

THE WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL  
INDICATORS III  
DOMESTIC POLITICAL EVENTS DATA 1948-1982  
(ZA NO. 1131-1132)  
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## CODEBOOK

## DOMESTIC POLITICAL EVENTS DATA, 1948-1982

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This codebook documents a dataset of domestic political events for 156 countries for the years 1948 to 1982. Data are reported by day, quarter, and year. The series include measures of political protest, government sanctions, and insitutional change. Data for the first 20 years were originally published in the WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: SECOND EDITION (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) compiled by Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson. Data for 1968 to 1977 were published in the WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: THIRD EDITION (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) by Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice. Now an additional five years have been added. For the new data, sources and definitions remain the same wherever possible. More event types and attributes of political conflict and coercion have been added, but these are archived in such a way that they can be collapsed into the definitions of the earlier work. Unfortunately, resources have been insufficient to recode 57,268 records for the first 20 years.

## ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY EVENTS INDICATORS, 1948-1982

The annual and quarterly events series consists of summations of the occurrences of each type of event within each country on a year to year or quarter to quarter basis. The daily events file contains 31 types of events for 1968 through 1982, but these have been collapsed to 17 for the annual events file in order to make them comparable with the annual data available for the first 20 years. The format for the annual and quarterly events series and the formulae for obtaining them from the event types are given on the following pages. Other aggregations, by different event type distributions or by different temporal units, are possible from the daily events file. For some purposes, a monthly aggregation might be more appropriate than an annual or quarterly one.

Each of the daily event records includes a field for recording the number of events which occurred on a single day of a single type. Multiple events were recorded only if all of the reported attributes were identical; otherwise, separate records were required. In aggregating the annual series, each record was weighted by the number of events recorded thereon; the exceptions were the imposition and relaxation of sanctions (V813 and V815) which seemed best aggregated by number of reports to make them most comparable with the earlier series for the first 20 years.

The variable DEATHS FROM DOMESTIC GROUP VIOLENCE was treated differently in the second and third editions of the WORLD HANDBOOK. In the second edition (1948-1967) and for the 1978-1982 period, a report of deaths was coded as a daily event (713) with an indication of the number killed. For the third edition (1968-1977), we coded number of deaths as an attribute of other specific events such as riots, armed attacks, and assassinations. Hence, in order to produce annual scores of deaths, the cases had to be resorted (by country and date, but not event type):

This method of calculating deaths from political violence seriously understated the magnitude of the loss in some of the major conflicts in the 1970s. For the countries in which these conflicts occurred, we conducted additional research to estimate fatalities on an annual basis. It is these estimates that are presented in the annual events file along with data from WORLD HANDBOOK II and data for the 1978-1982 time period. The daily events are unchanged.

## LIST OF INCLUDED COUNTRIES

1	700	Afghanistan
2	339	Albania
3	615	Algeria
4	540	Angola
5	160	Argentina
6	900	Australia
7	305	Austria
8	31	Bahamas
9	692	Bahrain
10	771	Bangladesh
11	53	Barbados
12	211	Belgium
13	434	Benin
14	760	Bhutan
15	145	Bolivia
16	571	Botswana
17	140	Brazil
18	355	Bulgaria
19	775	Burma
20	516	Burundi
21	471	Cameroon
22	20	Canada
23	402	Cape Verde
24	482	Central African Republic
25	483	Chad
26	155	Chile
27	710	China
28	100	Colombia
29	581	Comoros
30	484	Congo
31	94	Costa Rica
32	40	Cuba
33	352	Cyprus
34	315	Czechoslovakia
35	390	Denmark
36	42	Dominican Republic
37	130	Ecuador
38	651	Egypt
39	92	El Salvador
40	411	Equatorial Guinea
41	530	Ethiopia
42	950	Fiji
43	375	Finland
44	220	France
45	481	Gabon
46	420	Gambia
47	265	Germany, East
48	260	Germany, West
49	452	Ghana
50	350	Greece
51	55	Grenada
52	90	Guatemala
53	438	Guinea
54	404	Guinea-Bissau

55	110	Guyana
56	41	Haiti
57	91	Honduras
58	720	Hong Kong
59	310	Hungary
60	395	Iceland
61	750	India
62	850	Indonesia
63	630	Iran
64	645	Iraq
65	205	Ireland
66	666	Israel
67	325	Italy
68	437	Ivory Coast
69	51	Jamaica
70	740	Japan
71	663	Jordan
72	811	Kampuchea
73	501	Kenya
74	731	Korea, North
75	732	Korea, South
76	690	Kuwait
77	812	Laos
78	660	Lebanon
79	570	Lesotho
80	450	Liberia
81	620	Libya
82	212	Luxembourg
83	580	Madagascar
84	553	Malawi
85	820	Malaysia
86	781	Maldives
87	432	Mali
88	338	Malta
89	435	Mauritania
90	590	Mauritius
91	70	Mexico
92	712	Mongolia
93	600	Morocco
94	541	Mozambique
95	790	Nepal
96	210	Netherlands
97	920	New Zealand
98	93	Nicaragua
99	436	Niger
100	475	Nigeria
101	385	Norway
102	698	Oman
103	770	Pakistan
104	95	Panama
105	910	Papua New Guinea
106	150	Paraguay
107	135	Peru
108	840	Philippines
109	290	Poland
110	235	Portugal
111	6	Puerto Rico

112 694 Qatar  
113 360 Romania  
114 517 Rwanda  
115 403 Sao Tome and Principe  
116 670 Saudi Arabia  
117 433 Senegal  
118 591 Seychelles  
119 451 Sierra Leone  
120 830 Singapore  
121 520 Somalia  
122 560 South Africa  
123 365 Soviet Union  
124 230 Spain  
125 780 Sri Lanka  
126 625 Sudan  
127 115 Surinam  
128 572 Swaziland  
129 380 Sweden  
130 225 Switzerland  
131 652 Syria  
132 713 Taiwan  
133 510 Tanzania  
134 800 Thailand  
135 461 Togo  
136 52 Trinidad and Tobago  
137 616 Tunisia  
138 640 Turkey  
139 351 Turkish Cyprus  
140 500 Uganda  
141 696 United Arab Emirates  
142 200 United Kingdom  
143 2 United States  
144 439 Upper Volta  
145 165 Uruguay  
146 101 Venezuela  
147 816 Vietnam, North  
148 817 Vietnam, South  
149 815 Vietnam  
150 990 Western Samoa  
151 678 Yemen (Sana)  
152 680 Yemen (Aden)  
153 345 Yugoslavia  
154 490 Zaire  
155 551 Zambia  
156 552 Zimbabwe

### Event Definitions

A PROTEST DEMONSTRATION (Type: 700) is a non-violent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting a regime, a government, or one of its leaders; its ideology, policy, or intended policy; or its previous action or intended action. The issues of protest involved are perceived as significant at the national level, but within that framework demonstrations directed at all levels and branches of government are included. This category of events includes demonstrations for or against a foreign government, its leaders, or its visiting representatives when such demonstrations are reported to indicate opposition to the demonstrators own government. Not included are election meetings and rallies, political parades, and normal holiday celebrations. A residual category of other protests (712) was coded separately for the 1968-1982 period, but was aggregated with demonstrations in the annual series.

A REGIME SUPPORT DEMONSTRATION (701) is also a non-violent gathering of people whose purpose, however, is to lend support to a government, its policies and actions, or to one or more of its leaders. Support demonstrations directed at all levels and branches of government are included when the issues are perceived as significant at the national level. Included also are all demonstrations that are not clearly of a protest nature; therefore, the category includes demonstrations that, while political in nature, cannot be classified as explicitly supportive of a regime. This event type was aggregated separately for the annual and quarterly series.

A RIOT (704) is a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large number of people. Riots are distinguished from protest demonstrations by the presence of violence. Violence implies the use of physical force and is usually evinced by the destruction of property, the wounding or killing of people, the use of riot control equipment such as clubs, guns, gas, and water cannons, and by the rioters' use of various weapons. If destruction of property (e.g., the burning of automobiles, the smashing of storefronts, and the throwing of Molotov cocktails) is an essential component of the

observed behavior, the event is coded as a riot rather than as a demonstration. Demonstrations that changed nature within the course of a single day were coded for the 1968-1982 period separately. Peaceful demonstrations that were met by police violence (702) and demonstrations that turned into riots of their own accord (703) were coded as single events each and were aggregated in the annual series with riots to form a series comparable with the riots series of the first 20 years. Frequently, demonstrations turning violent were the result of two or more rival groups clashing when their demonstrations ran afoul of each other. In these instances, the the participation of a multiplicity of groups was noted among the the attributes, but only one event was coded.

Riots are distinguished from armed attacks by the degree of spontaneity. Riots may sometimes be planned, but the riot organizers constitute a small, often invisible, portion of the rioters. Events were classified as riots if it appeared from the report that most of those involved were violently agitated in their behavior, that they formed an excited or confused mob or crowd, that they were engaged in unpredictable acts of disorder, and that the objects of their violence would not seem to be closely related to the objects of their political discontent in the analysis of a dispassionate observer.

An ARMED ATTACK (705) is an act of violent political conflict carried out by (or on behalf of) an organized group with the object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another organized group. It is characterized by bloodshed, physical struggle, and the destruction of property. A wide variety of weapons may be used, including guns, explosives (conventional bombs, hand grenades, letter bombs), chemicals, bricks and other primitive hand weapons such as spears, knives or clubs. This category is intended to encompass all organized political violence, although assassinations are coded separately. It excludes all spontaneous violence. Also excluded are activities of organized crime which are not observed to be directly relevant to political cleavages and issues. The target of an armed attack is typically a regime, a government, or a political leader, but it may also be a religious, ethnic, racial, linguistic, or special interest minority. When a government is unable or unwilling to control an insurgency situation by normal sanctions (see below), it may also resort to armed attacks. For the 1968-1982 period, whenever possible, armed attacks by governmental and military forces (707) were coded separately from those undertaken by insurgents (706). When it was impossible to determine which side initiated the event, or when a battle or clash was reported, the generic armed attack code (705) was used. Further dictinctions were made between bombings (740), including defused bombs and bomb threats, ambushes (741) and raids (742). All six types were aggregated together in the annual and quarterly series.

Foreign interventions were not coded for the period 1968-82. We coded neither border clashes nor international wars. The two exceptions to this general rule are the operations of the United States Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam (1968-1973) and those of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon during the recent civil war. Although the PLO emphasizes its expatriate status, it had firmly established itself in Lebanese domestic politics before the outbreak of the civil war. Its extreme independence of the Lebanese authorities is testimony more to the "statelessness" of Lebanon than the "foreignness" of the PLO. The quasi-autonomous Palestinian entity in Lebanon is analogous to the private armies of the Christian Phalange and those of the leading political personalities (Kamal Jumblatt, Pierre Gemayyal and Camille Chamoun). The existence of all these groups was predicated on intense familial, religious and ethnic loyalties. These mutually-reinforcing loyalties were strengthened by the geographic contiguity of most of these sub-cultures. Beginning with 1968 we coded the United States' military actions in South Vietnam as armed attacks. We made this choice for two reasons. First, the role of the American ground forces by that time was so significant for the security of the Saigon government, that to ignore these events would be fundamentally to misrepresent the nature of the Vietnamese war. In neighboring Laos and Cambodia, American forces were not engaged for a sufficient period of time nor in large enough numbers to justify a further weakening of the general rule against coding armed attacks by foreign interveners. We do not argue that American support was not important for Vientianne and Phnom Penh, but rather that its incursions along with South Vietnamese and Thai units into these countries are different from the sustained and continuous commitment in South Vietnam. In the latter case, the American presence evolved into a long-term patterned relationship that was essential to the security of the South Vietnamese government.

A POLITICAL ASSASSINATION (709) is a politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a national leader, a high government official or a politician. Among the national leaders included are chiefs of state, heads of government, ministers, legislators, judges and high-ranking civil servants and military officers. In addition to national leaders, state, province or district governors, mayors of large cities, and newspaper editors are included. Nationally prominent politicians who are not holding office (e.g., Dr. Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy) were also included. Unsuccessful assassination attempts (708) were coded separately in the daily events file. Only successful assassinations, however, were aggregated into the annual and quarterly events file.

We excluded assassination plots that only reached the planning stage. Consistent with our general practice we have coded only those events that have actually taken place. Rumors about coups, arrests or demonstrations, for instance, were not coded. If an actual attempt was unsuccessful (e.g., that against General Alexander Haig, NATO Commander, in July 1979), it was coded as a failed assassination. One caveat is necessary here. Numerous (attempted) assassinations are the results of personal idiosyncrasies and even psychological illness on the part of the assassin. Often such events have no obvious political purpose. However, to judge their political relevance at each occurrence would have substantially reduced the reliability of the resulting series. We chose to be guided in our coding of assassinations by the identity and status of the target, rather than by the uncertain and often unknowable objectives of the assassin.

A POLITICAL STRIKE is a work stoppage by a body of industrial or service workers or a stoppage of normal academic life by students to protest a regime or its leaders' policies or actions. Strikes which were primarily directed at economic goals (higher wages, better working conditions, shorter hours) were not coded, even if the employer was a public enterprise. If there were a greater political significance to the strike we coded it. An indicator of such significance would be a political party's or movement's embracing of these economic demands, and supporting and disseminating them with the objective of embarrassing the government, eroding its base of support and even precipitating its fall. For the 1968-82 period we distinguished political strikes involving workers (710) from those involving only students (711). The two were added together in the annual series. A political strike may last for many days or weeks, but it was counted as a single event, unless its essential nature changed. For example, a new category of strikers might join in or a new set of goals might be announced. In cases of this sort, a new event was coded.

A RENEWAL OF EXECUTIVE TENURE (714) is an act that reestablishes or reconfirms the term of office of the national executive incumbent leader or ruling group through the country's regular institutionalized channels for this procedure. Formal power is neither lost nor transferred, but renewed in those who currently hold it. The term "regular" means that the change is not reported to be accompanied by actual or directly threatened violence or physical coercion and that it conforms to the prevailing conventional norms of the system. The idea was to measure change and continuity within systems as they are, not as they ought to be. For the moment we have had to ignore notions of structural

violence. Examples of executive renewals include the reelection of a President, the reelection to parliament of the party or parties that support an incumbent president or premier, the reappointment of an incumbent premier who has resigned, a vote of confidence in a premier or his cabinet and the defeat of a vote of no-confidence. On September 15, 1974, Tunisia's Bourguiba was named President for life. This was coded as a renewal of executive tenure. A renewal of executive tenure which occurred simultaneously with one or more executive adjustments was coded as a distinct event type (716). The two are aggregated together in the annual series.

An UNSUCCESSFUL REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFER (717) is an event in which an abortive attempt is made by persons not holding national executive office to obtain such office through legal or conventional procedures. National executive office refers both to individual leadership positions such as presidents, prime ministers, monarchs and party chiefs in states where single parties exercise decisive political power and also to collegial executive bodies such as cabinets composed of one or more parties or groupings. The term "regular" means that the change is not reported to be accompanied by actual or directly threatened violence or physical coercion, and that it conforms to the prevailing conventional procedures of the particular political system in which it takes place. Unsuccessful regular executive transfers are "intermediate" between renewals of tenure and regular executive transfers. An unsuccessful regular executive transfer is not coded after an election which confirms the ruling individual or group in power. This is coded as a renewal of executive tenure.

A recurring example of this type of event is the appointment of a premier who fails to form a coalition government or who fails to have her or his government approved by the legislature. Eventually, when a new government is formally installed, a regular or irregular executive transfer is also scored. Unlike the situation following a renewal of tenure, there is in this case a governmental crisis in which political decision-making beyond routine administration is suspended.

An UNSUCCESSFUL IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFER (719) is a reported attempt by an organized group to remove and replace the incumbent national executive outside the conventional procedures for transferring formal power. An important coding condition for such an event is that an actual attempt at seizing power must be reported; if the authorities discover a "plot" before its implementation is undertaken, an unsuccessful irregular transfer is not coded. The criterion of success is whether the incumbent executive is effectively removed from exercising his powers and the challenger is installed in his place. There is no

time condition; thus, a challenger who displaces the incumbent executive even for a period of hours has effected a successful irregular power transfer. In addition, the attempt must take place in the capital or in the physical center of government. A revolt or mutiny in a province or another city does not qualify; it is an armed attack. "Irregular" events, the opposite of "regular" as defined above, are characterized by actual or directly threatened violence and by non-conformity to the prevailing conventional procedures of the political system.

A group inside or outside of the government, including a member group in a coalition; a faction within an administration, ruling party or military; a political opposition party or movement; a dissatisfied element outside of politics per se, such as a religious brotherhood; or foreign conspirators can stage an unsuccessful irregular transfer. An example is a situation in which dissident units of the army in conjunction with a political party are reported to have taken up positions around key government installations and kidnapped several high government officials before being crushed by loyal army units.

An IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFER (720) is a change in the office of national executive from one leader or ruling group to another. The change is accomplished outside the conventional legal or customary procedures for transferring power in effect at the time of the event. Such events are accompanied either by actual physical violence or with the clear threat of force. These events thus encompass bloodless depositions of rulers as well as the more spectacular sanguinary variety. In conformity with the general practice, no qualitative assessment is made of the subsequent significance of an irregular power transfer as a criterion for coding. Thus, such an event may precipitate a fundamental change in the political system, or the system may continue substantially unchanged except for the irregularity of the power transfer event itself. Users of this variable would be ill-advised if they thought of it as an exhaustive indicator of political or social revolution.

Irregular power transfers are closer conceptually to what are conventionally thought of as coups d'etat. They are probably more numerous than conventional coups, however, because the coding rules required that the many steps and maneuvers associated with a crisis be recorded as distinct events. So there are a number of occasions in which events that historians might consider a single coup are represented here by two or more irregular change events. The only criterion for a "successful" irregular power transfer is that there be a report stating the new leadership has actually replaced the old, arrogating to itself the titles and functions of chief executive.

No minimum tenure limit could be imposed as a criterion for "success" without being unduly arbitrary. There are a few cases in which two irregular power transfers have occurred on the same date. The indicator is more sensitive to maneuverings and "counter-coups" than an inspection of the definition alone might lead one to suppose.

Irregular power transfers sometimes beget further irregular political crises. It happens even more frequently that an irregular transfer is closely followed by several other kinds of governmental change as a new regime seeks to consolidate and legitimize its position. After the coup, the coup leaders sometimes install a person either inside or outside the government as president or premier. Such events were coded as regular executive transfers because in the new power context such delegations or transfers of authority conform to new procedural norms and are not accompanied by threatened or actual coercion. Irregular power transfers are initiated by groups, cliques, cabals, parties and factions either inside or outside a government and its agencies. Sometimes they are carried out by rebellious minorities within a country, the military, or conspirators backed by foreign powers.

A much more modest form of governmental change is the EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENT (715). This event is a change in the composition of the ruling elite and its most prevalent variety is the cabinet coalition shift. More formally, an executive adjustment is a modification in the membership of a national executive body that does not signify a transfer of formal power from one leader or ruling group to another. National executive bodies include cabinets, councils of ministers, presidential offices, military juntas, and ruling party councils in states in which authoritative power is wielded by a single party. Modification in the membership of such a ruling body, short of major executive transfers, typically includes "reshuffles" or "shakeups" in which a single member or a small number of leaders are removed from or added to the membership. The simple redistribution of ministerial portfolios among the same individuals does not constitute an executive adjustment. There must be movement in or out of the executive body. The creation and elimination of cabinet posts were also coded as adjustments.

Executive adjustments are considered "minor" in the power process because only one or a few positions change hands. The control exercised by the leader or ruling group is not reported to have been transferred or lost either wholly or partially to another group, faction or coalition. In most cases, according to the coding staff, the ruling

group makes such adjustments to consolidate or strengthen its security or popularity. Often cabinet ministers are sacrificed to the populace as scapegoats for specific policy failures. Executive adjustments are also considered "regular" in that they are not reported to be accompanied by actual or threatened coercion or by unconventional procedures.

Executive adjustments can occur at any time during the tenure of a government. They can also be scored simultaneously with renewals (716). For the period 1968-82, we distinguished simple renewals of executive tenure from renewals that were accompanied by adjustments. But adjustments occurring simultaneously with major regular executive transfers or irregular power transfers are not scored because they are considered an integral part of the executive transfer. A reported major transfer in effect obscures the context in which mere adjustment could occur. The removal of a member from an executive body and his simultaneous arrest is coded as governmental sanction rather than an executive adjustment. The death of a minister in office is coded as an executive adjustment more because of possible political consequences rather than because there was a political cause for the death.

Significant shakeups can occur, of course, in many executive structures besides the highest ruling body. For example, in some countries large-scale purges of the military and civilian bureaucracies would seem to represent a kind of power adjustment. Nevertheless, considerations of comparability of categories and of available information required confining the arena for this variable to the pinnacle of the national government. Thus, changes in a country's general staff have not been coded unless the general staff actually ruled the country. Changes in deputy premiers or cabinet undersecretaries have not been coded. Adjustments in party central committee membership in communist countries have been excluded, but praesidium members and heads of ministries have been included.

A REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFER (718) is a change in the office of national executive from one leader or ruling group to another that is accomplished through conventional legal or customary procedures and is unaccompanied by actual or directly threatened physical violence. The office of national executive refers both to individual leaders, such as presidents and prime ministers, and also to collegial executive bodies, such as cabinets composed of one or more parties or groups. In the latter case, a change is recorded if a constituent element is included or if a new element replaces an old one.

The term "regular" means that the change is not reported to be accompanied by actual or directly threatened violence and that it conforms to the prevailing conventional procedures of the political system. In contrast, "irregular" change events are characterized by actual or threatened violence and by abnormal procedures.

Chief executives include monarchs, presidents, prime ministers, and party chiefs in countries where single parties exercise decisive power, paralleling or supervising the affairs of government. Also included are all other analogous offices and titles that may not enjoy general usage. For a transfer to be scored, it was necessary that the chief executive office change hands, but the new recipient of power could have held office previously. Cases in which an executive's tenure was extended through elections or other means were coded as renewal events.

In some political systems there are two chief executives. To avoid qualitative judgements about the relative significance of prime ministers over presidents (e.g., France) changes in both offices were coded. In constitutional or traditional monarchies changes in the prime minister were coded. A number of countries were under colonial administration during the period under investigation. In these countries, changes in the colonial executive, such as the governor-general were coded as power transfers. Many of these countries became independent during the coding period. This was especially true of the 1960-1965 period in Africa. The formal change to sovereign status was recorded as a power transfer even if there happened not to be a simultaneous change in executive officers. Several countries also underwent secession or unification during the 1948-77 period. These violent and tumultuous changes were coded as irregular executive transfers. Examples included Bangladesh, South Vietnam and Biafra. The date of the power transfer was coded as the effective date of the transfer. For example, the unification of North and South Vietnam was coded on April 30, 1975, the date of the fall of Saigon, rather than July 2, 1976, the date of formal unification. Similarly, changes in a country's constitution that clearly increased or decreased a chief executive's powers were also counted. Some constitutions, notably in Latin America, require the temporary resignation of a president while travelling abroad. Such resignations were not counted unless the President failed to resume office when he returned.

Another coding question concerns the duration of a change event. Sometimes, the consummation of a power transfer without any discernable change exceeded the 24 hour time boundary typical of most of our events. Coders therefore were instructed to score the date of each power transfer event as the date on which it was reported completed. For example, if a cabinet were restructured to include a new party, the event would be scored on the day that the new cabinet assumed power, not the day when the old one resigned. In the case of a newly elected president or prime minister, the executive transfer was scored as occurring when the office was taken and not on the day the election results were announced.

An ELECTION is an act of collective choice by a body of people entitled to vote. Reported events by a national electorate to elect national leaders or to express a choice about a policy issue were coded. Included are popular elections to national legislatures (722), popular elections of national chief executives (724), and national referenda (725). Also coded were by-elections (723), but these were not aggregated into the total for elections in the annual series file. In order to make the new aggregations comparable with the earlier series of elections for the first 20 years (721), we aggregated together elections for national legislatures, chief executives, and referenda discounting, however, more than any one of these on a single day.

No exclusions were made on the basis of suffrage limitations, competitiveness, legality, or political significance. Excluded were elections held within the national assembly or party congresses, popular elections to bodies such as trade union councils or political party leadership, and elections below the national level.

Although the coding was much more straightforward than was the case with events of protest and coercion, there were a number of ad hoc decision rules which were invoked as coding progressed. In the case of Algeria, for example, the election of the president on December 12, 1976, was coded as an election even though there was only one candidate. Alternatively, we could have considered this a referendum on Boumedienne's leadership. On the other hand, the selection of General Geisel on January 15, 1974, by the Brazilian state legislature was not coded as the election of a national chief executive because it was not a popular election. The event was coded as a renewal of executive tenure. Finally, although Puerto Rico's status is ambiguous, the election of the Governor on November 7, 1968, and every four years

subsequently, was coded as an election and, as appropriate, as a regular power transfer or a renewal of executive tenure.

The IMPOSITION OF CENSORSHIP (726) includes actions by the government to limit, to curb, or to intimidate the mass media, including newspapers, magazines, books, radio, and television. Typical examples of such action are the closing of newspapers or journals, the censoring of articles in the domestic press, and the controlling of dispatches sent out of the country.

The RELAXATION OF CENSORSHIP (729) involves the modification or elimination of controls on the mass media. These event types are reported in the daily events file, but they are combined with reports of the imposition and relaxation of other restrictions in the annual events file.

Coded separately from other political restrictions, but combined with the above events in the annual file are: Arrests (731), imposition of martial law or curfew (733), release of arrested (732) and relaxation of martial law and curfew (734).

The IMPOSITION OF OTHER POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS (727) includes actions taken by the government to neutralize, to suppress, or to eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime, or the state itself. Although this category encompasses a diversity of governmental activities, all of them share the characteristic of constituting specific responses to a perceived security problem at the national level even though sanctions are sometimes carried out by subnational governmental units. An attempt has been made to exclude sanctions against criminal behavior that has no political relevance. This does not mean that organized crime or crime in the streets are unimportant or that they do not indicate a degree of social dissatisfaction. Rather, we have tried to maintain a focus on behavior that is directly political, i.e., behavior concerned with the distribution and use of political power in the polity. The relaxation of political restrictions (730) involves the modification or elimination of these restrictions.

A POLITICAL EXECUTION (728), the outright elimination of a political dissident, is a more severe form of governmental sanction. This event type consists of the execution of persons in the control of the authorities and under orders of the national authorities. Excluded are assassinations, even if known to have been arranged by the authorities, and persons killed in riots, armed attacks, strikes, etc. Also excluded are executions for criminal offenses such as murder that are not reported to have political significance.

Typically, a political execution is one in which the person executed is charged with activities threatening the state, the regime, the government, or its leaders. Executions for political crimes committed before 1948 are excluded. Reports of death sentences handed down are not included unless there is evidence that the sentence was carried out.

DEATHS FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE (713) was coded as an event type for the 1948-1967 period and the 1978-1982 period, but was treated as an attribute of other events for the 1968-1977 period. Hence, there are no event type 713's during 1968-1977 in the daily events file; death events file; death reports appear instead as V29. Deaths from domestic political violence occur largely in conjunction with armed attacks and riots. Foreign deaths, except in Lebanon and South Vietnam, are excluded. Also excluded are political executions, deaths in enemy prisons, deaths in international war and border clashes, assassination victims, and homicide victims.

Sources, particularly the NEW YORK TIMES INDEX, make both daily reports and periodic cumulative summaries of deaths during periods of prolonged civil violence. Moreover, these reports contain inconsistencies between time periods covered and total magnitudes reported. Annual aggregates of deaths taken directly from the daily events file tend to understate total deaths in countries with extensive violence. For this reason, additional research was conducted into the sources used for the daily events file but with concentration upon summary reports of deaths. These data have been employed to adjust the annual series for a few countries. For a list of these, see note on clustering the daily events for the annual series.

#### ATTRIBUTES OF EVENTS FOR THE 1968-1977 PERIOD

Several attributes for events of mass political activity were coded whenever possible. Because of the nature of the sources and because we did not have unlimited funding, we could not be as thorough in the collection of these data as we would have liked. Missing data among the attribute variables are greater than ideal.

For events of mass political activity (types 700-712), attribute data were collected for target or purpose, issue, number of participants, number of injuries, extent of damage, duration of event, location of event, extent of event, number of deaths, and actor group identities. See the daily events format.

For events of imposition and relaxation of sanctions (726-730), only actor group identity was coded. Within the context of sanctions, of course, actor group might more accurately be thought of as target (from the government's point of view).

All other attributes for sanctions and all attributes for government change and elections (714-725) will appear as missing data. The attributes are irrelevant for these types.

#### DATES OF EVENTS

The actual date of event was coded whenever possible. Otherwise, the date of report was used. When no exact date was available, the first day of the month was assigned if the event appeared to happen early in the month or the 15th was assigned if it appeared to happen later. If an event lasted longer than one day and its basic features remained unchanged, the date of the first day was coded and the duration was specified as V26.

## DAILY EVENTS FORMAT

Variable No.	Variable Name	Position	Width	MD1
V1	ZA Study Number 1131	1-4	4	-
V2	Study Section 1	5-5	1	-
V3	Country Code	6-8	3	-
V4	Event Type	9-11	3	-
	700 Protest Demonstration			
	701 Regime Support Demonstration			
	702 Demonstration Met by Police Violence			
	703 Demonstration Into Riot			
	704 Riot			
	705 Armed Attack			
	706 Attack by Insurgents			
	707 Attack by the State			
	708 Unsuccessful Assassination			
	709 Assassination			
	710 Political Strike			
	711 Student Strike			
	712 Other Form of Protest			
	713 Deaths from Domestic Violence			
	714 Renewal of Executive Tenure			
	715 Executive Adjustment			
	716 Renewal and Adjustment			
	717 Unsuccessful Regular Executive Transfer			
	718 Regular Executive Transfer			
	719 Unsuccessful Irregular Executive Transfer			
	720 Irregular Executive Transfer			
	721 Election			
	722 Election to National Legislature			
	723 By-Election			
	724 Election of Chief Executive			
	725 Referendum			
	726 Imposition of Censorship			
	727 Imposition of Political Restrictions			
	728 Political Executions			
	729 Relaxation of Censorship			
	730 Relaxation of Political Restrictions			
	731 Arrest (added 1978)			
	732 Release of Arrested (added 1978)			
	733 Imposition of Martial Law or Curfew (added 1978)			
	734 Relaxation of Martial Law or Curfew (added 1978)			
	740 Bombings (incl. defused bombs, bomb threats)			
	741 Ambushes			
	742 Raids			
V5	Sequential Date	12-15	4	-
V6	Year	16-17	2	-

V7	Month	18-19	2	-
V8	Day	20-21	2	-
V9	Number of Events	22-28	7	-
V10	Magnitude	29-29	1	-
	Sources:			
V11	L'Annee Politique	30-30	1	-
V12	Africa Diary	31-31	1	-
V13	Facts on File	32-32	1	-
V14	Middle East Journal	33-33	1	-
V15	Asian Recorder	34-34	1	-
V16	Associated Press	35-35	1	-
V17	New York Times	36-36	1	-
V18	Archiv der Gegenwart	37-37	1	-
V19	Keesings	38-38	1	-
V20	Current Digest	39-39	1	-
V21	Target	40-40	1	0
	0 Missing Data			
	1 Support of the State and Its Policies			
	2 Protest Against Another Group			
	3 Protest Against the State and Its Policies			
	4 Overthrow of the Government			
	5 Control of Insurgents			
	6 Other			
	7 Protest Against a Foreign Power (added 1978)			
V22	Issue	41-41	1	0
	0 Missing Data			
	1 Civil and Political Liberties			
	2 Ethnic Discrimination			
	3 Country's External Military Policy			
	4 Government Policy (other than 3)			
	5 Change of Political, Social or Economic System			
	6 Policy of a Foreign Government			
	7 Other			
	8 Land Reform and Other Economic Issues (added 1978)			
V23	Participants	42-42	1	0
	0 Missing Data			
	1 1-20			
	2 21-100			
	3 101-1000			
	4 1001-10000			
	5 10001-50000			
	6 50001-100000			
	7 100001-1000000			
	8 More than 1000000			

V24	Injuries	43-43	1	-
	0 No Injuries			
	1 1-20			
	2 21-100			
	3 101-200			
	4 201-500			
	5 More than 500			
V25	Damage	44-44	1	-
	0 No Damage			
	1 Minimal			
	2 Extensive			
V26	Duration	45-46	2	-
V27	Location	47-47	1	0
	0 Missing Data			
	1 Inside Capital City			
	2 Outside Capital City			
	3 Both 1 and 2 above			
	4 Towns (added 1978)			
	5 Rural Areas or Villages (added 1978)			
V28	Extent	48-48	1	0
	0 Missing Data			
	1 Localized (1948-1977)			
	2 Widespread (3 or more locations) (1948-1977)			
	2 Two Locations (added 1978)			
	3 Three Locations (added 1978)			
	4 Widespread			
V29	Deaths	49-54	6	0
	Actor Groups			
V30	Government	55-55	1	0
V31	Political Party	56-56	1	0
V32	Political Group	57-57	1	0
V33	Military	58-58	1	0
V34	Clergy	59-59	1	0
V35	Intellectuals	60-60	1	0
V36	Workers	61-61	1	0
V37	Students	62-62	1	0
V38	Minorities	63-63	1	0
V39	Revolutionaries	64-64	1	0
V40	General Population	65-65	1	0

NOTE: Variable 5 and 10 apply to data for 1948 to 1967 only. Variable 21 through 40 apply to data for 1968 to 1982 only; these fields should be ignored for earlier dates.

## ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY EVENTS FORMAT

Variable No.	Variable Name	Position	Width
V1	ZA Study Number 1132	1-4	4
V2	Country Number	5-7	3
V3	Year	8-11	4
V4	0 = ID for Annual Data 1 = ID for First Quarter Data 2 = ID for Second Quarter Data 3 = ID for Third Quarter Data 4 = ID for Fourth Quarter Data	12-12	1
V800	Protest Demonstration	13-18	6
V801	Regime-Support Demonstration	19-24	6
V802	Riot	25-30	6
V803	Armed Attack	31-36	6
V804	Assassination (Successful)	37-42	6
V805	Political Strikes	43-48	6
V806	Executive Renewal	49-54	6
V807	Executive Adjustment	55-60	6
V808	Unsuccessful Regular Executive Transfer	61-66	6
V809	Regular Executive Transfer	67-72	6
V810	Unsuccessful Irregular Executive Transfer	73-78	6
V811	Irregular Executive Transfer	79-84	6
V812	Election	85-90	6
V813	Imposition of Political Sanction	91-96	6
V814	Political Execution	97-102	6
V815	Relaxation of Sanction	103-108	6
V816	Deaths from Domestic Violence	109-114	6

## CLUSTERING DAILY EVENTS FOR ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES

V800 = 700, 712  
V801 = 701  
V802 = 702, 703, 704  
V803 = 705, 706, 707, 740, 741, 742  
V804 = 709  
V805 = 710, 711  
V806 = 714, 716  
V807 = 715  
V808 = 717  
V809 = 718  
V810 = 719  
V811 = 720  
V812 = 721, 722, 724, 725  
V813 = 726, 727, 731, 733  
V814 = 728  
V815 = 729, 730, 732, 734  
V816 = 713

Variable 812 is modified to avoid double counting of chief executive and national legislature on same day.

Note, the deaths scores for the period 1968-77 were aggregated from daily event attributes rather than coded as separate events themselves. See the discussion of this variable on page 19 of this codebook.

Annual scores of deaths from domestic group violence were estimated for the following countries for the 1968-77 period: Argentina, Bangladesh, Burundi, Chile, Cyprus, Laos, Lebanon, Kampuchea, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Vietnam, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Frequently, the sources give annual or other long term estimates of deaths that are not included in daily reports.

## LIST OF COUNTRIES BY SOURCE, 1968-1977

Primary Source: New York Times Index

Secondary Sources:

Source 1 = Asian Recorder

2 = Africa Diary

3 = Keesings Contemporary Archives

4 = Middle East Journal

5 = Current Digest of the Soviet Press

6 = Archiv der Gegenwart

<u>Country</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date</u>
Afghanistan	S4			
Albania	S5			
Algeria	S4			
Angola	S2			
Argentina	S3			
Australia	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Austria	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Bahamas	S3			
Bangladesh	S1	1971-82		
Barbados	S3			
Belgium	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Benin	S2			
Bhutan	S3			
Bolivia	S3			
Botswana	S2			
Brazil	S3			
Bulgaria	S5			
Burma	S1			
Burundi	S2			
Cameroon	S2			
Canada	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Cape Verde	S3			
Central African Republic	S2			
Chad	S2			
Chile	S3			
China	S1			
Colombia	S3			
Comores	S3			
Congo	S2			
Costa Rica	S3			
Cuba	S3			
Cyprus	S4			
Czechoslovakia	S5			
Denmark	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Dominican Republic	S3			
Ecuador	S3			
Egypt	S4			
El Salvador	S3			
Equatorial Guinea	S3			
Ethiopia	S2			
Fiji	S3			
Finland	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
France	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Gabon	S2			
Gambia	S2			
Germany, East	S5			

Germany, West	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Ghana	S2			
Greece	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Grenada	S3			
Guatemala	S3			
Guinea	S2			
Guinea-Bissau	S3			
Guyana	S3			
Haiti	S3			
Honduras	S3			
Hong Kong	S1			
Hungary	S5			
Iceland	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
India	S1			
Indonesia	S1			
Iran	S4			
Iraq	S4			
Ireland	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Israel	S4			
Italy	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Ivory Coast	S2			
Jamaica	S3			
Japan	S1			
Jordan	S4			
Kampuchea	S1			
Kenya	S2			
Korea, North	S1			
Korea, South	S1			
Kuwait	S4			
Laos	S1			
Lebanon	S4			
Lesotho	S2			
Liberia	S2			
Libya	S4			
Luxembourg	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Madagascar	S2			
Malawi	S2			
Malaysia	S1			
Maldives	S1			
Mali	S2			
Malta	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Mauritania	S2			
Mauritius	S1			
Mexico	S3			
Mongolia	S1			
Morocco	S4			
Mozambique	S2			
Nepal	S1			
Netherlands	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
New Zealand	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Nicaragua	S3			
Niger	S2			
Nigeria	S2			
Norway	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Oman	S3			
Pakistan	S4			
Panama	S3			
Papua New Guinea	S1			
Paraguay	S3			

Peru	S3			
Philippines	S1			
Poland	S5			
Portugal	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Puerto Rico	S3			
Qatar	S3			
Romania	S5			
Rwanda	S2			
Sao Tome and Principe	S3			
Saudi Arabia	S4			
Senegal	S2			
Seychelles	S3			
Sierra Leone	S2			
Singapore	S1			
Somalia	S2			
South Africa	S2			
Soviet Union	S5			
Spain	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Sri Lanka	S1			
Sudan	S4			
Suriname	S3			
Swaziland	S3			
Sweden	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Switzerland	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
Syria	S4			
Taiwan	S1			
Tanzania	S2			
Thailand	S1			
Togo	S2			
Trinidad and Tobago	S3			
Tunisia	S4			
Turkey	S4			
Turkish Cyprus	S4			
Uganda	S2			
United Arab Emirates	S3			
United Kingdom	S6	1968-71	S3	1972-82
United States	(no secondary source used)			
Upper Volta	S2			
Uruguay	S3			
Venezuela	S3			
Vietnam	S1			
Vietnam, North	S1			
Vietnam, South	(no secondary source used)			
Western Samoa	S3			
Yemen (Aden)	S4			
Yemen (Sana'a)	S4			
Yugoslavia	S5			
Zaire	S2			
Zambia	S2			
Zimbabwe	S2			

Note: Unless otherwise indicated, the same secondary source was used for the entire 1968-82 period. Readers are asked to refer to Appendix 1, Table A.4 of the WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS, Second Edition, for the 1948-1967 source distribution.