to their country, a notion practically restricted to Yugoslavia (6% of respondents there). The main reasons given for a **neutral image** of the EU are the impression that the EU is remote and the respondents have enough problems of their own (an argument coming most of all from Croatia) and the belief that the aims and activities of the European Union are showing no results (above average in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

In the **CIS countries** surveyed by CEEB, almost half (48%) of those interviewed state no opinion at all (a trend already observed last year). If there is a clear opinion, it is mainly positive (26%) and neutral (20%) rather than negative (6%).

Armenians have the most positive impression of the EU (46%), as in all previous years (although less in 1996 than in 1995, -6). In Georgia, positive views have increased enormously (37%, +21) largely because of a big fall in "don't knows" (-40). In Kazakhstan (36% positive, 18% neutral, 5% negative) and Belarus (35% positive, 23% neutral, 5% negative) the impressions remain fairly stable.

Russia is the only CIS country where neutral (22%) and negative (7%) impressions together outnumber the positive ones due to a decline of positive opinions. In Ukraine 21% hold a positive, 14% a neutral and 3% a negative view - the overall impression of the EU declining over time (see annex figures 40-45).

Reasons for a positive image of the European Union in CIS countries differ considerably from those given in South-Eastern Europe. Most important is the argument of strength as a result of unity, a view that seems to hold special attraction for people in Russia, Kazakhstan and Armenia. Less importance is given to economic and financial aid provided by the EU and the European Union's help towards overall economic and financial development and higher living standards - these points are made most frequently in Armenia (where economic and financial aid is quoted by 19%) and in Georgia. Respondents in Russia and Armenia also underline the activities of the EU for peace, human rights and democracy.

Negative arguments play a very small role, reflecting mostly an impression that people receive no benefits from contacts with the European Union (9% of the statements given in Georgia). A positive conclusion can also be drawn from the critical voices, insofar that even fewer people believe that the EU is only acting in its own interests or constitutes a threat to the respondents' country. A **neutral image** of the European Union is mainly justified by the impression that the EU is remote and that other problems are more pressing - a feeling typical for people in Armenia and Russia. Russians also tend to believe that the activities of the EU do not exert a real influence on the situation in their country (6% in Russia). Another 4%, both in Russia and in CIS countries on the whole, declare to have no interest in and thus no opinion about the European Union.

2.3. Information on the European Union

In nearly all countries surveyed, national television is most frequently mentioned as the principal source of information on the European Union. The only country where television in general is not top is Estonia.

86% of citizens in **seven candidate countries**[12] outside the Baltic states and 70% in the **three Baltic states** cite national television as **their main source of information** (annex figures 48-53).

Great importance is also given to **national newspapers** (61% in the Baltics and 64% in the other candidate countries) and to **national radio** (54% in the Baltics and 53% in the other candidate countries).

National periodicals as a source of information are most common in Slovakia (57%), Poland (36%), the Czech Republic (34%) and Estonia (27%). In Estonia (22%) and Latvia (20%) **Russian television plays** an important role, and to a lesser extent **Russian newspapers** (Latvia: 14%, Estonia: 7%) and **Russian radio** (Latvia: 12%, Estonia: 8%), those numbers reflecting the media habits especially of the Russian speaking part of the population. On the other hand **Russian periodicals** are not used much.

Western information sources have only a limited role to play. Western television is used as a major source of information on the EU among candidate countries mainly in Romania and Slovakia (19% each) and in Slovenia (17%). **Western radio** is listened to fairly often in Slovakia (12%) and in Romania (11%). By contrast only 2% in all candidate countries get information about the EU from **Western periodicals**.

Information distributed by **national government** is an important source in Slovakia (23%), up to a certain point also in Poland (12%), the Czech Republic (10%) and Slovenia (8%).

12 For this question a distinction has been made between non-Baltic candidate countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and the Baltic states due to the importance of Russian information sources in the latter countries.

Schools and universities are mentioned most often in Slovakia (12%) and Slovenia (10%). People get information in **the workplace** fairly often in Slovakia (12%) as well as in Poland, Estonia and Slovenia (10% each). **Libraries** are named mainly in Slovakia (22%).

The largest number of people who **do not get information** on the EU from any source encompassed by the CEEB survey among candidate countries are found in Bulgaria (20%) and Lithuania (17%); a deficit already observed last year.

In South-Eastern Europe national television is named as the primary source of information on the European Union (80% in the whole area). **National newspapers** (45%) and **national radio** (33%) coming next (annex figures 54-55).

Western information sources play an important role in **Albania** (Western television: 24%, Western radio: 8%). In Croatia 10% are watching Western television and so do 8% in Yugoslavia. National periodicals are read on EU issues by 10% in the whole area, mostly in Yugoslavia (11%) and Croatia (10%).

In **Russia** only **national television** (79%), **national press** and **national radio** (both 37%) are important sources of information on the European Union; smaller numbers of people either read related topics in national periodicals or get information in their workplace. **Among the other CIS countries surveyed Russian television is a more popular source of information on the EU** than national television in **Kazahkstan** (67% and 47% respectively) and in **Belarus** (59% and 54% respectively). In Armenia the relationship is fairly equal (62% national, 60% Russian). National television is more important than Russian television, however, in Georgia (72% and 48% respectively) and in Ukraine (54% and 33%).

The highest percentage of people who claim to be informed by newspapers is to be found in Belarus: 47% by national newspapers and 21% by Russian ones. National radio is listened to most on EU issues in Ukraine (39%) and in Belarus (33%). Western information sources are hardly relevant at all for the general public.

12% interviewees in Russia and 16% in other CIS countries (21% in Ukraine) say they do not get information on the EU at all (annex figures 56-59).

In the **candidate countries** people were asked to express their opinion about the possibility of opening information centres run by the European Union in the countries' capitals. **The notion of setting up EU information centres is supported by an overall majority of 55%, who** say this is a good idea, while only 2% hold the opposite view and 33% are indifferent.

EU INFORMATION CENTRES IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES
CENTRES D'INFORMATION SUR L'UNION EUROPÉENNE DANS LES PAYS CANDIDATS



Q: IF THE EUROPEAN UNION WERE TO OPEN AN INFORMATION CENTRE IN (OUR CAPITAL), WOULD YOU PERSONALLY THINK THIS IS A GOOD IDEA, NOT A GOOD IDEA OR ARE YOU INDIFFERENT ABOUT IT?

Q: SI L'UNION EUROPÉENNE DÉCIDAIT D'OUVRIR UN CENTRE D'INFORMATION DANS (VOTRE CAPITALE), DIRIEZ-VOUS PERSONNELLEMENT QUE C'EST UNE BONNE IDÉE, UNE MAUVAISE IDÉE OU BIEN SERIEZ-VOUS INDIFFÉRENT?

TEXT FIGURE 6

Public support is **highest** in **Romania** (74%) and **Slovenia** (65%) followed by **Slovakia** (59%) and **Estonia** (57%). In Poland 51% think that this is a good idea (37% indifferent) and so do 50% in Bulgaria (29% indifferent). Czechs (49% support) and Latvians (47% support) show a higher percentage of indifference (43% each) but as in all other countries there is no significant number of people who think that it is a bad idea. In Hungary 45% support the idea and 36% are indifferent. The least support for opening an information centre is to be found in Lithuania (30% good idea, 38% indifferent, 4% bad idea) where, in fact, both positive EU attitudes and EU knowledge are at their lowest (for the latter see the CEEB6 report result for EU logo recognition in particular).

Asked about EU issues of most interest to them, people living in the ten candidate countries would like in particular to know more about working and living conditions (63%) and human rights (52%).

There is also considerable interest in issues like the environment (42%), bilateral relations between the European Union and one's own country, questions of agriculture and fisheries (37% each) business/industry/technology (35%), trade with the EU (35%), economic and monetary affairs (33%). Less than one third of all people interviewed in the region declare an interest in the common foreign and security policy (31%), culture and audio-visual media (29%), science, research and development (28%) and the single European market (28%). The EU assistance programme ("Phare") is met with interest by 25%, the area of competition and privatisation by 24%. Least interest is shown in the institutions of the European Union (22%) and the EU's activities in the fields of energy and transport (21% each).

Priorities are very different indeed among decision-makers and opinion formers. Predominant interest is shown by this group in the **candidate countries on bilateral relations between the EU and the respective countries**.

Interest is also very high in the EU **assistance programme** "Phare" (69%) and in EU activities in respect of **economic and monetary affairs**. Only the environmental issue ranks high both among decision-makers and opinion-formers and the general population. 63% of decision-makers/opinion-formers are interested in EU institutions, 62% with the European Union's activities in the areas of trade and of commerce, industry and technology and 61% with the single market. A middle position in the hierarchy of interest is held by the issues of science, research and development and human rights (58% each) as well as EU activities in the areas of competition and privatisation and working and living conditions (57% each). Cultural activities (56%) and questions of a common foreign and security policy (55%) hold a similar level of interest. Relatively little interest is dedicated to the issues of transport, energy, agriculture and fisheries.

Decision-makers and opinion-formers thus do not only show a higher level of interest in the activities of the European Union than ordinary citizens but their interests are also more oriented towards the political process itself.

EU ISSUES OF INTEREST IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES / THEMES CONCERNANT L'UE INTERESSANT LES PAYS CANDIDATS



Q: THE EUROPEAN UNION DEALS WITH MANY ISSUES. HERE ARE SOME OF THEM. WOULD YOU, OR WOULD YOU NOT PERSONALLY LIKE TO KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT THE EUROPEAN UNION IS DOING IN THE AREAS OF ...

Q: L'UNION EUROPÉENNE COUVRE DE NOMBREUX DOMAINES. JE VAIS MAINTENANT VOUS ENUMÉRER CERTAINS DE CES THÈMES. SOUHAITERIEZ-VOUS AVOIR PLUS D'INFORMATIONS EN CE QUI CONCERNE.

(NB. MULTIPLE RESPONSES/RÉPONSES MULTIPLES)

TEXT FIGURE 7

EU ISSUES OF INTEREST AMONG DECISION- MAKERS / OPINION-FORMERS IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES
THEMES CONCERNANT L'UE INTERESSANT LES DECIDEURS/LEADERS D'OPINION DES PAYS CANDIDATS



Q: THE EUROPEAN UNION DEALS WITH MANY ISSUES. I WILL NOW READ YOU A LIST OF SOME OF THEM. WOULD YOU, OR WOULD YOU NOT PERSONALLY LIKE TO KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT THE EUROPEAN UNION IS DOING IN THE AREAS OF ...

Q: L'UNION EUROPÉENNE COUVRE DE NOMBREUX DOMAINES. JE VAIS MAINTENANT VOUS ENUMÉRER CERTAINS DE CES THÈMES. SOUHAITERIEZ-VOUS AVOIR PLUS D'INFORMATIONS EN CE QUI CONCERNE.

(NB. MULTIPLE RESPONSES/REPONSES MULTIPLES)

TEXT FIGURE 8 CANDIDATE DECISION-MAKERS/OPINION-FORMERS 1

2.4. Referendum on membership of the EU and NATO

The discussion about the enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has gained in intensity among the political élite as well as the public in general in the countries concerned with this matter.

CEEB already dealt with this last year and has widened its approach by including questions on the reasons for the opinions held by people in the candidate countries.

In the ten candidate countries on the whole, an overwhelming majority of citizens[13] would vote for joining the European Union in the event of a referendum: 61% of those questioned in the ten countries would vote for membership, only 7% would vote against, and 15% remain undecided at the time of survey (text figure 9). The overall results are practically identical to those reported in CEEB6 last year.

In some countries, however, big shifts of opinion have taken place, albeit without questioning the majority pro-membership orientation in any of them.

In Romania, 80% declare a voting intention in favour of their country's EU membership (+10 compared to CEEB6). **Romania and Poland** (the latter 70% in favour) are the two countries with the **highest** number of people declaring their intention to vote for EU membership in the event of a referendum.

By contrast, in the **Baltic states** a **substantial decline** in the number of citizens who declare a **pro-membership voting intention** has taken place: Estonia: -15, Latvia: -13, Lithuania: -7. Citizens in the Baltics also have the least number of citizens in favour of membership (Latvia: 34%, Lithuania: 35%, Estonia: 29%). Since there is no concurrent increase in the numbers who would vote against (Latvia: 13%, Lithuania: 6%, Estonia: 17%) those developments indicate a growing uncertainty in the Baltics.

In the other candidate countries the declared voting intentions have remained fairly stable since last year: in Bulgaria 49% say that they would vote for their country joining the EU in the event of a referendum, in Slovenia 47%, in Hungary 47%, in Slovakia 46% and in the Czech Republic 43%. People who say they would vote against joining the EU are found in above-average numbers in Hungary and Slovenia (15% each).

A deeper insight into the reasons for voting "for" or "against" can be gained by analysing their **different motivations** (text figure 10). The strongest arguments given for a **vote in favour of joining the European Union** are **general progress** that can be made thanks to the EU (32% in the whole region) and the expectation that the **economy will improve** (26%). In Bulgaria this line of reasoning is often related to the hope that the EU will help the country out of its current crisis. Respondents in the Baltics (with the exception of Lithuania), however, are less inclined to give those two reasons. In some cases people also see the accession to the EU as an impulse for structural reforms (e.g. in the areas of economics or administration).

13 Note for the referendum question, the results are given obviously for citizens, not residents.

Higher standards of living as a result of EU membership are expected most of all in Romania (26% compared to an average of 15% in all candidate countries).

The need for integration into Europe - most often mentioned in Romania and Bulgaria - is summarised very clearly by one Bulgarian citizen, who said that *"the place of Bulgaria is in the EU"*, and in an all-encompassing though somehow resigned manner in the words of a Hungarian: "*there is no other way out, we have to belong somewhere, this is how we have a present and a future*". Open borders both in the literal and the more sophisticated meaning are mentioned spontaneously especially in Slovakia and Bulgaria. The EU's contribution to peace, human rights and stability are of some importance in the Baltic countries (14% in the three states): "*because the EU is a democratic institution*", says a Latvian, or "*a smaller country would be safer in a Union*", claims an Estonian. 7% refer to economic and financial aid provided by the European Union. Czechs and Slovaks more than anyone else see accession to the European Union as a way of "*becoming stronger*". General cooperation in the fields of science, technology and culture seems to be most attractive to Poles.

A **no-vote** is justified first of all by **economic arguments**. People in the Baltics, in the Czech Republic and in Slovenia in particular fear that joining the European Union might worsen the economic situation, be too expensive or bring no benefits to their own country (*"Local production will go bankrupt because these goods do not meet EU standards*", to quote a Latvian). In the Baltics, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, an above-average number of people is also concerned about a perceived loss of national identity and independence ("*we will be a colony of the EU*", to quote a Lithuanian, *"Estonian culture will disappear*", another respondent from the Baltics). Other reasons given for intending to vote against joining the European Union are the impression that the EU acts in its own interest and not in the interest of candidate countries (or even against them) and the fear that the EU could bring instability and disintegration.

Regarding **membership of NATO**, the overall picture in the region has not changed: **53%** of the interviewees say that they would **vote for their country's membership** of **NATO**, 17% remain undecided, and 10% would vote against (text figure 11).

As in the case of EU membership, changes are to be found in the declared voting intentions in some countries. **Romania** shows not only the **highest** percentage of absolute numbers wanting to join NATO but also the biggest shift in favour of entering NATO (76%, +12 compared to CEEB6). In Poland the large majority of 65% in favour of NATO membership remains largely stable. In Bulgaria the number of those declaring they would vote against NATO membership has declined -15 (for: 27%, against 13%).

On the contrary, intentions to vote in favour have declined: Lithuania -10 compared to CEEB6 and Estonia -15. Again there is no corresponding increase in citizens who say that they would cast a vote against NATO membership of their country.

REFERENDUM ON EU MEMBERSHIP* IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES/ REFERENDUM SUR L'ADHESION* A L'UE DANS LES PAYS CANDIDATS



*Those who have the right to vote/ Ceux qui ont le droit de vote

Q:IF THERE WERE TO BE A REFERENDUM TOMORROW ON THE QUESTION OF (OUR COUNTRY'S) MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU, WOULD YOU PERSONALLY VOTE FOR OR AGAINST MEMBERSHIP?

Q:SI DEMAIN, IL Y AVAIT UN REFERENDUM SUR LA QUESTION DE L'ADHÉSION DE (NOTRE PAYS) A L'UE, PERSONNELLEMENT, VOTERIEZ-VOUS POUR OU CONTRE CETTE ADHÉSION?

TEXT FIGURE 9

REASONS WHY FOR/AGAINST EU MEMBERSHIP/ ARGUMENTS EN FAVEUR/CONTRE L'ADHÉSION À L'UE/ CANDIDATE COUNTRIES/PAYS CANDIDATS



Q: WHAT ARE THE MAIN REASONS WHY YOU WOULD VOTE FOR/AGAINST? ANY OTHER REASONS?

Q: QUELLES SONT LES RAISONS PRINCIPALES POUR LESQUELLES VOUS VOTERIEZ EN FAVEUR/CONTRE UNE ADHÉSION À L'UE? AVEZ-VOUS D'AUTRES RAISONS?

(NB. OPEN-ENDED QUESTION/QUESTION OUVERTE)

TEXT FIGURE 10

REFERENDUM ON NATO MEMBERSHIP* IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES/ REFERENDUM SUR L'ADHESION* A L'OTAN DANS LES PAYS CANDIDATS



*Those who have the right to vote/ Ceux qui ont le droit de vote

Q:IF THERE WERE TO BE A REFERENDUM TOMORROW ON THE QUESTION OF (OUR COUNTRY'S) MEMBERSHIP OF NATO, WOULD YOU PERSONALLY VOTE FOR OR AGAINST MEMBERSHIP?

Q:SI DEMAIN, IL Y AVAIT UN REFERENDUM SUR LA QUESTION DE L'ADHÉSION DE (NOTRE PAYS) A L'OTAN, PERSONNELLEMENT, VOTERIEZ-VOUS POUR OU CONTRE CETTE ADHÉSION?

REASONS WHY FOR/AGAINST NATO MEMBERSHIP/ ARGUMENTS EN FAVEUR/CONTRE L'ADHÉSION À L'OTAN
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES/PAYS CANDIDATS

FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

AGAINST NATO MEMBERSHIP



Q: WHAT ARE THE MAIN REASONS WHY YOU WOULD VOTE FOR/AGAINST? ANY OTHER REASONS?

Q: QUELLES SONT LES RAISONS PRINCIPALES POUR LESQUELLES VOUS VOTERIEZ EN FAVEUR/CONTRE UNE ADHÉSION À L'OTAN? AVEZ-VOUS D'AUTRES RAISONS?

(NB. OPEN-ENDED QUESTION/QUESTION OUVERTE)

TEXT FIGURE 12

The absolute highest number of people saying they would vote against are to be found in Hungary (32% for, 23% against), the Czech Republic (28% for, 21% against) and Slovakia (27% for, 19% against). In those countries no dramatic changes in opinion have taken place : the same holds true for Slovenia (39% for, 15% against).

The clearly **dominating argument for joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation** is the image of NATO **as a guarantor of security and stability in the region** (49%). The desire for security guarantees is most outspoken in Poland (59%) and Lithuania (58%). In Poland and Estonia many people also refer to security and protection from Russia as a reason for entering NATO (7% in the whole region). However, a considerable number of interviewees (11%) also link NATO membership with hope for general progress and cooperation, this non-military understanding being most frequent in Romania. Another 11% expect that NATO will help to control and reform the army and the military industry as well as the same percentage stating simply that their country needs NATO support (text figure 12).

The most frequent reason given for a vote **against NATO membership** is people's preference for their country having a **neutral status**. This view is most prominent in the Baltics (with the exception of Lithuania) but is also shared by about one fifth of respondents in Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria and by 16% in the Czech Republic. On the other hand Poles and Romanians do not show any sympathy for neutrality. A general antipathy against the military and war is invoked as an argument against joining NATO more frequently than average in Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. This kind of reasoning is by contrast practically absent in Poland and Romania. The perceived cost of NATO membership is used as a justification for a no vote mostly in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Hungary.

2.5. European integration: who expects to benefit or to lose?

Asked who they think benefits most from the **relationship between their country and the European Union, 44%** of citizens interviewed in the ten **candidate countries** say that **both benefit equally**, while 21% believe that their own country benefits most and 17% that the European Union does (annex figure 60).

A "balanced" relationship is assumed most frequently in Romania (60%), followed by Poland (45%) and Slovakia (43%). Benefits for the respondents' own country are perceived especially in all three Baltic states. By contrast, the European Union is seen as the partner which benefits most in Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Looking at both sides of the coin, the difference between those who think that their own country benefits most and those who think that the European Union benefits most is clear in Bulgaria and Romania, where a strong and increasing net-majority notes favourable effects for their own country. A similar trend can be found in Poland.

The opposite opinion is held in Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia and this picture has not changed over time. Interestingly enough, citizens in the economically more developed countries are most likely to believe the EU is benefiting more than their own country, while those in the economically less developed countries tend to see a more favourable relationship for their own country.

In South-Eastern Europe, Albanians in particular believe that their country benefits more from the European Union (46%) followed by citizens in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (28%).

In both countries, however, the respective percentages have declined last year (Albania: -12, FYROM: -8). In Croatia nearly half of those interviewed think that the relationship is balanced. Very different are opinions in Yugoslavia where 34% see most benefits for the EU, 38% for both and only 9% think that the relationship works in favour of their own country.

In CIS countries, opinions are divided between those who see the relationship more advantageous for the European Union (29%) **and those who believe both benefit equally** (28%). The highest number of people, who think that their own country benefits most, is to be found in Armenia (19%), Georgia (16%) and Belarus (17%), although this opinion is declining in the former two countries (Armenia: -14, Georgia: -10) while the opposite view is gaining strength (EU benefit most; +16 in Armenia and +11 in Georgia compared to CEEB6). The European Union is seen to be the winner in this relationship above all by people in Armenia (39%), Russia (33%) and Kazakhstan (32%).

Citizens in **all candidate countries** were asked **"who do you think is likely to benefit or lose out as ties between (our country) and the European Union increase?"** Like last year a majority of interviewees indicated the **private sector as the primary winner"** (65%). **Other beneficiaries** are said to be the educational system (56%), the armed forces (55%) as well as health and social services (53%) (annex figure 61).

On the other hand farmers are thought most likely to lose out (33%). Those most worried about the future of farmers are people interviewed in Slovenia (57%), the Czech Republic (52%), Estonia (45%), Latvia (45%) and Poland (43%) (see annex figures 62-71). Overall, respondents in the candidate countries are divided as to whether or not farmers will benefit (38% : 33%).

Since this question has been asked four times now (CEEB3, 5, 6, 7)[14] changes in the perceived allocation of benefits and losses can be observed (annex figures 72 and 73).

14 This question was not asked in the three Baltic states and in Slovenia in CEEB5. Since the results are weighted according to the population size of each country and those four countries constitute only about one tenth of the total population of the region, changes for candidate countries as a whole for that year can be interpreted in a sensible though cautious manner.

Between 1992 (CEEB3) and 1994 (CEEB5), there was a notable decline of optimistic views and a somewhat lesser but still visible rise of pessimistic views about the future of most groups and sectors of society: a negative tendency affecting especially low income groups, manual workers and farmers but also the health and social services and the educational system. The future prospects of civil servants and private business, however, did not experience a similar slump.

It should be noted that this was the period when the original high hopes connected with the transformation became dampened in most countries of the region[15] and the overall image of the European Union suffered too. From 1995 (CEEB6), optimism returned and the future of the educational system, farmers, manual workers and low income groups was seen in a more rosy light again.

Private sectors entrepreneurs are even more confident than their fellow citizens, that closer ties with the European Union will benefit them. To a lesser extend this also holds true for workers in state enterprises and civil servants. By contrast, members of low income groups show very mixed feelings about their future prospects, but their vision was much more negative two years ago. Finally farmers are rather afraid that they might lose out (51%) while only 26% of them think that they will benefit from closer ties with the European Union (annex figure 74).

2.6. Use and knowledge of languages

In the **ten candidate countries Polish** is the most spoken language (38%), followed by **Russian** (23%) and **Romanian** (21%) (annex figure 75). The most widely known western language is English (12%) followed by German (11%). French is spoken by 5%.

Russian is spoken by the largest number of people in the Baltic countries (Latvia: 94%, Estonia: 84%, Lithuania: 79%). Indeed in Estonia and Latvia more people speak Russian than Estonian and Latvian respectively. Elsewhere Russian is most widely spoken in Slovakia and in Poland. Knowledge of English is the highest in Slovenia (32%) and Estonia (20%). German is spoken by the largest percentage of people in Slovenia (29%) and the Czech Republic (23%). 16% of those interviewed in Romania speak French.

In South-Eastern Europe, Serb is spoken by 50% of the general public. Outside Yugoslavia, Serb is spoken mostly in the FYROM. In this region 16% have a knowledge of English (the highest percentage being in Croatia: 28%). German is mentioned by 18% in Croatia. In Albania 21% say they can speak some Italian.

In CIS countries, Russian clearly dominates (95%). Indeed Russian is spoken by more people in Kazakhstan and Belarus than Kazakh or Belorussian. 4% of people have some knowledge of English (mostly in Georgia and Belarus) (annex figure 76).

15 People in the region generally tend to see categories such as manual workers and low income groups as losers of the first phase of the transformation process and equally the private sector as the one which stands to gain. The opinions on civil servants are mixed, but in most cases the impression prevails that they come to terms with the new order.

ANNEXES

GRAPHICS OF FULL RESULTS

NOTES ON ANNEX FIGURES

- All numbers shown in the graphics are percentages.

- Respondents who gave no answer to a question or who answered "don't know" are not shown.

- Where more than one positive or negative answer is possible, the responses are often combined.

- Totals for candidate countries, South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States countries surveyed this year are weighted according to the population size of each country.

- The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is shortened to its acronym FYROM.

- The results for Albania, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia (South-Eastern Europe), are shown separately because, at present, these countries do not have a Europe Agreement with the EU, nor have they applied for EU membership.

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - PAST 12 MONTHS / FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 DERNIERS MOIS



Q: COMPARED TO 12 MONTHS AGO, DO YOU THINK THAT THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAS GOT A LOT BETTER, GOT A LITTLE BETTER, STAYED THE SAME, GOT A LITTLE WORSE OR GOT A LOT WORSE ?/

Q: PAR RAPPORT A CE QU'ELLE ETAIT IL Y A 12 MOIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION FINANCIERE DE VOTRE MENAGE EST ACTUELLEMENT BIEN MEILLEURE, UN PEU MEILLEURE, INCHANGEE, UN PEU MOINS BONNE OU BIEN MOINS BONNE ?

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES - NEXT 12 MONTHS / FINANCES DU MENAGE - LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS



Q: AND OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS, DO YOU EXPECT THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD WILL GET A LOT BETTER, GET A LITTLE BETTER, STAY THE SAME, GET A LITTLE WORSE OR GET A LOT WORSE ?/

Q: ET DANS LES 12 PROCHAINS MOIS, PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION FINANCIERE DE VOTRE MENAGE SERA BIEN MEILLEURE, UN PEU MEILLEURE, INCHANGEE, UN PEU MOINS BONNE OU BIEN MOINS BONNE ?

ANNEX FIGURE 2

MARKET ECONOMY - RIGHT OR WRONG ?/ ECONOMIE DE MARCHE- BONNE OU MAUVAISE ?



Q: DO YOU PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THE CREATION OF A MARKET ECONOMY, THAT IS ONE LARGELY FREE FROM STATE CONTROL, IS RIGHT OR WRONG FOR (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE ?/

Q: PERSONELLEMENT, PENSEZ VOUS QUE LA CREATION D'UNE ECONOMIE DE MARCHE, C'EST-A-DIRE TRES PEU CONTROLEE PAR L'ETAT, SOIT UNE BONNE OU UNE MAUVAISE CHOSE POUR L'AVENIR DE (NOTRE PAYS) ?

SATISFACTION WITH DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY/ SATISFACTION AVEC LA DEMOCRATISATION



Q: ON THE WHOLE, ARE YOU VERY SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED OR NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS DEVELOPING IN (OUR COUNTRY) ?/

Q: DANS L'ENSEMBLE, ETES-VOUS TRES SATISFAIT, PLUTOT SATISFAIT, PLUTOT PAS SATISFAIT OU PAS DU TOUT SATISFAIT DE LA FACON DONT LA DEMOCRATIE S'INSTALLE DANS (NOTRE PAYS) ?

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS / RESPECT DES DROITS DE L'HOMME



Q: HOW MUCH RESPECT IS THERE FOR INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS NOWADAYS IN (OUR COUNTRY) ? DO YOU FEEL THERE IS A LOT OF RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS, SOME RESPECT, NOT MUCH RESPECT OR NO RESPECT AT ALL ?/

Q: COMMENT RESPECTE-T-ON LES DROITS DE L'HOMME ACTUELLEMENT(DANS NOTRE PAYS)? ESTIMEZ-VOUS QU'IL Y A BEAUCOUP DE RESPECT POUR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME, UN PEU DE RESPECT, PAS BEAUCOUP DE RESPECT OU PAS DE RESPECT DU TOUT ?

DIRECTION OF COUNTRY - RIGHT OR WRONG ?/ EVOLUTION DU PAYS - BONNE OU MAUVAISE ?



Q: IN GENERAL, DO YOU FEEL THINGS IN (OUR COUNTRY) ARE GOING IN THE RIGHT OR WRONG DIRECTION ?/

Q: EN GENERAL, ESTIMEZ-VOUS QUE LA SITUATION DANS (NOTRE PAYS) EVOLUE DANS UNE BONNE OU DANS UNE MAUVAISE DIRECTION ?

DIRECTION OF COUNTRY: ALBANIA/
EVOLUTION DU PAYS: ALBANIE

REASONS WHY " RIGHT DIRECTION"/
RAISONS POUR BONNE DIRECTION



REASONS WHY " WRONG DIRECTION"/
RAISONS POUR MAUVAISE DIRECTION



Q: PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR REASONS WHY YOU BELIEVE YOUR COUNTRY IS GOING IN THE RIGHT/WRONG DIRECTION? ANY OTHER REASONS?

Q: POUVEZ-VOUS S'IL VOUS PLAIT ME DONNER LES RAISONS POUR LESQUELLES L'ALBANIE ÉVOLUE SELON VOUS DANS LA BONNE/MAUVAISE DIRECTION? AVEZ-VOUS D'AUTRES RAISONS?

(NB. OPEN-ENDED QUESTION/QUESTION OUVERTE)

BULGARIA: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES / % RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES



CZECH REPUBLIC: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES / % RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES



ESTONIA: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES / % RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES





ANNEX FIGURE 11

LATVIA: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES / % RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES



LITHUANIA: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES / % RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES



POLAND: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES /
% RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES





ANNEX FIGURE 15



ANNEX FIGURE 16



SLOVENIA: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES /
% RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES
60%
30%
0%
-30%
-60%
-90%
40%
COUNTRY
DIRECTION
36%
26%
MARKET
ECONOMY
13%
14%
9%
HUMAN
RIGHTS
2%
8%
2%
1%
-4%
-5%
-11%
-16%
-11%
DEMOCRACY
SATISFACTION
-21%
-28%
-23%
-24%
-28%
CEEB1
1990
CEEB2
1991
CEEB3
1992
CEEB4
1993
CEEB5
1994
CEEB6
1995
CEEB7
1996



ANNEX FIGURE 18


FYROM: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES /
% RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES
60%
30%
0%
-30%
-60%
-90%
COUNTRY DIRECTION
HUMAN RIGHTS
DEMOCRACY SATISFACTION
MARKET ECONOMY
4%
4%
12%
9%
-5%
0%
8%
-7%
14%
-6%
-2%
-6%
-27%
-18%
-18%
-25%
-21%
-15 %
3%
4%
CEEB1 1990
CEEB2 1991
CEEB3 1992
CEEB4 1993
CEEB5 1994
CEEB6 1995
CEEB7 1996

ARMENIA: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES / % RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES





ANNEX FIGURE 21



ANNEX FIGURE 22

KAZAKHSTAN: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES /
% RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES



ANNEX FIGURE 23


EUROPEAN RUSSIA: NET REPLIES / RÉPONSES NETTES
% POSITIVE MINUS % NEGATIVE RESPONSES /
% RÉPONSES POSITIVES MOINS NEGATIVES
60%
30%
0%
-30%
-60%
-90%
MARKET ECONOMY
8%
-7%
-22%
-30%
-41%
-44%
-32%
COUNTRY DIRECTION
-12%
-24%
-16%
-14%
-51%
-46%
-41%
HUMAN RIGHTS
-64%
-46%
-53%
-62%
-68%
-70%
-64%
DEMOCRACY SATISFACTION
-51%
-64%
-56%
-75%
-79%
-72%
CEEB1 1990
CEEB2 1991
CEEB3 1992
CEEB4 1993
CEEB4A 1993
CEEB5 1994
CEEB6 1995
CEEB7 1996



ANNEX FIGURE 25

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE?
OU SE SITUÉ L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS?
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES/PAYS CANDIDATS

	FIRST PLACE	SECOND PLACE	THIRD PLACE	FOURTH PLACE	REST
BULGARIA	European Union 34%	Russia 15%	USA 6%	Other Central Europe 5%	Other 40%
CZECH REPUBLIC	European Union 44%	Other Western Europe* 17%	Other Central Europe 10%	USA 7%	Other 22%
ESTONIA	European Union 42%	Russia 18%	Other Western Europe* 14%	Other Central Europe 8%	Other 18%
HUNGARY	European Union 27%	USA 22%	Other Central Europe 12%	Germany 10%	Other 29%
LATVIA	Russia 31%	European Union 27%	Other Western Europe* 10%	USA 9%	Other 23%
LITHUANIA	European Union 25%	Russia 14%	USA 8%	Other Western Europe* 7%	Other 46%
POLAND	European Union 46%	USA 14%	Other Central Europe 8%	Germany 8%	Other 24%
ROMANIA	European Union 40%	USA 35%	Russia 3%	Germany 2%	Other 20%
SLOVAKIA	European Union 38%	Other Western Europe* 14%	Other Central Europe 12%	USA 10%	Other 26%
SLOVENIA	European Union 52%	USA 13%	Other Western Europe* 9%	Germany 5%	Other 21%
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES	European Union 40%	USA 17%	Other Central Europe 7%	Russia 6%	Other 30%

*) OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LIKE NORWAY AND SWITZERLAND, WHICH REMAIN OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION

(NB. ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED/UNE SEULE RESPONSE PERMISE)

Q: AS THINGS NOW STAND, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED TO?

Q: DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERA LE PLUS ETROITEMENT LIE?

ANNEX FIGURE 26

WHERE DOES OUR COUNTRY'S FUTURE LIE?
OU SE SITUÉ L'AVENIR DE NOTRE PAYS?
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE AND CIS/PAYS D'EUROPE DU SUD-EST ET CEI

	FIRST PLACE	SECOND PLACE	THIRD PLACE	FOURTH PLACE	REST
ALBANIA	European Union 46%	USA 36%	Other Western Europe 2%	Germany 2%	Other 14%
CROATIA	USA 39%	European Union 27%	Germany 14%	Other Western Europe 3%	Other 17%
FYROM	European Union 39%	USA 29%	Other Western Europe 5%	Germany 3%	Other 24%
YUGOSLAVIA	European Union 20%	USA 20%	Russia 19%	Other Central Europe 10%	Other 31%
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE	USA 29%	European Union 28%	Russia 9%	Other Central Europe 6%	Other 28%
ARMENIA	Russia 67%	USA 18%	European Union 4%	Turkey 3%	Other 8%
BELARUS	Russia 76%	European Union 6%	Germany 3%	USA 2%	Other 13%
GEORGIA	Russia 51%	USA 13%	European Union 11%	Germany 8%	Other 17%
KAZAKHSTAN	Russia 55%	Turkey 15%	USA 5%	European Union 4%	Other 21%
RUSSIA	CIS 27%	USA 27%	European Union 13%	Japan/ South Korea 4%	Other 29%
UKRAINE	Russia 46%	USA 17%	European Union 15%	Germany 2%	Other 20%
CIS*)	Russia 52%	USA 13%	European Union 12%	Germany 3%	Other 20%

*) RUSSIA EXCLUDED FROM CIS TOTAL/RUSSIE EXCLUE DU TOTAL CEI
(NB. ONLY ONE ANSWER ALLOWED/UNE SEULE RESPONSE PERMISE)

Q: AS THINGS NOW STAND, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU SEE (OUR COUNTRY'S) FUTURE MOST CLOSELY TIED TO?

Q: DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, AVEC LEQUEL DES (GROUPES DE) PAYS SUIVANTS PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LE FUTUR DE (NOTRE PAYS) SERA LE PLUS ETROITEMENT LIE?

ANNEX FIGURE 27

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN BULGARIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN BULGARIE



ANNEX FIGURE 28 CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN CZECH REPUBLIC
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN REPUBLIQUE TCHEQUE



ANNEX FIGURE 29 CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7



ANNEX FIGURE 30

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7



ANNEX FIGURE 31

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN LATVIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN LETTONIE



ANNEX FIGURE 32

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN LITHUANIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN LITUANIE



ANNEX FIGURE 33

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN POLAND
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN POLOGNE



ANNEX FIGURE 34

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN ROMANIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN ROUMANIE



ANNEX FIGURE 35

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN SLOVAKIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN SLOVAQUIE



ANNEX FIGURE 36

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN SLOVENIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN SLOVENIE



ANNEX FIGURE 37

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN ALBANIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN ALBANIE



ANNEX FIGURE 38

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN FYROM
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN FYROM



ANNEX FIGURE 39

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN ARMENIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN ARMÉNIE



ANNEX FIGURE 40

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN BELARUS
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN BIÉLORUSSIE



ANNEX FIGURE 41

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN GEORGIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN GEORGIE



ANNEX FIGURE 42

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN KAZAKHSTAN
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE AU KAZAKHSTAN



ANNEX FIGURE 43

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN RUSSIE D'EUROPE



ANNEX FIGURE 44

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

EUROPEAN UNION'S IMAGE IN UKRAINE
L'IMAGE DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE EN UKRAINE



ANNEX FIGURE 45

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROBAROMETER 7

REASONS GIVEN WHY THE IMAGE OF THE EU IS POSITIVE, NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE/
RAISONS POUR LESQUELLES L'IMAGE DE L'UE EST POSITIVE, NEUTRE OU NEGATIVE
ALBANIA, CROATIA, FYROM, YUGOSLAVIA



Q: AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, 15 STATES OF "WESTERN" EUROPE FORM TOGETHER THE "EUROPEAN UNION". WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE AIMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE, NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE?/

Q: COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ PEUT-ETRE, 15 ETATS D'EUROPE "OCCIDENTALE" FORMENT L' "UNION EUROPÉENNE". DIRIEZ-VOUS QUE VOS IMPRESSIONS QUANT AUX BUTS ET ACTIVITES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE SONT EN GENERAL POSITIVES, NEUTRES OU NEGATIVES ?

REASONS GIVEN WHY THE IMAGE OF THE EU IS POSITIVE, NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE/ RAISONS POUR LESQUELLES L'IMAGE DE L'UE EST POSITIVE, NEUTRE OU NEGATIVE

CIS COUNTRIES/PAYS DE LA CEI



Q: AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, 15 STATES OF "WESTERN" EUROPE FORM TOGETHER THE "EUROPEAN UNION". WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE AIMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ARE GENERALLY POSITIVE, NEUTRAL OR NEGATIVE?/

Q: COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ PEUT-ETRE, 15 ETATS D'EUROPE "OCCIDENTALE" FORMENT L' "UNION EUROPÉENNE". DIRIEZ-VOUS QUE VOS IMPRESSIONS QUANT AUX BUTS ET ACTIVITES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE SONT EN GENERAL POSITIVES, NEUTRES OU NEGATIVES ?

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR L' UE



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

*EXCLUDING RUSSIA/RUSSIE EXCLUE

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

*RESULT HERE EXCLUDES BALTIC STATES/ ICI, RESULTAT DES ETATS BALTES NON-COMPRIS

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ANNEX FIGURE 48

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR L' UE



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

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ANNEX FIGURE 50

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR L' UE



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

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

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ANNEX FIGURE 53

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR L' UE



* THERE IS NO EU DELEGATION IN CROATIA/ IL N'Y A PAS DE DELEGATION UE EN CROATIE

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INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR L' UE



*THERE IS NO EU DELEGATION IN FYROM/ IL N'Y A PAS DE DELEGATION UE EN FYROM

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INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU/ SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR L' UE

	ARMENIA	BELARUS
TELEVISION NATIONALE	62	54
TELEVISION DE RUSSIE	60	59
PRESSE NATIONALE	21	47
RADIO NATIONALE	20	33
JOURNAUX DE RUSSIE	9	21
RADIO RUSSE	8	14
RADIO OCCIDENTALE	8	5
AU TRAVAIL	2	3
TELEVISION OCCIDENTALE	2	3
ECOLE/UNIVERSITE	1	2
CONTACTS PERSONNELS AVEC LES GENS DE L'UE	1	2
VISITES DANS DES PAYS UE	1	1
PERIODIQUES NATIONAUX	1	7
DELEGATION UE*	1	0
GOUVERNEMENT	1	1
PRESSE OCCIDENTALE	1	3
PERIODIQUES DE RUSSIE	1	4
PERIODIQUES OCCIDENTAUX	0	0
BIBLIOTHEQUES	0	3
AUTRES	4	0
AUCUN	11	12

*EU DELEGATION IN MOSCOW COVERS ARMENIA AND BELARUS/
LA DELEGATION UE A MOSCOU COUVRE L'ARMENIE ET LA BIELORUSSIE

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ANNEX FIGURE 58

INFORMATION SOURCES ABOUT EU/
SOURCES D'INFORMATION SUR L' UE



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ANNEX FIGURE 59

EU-(OUR COUNTRY) RELATIONS:WHO BENEFITS MOST?/ RELATIONS UE-(NOTRE PAYS): QUI EN BENEFICIE LE PLUS?



Q: WHO DO YOU THINK BENEFITS THE MOST OUT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ? IS IT THE EUROPEAN UNION, (OUR COUNTRY) OR DO BOTH EQUALLY BENEFIT ?/

Q: QUI PENSEZ-VOUS BENEFICIE LE PLUS DES RELATIONS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET L'UNION EUROPEENNE ? EST-CE L'UNION EUROPEENNE, (NOTRE PAYS) OU LES DEUX TOUT AUTANT ?

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC L' UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



Q: DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

Q: PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET L'UNION EUROPÉENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 61

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/ LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC L' UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



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

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

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

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

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ANNEX FIGURE 66

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/
LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC L' UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



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

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ANNEX FIGURE 68

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/
LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC L' UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?



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

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Q: PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/
LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC L' UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?

SLOVENIA	BENEFIT/ Y GAGNERAIENT	LOSE OUT/ Y PERDRAIENT	SPONT: NO IMPACT / SANS IMPACT
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM	60	6	13
PRIVATE BUSINESS	59	12	9
ARMED FORCES	59	5	11
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES	41	20	19
STATE ENTERPRISES	35	31	10
GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVANTS	35	19	22
MANUAL WORKERS	28	40	13
LOW INCOME GROUPS	25	38	18
FARMERS	18	57	9

Q: DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

Q: PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET L'UNION EUROPEENNE S' ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ? CANDIDATE COUNTRIES TREND / LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC L' UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ? PAYS CANDIDATS, TENDANCES



*) CEEB 5 (1994) WITHOUT ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, SLOVENIA/
CEEB 5 (1994) SANS ESTONIE, LETTONIE, LITUANIE, SLOVENIE

Q: DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

Q: PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET L'UNION EUROPÉENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 72

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ? CANDIDATE COUNTRIES TREND / LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC L' UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ? TENDANCE DE LES PAYS CANDIDATS



*) CEEB 5 (1994) WITHOUT ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, SLOVENIA/
CEEB 5 (1994) SANS ESTONIE, LETTONIE, LITUANIE, SLOVENIE

Q: DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

Q: PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET L'UNION EUROPÉENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

ANNEX FIGURE 73

WHO MIGHT WIN OR LOSE AS TIES WITH THE EU BECOME CLOSER ?/
LIENS PLUS ETROITS AVEC L' UE: QUI POURRAIT Y PERDRE OU Y GAGNER ?

CANDIDATE COUNTRIES

BENEFIT/ Y GAGNERAIENT   LOSE OUT/ Y PERDRAIENT



*) CEEB 5 (1994) WITHOUT ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, SLOVENIA/
CEEB 5 (1994) SANS ESTONIE, LETTONE, LITUANIE, SLOVENIE

Q: DO YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING ARE LIKELY TO BENEFIT OR LOSE OUT IN (OUR COUNTRY) AS TIES BETWEEN (OUR COUNTRY) AND THE EUROPEAN UNION INCREASE ? WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO ...?/

Q: PENSEZ-VOUS QUE LES GROUPES DE PERSONNES ET LES ORGANISATIONS SUIVANTS DANS (NOTRE PAYS) SERAIENT SUSCEPTIBLES D'Y GAGNER OU D'Y PERDRE SI LES LIENS ENTRE (NOTRE PAYS) ET L'UNION EUROPÉENNE S'ACCROISSAIENT ? QUE PENSEZ-VOUS QU'IL ARRIVERAIT A ...?

USE OF LANGUAGES IN CANDIDATE COUNTRIES/ PRATIQUE DES LANGUES DANS LES PAYS CANDIDATS

	FIRST LANGUAGE	SECOND LANGUAGE	THIRD LANGUAGE	FOURTH LANGUAGE	FIFTH LANGUAGE
BULGARIA	Bulgarian 100%	Russian 16%	Turkish 12%	English 10%	Gypsy/Roman 6%
CZECH REPUBLIC	Czech 100%	Slovak 25%	German 23%	Russian 22%	Moravian 15%
ESTONIA	Russian 84%	Estonian 79%	English 20%	Finnish 14%	German 11%
HUNGARY	Hungarian 98%	German 10%	English 7%	Russian 3%	*
LATVIA	Russian 94%	Latvian 85%	English 12%	German 11%	Polish 5%
LITHUANIA	Lithuanian 96%	Russian 79%	Polish 22%	English 10%	German 8%
POLAND	Polish 99%	Russian 28%	German 13%	English 12%	*
ROMANIA	Romanian 99%	French 16%	English 14%	Hungarian 11%	Russian 4%
SLOVAKIA	Slovak 99%	Czech 33%	Russian 30%	Hungarian 18%	German 14%
SLOVENIA	Slovene 100%	Croat 54%	English 32%	German 29%	Serb 17%
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES	Polish 38%	Russian 23%	Romanian 21%	Hungarian 13%	English 12%

* LESS THAN 3% OF THE POPULATION/ MOINS DE 3% DE LA POPULATION

Q:WHICH LANGUAGES CAN YOU SPEAK WELL ENOUGH TO TAKE PART IN A CONVERSATION, INCLUDING YOUR MOTHER TONGUE?/

Q:QUELLES LANGUES PARLEZ-VOUS SUFFISAMMENT BIEN POUR PRENDRE PART A UNE CONVERSATION, Y COMPRIS VOTRE LANGUE MATERNELLE?

ANNEX FIGURE 75

USE OF LANGUAGES IN SOUTH-EASTERN COUNTRIES AND CIS/ PRATIQUE DES LANGUES DANS LES PAYS DU SUD-EST DE L'EUROPE ET DANS LA CEI

	FIRST LANGUAGE	SECOND LANGUAGE	THIRD LANGUAGE	FOURTH LANGUAGE	FIFTH LANGUAGE
ALBANIA	Albanian 100%	Italian 21%	Greek 12%	English 11%	French 6%
CROATIA	Croat 97%	English 28%	German 18%	Italian 8%	Serb 4%
FYROM	Macedonian 93%	Serb 30%	Albanian 20%	English 11%	Turkish 8%
YUGOSLAVIA	Serb 97%	English 12%	Croat 10%	Russian 8%	Romanian 8%
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE	Serb 50%	Croat 31%	Albanian 18%	English 16%	Macedonian 11%
ARMENIA	Armenian 100%	Russian 84%	English 10%	Azerbaijani 4%	German 3%
BELARUS	Russian 95%	Belarussian 91%	Polish 10%	Ukranian 7%	English 6%
GEORGIA	Georgian 92%	Russian 80%	Armenian 15%	English 8%	Azerbaijani 4%
KAZAKHSTAN	Russian 96%	Kazakh 44%	Uzbek 7%	Ukrainian 4%	Tartar 3%
RUSSIA	Russian 99%	Tartar 5%	English 4%	Ukrainian 3%	*
UKRAINE	Ukrainian 88%	Russian 84%	Polish 3%	English 3%	*
CIS	Russian 95%	Ukrainian 23%	Belarussian 4%	Tartar 4%	English 4%

* LESS THAN 3% OF THE POPULATION/ MOINS DE 3% DE LA POPULATION

Q:WHICH LANGUAGES CAN YOU SPEAK WELL ENOUGH TO TAKE PART IN A CONVERSATION, INCLUDING YOUR MOTHER TONGUE?/

Q:QUELLES LANGUES PARLEZ-VOUS SUFFISAMMENT BIEN POUR PRENDRE PART A UNE CONVERSATION, Y COMPRIS VOTRE LANGUE MATERNELLE?

ANNEXES

HOW THE POLL WAS DONE

COORDINATION AND DETAILS OF PARTICIPATING INSTITUTES

Overall co-ordination:	DG X.C (External Information) in coordination with DG X.B (EUROBAROMETER)
Co-ordination assistance:	GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research
Statistical data Processing:	GfK Data Services Germany
Regional co-ordination:	GfK Bulgaria for Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM and Yugoslavia AISA for Czech and Slovak Republic ROMIR for Belarus, Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Armenia

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NOVAK Belinskij str. 16/39 P.O. Box 157 220113 Minsk, BELARUS	Andrei Vardomatskii	**Tel :** 375.172.275140 **Fax :** 375.172.629266 vardomat@novak.belpak.minsk.by
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CEMA Osnovan 17, XII 1961, godine 41000 Zagreb, Milana Makanca 16 PP. 945, CROATIA	Vlasta Fiser	**Tel :** 385.1.447240 **Fax :** 385.1.4550166
AISA Lesanka 2a, 141, Praha 4 CZECH REPUBLIC	Rick Pinard	**Tel :** 422.24245521 /5522 Fax : 422.24245523 aisa@dial-up.cz
Saar Poll Ltd. Box 3336 EEO090 Tallin, ESTONIA	Andrus Saar	**Tel :** 372.6311 302 **Fax:** 372.6312 486 saar@poll.estnet.ee
Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research Bul. Partisanska odredi bb, PO box 435 91000, Skopje, FYROM	Jordan Jakimovski	**Tel :** 389 91 258222 **Fax:** 389 91 361282
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MODUS Szép u. 2 1053 Budapest, HUNGARY	**Emöke Lengyel**	**Tel :** 361.2607501 **Fax :** 361.2612945 modus@modus.hu
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Latvian Facts Brivibas Str 106-2 LV1001 Riga, LATVIA	Aigars Freimanis	**Tel :** 3712.293 201 Fax : 3712.274 936 lfakti@com.latnet.lv
Baltic Surveys 47, Didlaukio Str. 2057 Vilnius, LITHUANIA	Rasa Alishauskiene	**Tel :** 3702.762 790 Fax : 3702.762 681 **baltic.surveys@post.omnitel.net**
PENTOR Ul, Flory 9m4 00-586 Warsaw, POLAND	Jacek Dohnalik	**Tel :** 4822.498120 Fax : 4822.498151 pentor@ikp.atm.com.pl
GfK Romania 3. Rosetti Square 1st floor, app.3, sector 2 Bucharest, ROMANIA	Cosmin Alexandru	**Tel :** 40.1.312 0980 Fax : 40.1.312 6459 gfk.rom@bx.logicnet.ro
ROMIR 2nd Brestskay U, B 29a, Room 211 123056 Moscow, RUSSIA	**Elena Bashkirova**	Tel : 7095.2615772 Fax : 7095.883 9280 romir@sovam.com
AISA Slovensko Drotarska Cesta 46 81104 Bratislava, SLOVAKIA	Stanislava Chmelikova	Tel : 427-535 4143 **Fax :** 427-580 2170
GRAL Marketing Dunajska 29/IV 61000 Ljubljana, SLOVENIA	Rudi Tavcar	**Tel :** 38661.311 167 Fax : 38661.1323154 info@gral.si
SOCIS 12, Shelkovychanaya Str. Kiev, UKRAINE	Nicolai Churilov	**Tel :** 380.44.228 1997 Fax : 380.44.228 2297 gs@socis.freenet.kiev.ua
ARGUMENT Balkanska St. 12/1st floor apt.24 Beograd, FR YUGOSLAVIA	Zdenka Milivojevic	**Tel :** 381.11.688091 Fax : 381.11.656105 argument@eunet.yu

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - INTRODUCTION

Between 25th October and 30th November 1996, the institutes listed above conducted the seventh wave of the Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER (CEEB) on behalf of the **European Commission**, Directorate General X for Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual, Survey Research (EUROBAROMETER) Unit, in co-operation with the External Information Unit of the same Directorate-General. All requests for further information should be addressed to :

Mr. George CUNNINGHAM
External Information Unit
(T120 - 08/14)
European Commission
B - 1049 Brussels
Tel 32-2-299.91.71
Fax 32-2-299.92.88

Compared to CEEB6 (Autumn 1995) one more country was added, namely Yugoslavia.

All EUROBAROMETER data are stored at the Zentral Archiv (Universität Köln, Bachemer Strasse 40, D - 5000 Köln 41). They are at the disposal of all institutes which are members of the European Consortium for Political Research, of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Michigan) and all those interested in social science research.

DETAILS ON SAMPLING

A total of 20 countries in Central and Eastern Europe were surveyed : Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. In total 20.865 citizens aged 15 years and over were interviewed face-to-face in their private residences in the region as a whole. The survey was fully nationally-representative, except in Croatia, Georgia and Yugoslavia.

As with Central and Eastern EUROBAROMETER No. 2,3,4,5 and 6, each institute adopted a multi-stage random probability sample design. There were slight variations in each country's sample design to take account of its individual characteristics and population structure. In each of the 20 countries (with the exception of Georgia, Croatia and Yugoslavia) surveyed, interviews were conducted throughout every region within its national boundaries.

SAMPLING POINTS

Albania	150
Armenia	100
Belarus	114
Bulgaria	176
Croatia	40
Czech Republic	102
Estonia	181
FYROM	103
Georgia	110
Hungary	101
Kazakhstan	100
Latvia	127
Lithuania	114
Poland	251
Romania	110
Russian Federation	138
Slovakia	114
Slovenia	120
Ukraine	120
Yugoslavia	100
TOTAL	2.469

The sampling points for each country were selected, in the first instance, via a division into its major socio-economic areas. A list of these is appended. Within each of these areas smaller electoral or administrative districts were randomly selected and, taking into account such factors as the relative size of the population living in rural and urban settlements, the number and distribution of sampling points in each of these districts was finalised.

In general ten interviews were conducted around each sampling point, with individuals being selected via one of four main methods, these being :

(I) Double clustered random address sample + next birthday in the household

(II) Contact randomly selected from a list of the electorate. In most cases such lists were no more than three years old.

(III) Random selection of addresses from published, or specially commissioned lists, with individuals being selected via a Kish matrix or other random method.

(IV) Random route from a selected starting point (often the central bus station in larger settlements) with individuals again being selected via a Kish matrix or other random method.

Quite understandably, in many instances address or electoral data was not available for the population below the age of enfranchisement and therefore quotas were imposed to ensure that the correct number of 15-17 year olds were interviewed.

The maximum number of interviews in any individual household was one. All interviews were conducted face-to-face by fully-trained interviewers in people's homes.

In Albania, CEEB7 was carried out with a quota sample. The defined quota were: rural vs. urban, sex, age, education. 1000 interviews were distributed in 36 districts according to the percentage of the population of these districts with regard to the total Albanian population. According to the rural/urban distribution in each district, interviews were distributed as rural and urban in each district. According to the distribution male/female and to the age groups in each district, interviews were divided in male and female and in 5 age groups in each district.

In each country the final sample was representative of the adult population aged 15+ years. Exceptions were : Georgia (Abkahzia not included), Croatia (some areas in Slavonia, Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija) and Yugoslavia (Kosovo not included).

REALISATION OF FIELDWORK

	Fieldwork	**Number of respondents**
Albania	14 November-23 November	1013
Armenia	25 October - 05 November*	1000
Belarus	01 November-20 November	1061
Bulgaria	06 November-14 November	1035
Croatia	08 November-18 November	0988
Czech R.	08 November-17 November	1021
Estonia	06 November-18 November	1071
FYROM	05 November-15 November	1000
Georgia	06 November-17 November	1006
Hungary	07 November-18 November	1002
Kazakhstan	05 November-20 November	1002
Latvia	10 November-24 November	1017
Lithuania	10 November-18 November	1012
Poland	09 November-12 November	1004
Romania	18 November-29 November	1195
Russ. Fed.	01 November-22 November	1065
Slovakia	08 November-17 November	1066
Slovenia	20 November-26 November	1114
Ukraine	04 November-14 November	1200
Yugoslavia	05 November-15 November	0993
TOTAL	25 October - 29 November	20.865

* : Due to local elections, the fieldwork had to start earlier.

WEIGHTING OF DATA

Compared to CEEB6, more progress was made thanks to the use of an interlocking matrix age/education. This was the case for Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia.

Slovenia and Kazakhstan were also weighted in that manner, but as the distribution of age did not fully correspond to the requirements; age was used on top of the matrix to guarantee the distribution.

For the countries Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, FYROM and Poland, no statistical data were available for this matrix. In these cases, the weighting according to age and education was carried out separately.

It is important to notice that the weighting was done much more efficiently this year because the matrix age/education was given in advance so that the institutes could take this more into account.

The overall results for Central and Eastern Eurobarometer as a whole were weighted according to each country's 15+ population.

The data for each country's population by sex, age, education and region was prepared by the participating institutes :

	POPULATION TOTAL (15+yrs)	PROPORTION OF POPULATION (in %)
Albania	2.131.829	00.77
Armenia	2.696.425	00.97
Belarus	7.814.759	02.82
Bulgaria	6.880.016	02.49
Croatia	3.858.086	01.39
Czech Republic	8.137.779	02.94
Estonia	1.188.775	00.43
FYROM	1.462.009	00.53
Georgia	4.062.367	01.47
Hungary	8.244.274	02.98
Kazakhstan	11.217.539	04.05
Latvia	1.992.635	00.72
Lithuania	2.842.640	01.03
Poland	29.881.058	10.80
Romania	17.628.133	06.37
Russian Federation	113.037.728	40.86
Slovak Republic	3.960.374	01.43
Slovenia	1.561.628	00.56
Ukraine	41.279.161	14.92
Yugoslavia	6.795.456	02.46
TOTAL	**276.672.671**	**100 %**

AREAS COVERED

ALBANIA
Tirana
Northern
Central
Southern

ARMENIA
Ararat
Sevan
Shirak
Lori
Yerevan
Siunik
Aghstev

BELARUS
Brest
Vitebsk
Gomel
Grodno
Minsk (city)
Minsk (region)
Mogiljov

BULGARIA
Varna
Lovetch
Sofia-city
Sofia-region
Plovdiv
Bourgas
Haskovo
Montana
Rousse

CROATIA
Greater Zagreb
North Croatia
Slavonia
Lika, Kordun, Banovina
Istria, Primorje
Gorski Kotar
Dalmatia

CZECH REPUBLIC
Prague
Central Bohemia
Southern Bohemia
Western Bohemia
Northern Bohemia
Eastern Bohemia
Southern Moravia
Northern Moravia

ESTONIA
North-West
North-East
South-East
South-West
West

FYROM
Skopje
Tetovo
Shtip Region
Bitola
Ohrid Region
Kumanova Region
Along Varpar Regiona

GEORGIA
Tbilisi
Ajara
Kolkheti
Kartl-Kakheti
Kvemo Kartli
Meskhet-Javakheti
Samachablo

HUNGARY
Central
Northern Hungary
Northern Great Plain
Southern Great Plain
Southern Transdanubia
Northern Transdanubia

LATVIA
Riga
Vidzeme
Zemgale
Kurzeme
Latgale

POLAND
Central
Eastern
Malopolska
Silesia
North-western
Wielkopolska

RUSSIAN FEDERATION
North & Center (Northern + North-Western + Kaliningrad + Central + Volgo-Vjatski)
South of European Part of Russia (Tsentralno Chernozjemny + Povolzhsky + North-Caucasian)
Ural & West Siberia
East Siberia & Far East

SLOVENIA
Gorensjka (NW)
Primorska (W + SW)
Osrednja Slovenija (W. Central)
Koroska in Savinjska (E. Central)
Dolenjska in Posavje (South East)
Stajerska in Prekmurje (North East)

FR YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade
Voyvodina
Central Serbia
Montenegro

KAZAKHSTAN
Capital
South
Central
East
North
West

LITHUANIA
Zemaitija
Aukstaitija
Suvalkija
Dzukija
Vilnius/ SE Lithuania

ROMANIA
Crisana
Maramuresh
Banat
Oltenia
Muntenia
Dobrudja
Moldavia
Ardeal
Bucuresti

SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Bratislava
Central Slovakia
Eastern Slovakia
Western Slovakia

UKRAINE
Kiev
Northern
Central
North-Eastern
North-Western
Eastern
Western
South Western
Southern
Crimea
South-East

BACKTRANSLATION

As all questionnaires were backtranslated completely two years ago (CEEB5), backtranslation was limited this year (CEEB7) to the new questions that were added. Any differences were discussed with the appropriate institutes and an acceptable solution was found in all cases. For the newcomer, Yugoslavia, a complete backtranslation was carried out.

QUALITY CONTROL

For CEEB7, a specific quality control was carried out by Oxford Research International in Hungary, Kazakhstan, Romania, Russia and by GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research in Albania. The aim of the procedure is to help all organisations involved better understand fieldwork activity on this study. Furthermore, it serves as an opportunity to test the methodological merit of the institutes involved in the project and allows a cursory appreciation for the accuracy and reliability of data generated.

All work took place during November and was carried out by two or three person teams. The teams generally took one week to monitor fieldwork activities in the respective countries.

The method employed was to begin by interviewing fieldwork supervisors and interviewers in the field before working back to the institute for a final appraisal of the institute's work. Interviews of supervisors and interviewers commonly lasted between 40 minutes to one hour and enquired into the following areas:

- general information including interviewee's name and address, place of interview, length of interviews, selection and training of interviewers (asked to supervisors), number of sampling points or the number of interviews conducted on CEEB7, etc.
- Training and instruction given specifically for CEEB7
- Routine for selection of households and respondents
- Communications
- Knowledge about their respective institute
- Quality control exercised by the institute on their work.

Institutes were asked more details about the overall project management on CEEB7 and about the operations of the institute in general.

GfK EUROPE AD HOC RESEARCH

GfK EUROPE Ad hoc Research, located in Brussels, is GfK's co-ordination centre for all international ad hoc research with a turnover of over 100 million ECU in 1994. It is present in most countries of the European Union, in all former EFTA-countries, and in major Central European and CIS countries, making 23 countries in total. Outside Europe, GfK is represented in the USA, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong and Australia. The total turnover of GfK is about 200 million ECU making it number 4 in the world. Almost all the institutes are owned by the German mother company, GfK AG, founded in 1929.

GfK, through Dr. Rudolf Bretschneider, Managing Director of Fessel und GfK Austria (1959), was one of the first western research companies to found institutes in Hungary (1989), Poland (1990), Czech Republic (1991), Slovakia (1993) and Bulgaria (1994). Agreements have been reached with companies in Romania (1995), Croatia (1995), FYROM (1995) and Slovenia. All together more than 200 researchers are employed and trained by GfK in Central and Eastern Europe.

GfK has carried out several studies for the EU amongst which are the Standard EUROBAROMETER (in Denmark since 1989), the Consumer Confidence Barometer (in Germany since 1980, in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, United Kingdom since 1995) and several other ad hoc studies.

For further details please contact:

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Candidate countries' decision-makers/opinion-formers survey

Commissioned by Directorate General X. External Information Unit of the European Commission, this survey was carried out in the 10 candidate countries by the same institutes as those of CEEB7, apart from Bulgaria where another institute was selected:

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12 Gourko Street
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Kancho M. Stoychev

Tel. : +359-2-818772
Fax : +359-2-9800810
gallup@spct.net

Coordinating Agency :	AISA Prague
Fieldwork dates :	1 November - 12 December
Method :	Quantitative, telephone interviews from central studios
Interview length :	ca. 10 minutes
Target :	"Decision-makers/opinion-formers having an impact on European integration"
Sampling :	Random sampling from the European Commission's European Dialogue Magazine's address lists after sorting recipients names alphabetically

Number of respondents	Bulgaria	154
	Czech Republic	155
	Estonia	150
	Hungary	151
	Latvia	150
	Lithuania	170
	Poland	250
	Romania	160
	Slovakia	150
	Slovenia	153
	total N =	1643

Fieldforce :	Skilled and trained interviewers at all agencies
Control :	Continuous oversight and checking by supervisor
Data entry :	with 100% control

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